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Urban transportation planning in the United States underwent important changes 
in the decades after World War II.  In the immediate postwar period, federal highway 
engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads dominated the decision-making process, creating 
a planning regime that focused almost entirely on the building of modern expressways to 
relieve traffic congestion.  In the 1960s, however, local opposition to expressway 
construction emerged in cities across the nation, reflecting growing discontent wi h what 
many citizens perceived to be a closed planning process that resulted in the destruction of 
urban neighborhoods, environmental degradation, and inadequate attention paid to 
alternative modes of transportation.  Local freeway protestors found allies in the new 
U.S. Department of Transportation, which moved in the mid-1960s to absorb the Bureau 
of Public Roads and support legislation promoting a planning process more open to local 
input as well as a greater emphasis on federal aid for urban mass transportation.   
The changing culture of transportation planning produced a series of freeway 
revolts, resulting in the cancellation or modification of interstate highway projects, in 
major American cities.  Changes in transportation planning played out differently in 
every city, however.  This dissertation examines controversies over Philadelphia’s major 
 
 
expressway projects – the Schuylkill Expressway, the Delaware Expressway, and the 
never-built Crosstown Expressway, in addition to major mass transit developments such 
as the city’s subsidization of the commuter railroads, the creation of the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, and the building of a railroad tunnel known as 
the Center City Commuter Connection, in order to trace the evolution of the city’s 
transportation politics between 1946 and 1984.   
Significantly, Philadelphia’s own freeway revolt succeeded in eliminating the 
proposed Crosstown Expressway, which would have created a daunting racial barrier 
while decimating several low-income African American neighborhoods.  The Crosstown 
Expressway revolt, however, failed to change the overall trajectory of Philadelphia’s 
transportation planning politics, which continued to be dominated by an exceptionally 
strong alliance between City Hall and large business interests.  Philadelphi ’s turn to 
mass transit in the 1970s, in contrast to those of other cities, failed to redistribute 
transportation resources to its low-income residents, mainly because the city chose to 
devote a massive percentage of its federal funding to the Center City Commuter 
Connection, a downtown rail tunnel designed to serve approximately 8% of the region’s 
commuters.  The prioritization of a rail system serving predominantly affluent white 
suburbanites left Philadelphia’s lower-income population saddled with a crumbling urban 
mass transit system, demonstrating that, despite a more open planning process and a 
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While conducting research for my dissertation on the history of transportation 
planning in post-World War II Philadelphia, I made extensive use of the city’s 
transportation systems.  To reach the outstanding Urban Archives at Temple University, 
for instance, I took either the Broad Street Subway or the Regional Rail system, both run 
by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA).   
Although both the subway and the commuter railroad were operated by the same 
transit authority, the contrast between the two could not have been more striking.  The 
Walnut-Locust subway stop, in the heart of Center City, was dilapidated, crumbling, and 
dirty, its dank stairwells reeking of urine.  The subway came infrequently even at rush 
hour and, seemingly, at random times.  The track area and subway cars were often littered 
with trash. 
The commuter railroad system’s Suburban Station, although only a few blocks 
away, may as well have been in a different country.  The concourse was clean, brightly
lit, and filled with bustling shops.  A bank of video screens, one for each railroad line, 
listed the upcoming trains with time, track, and destination displayed clearly.  
Loudspeakers announced the same information in a precise, robotic voice, audible 
throughout the station.  The track area was freshly painted and free of debris.  The clean 
and comfortable trains arrived with surprising promptness, typically on time, but at most 
a minute or two behind schedule.  A glance at the SEPTA system map revealed that the
commuter railroad lines extended outward from downtown in every conceivable 
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direction, terminating at fourteen different points, while subway service was confined 
primarily to two lines, one running east-west and the other north-south, crisscrossing at 
City Hall. 
Riding the commuter train after having experienced the subway, I could not help 
but wonder why two forms of rail transit, run by the same authority in the same city, had 
evolved so differently.  The inquiry seemed especially important in light of the 
contentions of many historians that American transportation planning became more 
democratic in the second half of the twentieth century.  If that was true, then why did 
Philadelphia’s mass transit seem so decidedly undemocratic?  For although SEPTA does 
not compile information on the demographics of its ridership, my observations suggested 
that the less well-heeled, many of whom were African American, were rel gat d to a 
second-class transit system while briefcase-laden professionals, mostly white, were the 
beneficiaries of relative luxury during their commutes.1 
                                                     
1 Neither the Philadelphia Transportation Company nor the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (the two entities responsible for running the city’s mass transit system since World War II) ever 
compiled demographic information about urban mass transit riders in Philadelphia.  Nevertheless, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that throughout the postwar period, Philadelphia’s subway, bus, and trolley 
patrons were largely poor and working-class, and many of them were African Americans.  See, e.g., 
Greater Philadelphia Movement, Minutes of Board of Directors meeting, 18 June 1958, Papers of the 
Greater Philadelphia Movement, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA 
(containing remarks of Philadelphia Transportation Company president Douglas Pratt that PTC riders 
“come, for the most part, from the community’s lower income groups”); Thomas Reiner to Cushing 
Dolbeare, 14 March 1968, Papers of the Housing Associati n of the Delaware Valley, Temple University 
Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA (asserting hat “the poor stand less to gain from a 
transportation system that is road-oriented compared with one that is based on mass transit”); Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, “Report to the Public,” 1974, SEPTA Collection, Hagley Museum 
and Library, Wilmington, DE (pointing out that in the postwar period, urban transit riders “went from 
masses to minorities . . . those few who could not aff rd a car, or were too old, young, or infirm to drive 
one”); Philadelphia Daily News, 30 March 1977, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City 
Archives, RG 60-2.6, Administration of Frank L. Rizzo (noting the need of poor and handicapped citizens 
for improved urban transit service); David Williamson to Warren Corbin, 14 July 1980, City of 
Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.7, Administration of William J. Greene, III 
(recommending the hiring of an African American advertising firm to improve SEPTA’s image with its 
urban ridership); Frederic Tulsky, “SEPTA Gropes for Ways to Keep Commuters on the Rails,” 
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In his study of Washington, D.C.’s Metro system, historian Zachary Schrag 
remarked, “The particular system chosen by a community will express that community’s 
political values.”2  This is true in a way, but the statement taken in isolation fails to 
illuminate a more complex reality.  Communities, of course, possess multiple sets of 
political values, which often come into conflict.  The unwieldy process of democracy 
determines which values will win out at any given moment in time, and which will lose.  
This dissertation examines the history of Philadelphia’s post-World War II tr nsportation 
systems in order to determine whose values won out, why they won, and how (if at all) 
the identities of the winners and losers changed over time.  Looking carefully at battles 
over transportation projects is one of the best ways I can think of to gain greater insight 
into a city’s politics and the way its democracy functioned in a given era. 
In an effort to examine whether Philadelphia’s transportation politics became 
more democratic in the 1960s, as the current literature would lead us to expect, I have 
explored some of the most important decisions government officials made – as well
the influence different groups had on those decisions.  I have based this dissertation on 
specific case studies rather than attempting to document every detail of the city’s 
transportation history.  A great deal of my analysis centers on the various controversies 
that surrounded Philadelphia’s three major expressway projects planned between the 
1940s and the 1970s – the Schuylkill Expressway (later Interstate 76), the Delaware 
Expressway (later Interstate 95), and the never-built Crosstown Expressway.  I have also 
examined major developments with respect to mass transportation, including the city’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 November 1981, p. H1 (noting the objections of urban transit riders to subsidizing 
“presumably more affluent” commuter railroad patrons).   
2 Zachary M. Schrag, The Great Society Subway:  A History of the Washington Metro (Baltimore:  The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1. 
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early subsidization of the commuter railroads, the creation of SEPTA and its even ual 
takeover of the urban mass transit and commuter railroad systems, and the city’s fforts, 
eventually successful, to build a downtown railroad tunnel known as the Center City 
Commuter Connection.       
Overall, Philadelphia’s transportation planning became significantly more
democratic between the 1940s and the 1980s, mirroring a national trend.  In other words, 
the decision-making process evolved from one dominated by a small group of technical 
experts to one that allowed for input by a wider and more diverse set of interests, 
including various local constituencies that stood to be affected directly by planning 
decisions.  The democratization of Philadelphia’s transportation planning was evidencd 
by the increasing extent to which local officials pushed the state and federal governments 
to prioritize certain projects and modify or even cancel others – as well as those 
governments’ increasing receptivity to such pressure – in response to the exhortations of 
local interest groups that focused on projects’ social and economic, rather than merely 
technical, impacts.   
Until the mid-1960s the federal engineers who worked for the Bureau of Public 
Roads dominated every aspect of the nation’s highway planning.  Although the federal 
government could not force states to build expressways, the Bureau derived powerful 
influence from its carefully-maintained reputation for apolitical expertis  as well as its 
efforts to create stronger highway departments on the state level.  Of course, politics did 
intrude on highway planning to some extent, as every decision on infrastructure funding 
tended naturally to serve some constituents more than others.  When Congress began to 
discuss a new system of federal highways after World War II, for example, a split rose 
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over the allocation of federal funds between urban and rural areas.  The Interstate 
Highway Act of 1956 – the most significant piece of federal legislation – was, without a 
doubt, the product of political wrangling.  In the words of highway historian Bruce Seely, 
however, the law “provided something for everyone without forcing any radical shifts in 
principle.”  The BPR engineers had “resorted to politics,” he wrote, “but without 
disturbing their reputation as objective experts.”  As a result, technical factors continued 
to play a major role in shaping federal highway policy, with engineers making the most 
important decisions about route selection, the use of traffic statistics, and the like.3   
Highway planning thus remained highly technocratic well into the 1960s, when 
local politics became a major element of the decision-making process.  Generally, 
historians pick 1965 as the year when the tide began to turn and federal and state highway 
engineers lost a substantial amount of their power over road building.  Citizen discontent 
over both the destructive effects of urban highway construction and the failure of 
government on all levels to prioritize mass transportation intensified at a time when 
grassroots social movements were challenging top-down authority at every turn.  
Concurrently, the Bureau of Public Roads, which had operated with near autonomy, was 
placed into the new U.S. Department of Transportation, which began immediately to 
decentralize authority over transportation planning, curtail the ability of engin ers to 
build roads wherever they pleased, and support new federal legislation aimed at 
improving urban mass transportation.  As greater authority over transportation planning 
devolved to the local level, decision-making became less technocratic and more political, 
                                                     
3 Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway System:  Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia:  
Temple University Press, 1987), 3-4, 85, 186-87, 21-18, 222-23. 
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and therefore more democratic, now being subject to influence by a diverse array of local 
interests 4   
More democracy did not mean that all constituencies had equal input into the 
decision-making process, or even that everyone was able to participate meaningfully.  It 
did, however, entail greater governmental responsiveness to certain groups that stood to 
be affected directly by transportation planning, whether or not those groups resembled 
what historians have tended to characterize as “grassroots” coalitions.  By theearly 
1970s, believing that urban expressways had contributed to air pollution and traffic 
congestion while destabilizing cities by promoting massive decentralization or “urban 
sprawl,” most cities had begun to deemphasize expressway construction in favor of  
greater focus on mass transit improvements.5 
As historian Raymond Mohl explained, however, the precise dynamics of 
transportation politics were different in every city.6  While the decentralization and 
greater inclusiveness of transportation politics meant that local citizens’ interests gained 
more influence upon the planning process, local interests were far from monolithic.  The 
primary way in which historians have documented the concrete ramifications of the 
democratization of transportation planning (as opposed to lumping transportation issues 
into a broader study of postwar urban renewal) has been to focus on the freeway revolts 
                                                     
4 Raymond A. Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities:  The U.S. Department of Transportation and the 
Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973,” Journal of Policy History 20, no. 2 (2008):  194;  Mark H. Rose, Interstate:  
Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville:  The University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 101-12;  
Mark H. Rose and Bruce E. Seely, “Getting the Interstate System Built:  Road Engineers and the 
Implementation of Public Policy, 1955-1985,” Journal of Policy History 2, no. 1 (1990):  33-37; Zachary 
M. Schrag, “The Freeway Fight in Washington, D.C.:  The Three Sisters Bridge in Three Administrations,” 
Journal of Urban History 30, no. 5 (July 2004):  648-673; Seely, 231-32. 
5 Owen D. Gutfreund, Twentieth-Century Sprawl:  Highways and the Reshaping of the American 
Landscape (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004). 
6 Raymond A. Mohl, “Stop the Road:  Freeway Revolts in American Cities,” Journal of Urban History 30, 
no. 5 (July 2004):  676.  
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that swept the country from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s.  Historical accounts of 
expressway opposition in San Francisco, Baltimore, Miami, Boston, New Orleans, and 
Washington, D.C., to cite the examples most prominent in the literature, have revealed 
political circumstances that differed from city to city and a multiplicity of factors bearing 
on the relative success each anti-freeway movement achieved.7   
Generally speaking, the democratization of transportation politics in American 
cities opened up significant space for greater involvement by grassroots groupsin setting 
planning priorities and weighing in on specific projects.  Activists in each of te ci ies 
listed above (with the exception of Miami, in which Interstate 95 devastated the African 
American community of Overtown) achieved some degree of success in having major 
urban expressway projects cancelled or modified.  In every case but one, groups other 
than large business interests – such as neighborhood associations, anti-expressway 
coalitions, unofficial citizens’ planning organizations, historic preservationiss, and 
environmentalists – were able to assume a powerful role in transportation planning and 
exert strong influence on the city establishment.  The one exception was New Orleans, in 
which the freeway revolt’s success lay not in French Quarter preservationists’ influence 
on the local planning regime – which continued to be dominated by the Chamber of 
Commerce – but rather in their direct appeal to the federal government, which rejected a 
proposed waterfront expressway on environmental and historic preservationist grounds.8             
                                                     
7 On Washington, D.C., see Schrag, “The Freeway Fight in Washington, D.C.”  On Baltimore and Miami, 
see Mohl, “Stop the Road.”  On San Francisco, see Jos ph A. Rodriguez, City Against Suburb:  The 
Culture Wars in an American Metropolis (Westport, Conn.:  Praeger, 1999).  On Boston, see Alan Lupo, et 
al., Rites of Way:  The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. City (Boston:  Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971).  On New Orleans, see Richard O. Baumb ch, Jr. and William E. Borah, The Second 
Battle of New Orleans:  A History of the Vieux Carre Riverfront-Expressway Controversy (University, 
Ala.:  The University of Alabama Press, 1981). 
8 Baumbach and Borah, 243. 
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In the City of Brotherly Love, I have found that greater democratization entaild 
the shifting of power from a technocratic elite made up of planners and engineers not to 
neighborhood groups or environmentalists, but to another elite composed of downtown 
business interests involved primarily in the white-collar fields of retail, b nking, 
insurance, real estate, and law.  These business interests were the same ones who had 
dominated Philadelphia’s urban renewal since the end of World War II, and as a result, 
the move toward greater local control of transportation planning left them uniquely 
positioned to exert great power in that arena as well.  The business community exerted its 
influence primarily through powerful coalitions focused on Center City development, 
such as the Greater Philadelphia Movement (GPM), the Old Philadelphia Development 
Corporation (OPDC), and the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia.  While
those affected by transportation planning decisions gained greater influence over those 
decisions, Philadelphians who lacked close connections to the city’s tight alliance 
between business and government – most especially racial minorities and the poor – were 
unable to exert a significant degree of control over the aspects of transportation plnni g 
that impacted them most directly. 
The precise trajectory of Philadelphia’s mass transportation politics was not 
identical to that of its expressway politics, although the end result was the same – 
business-oriented planning that was focused on Center City.  Because the federal 
government did not become involved deeply in urban mass transportation until the mid-
1960s, when transportation politics were becoming more localized and democratic, 
control over Philadelphia’s mass transit planning remained in local hands throughout the 
post-World War II period.  City Hall’s priorities in this regard dovetailed consistently 
9 
 
with the business community’s, manifesting in a primary focus on preserving the area’s
commuter railroads to help maintain the central business district as a place of white-collar 
commerce.  The region in the 1960s took advantage of the federal government’s greater 
openness to providing aid for mass transit, mainly by creating SEPTA and seeking 
funding for the Commuter Connection, but Philadelphia’s greater emphasis on mass 
transit was not reflective of a fundamental change in transportation planning priorities.     
Although large business interests came to dominate Philadelphia’s postwar 
transportation planning, those with less political and economic power were able to score 
occasional victories, most importantly in Philadelphia’s own freeway revolt.  The 
grassroots movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with their emphasis on participatory 
democracy and the neighborhood as a locus of political action, combined with the fear of 
racial violence to disrupt the power of the business community now and then and in some 
cases produced results that benefited racial minorities and impoverished Philadelp ns 
directly.  In particular, African American activists, ministers, and liberal white 
professionals not allied with the city’s major business groups prevented the constru tion 
of the Crosstown Expressway, which would have torn through a corridor that was 90% 
African American, displacing its residents and walling it off from the central business 
district. 
The defeat of the Crosstown Expressway was the high point of the 
democratization of Philadelphia’s transportation politics, despite activists’ apparent 
failure to achieve large-scale mobilization of the low-income African Americans whom 
the highway would have displaced.  Those who lived in the Crosstown corridor opposed 
the expressway overwhelmingly and got the result they wanted with the project’s 
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cancellation.  While some leaders of the anti-expressway movement got involved because 
they felt the road would be harmful to the city as a whole, others, including but not 
limited to African American community leaders, were acting clearly in a representative 
capacity on behalf of corridor residents, stressing themes of racial justce a  their primary 
motivation for attempting to halt the highway’s construction.   
The prevention of the Crosstown Expressway in 1973 represented a significant 
defeat for the downtown business community, which saw the expressway as a necessry 
transportation project as well as an important tool of urban renewal.  It should be noted, 
however, that there were substantial obstacles to the road which, in addition to citizen 
opposition, helped to prevent its construction.  The Chamber of Commerce was 
successful in reviving the project in 1969, a year after City Hall had abandoned it, but 
was stymied by the impossibility of relocating those who resided in the proposed 
expressway’s corridor – by then a requirement under federal law – as well as an 
unfavorable consultant’s report.  The City Planning Commission’s attempt in 1972 to 
revive the expressway a second time by proposing to build replacement housing on top of 
it never got off the ground due to financial and legal barriers in conjunction with massive 
citizen protest. 
While Raymond Mohl, Zachary Schrag, and other scholars have identified 
changes within the federal bureaucracy of the 1960s and 1970s as crucial to the 
emergence of more effective citizen opposition to highway construction, the Philadelphia 
story serves as a reminder that events on the local level were often just as influential.9  
Paradoxically, the city’s redevelopment coalition, in conjunction with the massive 
                                                     
9 Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities,” 194, 199, 201-3, 206, 213; Schrag, “The Freeway Fight in 
Washington, D.C.,” 649, 651, 668-69. 
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upheaval and cultural change caused by the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, 
helped to create the conditions that allowed the Crosstown Expressway to be wiped off 
the Philadelphia map.  An earlier fight to have the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill 
lowered and topped with a landscaped cover, conducted by affluent professionals with 
close connections to the business community, helped to shift power away from the city’s 
technocracy, democratize its highway politics, and demonstrate that plans laid by
engineers were not set in stone but instead could be disrupted with enough effort.  
Although many of the same people that sought to have the Delaware Expressway lowered
and covered nevertheless favored the Crosstown Expressway, they found it difficult to 
put the genie back in the bottle. 
The Crosstown Expressway notwithstanding, the opening of the city’s 
transportation planning process to more input from local interests, as well as its shift 
away from expressway construction and toward a greater emphasis on mass 
transportation did not alter the fundamental trajectory of Philadelphia transportation 
politics.  Kirk Petshek, a professor of urban affairs and business administration as well  
Philadelphia’s Urban Development and Economic Coordinator between 1954 and 1962, 
admitted in his 1973 work, The Challenge of Urban Reform:  Policies & Programs in 
Philadelphia, that Philadelphia’s development activities during that period were 
“essentially of middle-class bias.”  Petshek stressed that it would have been unfair to 
judge what happened in the 1950s and early 1960s “in the light of the attitudes prevailing 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.”  He argued, however, that lower-income groups, 
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including racial and ethnic minorities, began to gain more influence in the late 1960s.10    
Although Petshek was writing of the city’s development as a whole, his argument did not
hold up well when it came to Philadelphia’s transportation planning.  The people and 
social groups most responsible for driving the city’s priorities changed from highway 
engineers and city planners to white-collar business interests, and the focus remained on 
revitalizing the downtown area as a destination for middle-class white suburbanites to 
work, shop, dine, and possibly even return to live.  This mindset resulted, for example, in 
the clear prioritization of the region’s commuter railroads, which served suburban whites 
of relative means, over the inner-city mass transportation system of buses, subway , and 
trolleys, patronized heavily by the poor and racial minorities.  The best evidence for th
inequitable treatment of the city’s mass transit systems was Philadelphia’s decision in the 
1970s to use federal money to build the Center City Commuter Connection, a $300 
million commuter rail tunnel, at a time when the urban mass transit system was 
crumbling. 
Historians have not done enough to document the material ramifications of the 
federal government’s greater emphasis on mass transportation in the 1960s and 1970s and 
the ways in which cities responded to the opportunities this shift created.  In Philadelphi , 
the Commuter Connection project ensured that the city’s greater emphasis on mass transit 
produced virtually no redistribution of transportation resources to its working-class and 
poor residents.  Intuitively, one might expect the opposite to have been the case, and 
indeed it was in many American cities – particularly cities like San Frcisco, Atlanta, 
and Washington, D.C., each of which built new mass transit systems in the 1960s and 
                                                     
10 Kirk R. Petshek, The Challenge of Urban Reform:  Policies & Programs in Philadelphia (Philadelphia:  
Temple University Press, 1973), xvi-xvii, 46, 266. 
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1970s.  San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system was, admittedly, 
designed to serve the city’s central business district, much as Philadelphia’s commuter 
railroads were.  Many African Americans living in the West Oakland neighborhoods 
through which the transit lines passed opposed construction of the system, believing – 
similarly to freeway protestors – that it would lead to both residential displacement and 
the suburbanization of jobs.  BART’s planners, however, felt they were providing West 
Oakland a valuable service by placing stations in what they characterized as “ghetto” 
neighborhoods and thereby enhancing residents’ mobility.  Without trivializing the 
significant concerns of those who opposed BART, it can nevertheless be acknowledged 
that planners intended to, and did, provide more extensive transit service for lower-
income people in the Bay Area.11 
The new transit systems built in Atlanta and the nation’s capital also provided a 
significant degree of service to a wide spectrum of patrons in terms of race and class.  
The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) was created in 1965 but 
could not begin operations until the passage of a referendum in 1971.  Because an earlier 
vote in 1968 had failed due to a lack of African American support, MARTA promised to 
keep fares low, to support affirmative action job and training programs, and to place a 
high priority on service to low-income African American neighborhoods.  The degree to 
which MARTA kept its promises has been the subject of intense debate, and MARTA 
has become, as historian Miriam Konrad put it, “a scapegoat for white animosity toward 
poor blacks as well as a locale in which African American resentment of white mobility 
privilege has been situated.”  What is clear, however, is that the creation of MARTA 
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increased transit service to low-income and African American communities.12  Likewise, 
on Washington D.C.’s Metro system (run by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority), as Zachary Schrag pointed out, rail riders were somewhat more affluent than 
bus passengers, but were nevertheless diverse in terms of both race and class.  In fact, as 
of 2000, white and black workers in the Washington area used Metro in proportion to the 
racial makeup of the region as a whole.13 
It may be comparing apples and oranges to some extent when drawing a 
distinction between newer systems like BART, MARTA, and WMATA on one hand, and 
older systems like SEPTA on the other.  That being said, San Francisco, Atlanta, and 
Washington, D.C. each faced uphill battles in undertaking the mammoth task of creating 
a new transit system.  Philadelphia, however, found itself in the decidedly easier position, 
in the 1960s and beyond, of being able to take advantage of federal aid for mass 
transportation to enhance an urban transit system that already existed.  In light of what 
other cities were able to accomplish in providing improved mobility to a broad spectrum 
of metropolitan residents, perhaps Philadelphia should be judged even more harshly for 
its utter failure to alter its transportation planning priorities to deliver higher quality and 
more extensive service to those who depended on mass transit the most.   
To get a clear picture of the extent to which the greater emphasis on mass 
transportation that began in the 1960s resulted in the redistribution of transportation 
benefits to low-income and minority urban dwellers, historians must conduct a fuller 
investigation of the improvements made to older transit systems during the latter decades 
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University of New York Press, 2009), 51-57. 
13 Schrag, The Great Society Subway, 245. 
15 
 
of the twentieth century.  New York began an expansion program in 1968 that was to 
include a Second Avenue subway line connecting Manhattan with the Bronx as well as 
other lines between Manhattan and Queens.  The city’s severe financial problems in the 
mid-1970s resulted in much of the project, including the Second Avenue subway, being 
scrapped, but New York did engage in a major overhaul of the system in the 1980s.  
Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, Boston undertook a modernization program 
using federal money and took over the area’s commuter railroad lines.  Chicago likewise 
began a modernization program of its own in the early 1970s.14  None of these programs, 
however, has been examined to determine the extent to which it redistributed 
transportation resources downward along the socioeconomic scale.   
It is perhaps unsurprising that historians have not engaged in deep analyses of the 
maintenance and improvement of postwar mass transit systems.  Scholar David Edgerton 
has pointed out that most histories of technology have focused on invention and 
innovation (meaning the creation and use of new ideas, respectively), but have neglected 
the issue of maintenance.  Edgerton has promoted a new history of “technology-in-use,” 
as a counterweight to innovation-centric accounts, which will explore questions of “the 
place of technology within wider historical processes.”15  By focusing much of my 
attention on what Philadelphia did (and didn’t do) to maintain its existing transportation 
systems, I hope to begin a trend that will broaden the scope of urban transportation 
history in the United States.          
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Although Philadelphia’s development in the postwar period was for the most part 
typical of large American cities, a closer look at the evolution of its transportation 
systems reveals unique dimensions in the city’s history.  Perhaps most interesti gly, class 
coexisted with race as a major determinant of the distribution of the benefits and costs of 
highway construction further into the postwar period than most historical accounts 
acknowledge.  Historical literature on urban renewal and highways in the postwar United 
States has focused heavily on the displacement of, and failure to provide adequate 
replacement housing for, African Americans.  As Raymond Mohl put it, the issues of 
“black housing and black neighborhoods” “assumed a dominant role in most big-city 
freeway controversies.”16  The impact of redevelopment on race relations was also a 
central theme in studies of postwar cities like Chicago, Oakland, Detroit, and others, such 
as Arnold Hirsch’s Making the Second Ghetto, Robert Self’s American Babylon, Alison 
Isenberg’s Downtown America, and Thomas Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis.17 
Federal urban renewal policy in the late 1940s and 1950s, while racially neutral 
on its face, was tremendously damaging to urban African American communities.  The 
seminal piece of federal legislation, the Housing Act of 1949, had as one of its major 
purposes the provision of federal funds to clear areas urban officials had deemed “slums” 
or “blighted” and to construct low-income housing in place of deteriorating structures.  
The Act’s primary political appeal lay in its promise of housing for white urban workers.  
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African Americans, who because of segregation often owned homes in neighborhoods 
with old and deteriorating housing stock, were made vulnerable by renewal programs 
giving municipal governments both the power and the funds to raze such areas.  In 1954, 
the situation for African Americans worsened when a conservative Congress passed a 
new Housing Act that had downtown redevelopment, rather than low-income housing, as 
its central focus.  Under the new legislation, cities were able to acquire and clear 
“blighted” sections more easily and turn them over to private developers who were 
encouraged to build not houses, but more profitable industrial, commercial, and 
institutional structures such as hospitals, universities, office buildings, and retil centers.  
As Robert Self put it in his study of postwar Oakland, “Renewal became a federal-local 
partnership in which the national state financed nearly anything local cities and 
developers wanted, a scenario in which downtown American business emerged to set the 
redevelopment agenda.”18   
The result of the shift in federal renewal policy, as Arnold Hirsch pointed out, was 
a change from “slum clearance and redevelopment” to “urban renewal” aimed at 
rebuilding central cities rather than diminishing inequalities.19  The shift impacted 
African Americans most heavily; as Self noted , “local residents knew the difference 
between low-interest loans and bulldozers:  the former meant restoration and community 
improvement, the latter symbolized what became widely known nationwide as ‘Negro 
Removal.’”20  The construction of highways through cities went hand-in-hand with urban 
renewal and usually had a disproportionate and decidedly negative effect on African 
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Americans.  As Self wrote, such highways were powerful tools of spatial organizatio , 
acting not only as physical barriers, but as signals that guided capital investment  toward 
certain areas and away from others.21  Similarly, Alison Isenberg asserted in her study of 
postwar renewal of central business districts that highway construction was one of the 
methods cities used to exclude non-white shoppers from downtown and lure white 
consumers back from suburban shopping malls.22   
Scholars writing about Philadelphia’s postwar history have likewise emphasized 
the disproportionate effects of urban renewal on African Americans.  In particul , John 
Bauman, Matthew Countryman, and James Wolfinger all argued that the growth-oriented 
consensus that dominated the city’s renewal was concerned primarily with the 
revitalization of Philadelphia’s downtown core as a place of white-collar business, 
resulting in the failure of public housing reform, the intensification of residential 
segregation with a large portion of the city’s African American population being forced 
into a large, racially homogeneous area  in North Central Philadelphia, and a lack of 
decent housing for non-whites.23 
Clearly, Philadelphia’s urban redevelopment program as a whole had a 
disproportionate effect on the city’s African American population, but nearly all of those 
displaced by its highway construction were white, with the one project that would have 
uprooted a large number of African Americans never being built.  The city’s first major 
highway, the Schuylkill Expressway, included the Roosevelt Boulevard extension, which 
                                                     
21 Self, 18. 
22 Isenberg, 207. 
23 John F. Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal:  Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974 
(Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1987), 103-5, 116-18; Matthew J. Countryman, Up South:  Civil 
Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 50-53, 
69-71; James Wolfinger, Philadelphia Divided:  Race & Politics in the City of Brotherly Love (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 200-1. 
19 
 
cut through the white, working-class Nicetown neighborhood in North Philadelphia.  The 
Delaware Expressway ran the length of the city’s waterfront, having a significant impact 
on several mostly white neighborhoods in Northeast Philadelphia, Center City, and South 
Philadelphia.24  More affluent whites, who enjoyed closer relationships with the city’s 
business-government coalition, had the most success in mitigating the effects of highway 
construction upon their communities.  White professionals in the newly-gentrified 
Society Hill neighborhood, for example, conducted in the 1960s a successful campaign to 
have their portion of the Delaware Expressway lowered and topped with a landscaped 
cover.  In the 1970s, residents of Queen Village, by then an up-and-coming area itself, 
prevented the construction of entrance and exit ramps that would have dumped 
expressway traffic onto the neighborhood’s narrow streets.  In both cases, less affluent 
white neighborhoods made similar efforts and failed.   
Bolstering the conclusion that race was not the most important factor in 
determining who bore the costs of the city’s highway construction was the story of he 
Crosstown Expressway, which, as mentioned above, would have displaced thousands of 
African Americans had it not been defeated by community opposition.  Opposition to the 
Crosstown Expressway crossed both geographic and racial lines.  While the protestors 
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who fought the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill, like those in many other ci ies, 
were defending their own neighborhood, anti-Crosstown Expressway groups included 
African American and white activists who engaged in a citywide campaign to prevent the 
construction of the Crosstown, believing it to be an unwise transportation project, an 
unacceptable barrier between the city’s white and black communities, and a potential 
cause of racial violence.   
It is true that Philadelphia was not the only major American city in which whites 
were displaced, yet the particular dimensions of its highway construction remain unique.  
Boston’s Central Artery (Interstate 93), for example, displaced working-class white 
residents downtown and in the heavily Italian North End.  That highway, however, was 
constructed in the 1950s, prior to the democratization of transportation politics and the 
emergence of Boston’s powerful anti-expressway movement, crossing both racial and 
class lines, which achieved the cancellation of two other major highway projects by 
1972.25  Philadelphia, on the other hand, built the Delaware Expressway during the 1960s 
and 1970s, uprooting large numbers of white people at a time when anti-highway 
sentiment was more widespread and influential, and most urban highways were being 
built through African American neighborhoods.26   
Perhaps ironically, it appears that Philadelphia’s intense residential segregation, 
which was firmly in place by the end of the 1950s, was partly responsible for the fact that 
its highway construction impacted whites disproportionately.27  The city’s largest African 
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American section was North Central Philadelphia, far from the central business d strict 
and an unlikely candidate for an expressway given City Hall’s desire for roads that would 
alleviate downtown traffic congestion and help to revitalize the urban core.  On the other 
hand, planners and engineers had since the 1940s perceived the Delaware River 
waterfront, populated mainly by working-class whites, to be a natural place for an
expressway, mainly because of its industrial character.  Those responsible for 
transportation planning in the immediate postwar period saw a future Delaware 
Expressway as not only easing downtown traffic woes, but providing better access to 
Philadelphia’s piers, warehouses, and manufacturing facilities, thereby increasing 
production and improving the city’s economy.  Although Philadelphia began in the 1950s 
to lose its manufacturing base, it had enough left by the time the federal government 
stepped in with 90% financing for the road pursuant to the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956 that the business community never wavered from its support for the expressway.  
Some of the residential areas in the highway’s path were in steep decline when plans for 
the Delaware Expressway were formulated, and this undoubtedly contributed to planners’ 
feeling that some displacement was an acceptable price to pay in achieving th  hi hway’s 
stated goals, particularly when placing the highway too close to the waterfron  to take 
fewer homes would have inhibited the port operations the road was supposed to enhance.         
The case studies this dissertation explores, including various controversies over 
the Schuylkill and Delaware Expressways, the defeat of the Crosstown Expressway, and 
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the battle over the Center City Commuter Connection, help to shed more light on the 
particular dynamics of politics and democracy in post-World War II Philadelphia.  They 
demonstrate that as transportation planning became less technocratic and more 
democratic in the postwar period, the strong business-government coalition that 
controlled the city’s redevelopment emerged as the dominant force shaping 
Philadelphia’s modern transportation systems.  While a strong business-government 
relationship in the context of urban renewal was a common feature of postwar cities and 
hardly unique to Philadelphia, the coalition that dominated in the City of Brotherly Love 
maintained a tighter grip on transportation planning than seemed to be the case in many
other cities.  The result was a transportation planning regime that focused heavily on 
revitalizing the central business district to the benefit of middle-class and affluent whites 
and often to the detriment of working-class and poor Philadelphians.  While African 
Americans bore a disproportionate share of the costs of redevelopment in many cases, the 
city’s highway construction burdened primarily white residents of lower socioecon mic 
status.  Despite a shift in power from one type of elite to another, those who controlled 
Philadelphia’s transportation planning could not impose their will completely, instead 
finding themselves bounded occasionally by the emerging social movements of the 1960s 




Chapter 1  




The end of World War II began the golden age of highway construction in the 
United States.  Americans already had a love affair with the automobile dating b ck to 
the 1920s – an affair that the war interrupted by necessitating a ban on civilian auto 
production and the rationing of gasoline.  The return of peace opened the floodgates of 
pent-up consumer demand for cars and new roads on which to drive them.  Older cities 
found their narrow streets choked with traffic and looked to the modern expressway as 
the solution. 
The federal government was only too happy to oblige.  The Bureau of Public 
Roads (or BPR, also known at some points in its history as the Public Roads 
Administration) had been providing the states with financial assistance for highways 
since 1916 and was largely responsible for the creation of modern state highway 
departments.  The BPR’s highway engineers used their carefully cultivated reputation for 
apolitical expertise to dominate the process of highway planning in the United Stats
until the mid-1960s.1  An engineer-dominated planning regime, focused on the efficient 
movement of automobile traffic and the relief of traffic congestion to the exclusion of 
environmental, aesthetic, or social factors, was the result.  At the same time, the f deral 
government’s racially biased subsidization of the mortgage market contributed to the 
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mass exodus of middle-class whites out of the nation’s cities and into the suburbs.2  The 
suburbs’ rapid growth was accelerated by federal-aid highway construction and at the 
same time served to justify more and more of it.  The circular relationship between 
suburbanization and highway construction became even more intense after Dwight 
Eisenhower signed the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, which provided for 90% federal 
funding for interstate highways and laid the groundwork for the massive expressway 
system that came to crisscross the United States with concrete.    
Philadelphia joined the rest of the nation in the expressway craze, beginning 
planning for its first major highway, the Schuylkill Expressway, in the late 1940s and 
finishing the road in 1959.  The city also began in the 1950s to plan for its second major 
highway, the Delaware Expressway, although construction of that project did not begin 
until the 1960s.  While federal highway engineers had strong influence over expressway 
planning in the postwar period, they did not push roads on Philadelphia that it did not 
want.  On the contrary, there existed a consensus among officials at the federal, state, and 
local levels that limited-access expressways were the solution to the city’s transportation 
problems.   
Philadelphia’s main complaint regarding expressways in the postwar period was a 
consistent belief that Pennsylvania allocated too much money to the construction of rural
roads and shortchanged urban areas.  The availability of state funds for road construction 
had long been a sore point for Philadelphia, as was illustrated by a 1954 report, issued 
jointly by the Philadelphia City Planning Commission and the Department of Streets, 
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indicating that over the past 30 years Philadelphia motorists had paid $388 million in 
gasoline taxes toward the state motor fund while the city had received back only $83 
million for highway projects over the same period.  Philadelphians had paid $305 million, 
the report concluded, toward “getting the farmers out of the mud” while the city beame 
“more and more deeply mired in traffic congestion.”3  The fact that Philadelphia 
perceived itself as in competition with other parts of the state for highway funds created a 
sense of urgency when making expressway plans for fear that if local projects were 
delayed, the state simply would allocate the money elsewhere.  Such fears int nsified 
after 1956, of course, when Philadelphia began competing for the state’s share of a much 
larger pool of federal highway money.  Anxieties over losing state and federal funds 
created incentives for planners and politicians to quell dissent and rush to decisions. 
The process of planning and building federal-aid highways was federalist in 
nature, as the federal government delegated a great deal of authority to the states.4  States 
were required to maintain highway departments meeting certain standards in o er to 
receive federal funding, and these departments were responsible for allocating the state’s 
share of federal highway money to specific projects, selecting routes, acquiring property 
along the right-of-way, making engineering studies and blueprints, and hiring contract rs 
to build the roads in question.5  In Pennsylvania and other states, highway departments 
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decentralized the process further, delegating many of their responsibilitie to local 
governments.  In Philadelphia, the City Planning Commission, assisted prior to 1951 by 
the Department of Public Works and thereafter by the Department of Streets, proposed 
urban highway routes and procured engineering and design studies.6  The Planning 
Commission was purely an advisory agency without legal authority to enforce its 
decisions, submitting proposals instead to Philadelphia’s City Council for its approval.7  
In truth, however, City Council often acted as nothing more than a rubber stamp for the 
Planning Commission.  Aaron Levine, who had worked for the Planning Commission in 
the postwar years, once boasted that citizen support for planning had “permitted the City 
Council to approve the passage of every major planning proposal brought before it 
between 1943 and 1960.”8     
Once city officials came to an agreement on preliminary highway plans, as 
evidenced by City Council’s authorization, the city submitted its plans to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Highways in order to enter into a formal agreement for 
construction of the road (under which the state promised to pay a significant portion of 
the cost not covered by federal funds, and the city pledged to make a financial 
contribution as well).  In addition to reaching an agreement with the city – signed by the 
mayor of Philadelphia and the governor of Pennsylvania – the state was responsible f r 
sending the plans to the Bureau of Public Roads, the blessing of which was needed for 
the allocation of federal highway funds to the project.   
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The decentralized nature of the process did not weaken the influence of federal 
highway engineers, who were perceived to be the ultimate authorities on expressway 
construction and whose prioritization of the efficient movement of automobile traffic was 
embraced wholeheartedly by state highway officials and Philadelphia planners alik .  
Moreover, the state and federal governments (and especially the latter after 1956) 
controlled the purse strings for expressway construction, meaning that local planners 
lacked the ability to fund projects that failed to conform to the expectations of federal 
highway engineers.  As historian John Bauman put it, “the structure of federal highway 
involvement, that is the process of project review, approval, and funding, diminished the 
role of the local agency in favor of the policy making role of the [federal] and state 
highway department engineers.”9     
While Philadelphia’s expressway boom began in the immediate postwar period, 
its mass transportation declined severely.  To be precise, the city and its suburbs were 
home to multiple privately owned transportation companies:  the Philadelphia 
Transportation Company (PTC), which ran buses, subways, and trolleys throughout the 
city; the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company, or Red Arrow, which operated 
buses and trolleys in the nearby suburbs; and the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads, 
which operated separate commuter railroad systems.  After World War II, all of these 
companies were plagued by spiraling operating costs due to inflation, aging infrastructure 
and equipment, labor problems, declining patronage, and governmental regulation that 
prohibited them from raising fares enough to compensate for diminishing revenue.  
Although certainly the public’s embrace of automobiles contributed to the decline of 
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mass transportation, the problems enumerated above were inherent to mass transit and 
existed independently of this trend.      
City officials were aware of the crisis, but continued throughout the 1940s and 
1950s to prioritize building highways over aiding mass transit, mirroring the attitude 
prevalent within the federal government.  Philadelphia’s favoritism toward expressways 
was undoubtedly a product of Cold War America, in which highways and autos were 
symbols of freedom and individualism and urban mass transportation was associated with 
collectivism and deprivation – a perception fueled by white flight, which made inner-city 
mass transit riders disproportionately poor and black.  But the disparity was also due to 
the fact that the state and federal funds available for expressway constru tion influenced 
priorities on the local level, and to government officials’ reluctance to make 
improvements to privately-owned mass transit systems that many would have perceived 
as benefitting shareholders at taxpayers’ expense.  When the city made tenttive first 
steps at the end of the 1950s toward the preservation of mass transit, it did so in a way 
that began a pattern of preferential treatment of the commuter railroads over the urban 
transit system. 
Both the building of expressways and the first efforts to save the commuter 
railroads were associated with Philadelphia’s drive to revitalize its cntral business 
district, which officials and planners saw as the city’s most urgent problem of the postwar 
era.  In the aftermath of World War II, urban America experienced a sharp decline, and 
Philadelphia was no different.  As occurred elsewhere, middle-class whites fled to the 
suburbs and took much of the tax base with them.  Manufacturing, for generations the 
backbone of the city’s economy, began the long downward spiral that caused 
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Philadelphia to lose 90,000 industrial jobs between 1950 and 1965.10  Like other cities, 
Philadelphia in the postwar years began the transition from a manufacturing to a service 
economy, but this transition did not occur overnight.  In the meantime, as historian 
Jeanne Lowe put it in Cites in a Race with Time, her study of postwar urban decline and 
renewal, “Philadelphia was like a doughnut, a vast metropolis built up around a hollow 
center.”  Lowe wrote of deserted and dirty streets, polluted water, and antiquated 
practices like collecting garbage by horse-drawn carriage and lighting some streets with 
gas lamps.11    
Perhaps Philadelphia’s biggest problem in the 1940s was the corruption and 
lethargy that had infected its city government.  When the city’s civic and business leaders 
lost their faith in the Republican political machine that had run the city since the Civil 
War, a reform movement emerged, having as its first goal the creation of a new city 
charter.  A group of businessmen known as the Young Turks (which included future city 
planner Edmund Bacon) spearheaded the movement.  Although early efforts at charter 
reform failed, the Young Turks succeeded in getting City Council to create a stronger 
City Planning Commission in 1942 and, soon afterward, formed the Citizens’ Council on 
City Planning to act as a private watchdog organization.  The new version of the Planning 
Commission, while still an advisory agency, now had a budget, a full-time staff, and the 
statutory authority to prepare six-year capital programs to be submitted to City Council, 
which retained authority over the expenditure of municipal funds.12  The Citizens’ 
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Council was run by large business interests but represented neighborhood groups from all 
over the city.  As Bauman wrote, the organization was “an ideal vehicle for creating the 
illusion of citizen participation in the planning process and imparting legitimacy to the 
city’s housing and redevelopment plans.”13  Because it was founded by the same business 
and civic leaders who were responsible for Philadelphia getting a stronger Planning 
Commission during World War II, it was unsurprising that the Citizens’ Council of the 
1940s and 1950s was in near total harmony with planners’ goals and philosophies 
regarding downtown revitalization and expressway construction. 
In 1948, a powerful group of business leaders – most of them presidents of major 
corporations, banks, department stores, and universities – created the Greater 
Philadelphia Movement (GPM) to oversee and influence the direction of Philadelphia’s 
urban renewal.  The GPM’s main focus was on revitalizing downtown, and according to 
Bauman, its leaders “realized that the city’s future growth hinged not only on the 
prospect of federal redevelopment aid but also on the cooperation of city government 
with enlightened business and civic leadership.”14  The new organization picked up the 
banner of charter reform and backed Democrat Joseph Clark, a reform candidate who was 
elected mayor in 1951, breaking finally the dominance of the Republican machine.  
Clark, a liberal, was both a business-oriented mayor and a technocrat who believed that 
problems could best be solved by hiring the most qualified professionals to work in city 
government rather than abiding by the patronage system that had mired City Hall in 
mediocrity for so long.  Clark’s election coincided with the breakthrough of charter 
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reform, which stripped City Council of many of its administrative powers, created new 
mayoral cabinet positions, and gave the mayor the ability to hire and remove bureaucrats 
without council approval, ostensibly to weaken the influence of politics upon such 
decisions.15   
As scholars Judith Goode and Jo Anne Schneider have written, both Clark and his 
Democratic successor Richardson Dilworth (the two of whom served from 1951 to 1962), 
were allied strongly with the city’s “corporate elites in the rising service sector:  banking, 
insurance, large-scale retailing, and real-estate development.”  The new approach of this 
technocratic, professional alliance was “to reconstruct the center as the site of corporate 
headquarters, financial institutions, business services, and retailing, which would bring 
people back to the city as workers, shoppers, and residents.”16  A great deal of 
Philadelphia’s redevelopment in the postwar period was spurred by quasi-public 
corporations, made up of business leaders and government officials, solidifying further 
the close relationship between white-collar business interests and the city’s Democratic 
reform administrations.17 
The relationship between business and government in postwar Philadelphia 
helped to shape the city’s transportation planning.  A consensus existed among 
Philadelphia’s planners and its business leaders that easing traffic congestion on 
downtown streets and providing for the free flow of automobile traffic was crucial to 
downtown renewal.  Embracing the assumptions of the federal highway engineers they 
perceived as the ultimate experts, they also believed that building modern, limited-access 
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expressways that would draw suburbanites back to the downtown was the key to 
achieving the aforementioned goals.  While transportation planning in the 1940s and 
1950s occurred in a relatively closed environment, with little public input into major 
decisions, the symbiosis between business and government in Philadelphia ensured that 
the planning philosophies and goals of each remained virtually the same.  To put it 
another way, big business was practically part of Philadelphia’s government in those 
days, to the extent that it would have been inaccurate to consider the city’s law firms, 
banks, large retail establishments and other major corporations just another constituency.  
Although the strong relationship between business and government in the context of 
urban redevelopment was in no way unique to Philadelphia, the democratization of 
transportation politics that occurred in the 1960s opened up less space for influence by 
grassroots groups in Philadelphia than was the case in many other cities. 
The Schuylkill Expressway:  Philadelphia’s First Expressway 
  
The Schuylkill Expressway, planned in the late 1940s and built in the 1950s, was 
Philadelphia’s first major expressway.  It was built during a time of consensu  that 
limited-access expressways were the only satisfactory solution to cities’ traffic and 
transportation problems.  Because Philadelphia’s transportation planning process in the 
immediate postwar period was decidedly undemocratic, allowing for little input by 
ordinary people, the public controversy surrounding the road’s construction, while 
irritating to planners at the time, proved to be quite minor in comparison to the public 
opposition to highway projects that arose in the 1960s and 1970s.  The result, 
unfortunately for Philadelphia, was a highway that was dangerous, inadequate to handle 
the traffic demand placed upon it, and perceived to be obsolete on the day it opened.  
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This outcome did not, however, change the fundamental assumptions that led to the 
Schuylkill’s construction in the first place, instead serving only to convince planners and 
engineers that more highways were needed. 
On a chilly day just before Thanksgiving of 1958, a crucial section of the 
expressway running past Center City Philadelphia opened for business.  The mood that 
day was festive, with the Vine Street Bridge decked out in colorful bunting and a band 
made up of police officers and firemen providing the music.  Chamber of Commerce 
president Andrew Young presided over the ceremonies as Mayor Richardson Dilworth 
and Pennsylvania Department of Highways head Lewis Stevens made speeches.  At 11 
a.m., Mayor Dilworth cut the ribbon and the traffic began to flow.  Despite the optimism 
of that day, it was not long before critics, citing heavy traffic and a frightening accident 
rate, charged that the Schuylkill “was obsolete before the blueprints were dry.”18  In fact, 
Philadelphians started complaining about the Schuylkill before it was even completed.  In 
September 1959, two months before the highway’s final link opened, the Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia’s leading newspaper until 1980) lamented,  “the irritating 
fact that the new $65,000,000 Schuylkill Expressway can be clogged for miles bumper-
to-bumper simply by taking one lane out of service demonstrates how close to capacity 
this superhighway normally operates.”19  The opening of the final section on November 
25 became not a cause for celebration, but rather an opportunity for the paper to point out 
that “new highway facilities so often prove inadequate before they are complete.”20 
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Some transportation planners had envisioned a system of expressways for the 
Philadelphia region since the early 1930s, but the Great Depression and World War II put 
the goal out of reach until the mid-1940s.21  Philadelphia’s expressway era began in 1946 
when, with World War II over and hopes abounding for a return to normality, planners 
began to think about how to revitalize their city.22  One of the most pressing problems 
they faced was a transportation infrastructure that most saw as grossly inadequate to 
serve Philadelphia’s needs.  Pennsylvania’s Republican governor, former Pittsburgh 
attorney James Duff, decried the lack of highway access in the commonwealth’s cities, 
claiming, “I know of no cities in the country where the access is worse.”23  The City 
Planning Commission’s thinking on the matter was never in doubt; the Commission 
embraced “the principle that the only satisfactory program is to build a primary system of 
express highways – made express by building them as elevated or depressed route or by 
limiting local access.”24  The Planning Commission made no secret of the fact that 
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expressways were its first priority, announcing that it was deferring work on a 
comprehensive plan to improve the city’s mass transit.25 
The following year, planning for the Schuylkill Expressway began in earnest.  
The Planning Commission described the route it proposed as extending from the Island 
Avenue – Essington Avenue traffic circle in South Philadelphia up the west bank of the 
Schuylkill River (a longstanding transportation route that was already hometo W st 
River Drive and the Reading Railroad tracks) to the city limits at City Line Avenue, and 
then continuing to follow the river in a northwesterly direction through suburban 
Montgomery County before veering west to connect with the proposed extension of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike at King of Prussia, approximately 20 miles to the northwest of 
downtown Philadelphia.26  Planners felt that the extension of the turnpike eastward to 
King of Prussia, which the state’s Turnpike Commission planned to complete by 1950, 
heightened the need for the Schuylkill Expressway.27  In July 1947, city and state 
officials met to discuss the fact that they expected the turnpike extension to bear a load of 
6,000 cars and trucks a day, but had no definite plans for how to get traffic from the end 
of the turnpike to Philadelphia.28   
One planner concerned by this scenario was Edmund Bacon, who became the 
Executive Director of the City Planning Commission in August 1948.  Bacon exerted 
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tremendous influence over Philadelphia’s planning in the postwar period and gained 
national prominence for his efforts.  A native Philadelphian, he received his degree in 
architecture from Cornell University in 1932.  In the ensuing years, he broadened his 
perspective by traveling in Europe, working for an architectural firm in Shaghai, China, 
and obtaining a graduate fellowship to work under famous architect and city planner Eliel 
Saarinen at Cranbrook Academy in Michigan.  By 1940, he had returned home to assume 
the directorship of the Philadelphia Housing Association while holding several other 
positions, including secretary of the Citizens’ Council on City Planning.  Aftera stint in 
the U.S. Navy during which he took part in the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, 
Bacon became the senior land planner of the City Planning Commission in 1946, a 
position he held until the Planning Commission’s executive director, Raymond Leonard, 
passed away in 1948 and Bacon was appointed to fill his place.29  Over the next 22 years, 
Bacon built a sparkling reputation as the person most responsible for shaping 
Philadelphia.30  Those that interacted with him and witnessed his handiwork described 
him with terms such as “God-like” and “the god of city planners.”31  In 1964, Bacon’s 
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efforts to revitalize Center City Philadelphia landed him a glowing profile in Time 
magazine, complete with a flattering portrait on the magazine’s cover.32   
In the late 1940s, Bacon believed that if the turnpike extension to King of Prussia 
opened before an access road to Philadelphia were completed, “there would be a terrific 
pile-up of traffic on the feeder roads out of King of Prussia and the Philadelphia area 
would not be adequately served.”  The Schuylkill Expressway, he felt, would provide 
easy access from the turnpike to Philadelphia’s Center City, reduce traffic on feeder roads 
between the suburbs and the city, “and furnish a necessary link in the city’s highway 
system.”33   
Because city and state officials intended the Schuylkill Expressway to be a 
federal-aid highway, meaning that the Bureau of Public Roads and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Highways would share primary financial responsibility for the oad, any 
plans made in Philadelphia were subject to both state and federal approval.  During early 
discussions about the expressway, federal officials disagreed with the City Planning 
Commission and the state Department of Highways about the road’s purpose, but it does 
not appear as though this disagreement ever jeopardized federal funding for the prject in 
any serious way.  The disagreement stemmed from the fact that Philadelphia planners 
were portraying the Schuylkill Expressway as designed to serve mainly regional traffic 
coming to and from the Pennsylvania Turnpike, while federal highway engineers 
believed the road would be used mostly by local drivers traveling between Philadelphi  
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and its northwestern suburbs.  One federal official, J.L. Stinson, told state highway 
officials that the amount of traffic expected to head for Philadelphia from the turnpike 
was “relatively small in comparison to [the amount] originating within the urban area of 
Philadelphia.”  The city’s approach, he felt, gave “a misleading impression” as to the
purpose and intended use of the Schuylkill Expressway.34  Nevertheless, federal official 
C.N. Connor, while reiterating Stinson’s point, wrote in July 1949 that the Bureau was 
“glad to observe that efforts are under way to relieve traffic congestion in the 
Philadelphia area with Federal-aid participation.”35  Clearly, officials at all levels wanted 
the expressway to be built, even if no firm consensus existed as to its precise purpose.  In 
their zeal to push the project forward, it appears that no planners or engineers considered 
the possibility that the new expressway might exacerbate, rather than alleviate, traffic 
congestion within the city by encouraging more automobile use. 
The Citizens’ Council on City Planning, which served as a liaison between the 
City Planning Commission and the public, supported the Schuylkill Expressway strongly 
from the start.  Although the Citizens’ Council later took a more critical stance toward 
governmental actions, its primary function in the 1940s and 1950s was to explain to the 
public the decisions of the City Planning Commission and enlist support for those 
decisions.  In 1947, the Council attempted to answer questions the public might have 
regarding the proposed expressway.  In providing a definition of an express highway that 
later generations of Philadelphians might have found humorous, the Council proclaimed 
that “such a highway provides for continuous movement of traffic, unhampered by start 
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and stop driving, parking or pedestrian problems and with danger of accidents greatly 
reduced.”  Posing the question, “Is There No Other Answer?” the Citizens’ Council noted 
the limited success of other means of reducing traffic congestion, such as street widening 
and parking limitations, but did not mention mass transit improvements as a possible 
solution.  The group pointed out that the Planning Commission was already aware that “a 
system of express highways is THE solution for the city’s traffic ills,” and appealed to the 
public to put pressure on City Council to grant its quick approval to proposed highways.36 
Because city, state, and federal officials shared a narrow focus on the efficient 
movement of traffic, they based their decisions about the Schuylkill Expressway almost 
entirely on traffic data.  Such an emphasis was not surprising given the philosophy 
surrounding expressway construction in the 1940s and 1950s.  It seems, however, that 
planners’ rush to complete the expressway led them to make preliminary decisions about 
route and design – decisions that, while subject to change, would guide all future 
discussions – before they had even finished analyzing the traffic data in question.  In 
1947, Philadelphia conducted an origin-destination survey with financial support from all 
three levels of government.  The survey – which collected data on the beginning and end 
points for trips made by various methods of transport in the Philadelphia metropolitan 
area, was intended to assist planners in determining, as the Planning Commissi n said, 
“where and what type highways should be built.”37 
Field work for the study was completed in 1947, but it was some time before all 
of the data was available for analysis by the engineering firm of Clarke, Rapuano, 
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Holleran, Hardesty, and Hanover, which the Planning Commission had hired to consult 
on the Schuylkill Expressway.  In its annual report for 1947, the Planning Commission 
announced that the punch cards containing the data were being prepared and were 
expected to be ready for tabulation by March 1948.  The Commission’s next annual 
report revealed that planners expected the full report on the data to be finished by late 
1949, but had provided the consultants with a limited amount of data to work with in the 
meantime.  The lack of a completed study in 1949 did not stop the Commission from 
issuing a report entitled “Philadelphia’s First Expressway,” which stated boldly that data 
derived from the origin-destination survey showed “sufficient traffic volumes to justify a 
six-lane express highway along the west side of the Schuylkill River.”  Apparently, 
however, Philadelphia’s planners did not complete a full analysis of the data in 1949, or 
even in 1950.  The Commission’s annual report for 1951 indicated that “From the 1947 
Origin and Destination Survey data were assembled, analyzed, and mapped, showing the 
number of persons traveling to the Central City by various modes of transportation.  
Analysis by zone of origin and purpose of travel was initiated.”38   
While the analysis of the origin-destination data was underway, government 
officials barreled ahead with the Schuylkill Expressway.  In December 1949, the city sent 
first-phase engineering plans for the expressway to the state highway departm nt, which 
resulted in the expressway being placed officially on the state highway system on January 
1, 1950.  In May 1950, lead consultant Michael Rapuano issued his engineering and 
design report.  Soon after, both the Pennsylvania Department of Highways and the 
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Bureau of Public Roads approved preliminary plans for the expressway.  In November 
1950, Philadelphia City Council voted its approval, paving the way for the city to enter 
into a formal agreement with the state.  By December 18, Philadelphia’s Republican 
mayor, Bernard Samuel, and Governor Duff had both signed the agreement, leaving no 
legal obstacles to construction of the highway.39   
The fact that final, detailed engineering plans for each section of the expressway 
had not yet been completed should not obscure the reality that officials made crucial 
decisions about the project before planners had finished analyzing the data from the 
origin-destination survey.  All three governments involved had approved the expressway 
in principal and committed to provide their share of the funding, thus ensuring that the 
road would be built.  The consultants’ engineering report, which informed future 
discussions on the details of route and design, had also been completed.  In other words, 
circumstances at the end of 1950 would have made it difficult to backtrack had further 
analysis undermined initial assumptions.   
As John Bauman explained, Michael Rapuano used only samples of the traffic 
data for calculating traffic flow and making design decisions, a shortcut that worried 
federal officials.40  In September 1949, the BPR expressed its “disappointment that such 
limited use had been made of results of the origin-destination survey.”  While it was
willing to accept the consultants’ traffic analysis this time, the Bureau “w nted it clearly 
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understood that acceptance was not an endorsement of [the consultants’] procedure as a 
method for future studies.”41  Once the data analysis was complete, however, neither 
Rapuano nor the Planning Commission offered any hint that the Schuylkill Expressway 
would have been routed or designed differently had they waited longer or that any of 
their baseline assumptions had changed.  If federal, state, or local officials ever harbored 
doubts in this regard, they did not air those doubts in public. 
In such a rushed atmosphere, preliminary discussions about the Schuylkill 
Expressway proceeded with all the suspense of a one-party election involving an 
unopposed candidate.  Never did those responsible question seriously the decision to 
build the expressway.  A 1950 memo from H.E. Hilts, Deputy Commissioner of the BPR, 
to Division Engineer S.L. Taylor provided evidence that the justification for building a 
highway was sometimes an afterthought.  After reading a draft of the Rapuano report on 
the Schuylkill Expressway, Hilts noted, “There remains the problem of [ecnomic] 
justification which is not touched upon in the report except in a very general way citing 
the need for expressways to take traffic off existing streets and provide better facilities for 
travel.  Some measure of justification is desirable and it may not be too much of a job to 
make such calculation.”42  Federal officials had been discussing the Schuylkill 
Expressway in detail with the state of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia since 
1948, and in March 1950 were close to signing off on the plans, so it was more than a bit 
late to be concerned with planners’ failure to articulate an economic justification for the 
project.  As Bauman pointed out, the economic and social aspects of expressway 
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construction “rarely if ever intruded into these usually technical discussions. . . . Socio-
economic considerations, short and long-term, were at best incidental. . . . Indeed, belief 
in the utility of expressways was so great and so widespread in the 1950s that [the subject 
of justification] hardly warranted further amplification.”43   
To the limited extent planners considered factors other than the efficient 
movement of automobile traffic, their analysis could be short-sighted.  The City Planning 
Commission, rather than expressing concern that expressways might contribute to a flow 
of people and capital out of the city, embraced the idea.  Pointing out that the “century-
old trend toward decentralization” was “based on the natural and healthy desire of people 
for more space, air, and light,” the Commission asserted that the city’s future 
development should “be in accordance with this trend, leading to a reduction of 
densities.”44 
As a result of prevailing attitudes among those in power, discussions about the 
highway focused only on the precise details of the route and design; everyone agreed, 
however, that the road would follow the Schuylkill River.  Perhaps most importantly, 
very few groups were included in these discussions.  In choosing a route, the City 
Planning Commission consulted the city’s Department of Public Works, state and fderal 
highway officials (who, as explained above, combined to provide most of the funding for 
the project), the Fairmount Park Commission (FPC) (the approval of which was needed 
for portions of the proposed route passing through city parkland), the Chamber of 
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Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, local officials of the American Automobile 
Association, and the Citizens’ Council on City Planning.45   
The Citizens’ Council had the greatest ability to represent members of the public 
who wished to participate in decisions regarding the expressway, because it reprsented, 
at least ostensibly, neighborhood groups from all over Philadelphia.  At this point in its 
history, however, the Council acted primarily as a booster for the City Planning 
Commission and did not take an aggressive role in pressing planners to be receptive to 
citizen input.  Although the Council itself was composed mainly of neighborhood groups, 
its board of directors was made up of wealthy and powerful men from the ranks of 
business, law, education, media, and labor.46  These men decided that the Schuylkill 
Expressway was necessary for Philadelphia’s future before it would have been possible to 
gauge accurately the feelings of their member organizations, and never wavered from 
their initial support of the expressway.   
In December 1948, the Citizens’ Council held a meeting at which Edmund Bacon, 
with Governor Duff looking on, explained the details of the Schuylkill Expressway to 
more than 200 delegates representing 125 member organizations, who then passed a 
resolution approving the Planning Commission’s highway plan.47  The minutes of this 
meeting seem not to have survived, however, making it unclear as to whether any of the 
delegates dissented from the resolution or expressed sentiments critical of the expressway 
plan.  It is clear that the leaders of the Citizens’ Council perceived no unfairness n the 
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way the Planning Commission went about its business.  Council Executive Director S.B. 
Zisman commended the Planning Commission for considering suggestions from various
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Fairmount Park Commission, and the 
Citizens’ Council itself.  The Planning Commission, he wrote, “has demonstrated the 
right approach in city planning.  Citizen understanding and citizen participation are 
essential in a democratic procedure in planning and do, as in this case, help develop 
better plans.”48  Citizens’ Council President Walter Hudson soon echoed Zisman’s praise 
to Edward Hopkinson, the chair of the Planning Commission.49   
Despite the kind words from the Citizens’ Council, the Planning Commission 
made clear that while it was willing to listen to a select few groups, it would not accept 
input from everyone.  When the Civic Club of Philadelphia requested that the Planning 
Commission hold public hearings on the issue of using land in Fairmount Park for the 
Schuylkill Expressway, Hopkinson responded that public hearings would be held only 
once City Council had accepted the Planning Commission’s recommendations and 
introduced an ordinance authorizing the city to make an arrangement with the state for 
construction of the expressway.  Holding separate hearings before then, he asserted, 
could not be done “without confusing issues.”50  Ironically, Hopkinson sent his response 
on the same day Hudson sent his letter praising the Planning Commission for its openness 
to citizen input.  Although it is impossible to be certain, public hearings may have made a 
difference.  The Fairmount Park Commission gave the expressway its tentative approval 
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during the early stages of planning in October 1948, believing the highway to be 
necessary for Philadelphia, but the parkland portion of the expressway became a point of 
contention when more detailed plans were developed in late 1952, as is discussed 
below.51 
The closed environment in which officials planned the Schuylkill Expressway 
could not quell controversy completely.  The disputes that did arise, while vexing to 
highway boosters at the time, nevertheless proved to be rather minor and short-lived 
when compared to the expressway battles that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.  In 
contrast to later expressway protesters, opponents of the Schuylkill Expressway did not 
question the decision to build the highway or demand a broader inquiry into its social, 
environmental, or economic impact.  Instead, the battles revolved primarily around two 
specific portions of the route – the aforementioned section through Fairmount Park, and 
the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension – because of the parkland and homes they were slated 
to destroy.   
The fight over the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension was the first significant 
controversy to arise, as residents of the Nicetown neighborhood in North Philadelphia 
protested the taking of their homes the extension would require.  From the earliest stages 
of thinking about the Schuylkill Expressway, the Planning Commission intended for an 
extension to cut across North Philadelphia in a northeasterly direction before connecting 
a few blocks east of Broad Street with Roosevelt Boulevard, the main thoroughfare 
carrying traffic to the vast expanses of Northeast Philadelphia – a booming area with 
suburban-style housing to which many whites moved in the postwar years.  In order to 
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reach Roosevelt Boulevard from the Schuylkill River, the extension would have to cut 
directly through Nicetown. 
In 1950, Nicetown was a mostly white, working- and middle-class neighborhood.  
The area was roughly coincident with census tract 43-B, which contained 6,410 residents, 
6,081 of whom were white.  Of the approximately 18% of the white population that was 
foreign-born, the largest numbers came from Poland and the Soviet Union.  The 
households in tract 43-B had a median income of $3,044 (as compared with a national 
median household income of $3,319), and most residents in the labor force were 
classified as operatives or clerical workers.52  Because the Schuylkill Expressway 
followed a river route through the city, the main stem of the road required the taking of 
very few properties.  As a result, Nicetown stood nearly alone in its battle.  In the
overwhelmingly pro-expressway atmosphere of the immediate postwar period, the 
humble neighborhood never stood a chance.  Philadelphia’s first anti-expressway 
movement, which began in 1949, was over by the end of 1950 when Mayor Samuel and 
Governor Duff signed the agreement to build the expressway, including its Roosevelt 
Boulevard extension. 
Early on, it appeared that the Planning Commission was concerned mainly about 
the businesses in the proposed extension’s path.  In January 1949, Edward Hopkinson 
wrote to the president of the Philco Corporation to let him know that one of the routes 
under consideration would affect the Philco plant in North Philadelphia.  Believing it to 
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be “highly desirable” that Philco “be consulted in this early planning stage,” Hopkinsn 
invited the corporation to designate a representative to meet with Michael Rapuano, the 
City Planning Commission’s lead consultant on route selection.53  After Rapuano visited 
the Philco plant, he informed Edmund Bacon that the route in question, which would 
require the destruction of an entire wing of Philco’s freezer division, would be too 
expensive for the state to acquire and too burdensome for Philco.  The planners should, 
he advised, “bend every effort to find another solution.”54  Rapuano’s suggestion was 
well taken, as in February the Planning Commission announced it had decided to run the 
extension through Fernhill Park, a small neighborhood park near the Philco plant, to save 
on construction costs and cause less disruption to industry.55  Unsurprisingly, the 
Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia met the decision with approval.56  
The residents of Nicetown, however, did not receive the same consideration, 
because city planners perceived building the extension without taking homes to be 
impossible.57  When the Planning Commission announced plans for the extension in early 
1949, anxious residents, wanting to know whether their homes would be taken, flooded 
the Commission’s offices with letters.  The Commission responded to each letter in a 
timely and courteous fashion, giving homeowners as much information as was 
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available.58  It was clear, however, that citizen opposition was not going to prevent the 
road from being built, or protect homes from being taken.  In April, Edmund Bacon tried 
to reassure residents by informing them that their homes would not be taken for at least
two years and that they would be paid “fair and equitable sums” for them.  Above all, 
Bacon asked residents “to consider the overall welfare of their community and the vas  
benefits which would accrue to Philadelphia by construction of the expressway.”59  To 
help smooth over concerns, the Planning Commission pointed out that the Schuylkill was 
much less destructive than expressways in other cities, with only 6% of its ten-mile city 
route requiring residential demolition.60 
Such assurances failed to placate those whose homes were threatened, however.  
In March, executives of the Nicetown Business and Civic Association formed a 
committee to oppose the construction of the extension through their neighborhood.  More 
than 1,500 Nicetown residents packed into a local junior high school to hear the 
association’s president, Emil Schurgot, estimate that the project would require that 1,000 
homes be torn down.  Bacon, who attended the meeting, disputed Shurgot’s assessment 
but did not offer one of his own, noting that plans were still in the development stage.61  
When the Planning Commission did supply City Council with an estimate, it anticipated 
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the demolition of 261 homes and 19 small apartment houses resulting in the displacement 
of approximately 1,200 people.62 
This announcement spurred more protest from Nicetown, as Schurgot claimed 
that the Planning Commission was misleading City Council and that at least 600 to 700 
homes would need to be destroyed for the extension.  Schurgot railed against the project, 
saying: 
This highway serves no purpose to the community or the 
city.  Its only beneficiary would be high speed traffic and 
the motor freight interests.  They would be able to run fresh 
eggs and butter from Ohio to New York City more cheaply 
than by railroad and at our expense.  I am amazed that City 
Council appears to be willing to sacrifice the tax income 
the city receives from the houses that would be 
demolished.63  
 
In May, the Pennsylvania Highway Department came up with its own estimate, 
splitting the difference between Schurgot and the Planning Commission and projecting 
480 homes to be demolished.  Predictably, the new estimate set off another round of 
citizen complaints, as more than 800 people attended a community meeting at which a
state representative indicated that more than 2,500 people were now slated to lose their 
homes.  Someone at the meeting read a letter from a city councilman claiming that any 
alternate route for the extension would cost the city an extra $6 million.64 
While the Nicetown protests had no immediate impact, residents received some 
good news in November 1949.  Citing a recent engineering survey conducted by the state 
indicating that four lanes, rather than six, would be sufficient, the Planning Commission 
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announced that it had revised its plans for the extension by narrowing the right-of-way 
required.  The change was predicted to result in the demolition of 116 fewer homes than 
had been anticipated.65  Perhaps seeking to maximize the public relations value of the 
alteration, the Commission announced the revision to coincide exactly with another 
community meeting scheduled to take place in Nicetown.66  The Evening Bulletin 
cheered the decision while calling the loss of what was now believed to be 321 homes “a 
necessary and unpleasant incident” to progress.  In doing so, the paper attributed the 
change in plans to the protests that had arisen, writing: 
Not content with its original plans in the light of the 
protests that developed, the Commission has worked out 
various expedients to save a home here and another there. . 
. . By its technique of working with open mind with 
citizens’ groups to smooth off every rough edge possible 
the Planning Commission shows a fine appreciation of its 
responsibility.67 
 
Despite the paper’s praise of the Planning Commission, there was no reason to believe 
that citizen protests had anything to do with the change, which appeared instead to be 
solely the product of an engineering assessment that fewer lanes, at les cost, would be 
acceptable. 
In spite of the homes saved by the lane reduction, the expressway protests 
continued.  In December, the Evening Bulletin editorial page, seemingly irritated that 
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opponents had not yet been silenced, cited the Nicetown protests as “point[ing] up the 
need not only for early and final decisions on routes, but also for speed in construction.”68  
Later that month, however, the scope of the protests widened to surrounding 
neighborhoods in the northwestern part of the city near the Roosevelt Boulevard 
Extension’s proposed path.  At a meeting on December 19, 1949, the Germantown, Mt. 
Airy, and Chestnut Hill Improvement Association announced its opposition to the 
extension.69  The Planning Commission was undaunted, however.  Announcing that the 
revised plans would result in 500 fewer people having to move, Bacon let it be known 
that he regretted that anyone would be dislocated by the extension, but stayed firm in his 
conviction that “the highway must go ahead.”70 
As protests continued into 1950, the Planning Commission continued to be 
inundated with letters from angry and anxious homeowners.  Bacon and his staff 
continued to respond dutifully to each letter received, even ones such as that from George 
Wilk, who accused the Planning Commission of proposing “to defile the American flag 
and the principles and way of life for which it stands” and demanded that the 
Commission choose between “democracy or fascism.”71  The Planning Commission 
could take heart, however, in the fact that several community groups had gone on record 
as approving the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension, many of them business groups, such as 
the Chamber of Commerce of West Philadelphia, the Northeast Chamber of Commerce, 
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and the Business Men’s Association of Germantown.72  In addition, many residents of 
Northeast Philadelphia, whose homes were not threatened, were in favor of a link th t 
would provide them with better expressway access.  In October 1950, the United 
Northeast Civic Association delayed a public meeting on the project after a vocal gr up 
of Nicetown residents showed up and disrupted the meeting with loud protests.  
Association president Elroy Simons informed members that the meeting would be held 
again later that month and urged them to round up supporters of the extension and bring 
them to the meeting.73 
As for the Citizens’ Council on City Planning, it continued its steadfast support of 
the City Planning Commission and its expressway plans.  Having already approved the 
Schuylkill Expressway at its December 1948 delegates’ meeting, the Council called 
another delegates’ meeting for February 1950 to discuss the fact that the Roosevelt 
Boulevard Extension would require some residents to move.  The meeting resulted in the 
reaffirmation of the Council’s original resolution approving the expressway.  In 
informing Governor Duff of the Council’s support, Executive Director John Mladjen told 
him, “The Citizens’ Council recognizes the hardships that will occur and have expr ssed 
their [sic] regrets that the interests of a few people must sometimes be sacrificed for the 
general welfare of all the citizens.”74 
The Council’s decision to support the expressway extension was not unanimous, 
however, as the aforementioned Germantown, Mt. Airy, and Chestnut Hill Improvement 
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Association, a member of the Council, continued its opposition.  The group’s president, 
Albert Redles, claimed at a public meeting on October 17, 1950, that the Nicetown Civic 
Association, the Nicetown Businessmen’s Association, and several other groups opposed 
the extension as well.75  Edward Hopkinson, who attended the meeting, reminded the 
assembled group that at Bacon’s March 1949 meeting with Nicetown residents, four 
alternate routes had been proposed, and that the Planning Commission had given detailed 
study to three of them before discarding them.  Planners had rejected immediately the 
fourth proposal, which entailed building a bypass to the north of the city, feeling that only 
routes within the city limits would reduce traffic congestion adequately by taking cars off 
local streets and shifting them to the expressway.76  The lack of unanimity within the 
Citizens’ Council’s membership had no discernable effect on either the attitude of city 
officials or the Council’s leadership’s staunch support for the expressway. 
The City Council hearing of October 31, 1950 was the last gasp for community 
opposition to the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension.  Members of the Greater Philadelphia 
movement, in response to a personal plea from Director of Public Works Thomas 
Buckley, showed up at the hearing to demonstrate the business community’s support for 
the proposed expressway route.77  The GPM also helped to lay the groundwork in terms 
of public relations, helping to arrange a meeting between Buckley and Philadelphia 
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Inquirer editorial director Paul Warner “for the purpose of explaining the necessity of 
retaining the Roosevelt Boulevard spur in the plan.”78   
At the hearing, protesting residents questioned consultant Michael Rapuano about 
the proposed route, with much of the questioning focusing on who was to be served by 
the extension.  Countering the argument that the extension was being designed to serve 
people trying to get through Philadelphia, rather than to Philadelphia, Rapuano claimed 
that 85% of the traffic entering the city on the Schuylkill Expressway would be bound for 
destinations within the city.79  Rapuano’s statement illustrated clearly planners’ and 
engineers’ failure to consider that expressways, in generating their own demand, could 
add to a city’s traffic congestion.  In November, City Council’s committee on public 
works approved the Schuylkill Expressway plan, including the Roosevelt Boulevard 
Extension, by a 9-0 vote, paving the way for the December 1950 city-state agreement for 
construction of the highway.80  Philadelphia’s first anti-expressway movement had failed. 
With the City Planning Commission, the Department of Public Works, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Highways, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads all in 
agreement that Philadelphia needed the Schuylkill Expressway, little outside pressure 
was needed to push the project through.  Nevertheless, in the wake of the December 1950 
agreement, two of the city’s most important business groups rushed to take credit.  
Saying in a letter to Gimbel Brothers department store head and Chamber of Commerce 
president Arthur Kaufmann that the planned highway “could generally be termed the 
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greatest single improvement in our city’s history,” Greater Philadelphia Movement board 
member and Philadelphia National Bank president Frederic Potts took note of the delay 
the Nicetown protests had caused, and highlighted his organization’s role in overcoming 
the opposition.  The GPM, he stated, wrote an October 1950 letter to Mayor Samuel 
backing the expressway, which was then published in the newspapers, and organized a 
meeting with city officials and planners aimed at discrediting alternative expressway 
proposals from Nicetown residents.  Chamber of Commerce member W. Jordan passed 
Potts’ letter on to C.V. Conole, the Chamber’s executive director, decrying the GPM’s 
effort to take credit for the Schuylkill Expressway.  The Chamber, he emphasized, had 
been cooperating closely with city and state officials since 1948 and had taken “the 
leading part” in the Schuylkill and other road projects.81  The competitive crowing of the 
city’s business leaders aside, the evidence suggests that officials at all levels of 
government were committed to building the Schuylkill Expressway regardless of what 
outside groups thought of the project.    
The Nicetown protest was not the last controversy to arise during the planning for 
the Schuylkill Expressway.  Another minor revolt erupted over the portion of the 
expressway slated to tear through Fairmount Park.  As with the Nicetown controversy, 
the Fairmount Park battle did not implicate larger questions about the purpose or 
necessity of modern expressways or the larger impact such roads had on the cities 
through which they passed.  Moreover, this was not a grassroots fight, but one that 
existed almost entirely within the Fairmount Park Commission, which was charged with 
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preserving Philadelphia’s parkland for use by the public.  Like the Nicetown situation, 
this controversy was short-lived and failed to alter what seemed to be the expressway’s 
inevitable course. 
Fairmount Park, beloved by residents of the Philadelphia region, was a long chain 
of parkland stretching from the city to neighboring Lower Merion Township, 
immediately to the northwest.82  The urban portion of the park hugged the Schuylkill 
River, with most of the parkland on the river’s west bank.  Building an expressway 
through what had been a long-cherished place of peace and relaxation for generations of 
Philadelphians generated surprisingly little public protest.  Planners’ concerns, from the 
beginning, focused on how the FPC – the approval of which was required to use parkland 
for the expressway – would react to the preliminary plans.   
Although passenger cars already passed through Fairmount Park on scenic West 
River Drive, Edmund Bacon worried at first that the FPC might object to building an all-
purpose expressway through the park that would allow trucks.  If trucks were not allowed 
through the park, he feared, the state might decline to extend financial assistance in 
building the expressway.83  Bacon’s concerns were justified, at least initially, as the plan 
to allow trucks to rumble through the park raised “strong objections” from the park 
commissioners.84  The protest over trucks was extremely short-lived, however, and the 
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FPC relented in October 1948, giving its preliminary approval after being assured that the 
“the integrity and beauty of the West River Drive and West Park area would be 
preserved.”85  A report issued soon after by the Citizens’ Council on City Planning, 
detailed below, shed some light on how planners intended to keep the expressway from 
ruining the natural ambiance of the park.    
In November 1948 Bacon and assistant site planner (and future Executive 
Director of the Citizens’ Council) Aaron Levine met with members of the Citizens’ 
Council to discuss the expressway.  While some Council members had entered the 
meeting with doubts about running the road through Fairmount Park, they were 
persuaded quickly that the Planning Commission’s plan was best.86  Later that month, the 
Citizens’ Council went public with its support, proclaiming: 
The Expressway route has been carefully located to avoid 
as far as practicable interference with the appearance and 
the functioning of Fairmount Park.  Along most of its 
length the Expressway is located just to the west of the 
Reading [Railroad] tracks where it is shielded from the rest 
of the Park both by planting and by differences in 
elevation.  Owing to its location near the tracks and the 
sloping terrain, this strip is of small scenic and recreational 
value.87 
 
Perhaps because the Citizens’ Council’s steadfast support of the Schuylkill Expressway 
route made it appear to be a fait accompli, there seems to have been no organized public 
opposition by Philadelphians to building the expressway through the park.  As a result, 
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the FPC stood virtually alone when some of its members began to have qualms about the 
expressway a few years later. 
The first phase of the Schuylkill Expressway was built between 1950 and 1954 in 
suburban Montgomery County, connecting the eastern terminus of the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike at King of Prussia with City Line Avenue, the border between Philadelphia and 
its northwestern suburbs.  As a result, the Planning Commission and Pennsylvania 
Department of Highways did not develop detailed, final plans for the Fairmount Park 
portion of the road right away.  When such plans emerged in late 1952, however, some of 
the park commissioners were displeased with what they saw, leading to a flurry of 
activity at FPC meetings between September and December that year.  In September, 
following a presentation by city and state officials, the FPC gave the proposed rout  its 
tentative approval, with two caveats – first, that the state build underpasses to provide 
access to parts of the park that would otherwise be isolated, and second, that the design of
the road be altered to preserve rather than fill in the Schuylkill Canal locks in the vicinity 
of the park which, despite the decline of commercial shipping traffic on the Schuylkill, 
were still used by pleasure boaters.88  Before these issues could be resolved, 
Commissioner John B. Kelly complained at the October meeting that the proposed route 
would “ruin the appearance” of a large section of the park, “do away with the locks,” and 
would interfere with the Philadelphia Zoo.  “Mr. Kelly felt that the present plan would be 
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a mistake,” according to the minutes of that meeting, “and he wished to be recorded as 
having said so.”89 
  Kelly, a former bricklayer who gained fame in the 1920s as an Olympic rowing 
champion (and whose daughter, actress Grace Kelly, later became Princess Grace of 
Monaco), had run for mayor as a Democrat in 1935, losing by 49,000 votes at a time 
when the Republicans maintained a stranglehold on City Hall.  He joined the FPC in 
1939, becoming vice-president in 1952 and president in 1958.  During his tenure, Kelly 
was known as a vociferous advocate for Fairmount Park who was responsible for two 
innovations in the park that met initially with opposition – the building of a playhouse 
and an Olympic-sized swimming pool, the latter of which was named in his honor.90  
Despite his earlier victories, Kelly’s protests regarding the locks fell on deaf ears, 
because state officials estimated it would cost an additional $1 million to preserve th  
locks, an expense they considered “untenable.”  Although Kelly relented on the issue of 
underpasses, he remained staunchly opposed to the destruction of the locks.  In this 
position he was joined by Commissioner Harold Saylor, who reminded the other 
commissioners that had been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining the park for 
the people of Philadelphia and that doing away with the locks would destroy a significant 
part of the park’s utility.  After a heated discussion that included a warning from Mayor 
Joseph Clark that the city could lose state funds by delaying its approval over the lock 
issue, the commissioners voted 10-4 in favor of the state-approved route.91  
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Commissioner Kelly charged Clark and his administration angrily with pressuring the 
city officials on the Fairmount Park Commission to approve the state’s route by telling
them that the state would refuse to build the Schuylkill Expressway otherwise.  Kelly 
sought unsuccessfully to have the city officials removed from the FPC.92   
At another meeting on December 11, the FPC reversed course twice – first by
overturning its earlier acceptance of the state’s route (based on a change th t moved a 
ramp to land the commissioners wanted to use for parking at the Philadelphia Zoo), and 
then by accepting it again, this time by a 9-2 vote.  An outraged Kelly, one of only two 
remaining dissenters, proclaimed, “I’m against the whole business.  The state wants to 
wreck the park just to save a little money.  We’ve got a park you couldn’t buy anywhere 
and now the state wants to pour concrete all over it.”93  Most of the commissioners, 
however, continued to express concern that they would be responsible for the city losing 
$8 million in state funds were they to delay the expressway.94 
One issue remained open, however, as the FPC decided at its December 11 
meeting to prepare its own plan for how to route the expressway around the zoo, which 
stood within the park on the west bank of the Schuylkill River.  An easterly route, which 
the state preferred due to its lower cost, would run between the zoo and the river, while a 
westerly route, advocated by the FPC, would leave the land between the zoo and the river
undisturbed.  On December 17, the FPC presented its alternate plan to Edmund Bacon, 
Mayor Clark, and other city officials, who agreed to ask the state to postpone work on 
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that portion of the expressway until the alternate plan could be evaluated.95  In June 1953, 
however, the Planning Commission rejected the idea of proposing the westerly route as 
its preferred plan due to the extra $5.4 million the city would have to pay toward the 
increased cost.  Money was not the only issue – state officials let it be known that 
regardless of cost, they considered the FPC’s westerly route to be too dangerous for 
drivers due to its many curves.96 
Pennsylvania Secretary of Highways E.L. Schmidt claimed that the state was “of 
a mind” not to build the expressway through the park until city officials could get their 
act together and agree on a definite route.  Schmidt, of course, coupled his threat wit a 
reminder that the state would have to use the money for other projects if Philadelp i  
could not commit quickly.    Fairmount Park Commission chair Charles Thompson was 
concerned, fretting that “if the state stays out, that means they’ll drop the expressway at 
City Line, leaving thousands of automobiles to find their way through the park as best 
they can.”  Commissioner Joseph Gaffney scoffed at Thompson’s fear, replying, “We’re 
not children.  Why should we be frightened by a lot of wild talk like that from Schmidt?  
He’s not going to drop that road at City Line.  He’s got to build it south and we ought to 
make him put it where we want it.”  Mayor Clark was not so bold, proclaiming, “We 
don’t like it, but we will take it, because we can’t afford to leave it.”97   
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Seeking a compromise, the FPC proposed building a viaduct that would elevate 
the expressway in order to carry it past the east side of the zoo without wrecking the 
riverbank.  Republican Governor John Fine, a former judge in northeastern Pennsylvania, 
said that he would consider the compromise plan, not wanting his administration to go 
down in history as having “chopped down thousands of trees.”98  The City Council 
approved the FPC’s viaduct route, but needed final approval from the city’s Art 
Commission, which had the ability to veto certain structures that would affect the ci y’s 
physical appearance.99  City officials did not anticipate that this would be a problem, but 
the Art Commission surprised everyone by voting down the proposed viaduct, saying it 
would destroy the natural beauty of a long stretch of river frontage in the park.  The 
failure of its compromise plan left the FPC with no alternative but to accept the state’s 
plan to route the expressway east of the zoo at ground level.100  The city’s business 
community, represented most prominently by the Greater Philadelphia Movement, urged 
that the city approve the ground-level route quickly so that construction could begin.101   
The battle over Fairmount Park was now, for all intents and purposes, over.  The 
Fairmount Park Commission had lost on every single point on which it had challenged 
the route and design of the Schuylkill Expressway.  Three Philadelphians, acting on a 
                                                     
98 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 24 September 1953, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
99 The Art Commission, known prior to 1951 as the Art Jury, had the power to approve or disapprove 
certain items that would affect the city’s physical appearance, including “structures or fixtures to be erected 
over highways, streams, lakes, squares, parks or othe public places within the city.”  City of Philadelphia, 
Department of Records and Free Library of Philadelphia, “Philadelphia Information Locator Service:  
Agency Information”; available from 
http://www.phila.gov/phils/Docs/Inventor/graphics/agencies/A140.htm; Internet; accessed 25 September 
2009. 
100 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 7 October 1953, 13 November 1953, George D. McDowell Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
101 Greater Philadelphia Movement, Annual report, 1953, Papers of the Greater Philadelphia Movement, 
Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
64 
 
suggestion from former Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice Grover Ladner that “some 
public spirited citizens” should sue to prevent the expressway from cutting through the 
park, did sue the FPC in November 1953 to prevent it from ceding the necessary land to 
the state.102  The lawsuit seems to have generated little public support.  An editorial in the 
Evening Bulletin expressed disapproval, calling it “unthinkable” that “any Philadelphian 
would deliberately kill the [expressway] project,” and bemoaning the “danger that it will 
die or be seriously delayed” or that the city would lose state funds “to other communities 
that know what they want and can speak with undivided voices.”103  
To the relief of many, the legal challenge to the expressway failed.  Becaus  the 
road would affect the physical appearance of the park, officials still needed the approval 
of the Art Commission.  Feeling, evidently, that a ground-level expressway would be less 
unsightly than a viaduct, the Art Commission approved the state’s plan in early 1954.104  
Later that year, construction on the first section of the Schuylkill Expressway within 
Philadelphia began.105  Ironically, several years later, the Evening Bulletin – seeming to 
have forgotten its earlier desire that the community “speak with undivided voices” – 
grumbled about the damage being done to Fairmount Park in an editorial entitled “Park 
Beauty or Roads?”  After recounting the story of the Fairmount Park Commission’s 
expulsion in 1871 of surveyors attempting to lay a new railroad line across the park, the 
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paper observed, “No one would dare behave that way with these lords of creation, the 
modern concrete highway engineers.”  The editorial continued as follows: 
It makes no difference (although John B. Kelly put up a 
stout fight) whether the Schuylkill Expressway will cut off 
ready access to about a mile of the river bank. . . . We know 
the force of one magic formula, which runs as follows:  If 
you people won’t accept the highway line as we have 
traced it, then you don’t get this wonderful State money.  
The Federal Highway Act has multiplied many times the 
power of this appeal.  But, in the case of park land and park 
amenities created for other purposes, it amounts to saying:  
If you don’t give us what doesn’t belong to you, we won’t 
ruin the beauty you keep in trust for all the people.106  
 
The paper’s change of heart came too late to make a difference.  By 1958, the section of 
the Schuylkill Expressway cutting through Fairmount Park was complete. 
The controversies over the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension and the Fairmount 
Park portion of the route delayed the Schuylkill Expressway a bit, but did nothing to stop 
the steamroller, both literal and figurative, of highway planning and construction in the
1940s and 1950s.  Neither battle resulted in a reexamination of Philadelphia’s 
transportation planning priorities or a searching analysis of the overall impact of urban 
expressways.  The overwhelming consensus in favor of expressway construction on the 
part of planners, engineers, and elected officials resulted by 1959 in a highway that 
Philadelphians considered dangerous, obsolete, and clogged hopelessly with bumper-to-
bumper traffic. 
For city officials, battles over expressway routes were dangerous nuisances that at 
best delayed projects, and at worst threatened the loss of funds for projects they perceived 
as desperately needed.  This fear was exacerbated by the knowledge that th federal 
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government was preparing to pass what ultimately became the National Interstate and 
Defense Highways Act (commonly known as the Interstate Highway Act) of 1956, a 
landmark piece of legislation that raised the financial stakes considerably for all 
concerned with expressway planning.  The lesson city officials learned from the 
Fairmount Park fight, which had delayed the project by approximately 18 months, was to
do everything possible to get quick City Council approval of future expressway routes 
before complications could arise.  This issue loomed particularly large in 1955, as 
planners worked on the Delaware Expressway, a highway they expected to be built
largely with federal money.107 
The Delaware Expressway:  Early Controversies 
 
As early as 1949, before ground was even broken for the construction of the 
Schuylkill Expressway, many – including expressway proponents – predicted accurately 
that the expressway would be inadequate to serve the city’s traffic needs.  This 
realization, however, did not prompt a wholesale reassessment of Philadelphia’s 
transportation planning strategy.  On the contrary, the prevailing philosophy in favor of 
expressways was so strong that planners and politicians alike believed that if a ighway 
built to relieve traffic congestion became clogged with traffic itself, the solution was 
simply to build another highway.  “The answer” to ensuring that the Schuylkill 
Expressway would not become overwhelmed with traffic, reported the Evening Bulletin 
in 1949, “is the Delaware Expressway.”108      
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The Delaware Expressway was the manifestation of planners’ longstanding vision 
of a major highway running along the Delaware River, which formed the city’s eastern 
boundary as well as the boundary between Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  Back in 1944, 
planners had considered putting an expressway on a widened Delaware Avenue, the 
city’s existing waterfront thoroughfare, but engineers expressed doubt as to whether this 
could be done without interfering with port operations.109  The idea was put on hold while 
attention turned to the Schuylkill Expressway, but it was clear from the beginnin  that 
planners expected the two highways to work in tandem one day.  The Planning 
Commission’s first explicit mention of the Schuylkill Expressway, in its 1947 annual 
report, declared that the highway would “extend from the Delaware Expressway” without 
at that time giving further detail on the latter.110  In 1949, once the city had forwarded 
initial plans for the Schuylkill Expressway to the state highway department, th  Planning 
Commission identified the Delaware Expressway as its next priority in transportation 
planning.111  City officials such as Edmund Bacon and Thomas Buckley, despite 
advocating vigorously for the Schuylkill, were already concerned that it would be 
inadequate to handle the traffic it would attract, and told state officials in 1949 that the 
Delaware Expressway was essential for drawing congestion away from the Schuylkill.112 
To Philadelphia planners, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 heightened the 
need for more expressways.  Reviewing its plans “in the light of war demands,” the 
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Planning Commission concluded that “the grave international situation” created the need 
for a modern expressway system, “valuable both for increasing efficiency of war 
production and aiding in civilian evacuation problems.”  Construction of the Delaware 
Expressway should begin as soon as possible, said the Commission, “to further the 
defense effort.”  The proposed location of the expressway made it particularly rucial, 
planners believed, to the development of Philadelphia’s wartime economy, due to the 
large amount of industry concentrated on the waterfront.  As the Commission explained, 
“The Delaware Expressway would become in effect the conveyor belt of Philadelphia as 
a producing unit, providing for the transportation of materials and parts between the 
various units in the total process of producing the finished product.  It will provide access 
to the piers and the warehouses essential for operation of the port.  In addition it will help 
workers to get to the industrial areas and would be of great value in the event of a disaster 
requiring civilian evacuation.”113 
The Greater Philadelphia Movement supported the Delaware Expressway from 
the beginning, agreeing with the Planning Commission’s rationale that a waterfront 
highway would help to spur economic development and keep the city’s port busy.  As the 
GPM’s Executive Committee stated in 1953, the expressway “would provide good 
highway transportation facilities from the industrial development taking placein th  
Bucks County area to the Philadelphia Port.  If construction of this expressway is 
delayed, it is possible that business which should come from this area to Philadelphia 
                                                     
113 Philadelphia City Planning Commission, Annual report, 1950, p. 1, City of Philadelphia, Department of 
Records, City Archives, RG 145, Philadelphia City Planning Commission. 
69 
 
Port will find it easier to get to Port Newark.”114  The GPM’s reference to Bucks County, 
a growing suburban area immediately to the north of the city, showed that highway 
proponents thought of the Delaware Expressway as a way to keep Philadelphia 
economically relevant during an era in which it was losing population and jobs to the 
suburbs.  In this vein, the Planning Commission released a report calling the expressway 
a “Regional Life Line,” and pointing out that it “connects with the United States S el 
plant at Morrisville [and] the Levittown, Fairless Hills and other rapidly expanding 
residential areas of lower Bucks County.”115    
Also contributing to the rationale for the Delaware Expressway was the ongoing 
effort to build a new Food Distribution Center to replace the decaying wholesale food 
market in Center City, near the waterfront.  In February 1955, the Greater Philadelphi  
Movement took the lead by chartering the Food Distribution Center Corporation with a 
board of directors consisting of GPM members, other businessmen, and city officials.  
Consistent with Philadelphia tradition, private business interests cooperated clos ly with 
city government to undertake a major redevelopment project.  The site of the new cent r 
was in South Philadelphia, not far from the Delaware River, on land the city had been 
using as a dump site.  The Food Distribution Center was a huge undertaking; the first
phase was completed in 1958, but the center continued to evolve until its final completion 
in 1966.116  The food wholesalers who moved into the new facility were eager to see the 
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new expressway completed, as it would pass close by the distribution center, aiding 
greatly the transportation of foodstuffs.    
The Planning Commission spent much of 1951 studying various routes for the 
Delaware Expressway, and by January 1952, had come up with preliminary plans.117  In 
keeping with the closed atmosphere surrounding highway planning in the 1950s, it 
appears that the Commission consulted the public neither on the need for the expressway 
nor on the preliminary routes to be studied.  By 1953, the Commission turned its focus to 
the thorny problem of how the project would be funded.118  Because a large amount of 
city and state money was already tied up in the Schuylkill Expressway, planners d 
other officials considered seriously the prospect of making the Delaware Exp ssway a 
toll road, a strategy the Planning Commission’s consulting engineers, Madigan-Hyland, 
found feasible.119  Democratic mayor Joseph Clark, who had been elected in 1951 to 
replace Samuel (who had served two terms and was not eligible for reelection), took the 
opportunity to chide the state Department of Highways for shortchanging Philadelphia on 
road construction funds relative to rural areas of the state.  The Delaware Expressway, he 
lamented, “will have to be a toll highway unless the State Highway Department is 
prepared to be more generous to Philadelphia in the future than it has been in the past.”120  
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By 1955, however, federal legislation for a new interstate highway system see ed 
closer to reality.  Proponents of the Delaware Expressway wanted desperately to have all 
of their ducks in a row by the time Congress acted so that Philadelphia would have first 
crack at a giant new pot of federal money.  Planners recalled nervously the fight over the 
route of the Schuylkill Expressway that had delayed the project and hoped that a similar 
result could be avoided this time.  What the city needed, said the Evening Bulletin, was “a 
route which will get [City] Council support without a prolonged wrangle.  A fight will 
hurt, and perhaps doom, the project.”121   
When the Interstate Highway Act became law in June 1956, bringing with it the 
possibility of having the federal government pay for 90% of the Delaware Expressway, 
the question of building a toll road faded away, replaced by a focus on ensuring that 
Philadelphia could obtain enough of Pennsylvania’s share of federal funds under the new 
law.  Delaware Expressway proponents were well aware that they would be competing 
with other localities throughout Pennsylvania for the state’s share of federal money.  
Deputy Managing Director John Bailey told his boss, Managing Director Donald W gner 
(a member of the mayor’s cabinet), of a conversation he had had with Arthur 
Wiesenberger, Chief Engineer of the state highway department.  He had gone to meet 
with Wiesenberger to complain that the state had not yet placed the Delaware 
Expressway on its preliminary highway plan and was resisting making a financial 
contribution to engineering studies for the road.   
Bailey came away from his talk with Wiesenberger with a sense of the “obvious 
reluctance in the State to paying for any planning which would tend to get more interstate 
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money into Philadelphia.”  In fact, Wiesenberger had said plainly that unless 
Pennsylvania elected another Democratic governor in the next election, Philadelphia had 
little hope of completing the Delaware Expressway due to the “terrific amount of sniping 
in the hinterland about the amount of work being done in Philadelphia.”122  If the city 
hoped to get its highway built, Wiesenberger advised, it had to be willing to spend the 
money to create sound engineering studies upon which to base its application for federal 
aid.123   
The Planning Commission already had its consultants from the firm of Edwards, 
Kelcey, and Beck working on engineering studies to be submitted to the state and federal 
governments.124  Early on, it was apparent that the prevailing ethos of prioritizing 
expressway construction to the exclusion of mass transportation improvements had not 
changed.  One question the engineers resolved quickly was whether to integrate mass 
transit into the design of the Delaware Expressway.  R.F. Tyson, the president of the 
Philadelphia Transportation Company, advocated building the highway with a wide 
median strip to accommodate mass transit tracks.  “For too many years,” he complained, 
“too many highway and traffic engineers were almost completely engrossed in meeting 
the requirements of the motorist, giving very little if any attention to the needs of those 
who use mass transportation.”125  The engineers rejected the expressway as a mass transit 
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route, however, because the waterfront route provided an “extreme marginal rather th n 
axial location.”126  An independent engineer named Charles Elcock wrote to Edmund 
Bacon proposing that bus stops be placed along the expressway, with dedicated lanes to 
allow the buses to enter and exit the main travel lanes safely, but Bacon rejected this idea 
as well, replying that buses could pick up passengers in their own neighborhoods and 
then use the expressway for non-stop runs.127  Planners never revisited the question of 
using the Delaware Expressway corridor for mass transit. 
The consulting engineers had listed public opinion as one of the factors that 
would bear on choosing an expressway route, but given the tenor of the times, it is likely
that they underestimated how influential a factor it would become.  Planners hoped that 
the Delaware Expressway would be less controversial than the Schuylkill Expressway – a 
hope that was, frankly, incredibly naive.  The Schuylkill Expressway followed a river 
route for the vast majority of its course through the city, with only the Fairmount Park 
section of the road and the Roosevelt Boulevard spur cause for serious unrest.  In 
contrast, the Delaware Expressway was to run the length of the city’s historic waterfront 
on a course totaling 30 miles from one city line to another, demolishing the factories, 
warehouses, homes, and churches in its path.  The multiple battles that occurred over the 
expressway between 1956 and 1979, when the highway was completed, made the 
difficulties surrounding the Schuylkill Expressway appear less than insign ficant by 
comparison. 
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Although the Delaware Expressway did prove to be an extremely controversial 
and drawn-out highway project, the early struggles over the road’s planning, in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, were minor compared to the battles of the later 1960s and 1970s.  
As was true with the Schuylkill Expressway controversies, some citizens sought 
alterations to the route to preserve their own homes, churches, or businesses, but failed to 
question the basic assumptions that underlay the era’s expressway construction.  Because 
no one was able to get planners to reconsider their devotion to expressways in the 1950s, 
the Delaware Expressway’s completion was a foregone conclusion by the time 
expressway planning became more democratic and more citizens awoke to the 
destructive consequences of the concrete monsters tearing through the nation’s cities. 
The battle over the expressway route began in 1956, with the first question being 
whether to run the expressway along Delaware Avenue, on the waterfront, or closer to 
Front Street, one block farther inland.  As was the case in the 1940s, some were 
concerned that placing the highway too close to the Delaware River would interfere with 
port operations.  Transportation consultant James Buckley pointed out that placing the 
Delaware Expressway on Delaware Avenue would have:  
a blighting effect both on the adjacent waterfront property 
to the east, and on the related commercial and warehouse 
facilities to the west.  Since waterfront and waterfront-
related activity is basic to the Philadelphia economy and to 
its continued growth and prosperity, the installation of the 
Expressway in Delaware Avenue is not compatible with the 
best interests of the City and its people.  An alignment west 
of Delaware Avenue should be adopted.128 
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Others concerned with the highway’s impact on the business community and economic 
life of the city shared this concern.  Harry Schad, chair of the Joint Executive Committee 
for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port Area, told Bacon that 
placing the Delaware Expressway right on the river would present “an unalterable 
obstacle to the free and easy movement of traffic within the port area.”129  James Sutton, 
chair of the Philadelphia Committee on City Policy, agreed.130 
The prospect of moving the highway farther inland caused substantial distress in 
several quarters of the city where leaders and residents had advocated a watrfront route, 
which they believed would be less disruptive to their communities.  Objections to a Front 
Street route were based on concerns about the destruction of treasured buildings and 
homes in the waterfront area – the most historic part of one of America’s most historic 
cities.  One area of particular concern was Elfreth’s Alley, a small residential lane in the 
Society Hill neighborhood between Front and 2nd Streets and containing some of the most 
historic homes in America, which looked much as they did in colonial days.  The 
Elfreth’s Alley Association and the Philadelphia Society for the Preservation of 
Landmarks wrote to Albert Greenfield, chair of the Planning Commission, asking that he 
prevent the Delaware Expressway from harming the beloved street and its irreplaceable 
homes.131   
Southwark, a mostly Catholic neighborhood near the waterfront in South 
Philadelphia, was the site of significant anxiety regarding a potential inland route for the 
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Delaware Expressway. The generally agreed upon boundaries of Southwark were the 
Delaware River and 3rd Street on the east and west, and South Street and Washington 
Avenue on the north and south.  Being a waterfront neighborhood, Southwark was one of 
the oldest parts of Philadelphia; Swedes were the first Europeans to settle there, in 1653, 
and the neighborhood experienced dramatic growth between 1740 and 1770.  In the 
1960s, Southwark was populated mainly by white ethnic groups, including many people 
of Polish, Russian, and Irish descent.  It was a decidedly working-class neighborhood:  
the three census tracts encompassing Southwark had median family incomes in 1960 of 
$4,933, $3,988, and $3,987, compared to a national median of $5,620.132 
Residents of Southwark were worried that shifting the expressway route cl ser to 
Front Street would result in the destruction of several historic churches, some of which 
had served the area’s various ethnic communities for centuries.  They were also 
concerned about a route that would isolate the most well-known of these churches, Gloria 
Dei, also known as Old Swedes’ Church, from the rest of the neighborhood.  Old 
Swedes’ was built on the waterfront in 1700 and was the oldest church in Pennsylvania.  
The area around it, like Society Hill, was studded with historic houses, many of which lay 
in the expressway’s proposed path.  The Colonial Philadelphia Historical Society was 
moved to say that “location of the proposed Delaware Expressway on Front Street 
between Elfreth’s Alley and Old Swedes’ Church would mean the greatest slaughter of 
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early Philadelphia houses ever proposed.”133  The Reverend Henry Walsh of Sacred 
Heart Rectory asked Democratic mayor Richardson Dilworth, a close ally of Mayor 
Clark’s who had succeeded him in 1956, whether he was “on the side of human beings, 
or on the side of the engineers whose hearts are apparently made of the steel and concrete 
with which they would build a highway on the crushed homes of thousands of people and 
the ruins of six Catholic parishes.”134 
The protests over an inland route were not limited to South Philadelphia and 
Center City.    Joseph Schafer, chair of the Traffic and Transportation Committee of he 
United Northeast Civic Association – an umbrella community organization in the large,
mainly white section of the city known as Northeast Philadelphia – denounced the 
Planning Commission’s engineers for dismissing the waterfront route his organization 
had suggested, accusing them of “gross misrepresentation” and having “distorted the true
facts” in order to comply with the wishes of the Northeast Philadelphia Chamber of 
Commerce that the area be reserved exclusively for industrial use.  “To shield a few 
industrialists from a highway across [sic] the river,” he charged, “the Northeast Chamber, 
the engineers, and the city officials would sacrifice many other industrial plants and 
homes affecting thousands of people.”135  A few months later, in his role as president of 
the Businessmen’s and Taxpayers’ Association of Frankford, Schafer continued to argue 
for a riverfront route, asserting that it would result in virtually no homes being destroy d 
in his area and that the highway could be designed to avoid interference with business 
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operations.  In fact, he claimed, a riverfront expressway would invite improvement of that 
area and result in the expansion of port facilities in the Northeast section of the city.136   
Although planners made no final decisions on the Delaware Expressway route in 
1956, the Planning Commission seemed at the outset more receptive to the concerns of 
Philadelphia’s business community about the highway’s potential impact on port 
operations.  In October 1956, the Commission proposed officially moving part of the 
route that would most affect the port area west from Delaware Avenue to the area of 
Front Street.137  As 1957 dawned, planners were expending much of their energy trying to 
determine how the expressway would affect the city’s businesses.  A consultant the 
Planning Commission hired to assist with this issue compiled a list of companies whose 
property might be taken for the highway; the companies named revealed a broad array of 
potentially affected industries, including sugar refining, metal, transportation, 
warehousing and safe deposit, dairies, plywood, groceries, auto body works, bags, syrup, 
electric power, trucking, tools, soap, oil products, chemicals, fabrics, auto parts, packing 
coal, and lace.138  Mayor Dilworth assured businesses in the area that “if it becomes 
necessary for you to relocate your plant, every effort will be made to help you find a 
place in the City, with a minimum of inconvenience to your operations.”  The city’s 
Department of Commerce, he told them, had already begun to make arrangements, such 
as listing all the available manufacturing and warehousing floor space in the city, listing 
all available land in the city on which new plants could be built, and offering emergency 
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engineering and economic assistance to businesses required to move.139  Clearly, 
Dilworth and his administration were committed to ensuring that the expressway, which 
was designed in part to enhance the city’s economic life, not be allowed to decimate 
Philadelphia’s industries. 
By early 1957, City Council had decided on the inland route, the state Department 
of Highways had approved the same, and the Bureau of Public Roads had placed the 
Delaware Expressway on the Interstate System.140  Dilworth, unaware of the difficulties 
yet to come, told Pennsylvania Secretary of Highways Lewis Stevens in late 1957 that the 
“short but sharp argument” over the route of the expressway had been resolved in favor 
of Front Street because the Delaware Avenue route “met with violent, and I believe 
sound, objections from port interests, railroads, and our own Department of 
Commerce.”141  Although the United Northeast Civic Association continued to object 
strenuously to an inland route, Managing Director Wagner felt that the mayor should 
advise state officials to ignore these protests as “not representative of any large group.”142  
In truth, Northeast Philadelphia was divided on the issue.  Bruce Beaton, another 
Northeast Philadelphia civic leader whose organization was a member of the United
Northeast Civic Association, asserted a few months later that Schafer and his supporters 
were not representative of the area as a whole or even of the UNCA, and that many 
                                                     
139 Richardson Dilworth to All Firms Affected by the Installation of the Delaware Expressway, 6 March 
1957, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 145, Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission. 
140 “Mayor’s Route is Accepted for Delaware Expressway,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 January 1957, p, 19. 
141 Richardson Dilworth to Lewis Stevens, 22 November 1957, City of Philadelphia, Department of 
Records, City Archives, RG 145, Philadelphia City Planning Commission. 
142 Donald Wagner to Richardson Dilworth, 31 October 1957, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, 
City Archives, RG 60-2.4, Administration of Richardson Dilworth. 
80 
 
residents joined the Northeast Chamber of Commerce in preferring a river rout  because 
it would be less disruptive to industry.143  
Mayor Dilworth’s belief that the expressway route was settled was disproven 
soon afterward when the Department of Highways rescinded its original accept n e of 
the city’s route based on its engineers’ determination that eight lanes, rather than the 
four- and six-lane sections the city had called for, were necessary.  As a result, the 
Planning Commission’s engineers went back to the drawing board and came up with a 
new design, approved by City Council and the Department of Highways by mid-1958, 
calling for a route that would swing even further west, cut into more residential areas, and 
act as a barrier between residential neighborhoods and the more industrial areas on the 
waterfront.144   
The Evening Bulletin fretted that the new expressway route would create “an 
imposing barrier” that would, along with future urban highways, make Philadelphia 
“more sectionalized than ever.”145  Controversy over the route continued to rage, 
particularly in South Philadelphia, where the route was slated to impact heavily both 
houses and Catholic parishes.  In response to the inquiries of worried citizens, Dilworth 
downplayed the city’s role in selecting a route, insisting that the location of the
expressway was “entirely within the control” of state and federal authorities because they 
would be providing most of the funding.146  Dilworth’s claims were disingenuous at best, 
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for City Hall was clamoring for the Delaware Expressway and the city’s Planning 
Commission, as always, played a major role in developing proposals for route and desig.  
Had Philadelphia declined the Delaware Expressway funds, of course, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Highways would have been happy to allocate its share of federalhighway 
money to other projects throughout the state.   
In the summer of 1958, city councilman Victor Moore of South Philadelphia, who 
chaired City Council’s Delaware Expressway Committee, proposed a drastic change to 
the route in an effort to relieve his constituents’ anxiety.  Under his plan, the Delawar  
Expressway would be built only as far south as Lombard Street or Washington Avenue 
(which would spare all or most of South Philadelphia) and then swing westward over one 
of those streets to connect with the Schuylkill Expressway, thereby creating a loop 
around Center City.  Rather than soothe the controversy, Moore’s plan served only to 
stoke it.  Objections abounded, from residents who were concerned that a westward 
swing would take even more homes; from clergy worried about losing homes in their 
parishes; from South Philadelphians who did not want to lose a recreation center lying in
Moore’s route; and from executives of Philadelphia’s Food Distribution Center, deep in 
South Philadelphia, who wanted the new expressway to reach their facility.147  Dilworth 
derided Moore’s proposal, calling it the “counsel of timidity and fear.”148 
After several months of haggling, City Council reached a compromise in 
November 1958 by which the expressway route in South Philadelphia would once again 
be shifted farther toward the waterfront – specifically, east of Water Str et, a small north-
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south thoroughfare running in between Delaware Avenue and Front Street.  Placated 
somewhat, Councilman Moore agreed to recommend this route to his committee.149  A 
report from consulting engineers Simpson & Curtin, whom the GPM hired to study the 
issue at the mayor’s request, aided the compromise.  The engineers found that if the 
expressway were not built to reach South Philadelphia, the area would become, as the 
GPM put it, “an isolated island of economic stagnation” and “a congested superslum 
overrun with automobiles and trucks by 1975.”  The GPM later took credit for breaking 
the “bottleneck” on the South Philadelphia question and ensuring that the expressway 
would be built as far south as Packer Avenue.150 
In 1959, three years of controversy and route alterations had taken their toll, and 
the expressway was already far behind schedule.  In July of that year, engineers had 
completed final designs for only 2.9 miles of what was to be a 30-mile route through the 
city, and only $5 million had been spent out of an expected $300 million.  Moreover, the 
Department of Highways was saying it was now short the funds it would need to pay for
its 10% of the road.151  Mayor Dilworth had predicted in May that the expressway would 
be delayed a dozen years if both federal and state gas taxes – the primary sources of 
highway funds – were not increased.152  The funding issue seemed to be a major obstacle, 
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but those anxious to see the Delaware Expressway become a reality were unaware th t 
even darker days lay ahead. 
While delays mounted, Commissioner of Streets David Smallwood, a fierce 
expressway advocate, bemoaned the fact that the newly-completed Schuylkill 
Expressway was already inadequate to handle its traffic demand, heightening the need for 
expedited construction of the Delaware Expressway.153  No one in power, however, 
seems to have questioned whether the Delaware Expressway might, when completed, 
become just as clogged with traffic as the Schuylkill was.  Planners and politicians 
assumed the need for a new expressway so strongly that few bothered to suggest that it 
might not be the best solution to Philadelphia’s transportation problems.  A letter to the 
Evening Bulletin in August 1959 asserted that rather than solving traffic problems, a new 
expressway would exacerbate them.  Road construction, the writer pointed out, led to a 
rise in car ownership, which in turn led to the need for more roads.  “The net result,” he 
wrote, “has been the destruction of public transportation systems through lost patronage 
until it is predicted that within the next decade we will see the disappearance of it rcity 
railway passenger traffic. . . . Have we gone too far in this direction to be able to 
reverse?”154  In the Philadelphia of 1960, however, no answer was forthcoming, and few 
seemed interested in the question.  The Ev ning Bulletin, while admitting that the most 
“peaceful” course of action would be to forego the expressway completely, asserted that 
“the peaceful way is not always the best.”  “The Schuylkill Expressway, in 1960, seems 
indispensible,” the paper claimed, and “the Delaware Expressway quite likely will have 
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the same status a decade hence.”155  In 1960, however, the expressway was about to enter 
a new and even more contentious phase when engineers completed detailed plans for the 
Delaware Expressway’s Center City and South Philadelphia sections.  The result was 
more protest, political wrangling, and above all, delay. 
Mass Transportation:  The Postwar Decline 
 
Philadelphia’s expressway era, which began with the construction of the 
Schuylkill Expressway and early planning for the Delaware Expressway, coincided with 
the steep and severe decline of mass transportation.  City officials in the 1940s and 1950s 
prioritized expressways over mass transit consistently, mirroring a pattern that occurred 
in cities throughout the nation.  The disparity in priorities was, to some extent, the 
product of the Cold War and its accompanying Red Scare – a phenomenon that 
influenced virtually every area of American public policy.  Planners, politicians, and 
automobile drivers perceived new expressways to be the wave of the future, representing 
the things that distinguished the United States most from the Soviet Union.  Highways 
would, they believed, promote economic growth and allow more citizens to realize the 
American Dream by owning homes in the mushrooming suburbs.  Perhaps most 
importantly, Americans loved the automobile – a mode of transport over which 
individual drivers were supposed to have total control.  In contrast to the individualism 
and prosperity represented by autos and highways stood mass transportation, thought of 
by policymakers and others as a relic of the past, associated with collectivism, urban 
decay, and poverty.  White flight, which decimated Philadelphia and other cities, making 
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their populations and their mass transit ridership proportionately poorer and blacker, 
contributed to these associations.156 
Postwar cultural beliefs that promoted expressways at the expense of mass 
transportation helped to create structural factors that pointed in the same direction.  
Specifically, large amounts of state and federal money were available to assist cities with 
expressway construction, particularly after the passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956, which made available 90% federal funding for interstate highways.  The money, 
and the perception that Philadelphia was in competition with other areas of the state for 
Pennsylvania’s share of federal money, influenced priorities on the local level to a great 
extent.  There were no similar federal programs for urban mass transit prior to the 1960s, 
and the state was not willing to provide such funds either.  As a result, any mass transit 
improvements Philadelphia wanted to undertake had to come out of the city’s own 
coffers with no outside assistance.  Prior to 1968, all of Philadelphia’s mass 
transportation was run by private companies, making unpopular the idea of large capital 
expenditures, at taxpayers’ expense, for the benefit of private shareholders.157  The city 
sometimes urged the transit companies to make improvements, but the companies 
pleaded poverty.  Moreover, the city had no ability to force private companies to upgrade 
their systems short of terminating the operating agreements under which those companies 
provided service. 
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Problems inherent to mass transit, combined with the expressway boom, hastened 
its decline.  After the war, all of the area’s private transit companies – the Philadelphia 
Transportation Company, the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Reading Railroad – experienced declining patronage, 
shrinking revenues, aging infrastructure and equipment, higher operating costs, 
increasing customer dissatisfaction, and bitter fights with their customers, th ir workers, 
and city government over wages, fares, and service cutbacks.   
Even prior to World War II, urban mass transportation in Philadelphia had a 
troubled history.  The modern system took shape over the first few decades of the 
twentieth century:  electric streetcars were prominent by 1900; the city’s first transit line, 
the Market Street subway, was built in 1908 to serve the booming West Philadelphia 
suburbs; and an extensive modernization program between 1916 and 1934 resulted in the 
opening of the Frankford elevated line to Northeast Philadelphia in 1922, the North 
Broad Street subway in 1928, and the South Broad Street Subway and Ridge Avenue 
Connector in 1934-36.  Historian Sam Bass Warner called Philadelphia’s prewar transit 
program “an enormously expensive failure” because the amount of money spent was 
wildly disproportionate to the benefits gained.  The expansion of mass transportation had 
the unintended consequence of pushing the city’s population farther and farther outward, 
thereby increasing reliance on the automobile.  As Warner explained, “no transit system 
could satisfy all the many paths of travel of the diffuse residential suburbs,” making the 
private automobile a necessity for those who moved away from the downtown area.  
Transit ridership increased only 4.5 percent from 1912 to 1934, and downtown businesses 
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suffered as new shopping centers opened on the city’s fringes to serve suburban 
consumers.158  
The war interrupted what otherwise might have been a steady decline.  
Philadelphia, like many cities, experienced a large increase in mass tran it patronage due 
to wartime circumstances such as the halting of civilian auto production and the rationing 
of gasoline.  The spike in transit riders ended in 1946, however, after which the PTC lost 
riders steadily.  By 1955, the 1946 peak of over 1.1 billion riders had been cut nearly in 
half, to 620 million.159   The number of base fare passengers dropped every single year 
from 1946 to 1963, from 715 million down to 270 million.160  By early 1947, it was clear 
that any goodwill the PTC had accrued during the war had dissipated.  The company 
revealed that compared to 1940-41, it had in 1946 experienced a significant rise in 
customer complaints, including 75% more complaints about missed stops; 104% more 
about discourtesy; 97% more about rough and reckless driving; 46% more about service 
and equipment, and 85% more miscellaneous complaints.  Complaints had decreased (by 
20%) only with respect to tickets and fares.161   
The relative dearth of complaints about fares was understandable, as the PTC’s 
base fare of 8 cents (or two tokens for 15 cents) remained in place from 1924 all the way
to early 1947.162  Beginning in 1947, however, there were nearly constant battles between 
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the PTC, the city, and mass transit patrons over fare increases driven by increased labor 
costs.  That December, despite having received a wage increase a few months earlier, 
Local 234 of the Transit Workers’ Union notified the PTC of its desire to terminate the 
contract set to expire in February 1948.163  Tense negotiations took place that winter, and 
a threatened strike was averted narrowly when Mayor Samuel brokered a compromise 
that included a 15-cent raise for both the transit workers in Local 234 and the clerical 
workers in Local 187.164   
Unsurprisingly, the new labor contract was followed by the PTC’s announcement 
of a fare increase to take effect in March 1948.165  The city challenged the proposed 
increase, as it often did, before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), 
which had the authority to allow or disallow the new fare.  After the PUC affirmed the 
higher fare, the city appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court seeking to have the 
PUC’s decision overturned.166  Before the Superior Court had a chance to rule, the PTC 
filed for yet another fare increase to take effect in January 1949.167  Mayor Samuel 
protested immediately, asking the PUC to block the increase and charging in a formal 
complaint that the PTC was “endangering the health of the traveling public” by making 
passengers stand for long periods on crowded vehicles and “not making a sincere effort to
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render service to the public at a minimum cost and in an efficient manner.”168  Within a 
week of the fare announcement, the PTC and Local 234 began negotiations on a new 
labor contract, with the union asking for a substantial raise.169 
Things seemed to be looking up for the PTC in January 1949 when the Superior 
Court dismissed the city’s appeal of the March 1948 fare increase.  Less than a month 
later, however, Local 234 rejected the PTC’s wage offer and announced that there was no 
hope for a peaceful settlement.  The union also rejected Mayor Samuel’s offer to m diate 
the dispute, perhaps because the mayor had decided that it would be unfair of him to 
pressure the PTC to increase wages while fighting fare increases vigorously at the same 
time.170  As a result of the impasse, Philadelphia was forced to suffer through a 10-day 
transit strike, particularly unwelcome in the dead of winter, before the union settled for an 
8-cent wage increase and other benefits.171  Meanwhile, the PUC suspended the PTC’s 
latest request for a fare increase, and denied its request for a temporary emergency fare 
increase while the case was pending.172  In May 1949, however, the PUC did approve an 
increase to 13 cents (or 3 tokens for 35 cents).173  The PTC’s victory was short-lived, 
however, as the Superior Court ordered a return to the previous 10-cent fare until the 
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company could present more information regarding how much additional revenue it 
would need to maintain service and how it could be obtained.174   
PTC fare increases, while outraging the public, inspired little grassroot pr test, 
perhaps because City Hall was already committed to fighting each and every proposed 
increase.  In hindsight, it seems doubtful that more citizen protest would have 
strengthened the city’s already vigorous advocacy of the riding public’s interests.  In 
January 1949, a citizens’ committee formed to fight fare increases, but the group was 
headed by prominent citizens – such as Pennsylvania state senator Jerome Jaspan, 
Congressman Earl Chudoff, former City Solicitor Joseph Sharfsin, and chair of the 
Committee on City Government Maurice Burrison – rather than springing up from the 
grassroots.  The committee’s initial meeting drew about 100 people, a small crowd 
considering that transit fare increases affected residents throughout the city.175 
Another meeting in May 1949 of what was now called the Philadelphia Citizens 
Committee against a Fare Rise did draw 500 people, but it seemed that most 
Philadelphians were content to express their displeasure over transit fares by writing 
letters to newspaper editors rather than through mass political action.176  Some, such as 
Mrs. James A. Sine, chose to write directly to city officials.  Mrs. Sine told Mayor 
Samuel in 1950: 
If you really want to do something for the City of 
Philadelphia prevent that “other fare raise.”  For the sake of 
all the Philadelphians whose weekly wage scale is about 
half of that of the P.T.C. employees.  Also, realize that if 
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people could afford to pay such high fares they would own 
cars.177 
 
The PTC complained bitterly about the city’s constant opposition to fare 
increases, calling it “nothing less than cold-blooded confiscation.”  The city, claimed the 
PTC, blamed declining mass transit patronage entirely on fare increases whil  ignoring 
factors such as the shift to a five-day work week, television (which kept people at home 
in the evenings), and the decentralization of both industrial and residential areas, not to 
mention the surge in automobile ownership.178  On several occasions, the PTC threatened 
to cut service if it did not receive permission to raise fares, as in the summer of 1952, 
when it claimed that it was in immediate danger of bankruptcy and would need to cut 20 
to 25 Sunday routes if fares were not increased.179  Of course, the public, city 
government, and transit workers opposed threatened service cuts vociferously.  
Although most members of the public seemed to blame the PTC for fare increases 
and what they perceived to be subpar service, some believed that the problem stemmed 
from the greediness of Local 234 and its members, who, as previously mentioned, sought 
constant wage increases during the late 1940s and 1950s.  The Evening Bulletin went on 
record as blaming labor for transit’s troubles in a January 1950 editorial in which it noted 
that the PTC had operated at a loss of $2.5 million in 1949, and continued: 
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Mr. Quill [head of Local 234] is not interested in this fact.  
Speaking for his union, he says its members want more 
pay.  Not because living standards have increased – they 
haven’t.  The men just want more money.  Another fact of 
importance is that the company is entitled to earn a profit.  
That is recognized by the law.  It is common sense.  PT[C] 
is not a public charity.  It needs profit to maintain its plant 
in good shape, to establish its credit, to replace worn-out 
equipment.  The law has set up machinery to ensure that the 
company shall furnish satisfactory service and earn no 
more than a reasonable sum.  It does not furnish 
satisfactory service, and it doesn’t earn enough to furnish 
such service.  No inquiry is needed to establish the fact that 
even increased fares have not brought in the revenue which 
alone would justify another increase in wages.  Fare boosts 
do not solve the good service problem when the proceeds 
thereof are taken away from the company in wage boosts 
before it even gets its hands on them.180 
 
The Bulletin editorial reflected changing perceptions of organized labor after 
World War II.  In her 2005 study Pocketbook Politics, historian Meg Jacobs detailed the 
fracturing of the labor-consumer alliance in the postwar period.  In short, the United 
States experienced rampant inflation in the late 1940s, exacerbated by the end of wartime 
price controls.  Large business interests attempted to put the blame on organized labor’s 
efforts to obtain higher wages – a strategy that paid off with the election of a conservative 
Congress in 1946 and the passage of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act a year lter.  As 
many Americans came to see themselves primarily as consumers, defined increasingly by 
their material possessions, they perceived their interests as divergent from those of labor, 
particularly as cost-of-living wage increases ensured a wage-price spiral.181  It was in this 
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environment – part of a general rightward turn in American politics during the Cold War 
– that the PTC, Local 234, and City Hall conducted their battles over wages and fares.   
The 1949 fare battle ended with a denial of the base fare increase with an 
allowance for a small rise in transfer fares to take effect in October 1949.  The 
Department of City Transit called the result “a complete victory for half the City riders, 
who use one vehicle, and a partial victory for the other half by keeping the transfer 
charge down.”182  Just as the 1949 fare case was coming to its conclusion, Local 234 
sought to open its 1950 contract talks with the PTC.183  Although the union threatened 
another strike, the parties reached an agreement in January 1950 for another wage 
increase which, of course, spurred the PTC immediately to announce another fare 
increase, followed by the standard proclamation of outrage from Mayor Samuel.184 
The events of 1947-1950 were typical of the pattern that continued for most of the 
1950s.  The PTC’s annual report for 1948 reflected the company’s frustration at 
governmental resistance to fare increases in conjunction with workers’ deman s for 
higher wages: 
Your company is fighting to preserve its ability to render 
good service to the public.  It is fighting for the right to 
earn a fair return on the capital which provided the 
privately-owned transit lines carrying over 80% of all 
system passengers.  High costs and inadequate rates of fare 
are straining the resources of this transportation system, 
one of the finest in the world.  Unreasonable demands are 
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pressed by labor leaders.  Opposition to every move to 
bring revenues into line with higher costs is encountered.185 
 
Despite City Hall’s opposition, fares continued to rise steadily (althoug  not nearly as 
quickly as the PTC would have preferred).  Between February 1947 and January 1954, 
for example, fares rose six times, beginning with a February 1947 increase to 10 cents (or 
4 tokens for 35 cents) and ending with the January 1954 increase to 18 cents (or 2 tokens 
for 35 cents, with regular riders having the option of purchasing a book of 10 fares for 
$1.50).186  In 1955, the Evening Bulletin expressed the frustration that many in 
Philadelphia were no doubt feeling.  Seeming to absolve the city, the paper blamed both 
the PTC and the union, asserting that “if the private citizens’ comments were translated 
supernaturally into action, both houses would have plagues on them long ago.”  Simply 
put, the paper claimed, “There must be a better way of doing things than this.”187 
Many Philadelphians believed there was indeed a better way.  Weary of the 
constant battles between City Hall and the PTC over wages, fares and service, some 
called for public ownership of mass transit, as had already been established, or was in the 
process of being established, in most major cities.188  Cries for public ownership reached 
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a fever pitch when transit workers engaged in five wildcat strikes between August 1955 
and May 1956.189  Disgruntled riders complained in droves to the newspapers.  One 
exclaimed, “I’ve just about had it.  I have a car in my garage and have been using the 
PTC, but with the PTC persisting in its public-be-damned attitude, I’m going to pay the 
extra expense and ride to and from work in comfort.”190 
Mayor Dilworth was among those who believed strongly that the city should 
purchase the PTC.  In 1955, city negotiators began preliminary efforts to reach an 
agreement for purchase of the PTC system, but reached a stalemate quickly.191  By 
September 1956, Dilworth had reached the boiling point, calling the PTC’s demand of 
$102 million “strictly a pistol-at-the-head job” and warning that the company might soon 
“find itself out of business.”192  In the mid-1950s, Dilworth watched with dismay the 
flood of higher-income Philadelphians moving to the suburbs and expressed his desire to 
maintain the city’s central business district as a vibrant place of business, shopping, and 
entertainment.  Modernization of Philadelphia’s mass transit was crucial, he believed, and 
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only the city had the financial resources to make the needed improvements.193  Implied 
clearly was that the city did not desire to sink large amounts of capital into a system it did 
not own and allow private stockholders to reap additional profits by using taxpayers’ 
money.   
Dilworth’s detractors argued that municipal operation of mass transit would be 
inefficient, but Dilworth explained that he was advocating only city ownership, not 
operation, of the transit system.  His goal was to have a private operator (possibly even 
the PTC) run the system for a fixed fee with financial incentives for attracting additional 
passengers.  Without attracting more riders to mass transit, he believed, Center City 
Philadelphia would quickly “become a ghost town.”194  When negotiations with the PTC 
continued to go nowhere, Dilworth even threatened to go into competition with the PTC, 
a plan he dropped quickly due to the opposition of the business and banking community, 
which advised that such a move would ruin the city’s credit.195 
Mayor Dilworth remained convinced throughout the remainder of his 
administration that city ownership of the PTC was an absolute necessity.  For nearly fiv  
years, negotiations between the parties waxed and waned.  Under the city’s original 1907 
operating agreement with the PTC’s predecessor company, Philadelphia Rapid Transit, 
there were two ways the city could acquire the mass transit system.  One way was simply 
to negotiate a purchase price.  The second method stemmed from an option clause in the 
agreement, under which the price would be set by formula.  The city was reluctant to 
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invoke the option clause, because by its calculations, the sale price under the option 
formula would be $62 million, but the PTC maintained that it would be $95 million, far 
more than the city was willing to pay.  In the event that a court agreed with the PTC, the 
city would not be obligated to purchase at the option price, but would find itself in a 
weaker negotiating position.196  The operating agreement, which prevented the city from 
acquiring the transit system by eminent domain, as Pittsburgh’s Port Authority eventually 
did, placed Philadelphia in a difficult position in its efforts to take over the PTC.  As a 
result, the 1950s came to a close with the parties far apart in their bargaining positions, 
and public ownership of mass transit appearing to be a remote possibility. 
Although the PTC had problems – such as aging equipment, labor strife, increased 
operating costs, and government hostility – that existed apart from the rise of the 
automobile, its decline was hastened by the fact that Philadelphia’s planners ad 
politicians prioritized expressways over mass transit.  As is mentioned above, the City 
Planning Commission’s 1946 annual report made its priorities clear, providing extensive 
detail on the city’s need for an expressway system while deferring work on a 
comprehensive mass transit plan.197  In its 1949 annual report, the Planning Commission 
remarked on rapid residential decentralization, asserting that “the primary need” this 
trend created was for a modern expressway system.  The Planning Commission cat the
alternatives as widening existing streets or remodeling certain intersections, but did not 
even mention upgrading the city’s mass transit system as a possibility.  It was telling that 
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unlike previous annual reports, the 1949 version did not contain a separate section for 
mass transit.198 
Other city entities, such as the Philadelphia Highway Traffic Board (PHTB), 
seemed to share the Planning Commission’s disregard for mass transit.199  The PHTB was 
an advisory board charged with making recommendations to the mayor and City Council 
on how best to improve the city’s traffic conditions.200  During its 1948-1952 tenure, the 
board was most concerned with reducing congestion on local streets and its advice 
included removing trolley tracks, widening streets, and building garages to ensure that the 
city had adequate off-street parking.201  The PHTB was extremely concerned about the 
threat to downtown Philadelphia posed by decentralization, but seems not to have 
considered improvements to mass transit as a potential solution, focusing most of its 
energy instead on adding as many off-street parking spaces as possible.202 
Not all city agencies were silent on mass transit, however.  The Urban Traffic and 
Transportation Board (UTTB), established in 1954 to serve as an advisory body to Mayor 
Clark on all aspects of traffic and transportation problems, advocated a balance betwe n 
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expressways and mass transportation.  In 1955, the UTTB released its Plan and Program, 
a detailed report on the city’s future transportation planning needs, much of which the 
City Planning Commission incorporated into its 1960 Comprehensive Plan.203  The Plan 
and Program recommended 300 miles of new expressways for the region, 75 miles of 
which would be in Philadelphia itself.  The UTTB envisioned an extensive system of 
both circumferential and radial highways extending in every possible direction, burying 
the region in concrete.  
Despite its embrace of expressways, the UTTB acknowledged that its proposed 
highway improvements could be expected to handle only a 25% increase in vehicular 
traffic to the central business district.  “Excellent highway access to the area should be 
afforded to those who need it and are willing to pay for it,” the Board concluded, “but, at 
the same time, large volumes of people must continue to depend on public 
transportation.”  To that end, the UTTB made specific recommendations for improving 
Philadelphia’s mass transit, including improving the Market-Frankford elevated, 
extending the Broad Street subway in several directions, and providing express bus 
service to areas not accessible by rapid rail transit.204   
The UTTB’s 1955 plan, with its call for vast improvements to both expressways 
and mass transit, had something for everyone.  In reality, however, limited funds made it 
necessary for the city to prioritize its transportation needs.  The dynamics of expressway 
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financing, which provided the city with large returns on its investments in the form of 
state and federal funds, made it almost a foregone conclusion that planners and elected 
officials would give highways priority over mass transit.  Soon, the UTTB recognized 
that “the maintenance of an adequate and improved public transportation system presents 
difficult financial problems in the face of declining patronage, obsolete equipment and 
rising costs of transit operation.”  The Board suggested that some of the capital costs of 
rehabilitating mass transit could be raised by sharing the revenue from a total, in egrated 
mass transit system.205  The Philadelphia region did not have such a system until the 
1980s, however. 
Despite its consistent agitation for better mass transit funding, the UTTB came 
eventually to believe that it would be a mistake for Philadelphia to contribute substantial 
funds until it had wrested control of the urban transit system from the PTC.  Robert 
Mitchell, the Board’s first executive director, recalled in a 1975 interview that the UTTB 
recommended “that the city should make no more capital investments in transportation in 
Philadelphia until the city had not only a veto but a positive power of determining the 
quality and quantity of transportation service it should receive.”206  As the 1950s came to 
a close, a note of frustration that such a takeover had not yet occurred could be detected 
in the Board’s reports.  “If we want to improve our transportation system,” the Board 
pleaded, “we must place our limited funds where they will bring the greatest benefit. . . . 
that is, improved and modernized commuter railroad and high-speed transit systems.  
Even this will require far greater sums of local money than the region has been willing to 
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invest.”  After pointing out that Philadelphia was the only major city with a privately-
owned transit system, the Board asked: 
Should Philadelphia continue to be the only holdout?  Do 
we continue the division between the City and the company 
which has cost us so dearly over the past fifty years, or do 
we find some way to put service to the riders as the top-
policy consideration?  Of course, this is not compatible 
with profits to the stockholders!  The City is going to be in 
serious trouble unless this dichotomy is ended.207 
 
The UTTB’s agitation for a public takeover of mass transportation spurred Mayor 
Dilworth’s failed attempts to have the city purchase the PTC, but more importantly, l id 
the groundwork for the eventual creation of the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority. 
Other agencies spoke up as well about the need for better mass transit.  The 
Department of City Transit, in its annual report for 1951 (its last before its functions were 
transferred to the Department of Public Property in early 1952), advocated the 
construction of “a network of subways and high-speed transit facilities serving every 
sector of this great city” which it saw as possibly “the only solution of the surface traffic 
problem that troubles all major municipalities.”208  In addition, Mayor Clark tried to 
persuade Philadelphia commuters to make better use of the city’s mass transit facilities, 
taking to the airwaves to give several radio addresses to this effect in 1954.  In one such 
address, Mayor Clark spoke of his frustration with the city’s traffic congestion, recalling 
that recently it had taken him 35 minutes to fly the 150 miles from Washington, D.C. to 
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Philadelphia, and then another 60 minutes to reach his home in Chestnut Hill, 15 miles 
from the airport.  Clark proposed several ways of reducing traffic congestion, listi g the 
first as getting citizens out of their cars and onto public transit.209 
In 1955, the Chicago engineering firm of De Leuw, Cather and Company 
presented a comprehensive report on Philadelphia’s mass transit at the request of the 
Department of Public Property.  The report explained that the city had not been activ  in 
improving its mass transit system, with most of the prior planning and development work 
having come from PTC proposals.210  “The City has generally not,” the engineers 
observed, “been able to take the initiative in the determination of basic Philadelphia 
transit requirements or in the overall planning for necessary or desirable modifications of 
the system.”  If Philadelphia’s transit situation were to improve, the report cautioned, the 
Department of Public Property must take a more active role.  Although the firm made 
some specific recommendations for improving mass transit – such as improving the 
transfer system, redistributing or altering certain routes, adding some surface bus routes 
to get more people to rail stations, utilizing skip-stop and express service to improve 
speed, and modernization of equipment – it did not call for major additions to existing 
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transit lines, concluding that more study was needed before deciding whether to ext nd 
the Broad Street subway or the Frankford elevated line.211 
The De Leuw, Cather report ended on a fairly grim note, citing the nationwide 
downward trend in mass transit revenue and the “phenomenal” increase in automobile 
use.  The rapid decentralization taking place in Philadelphia and throughout the nation, 
combined with aging equipment, increasing operating expenses, and declining patronage, 
presented mass transit operators with “an almost impossible financial problem.”  Rising 
fares had not helped the revenue situation, leading instead to a further decline in 
patronage.  As a result, many cities had been forced to pay for capital improveents 
themselves, or provide assistance in the form of tax relief or direct subsidies in order to 
maintain adequate mass transit service.  If mass transit were not improved, the ngineers 
warned, so many people would be induced to prefer the automobile that the city would be 
unable to provide expressways sufficient to meet the demand.212 
Philadelphia’s prioritization of expressways, in conjunction with its failure to 
acquire the PTC, led to a dramatic decline in its funding for mass transportation.  Each 
year, the City Planning Commission published a six-year capital budget report indicating 
the amount of city funds scheduled to be spent on physical improvements over the 
ensuing six-year period.  The capital budgets for 1947-1952 to 1950-1955 contained 
planned six-year mass transit expenditures of $27.9 million, $38.4 million, $15.4 million, 
and $32.4 million, respectively.  By 1950, however, construction of the Schuylkill 
Expressway had begun, and ensuing reports showed a drop in expected transit 
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expenditures – at first gradual, to $13.9 million and $12.5 million – and then dramatic, to 
$3.6 million, $5 million, $2 million, and then, in accordance with the UTTB’s 
recommendation to stop capital expenditures until a public takeover had been 
accomplished, zero for the 1956-1961 report.213 
As of 1955, the only major postwar improvements to Philadelphia’s mass transit 
system were the extensions of the Market Street subway-elevated line to 46th Street and 
of the subway-surface line to 40th Street and Woodland Avenue (at a total cost of 
approximately $38 million).214  At the ceremonies celebrating the completion of these 
projects, Mayor Clark hailed them as major improvements that would serve to attract 
many new passengers to mass transit.  Clark stressed the need to bring mass transit to 
other areas of the city, including Germantown, South Philadelphia, North Philadelphia, 
and the far reaches of Northeast Philadelphia.215  The large-scale expansion of 
Philadelphia’s mass transit system, of which Mayor Clark spoke so optimistically hat 
day, never came to fruition.   
Recognizing perhaps that his company’s acrimonious relationship with the city 
was contributing to the deterioration of mass transit, PTC president Douglas Pratt went to 
the Greater Philadelphia Movement Board of Directors in 1958 to plead his case.  Pratt 
complained that his buses were the only vehicles the city taxed to use the public streets, 
pointing out that “others who use the City’s streets and who add so materially to traffic 
snarls are exempt from special City levies.  The motorist, in fact, is thebeneficiary of 
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vast sums now being spent for expressways and improved highways to bring even more 
cars into the traffic-jammed City.”  Transit riders, Pratt told the GPM, were generally 
lower-income individuals and deserved at least as much help from City Hall as 
automobile drivers were receiving.216  Charles Frazier, chair of the UTTB, made a similar 
point, telling the GPM’s directors that city taxes subsidized car drivers to theune of 50 
cents per day, and that similar subsidies for mass transit were “necessary for the survival 
of the City of Philadelphia.”217  It seems, however, that the GPM listened politely to both 
men but did not attempt to influence Philadelphia’s government to alter its pro-
expressway bias.    
Philadelphia’s mass transportation problems in the postwar period were not 
limited to the PTC’s urban transit system of buses, subways, and trolleys.  The region’s 
two commuter railroad systems, run by the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads, were 
experiencing severe decline at the same time, and for many of the same reasons.  
Specifically, both patronage and revenue declined sharply as costs increased, equipment 
aged, and more Philadelphians embraced the automobile for their commuting needs.   
The Philadelphia area had a long and distinguished history of railroad travel.  
Pennsylvania took the lead in building railroads as early as the 1830s, with the first lines 
having been designed to link the state’s coal mines with canals and rivers.  By the 1860s, 
Pennsylvania had in excess of 2,500 miles of railroads – more than all but three other 
states.218  Toward the end of the nineteenth century, as historian Michael Bezilla put it, 
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“thousands of Philadelphians began flocking to the suburbs to escape the increasingly 
unattractive conditions of life in the city,” resulting in a greater emphasis on passenger 
railroads.  For this reason, commuter railroad service – by the 1890s provided primarily 
by the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads – expanded dramatically in the lastyears of 
the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth.219  By World War II, 
Philadelphia had for many years possessed one of the best and most extensive commutr 
railroad systems in the United States.  Actually, the region had two separate systems 
comprised of 12 lines, with the Pennsylvania and the Reading operating six lines apiec.
The Pennsylvania and the Reading, despite their long histories, could not escape 
national trends affecting twentieth-century railroads.  As historian Stephen Goddard 
explained, passenger railroads began to lose money as early as the 1920s, when the 
automobile began to achieve mass popularity.  World War II halted briefly a decline that 
had been underway for decades, as the railroads “won a grateful public’s newfound 
respect through their wartime efforts.”  Once the war was over, however, “the trickl  of 
red ink from passenger service became a river, in the face of inflation, motor competition, 
and onerous union settlements.”220  The Pennsylvania Railroad’s annual reports from the 
late 1940s illustrated the company’s frustration at not being able to share in the postwar 
prosperity that lifted the nation in those years.  In its 1947 report, for example, the 
railroad complained: 
The year 1947 should have been one of your Company’s 
most satisfactory years.  The country has been prosperous, 
labor has been well employed and well paid, farmers have 
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had bumper crops at good prices, and industry as a whole 
has operated at a good profit.  Railroads, including your 
railroad, handled a tremendous volume of business, both 
passenger and freight, and out of this volume – if adequate 
rates had been in effect – your Company could have made 
sufficient earnings not only to have paid its stockholders a 
proper dividend, but to have made up part of the deferred 
maintenance brought about by the war and to have set aside 
reasonable funds for improvements to plant and equipment, 
so essential to provide the type of service now desired.  The 
reason your Company did not have a satisfactory profit for 
the year was due to the lag between advancing costs and 
the rate increases allowed by regulatory authorities.221 
 
As losses mounted, railroads asked the Interstate Commerce Commission to allw 
the abandonment of passenger lines so they could concentrate on more profitable freight 
service.  The ICC forced railroads against their will to maintain commuter service, with 
the result that remaining passengers, according to Goddard, “complained increas gly of 
passenger cars strewn with debris, chronically late, too hot in the summer and too cold in 
the winter, and of abuse from surly conductors.”  Once Congress passed the Interstate 
Highway Act of 1956, passenger railroads were doomed.  By 1958, commuter rail service 
in the United States had been cut to half of its 1920s level.222   
Like other railroads across the country, the Pennsylvania and the Reading suffered 
large losses on their commuter business after World War II, and just like the PTC, they 
sought relief through fare increases.  In 1957, both the Reading and the Pennsylvania 
sought Mayor Dilworth’s support for higher commuter fares.  Reading president J.A. 
Fisher told Dilworth that the railroad’s passenger operations ran a $6.7 million deficit in 
1956.  James Symes, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, reported that his company 
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suffered annual deficits of more than $4 million and asked for help in offsetting these 
“staggering losses.”223  Unsurprisingly, the idea of higher railroad fares for commuters 
met resistance.  One local businessman likened the railroads to public utilities, arguing 
that they were entitled to a fair return on their investments, but should not be able to cut 
service on one money-losing operation if they were making good profits overall.224  
Dilworth agreed that the idea made “a great deal of sense.”225   
Apparently the railroads were expecting Dilworth’s support for their fare 
increases and were surprised when they didn’t get it.  A puzzled Symes wrote to Dilworth 
in February 1958 asking him to explain his prior statements that he didn’t oppose new 
fares when the city’s lawyers had “vigorously opposed the proposed fare increases and on 
three occasions made motions to dismiss the proceedings” before the PUC.  “In these 
circumstances,” wrote Symes, “it seems clear to me that the City has in fact both opposed 
and delayed the commutation fare increase.”226  Frustrated, Symes testified before 
Congress in early 1958 that local, state and federal governments were “treating the 
railroad industry as if it were still the wealthy monopoly it was considered generations 
ago.  The result of this treatment is that railroad earnings have been kept abnorm lly l w, 
even in good times.  But railroads are not a monopoly.  They must compete for their 
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living with the users of untold billions of dollars worth of publicly-provided and untaxed 
highways, airways, and waterways.”227    
After proceedings lasting nearly a year, the PUC rejected the Pennsylva ia 
Railroad’s request for new fares in April 1958, ruling that the company had not met its 
burden of proof that new rates were needed.  In its request to reopen the proceedings so it 
could submit more evidence, the railroad complained of its “critical plight” as a result of 
“sharply reduced freight traffic, high operating costs, and crushing passenger deficits.”  
Previous losses on commuter service had been absorbed by freight profits, but this had 
required raising freight rates, which had placed the railroad at a “competitive 
disadvantage.”  Whereas in 1957 passenger losses had eaten up 57% of freight profits, 
now the profits were not large enough to cover commuter service losses.  The 
Pennsylvania told the PUC that now, its combined freight and passenger operations were 
running a deficit, “with no end presently in sight.”228  The PUC relented, allowing a fare 
increase to take effect in June 1958, but this concession did not change the bleak outlook 
for the region’s commuter railroad service.229 
The Reading and Pennsylvania Railroads continued to lose money, a fact that 
concerned Dilworth greatly.  As he wrote in 1958: 
We have very good commutation lines in the City of 
Philadelphia, much better ones than most big cities, and it 
is essential that we preserve these and improve the service 
on them.  Otherwise, fewer and fewer people will come 
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into the city, and also, more and more people will turn to 
the automobile, and our narrow old streets just won’t hold 
many more automobiles.230 
 
Believing higher fares to be a mistake, but realizing that the commuter railroads faced an 
existential threat, Philadelphia’s city government began “Operation Northwest” – a 
program debuting in October 1958 whereby the city subsidized the Pennsylvania and 
Reading lines to Chestnut Hill in the city’s northwest section in exchange for improved 
service and lower fares.  The subsidies expanded in 1959 with “Operation Northeast,” an 
identical program focusing on service to Northeast Philadelphia.231  The goal of both 
Operations – based on recommendations the Urban Traffic and Transportation Board had 
made in 1956 for improving commuter railroad service – was to see if better service and 
lower fares could induce commuters to give up their cars and return to the railroads.232  If 
the programs succeeded, it was hoped, the railroads’ commuter operations might return 
eventually to the black without the need for higher fares.  The railroads were pleasd to 
be receiving some government assistance, but the Pennsylvania took pains to point out 
that the Operations “emphasized rather than solved the problem,” with the limited 
subsidies being insufficient to cover its losses entirely.233 
Operations Northeast and Northwest were the tentative beginnings of what 
became, in the early 1960s, a much more extensive program of city and county subsidie  
for the railroads.  The events of the late 1950s established a precedent of government 
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assistance, and also helped to set Philadelphia on a path that led eventually to the creation 
of a regional transit authority and a wholesale public takeover of the commuter railroads.  
Equally significant was the beginning of a pattern of disparate treatment by 
Philadelphia’s city government of the commuter railroads on one hand, and the urban 
mass transit system on the other – a discrepancy that was later the subject of considerable 
political tension.  As the 1950s came to a close, expressways still dominated the thinking 





“A Sea of Discontent”:  Expressway Protest Intensifies, 1960-1963 
 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s, transportation planning in Philadelphia took place in 
nearly a closed environment.  The Philadelphia City Planning Commission was akin to a 
fiefdom, making its decisions behind closed doors with little public input.  Although the 
Planning Commission had no actual authority, the City Council acted like a rubber stamp,
approving nearly every planning proposal brought before it.  Philadelphia’s planners 
shared fully the assumptions of the state and federal engineers to whom they were 
required to answer in order to have their highway projects funded – most importantly, 
that traffic congestion was the city’s biggest problem and that modern, limited-access 
expressways were the solution.  Alongside the expressway boom, the city’s mass transit 
declined precipitously.  In addition to Cold War cultural beliefs that made the 
individualistic practice of driving automobiles seem more American than the collectivism 
of mass transit, the availability of state and federal funding for expressway (but not for 
mass transit) created financial incentives that contributed to planners’ skewed priorities.  
The city attempted in the 1950s a public takeover of the Philadelphia Transportation 
Company’s urban transit system – in part to solve the thorny problem of using public 
funds for capital improvements that would have benefitted private shareholders – but got 
nowhere due to the parties’ inability to agree on a price. 
At the close of the 1950s, Philadelphia had completed its first major highway 
project, the Schuylkill Expressway, and was well into the process of planning for its 
second, the Delaware Expressway.  Both expressways generated public protest.  The ci y 
faced two important controversies over the Schuylkill Expressway between 1949 and 
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1953 – one over the displacement of residents in Nicetown for the Roosevelt Boulevard 
Extension, and the other regarding the expressway’s route through beloved Fairmount 
Park and past the Philadelphia Zoo.  In the mid-1950s, as plans for the Delaware 
Expressway took shape, residents who lived along the waterfront began to object to th  
potential destruction of homes and churches that lay in the expressway’s proposed path.  
The expressway protest that occurred prior to 1960 was limited in scope in the sense that 
only those whose homes or churches faced an immediate threat of destruction were 
moved to complain, and very few asked larger questions about the purpose of 
expressways, their broader impact upon the city and its residents, and planners’ lack of 
balance in their thinking about roads and mass transit.  The Fairmount Park Commission, 
for example, stood virtually alone in its battle to alter the Schuylkill Expressway’  route 
through the park.  The idea of paving public parkland for an expressway failed in the 
early 1950s to arouse significant hostility amongst the Philadelphia citizenry. 
In the 1960s, however, the tide began to turn.  The release of detailed plans for the 
Delaware Expressway in Center City and South Philadelphia unleashed protest far 
beyond any the city had experienced previously.  Much of the increase in highway 
opposition was due to one simple difference between the Schuylkill and Delaware 
Expressways.  Although both were riverfront highways, the Schuylkill was built along a 
relatively undeveloped riverbank, in a pre-existing transportation corridor that was home 
to both West River Drive and the Reading Railroad tracks.  As a result, the expressway’s 
main stem took almost no homes.  The Delaware Expressway, by contrast, was built 
along the city’s main waterfront, which was not only one of the most historic areas in the 
United States, but contained the city’s port, a wide variety of industries, and a great many 
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homes and churches.  Because of these fundamental differences, it would have been 
surprising had the city’s second expressway project not generated more controversy than 
its first one. 
The Delaware Expressway protests that arose in the early 1960s differed in 
content, as well as in volume, from those that occurred in the 1940s and 1950s.  For the 
first time, a significant number of people began to question the nature of the relationship 
between the City Planning Commission and the people for whom, ostensibly, it planned.  
Protestors now focused not only on the specific details of highway routes, but on the 
process by which planners and engineers chose those routes.  The neighborhoods through 
which highways were to pass, the protestors believed, should have more input into the 
initial development of plans, rather than being presented with plans after the fact, when 
decision-makers would be less receptive to changes.  Significantly, the Citiz ns’ Council 
on City Planning, which had up to this point acted mainly as a booster for the Planning 
Commission, joined disgruntled residents in asking for a more inclusive planning 
process. 
By questioning the planning process in addition to its results, highway protestors 
in early 1960s Philadelphia were engaging in something more meaningful than were their 
1950s predecessors.  The years between 1960 and 1963 represented a transitional period 
in this regard, as the objections to urban expressways that arose in these years did not run 
as deep as those of the later 1960s and 1970s.  Beginning in 1964, some Philadelphians 
began to ask larger questions about expressways, focusing not only on the destruction of 
homes and churches, but on the roads’ environmental, aesthetic, and social impacts.  The 
charged issue of race relations eventually became an integral part of highway opposition 
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as well, but not until the late 1960s, when racial tensions in northern urban America 
reached a crisis. 
As it continued to move forward with the Delaware Expressway, Philadelphia’s 
City Hall began in the early 1960s to build on the tentative steps it had taken at the end of 
the 1950s to save the region’s faltering commuter railroads.  The city joined with the 
southeastern Pennsylvania suburbs to expand existing railroad subsidies on a regional 
basis – a development that represented a substantial step toward the creation of the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority in 1964.  Expanding the railroad 
subsidies solidified a pattern of disparate treatment whereby Philadelphia gave preference 
to the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads while refusing similar aid to the struggling 
Philadelphia Transportation Company and its urban mass transit system of buses, 
subways, and trolleys.  Such a discrepancy was the result of City Hall’s focus on bringing 
suburban whites back to the central business district so they could work in downtown 
office buildings and patronize shops, theaters, and restaurants.  The PTC’s less afflu nt 
riders, whom city officials and planners perceived as less integral to Philadelphia’s 
postwar downtown renewal, were simply not as high a priority.   
The earliest years of the 1960s did not represent a radical change from the 
transportation planning atmosphere of the 1950s, but bridged the gap between two 
distinct eras.  Philadelphia in these years began the gradual shift to greater democracy in 
its planning process, and laid the groundwork for an eventual move away from 
expressways and toward a greater emphasis on mass transportation.  
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“The Present State of Uncertainty”:  The Delaware Expressway 
At the close of the 1950s, despite a general agreement between the city, the state, 
and the federal government to build the Delaware Expressway, no final, detaile  route 
existed yet for the expressway’s route through Center City and South Philadelphi .  The 
Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia complained that the delay was costing
businesses near the route millions of dollars in foregone economic opportunities; due to 
the uncertainty surrounding the route, companies were avoiding renewing leases, entering 
into long-term commitments, or making capital investments.1  City and state officials 
announced in April 1960 that they had reached agreement on a Center City/South 
Philadelphia route, but rather than rejoicing, the Chamber of Commerce blasted state 
highway secretary Park Martin for “inaction, indecision, and lack of planning,” ad 
chastised his department for “its complacency and satisfaction with its do-nothing 
policy.”2  On July 6, 1960, officials made the chosen route public and announced that the 
state highway department would hold a public hearing on July 27.3  The sequence of 
events was representative of the anti-democratic planning process still in place – planners 
and engineers made detailed blueprints, officials approved them, and only then did they 
inform the public of the plans and hold a hearing. 
   From the outset, it was apparent that the expressway route would face 
considerable resistance from Philadelphia residents.  On July 18, Mayor Dilworth 
attended a protest meeting with 1,500 angry residents in a South Philadelphia church.  
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Those present met his announcement that he intended to recommend the proposed route 
to City Council “even though this may cost me a great many votes,” with an outburst of 
shouting, booing and foot-stamping.  The meeting returned to order only when Reverend 
Carl Werner reminded protestors that they were in a house of worship.4  Years later, 
Dilworth’s deputy managing director John Bailey said, “I’ll never forget Dilworth getting 
up and saying he was not elected to be a popular Mayor, but to be an effective Mayor and 
even though people in South Philadelphia didn’t want the expressway he thought the rest 
of the region required it and he was going to do all he could to run it through their 
neighborhood.”5   
The state’s first official public hearing on July 27 went no better.  In what the 
Evening Bulletin described as a “wild, stormy” meeting, more than 1,000 irate 
Philadelphia property owners carried protest signs, “booed, catcalled, whistled and 
stamped their feet in disapproval of the project.”  Streets Commissioner David 
Smallwood’s announcement that the 15-mile section of the road between Montgomery 
Avenue in Northeast Philadelphia and the Delaware County line at the city’s southern 
border would take 1,140 homes, 762 industrial and commercial properties and nine 
institutions did not improve the collective mood.  In fact, the crowd was so loud that 
many who tried to speak in favor of the proposed route could not be heard.  In utter 
frustration, John Rezzolla, chief counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 
told the assembly, “it is apparent you want to hear only one side of this question.”  When 
the audience responded with cries of “yes, yes,” Rezzolla suspended the rules of the 
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hearing, discontinued the speeches in favor of the route, and allowed representatives of 
the residents to begin their speeches immediately.6 
One of the people who attended the hearing to criticize the plan was Aaron 
Levine, formerly an employee of the City Planning Commission and now the executive 
director of the Citizens’ Council on City Planning.  The Citizens’ Council had sinceits 
inception acted as a booster for the Planning Commission and had supported the 
Schuylkill Expressway wholeheartedly in the 1940s and 1950s.  In 1960, however, it 
broke new ground by criticizing publically a major highway project.  The proposed route, 
Levine argued, would create isolated pockets of residential land east of the expressway.  
Bisecting residential areas, he pointed out, would “lead to eventual isolation and decy of 
the remaining residential pockets.”  Moreover, Levine asserted that enginers had failed 
to consider how the elevated highway structure proposed for part of the expressway’s run 
through South Philadelphia would blight the landscape – particularly in view of the fact 
that planners had found no productive use for the land beneath the expressway.  The 
elevated portion would become, he predicted, “a neighborhood nuisance and a police 
problem.” 
In addition to its substantive complaints regarding route and design, the Citizens’ 
Council was less than pleased about the procedure City Hall and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Highways used to present the proposed route to the public.  Levine did not 
go so far as to suggest widespread citizen participation in the earliest stages of the 
planning process.  He did ask, however, that public meetings on the route be held in the 
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evening, rather than during the day, so that more people would be able to attend; that 
plans be made public further in advance of public hearings; and that the Citizens’ Council
be allowed to review the engineering studies, made using public money, on which the 
final plans were based (a request that City Council had denied).7 
 The always vigorous competition between Philadelphia and rural areas of 
Pennsylvania over the state’s share of federal highway money provided Dilworth with his 
primary tactic to counter the Delaware Expressway naysayers.  A week before the July 27 
public hearing, he revealed that in April state and federal officials had delivered an 
ultimatum:  “After four years of planning and studies it’s come to this:  either we build 
the Expressway on this plan or the $300 million will be spent in western Pennsylvania.”8  
Dilworth was not necessarily bluffing, as there were indeed other bidders for 
Pennsylvania’s highway money.  Many in upstate Pennsylvania wanted the state to build 
the Keystone Shortway, which would have traversed the northern part of the state from 
Stroudsburg to Sharon in order to provide easier access to northern counties for business 
and farming interests.9  It was clear that Philadelphia and its Delaware Expressway had 
first crack at the state’s share of federal highway funds, but it was not out of the question 
that undue delays and political wrangling within Philadelphia and between Philadelphia 
and Harrisburg could alter the situation.10  Greater Philadelphia Magazine pointed out 
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that the Shortway, which was to be a free road, would compete with the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike, a toll road connected to Philadelphia via the new Schuylkill Expressway – a 
situation that could be harmful to Philadelphia’s economy.  Nevertheless, the magazine 
lamented, South Philadelphia remained a “sea of discontent,” with protests emanating 
chiefly from the area’s clergymen and considerable hostility directed toward Mayor 
Dilworth and Councilman Victor Moore, whom many in South Philadelphia considered a 
“double-crosser” for backing off from his 1958 plan to have the expressway swingwest 
before reaching their area.11 
Dilworth’s threat that Philadelphia could lose its highway funds failed to win over 
disgruntled Center City and South Philadelphia residents.  On the contrary, the protests 
continued unabated throughout 1960.  At least one objection came from within city 
government, as Dennis Clark, supervisor of the Housing Division of the Commission on 
Human Relations (a body that enforced anti-discrimination laws and attempted to ensure 
fair treatment of the city’s African Americans), was concerned that the expressway would 
disrupt what were then cohesive ethnic enclaves within South Philadelphia.  Clark told 
his boss George Schermer that he was not concerned about the Italians, who lived mostly 
west of Fourth Street, out of the way of the proposed highway; the Germans, who were 
not concentrated enough to be disrupted; and the Irish, who did not represent a cohesive 
group in South Philadelphia.  Clark was, however, worried about the Lithuanians 
attached to St. Casimir’s parish at 3rd and Wharton Streets; the Polish community 
attending St. Stanislaus near 2nd and Fitzwater; and the African American population 
north of Fitzwater Street.  One hundred Lithuanian families, he told Schermer, would lose 
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their homes if the proposed route were constructed, while the Poles would be displaced 
heavily, their enclave cut in half by the expressway.  Shifting ethnic geography, he said, 
would create racial problems in the area, explaining: 
In the event of an exodus of Polish families in this area 
along each side of the Expressway, the Negro group to the 
west and north would no doubt move into the vacancies.  
This succession would probably be rather vigorously 
resisted.  The Polish group has been strongly adverse [sic] 
to racial change in many situations.  The pocket of 
population east of the Expressway would be a particular 
problem.  The natural boundary of the Expressway would 
heighten the sense of solidarity, but the movement of white 
families from houses immediately adjacent to it would 
create tempting opportunities for infiltration by non-white 
families. . . . The various ethnic groups have been united in 
their opposition to the proposed Expressway route.  Their 
movement, due to the construction work and other results 
of the new highway, will be the first major change in 
population patterns in South Philadelphia since the 
construction of public housing projects west of Broad 
Street during and after World War II.12 
 
Clark’s memo to Schermer reflected the fact that the Delaware Expressway, like 
the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension of the Schuylkill Expressway, was slated to displace 
primarily working-class whites.  Philadelphia’s expressway planning was unique in this 
respect, for by the 1960s, highways in other cities were built mainly through African 
American neighborhoods.13  Nevertheless, as Clark’s analysis demonstrated, even roads 
that displaced whites could pose a threat of racial conflict by promoting residential 
integration in areas where remaining whites were likely to be deeply antagonistic to such 
a development.   
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Clark’s objections seem to have fallen on deaf ears, but controversy continued.  
Although many Philadelphia citizens wrote to Dilworth urging him to reconsider the 
route of the expressway, some, such as Edward Kane of the Foley Brothers constructi  
firm, advocated a more decisive course.  Kane opined that “what we sadly need is another 
[New York City planner] Bob Moses.  Let’s face whatever or whichever way the damned 
thing is routed, there will be a hue and cry – so it boils down to knocking the objectors 
out of the way, it requires a little courage.”14  Dilworth agreed that it was impossible to 
quell dissent completely.  When it came to taking people’s homes, he acknowledged, “no 
amount of consultation makes them happy.  They become convinced they have not been 
treated fairly, and are equally convinced they have never really been given a chance to 
express their views.”15   
David Smallwood reacted with irritation to citizen opposition to the expressway 
and objected to efforts to make the planning process more democratic.  His ultimate goal 
was not to accommodate protest, but to eliminate it.  In July 1960 he rejected the 
suggestion of some activists that a city advisory group with community representation be 
created.  “It has been our experience in the past,” he asserted, “that the repres ntatives of 
these groups, in many cases, have served to crystallize opposition to highway 
improvements rather than to lend assistance.”  While he approved of some efforts to 
“mitigate” highway opposition, he refused to believe “that the establishment of a y 
citizens group will ever serve to result in its complete elimination.”16 
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Smallwood, despite his hard-line attitude toward highway protestors, drew 
Dilworth’s wrath in mid-1960 when he suggested, inexplicably, that expressway plans 
were not set in stone. In late July 1960 Dilworth attended a community meeting at which 
he stated that neither the Bureau of Public Roads nor the Pennsylvania Department of 
Highways would accept any further changes to the Delaware Expressway route.  Either 
Philadelphia could accept the present route, he said, “or forget about the Delaware 
Expressway.”  To Dilworth’s “amazement,” however, Smallwood then issued a statement 
saying that the route was still subject to change because construction in South 
Philadelphia would most likely not begin for five years.  “I think it is time we wrap up 
the Delaware Expressway and stop horsing around,” Dilworth fumed, “and I also suggest, 
very strenuously, that if any official in the City Government wants to issue a statement or 
arrange a meeting to make himself look good, that he at least let me know before he acts 
at my expense.”17 
Dilworth’s insistence that the Delaware Expressway route was final failed to deter 
community leaders – and especially the South Philadelphia clergy – from continuing he 
fight.  The mayor kept up his strategy of making it seem as though City Hall had no sy
in the matter.  He told Catholic Standard and Times editor Reverend Monsignor Anthony 
Ostheimer that the federal government had the final say over the route and that planners 
had done everything possible to minimize the number of houses that would be lost to the 
expressway.  “In short,” Dilworth argued, “I believe the time is past when we can ask for 
further reconsideration.  I am convinced that the route proposed is as good a route as we 
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can hope for, and takes a minimum number of houses.”18  Ostheimer was not persuaded, 
and soon afterward the Standard and Times decried the mayor’s “spirit of defeatism.”  A 
major point of contention was the four years that elapsed between the time planners and 
engineers began serious discussions over the route in 1956 and disclosed the route to the 
public in 1960.  “One of the most serious charges leveled against the planners,” the paper 
intoned, “is the manner in which developments were held from the public until it 
amounted to telling the public:  ‘Here it is, take it and like it!’”  As to the threat that 
public dissent would cause Philadelphia to lose the expressway, the paper asked, “Why 
must the great City of Philadelphia run scared? . . . Have Philadelphia voters no longer a 
voice in Harrisburg, and no voice in Washington?  If we have no such voice, then we had 
better close up shop and resign ourselves to being pushed around – while we keep on 
paying our taxes!”19 
As controversy continued to rage in Philadelphia, the Bureau of Public Roads 
remained above the fray and reviewed the proposed plans, which the state highway 
department had already submitted for its approval.  In January 1961, the BPR approved 
the use of federal funds for the controversial Center City/South Philadelphia piece of the 
expressway – the 15-mile stretch between Montgomery Avenue and the Delaware 
County line.20  Although the federal government had agreed to pay 90% of the 
construction costs pursuant to the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, the BPR’s approval of 
the expressway route was not necessarily a final verdict on the particular details of the 
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plan.  Federal highway dollars were limited, and BPR officials were not anxious to fund 
projects that were likely to become mired in controversy and perhaps left unfinished.  As 
a result, when city and state governments requested changes to a federally-approved 
route, the BPR often obliged.   
In early 1961, Philadelphia took a significant step toward the democratization of 
its transportation politics when Dilworth and City Council agreed to a major change to 
the Delaware Expressway route in response to citizen protests.  In January, just after the 
BPR approved the route, Mayor Dilworth and Democratic governor David Lawrence 
received a petition, signed by 12,000 people, to save historic Elfreth’s Alley in Society 
Hill from destruction.21  In response to the petition, as well as the protests at the July 27, 
1960 public hearing, engineers and planners restudied the route and decided that it would 
be feasible to shift a large portion of the expressway in Center City and South 
Philadelphia half a block east – a modification that would save Elfreth’s Alley, a small 
offshoot from the alley known as Bladen’s Court, and Workman’s Place, a group of 
homes in Southwark dating back to 1748.22  The Pennsylvania Department of Highways 
came on board, primarily because it determined the change would make the project 
cheaper by about $12 million.  In July 1961, Mayor Dilworth, his staff, state highway 
officials, and members of Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation went to Washington 
to present the proposed modification to Federal Highway Administrator Rex Whitton.  
Philadelphia Managing Director Donald Wagner told Whitton that the change would save 
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historic buildings and leave a smaller pocket of isolated land between the expressway and 
the river.  State officials chimed in about the reduced cost.23   
In August, the Bureau of Public Roads approved the new route.  The Evening 
Bulletin proclaimed (perhaps with excessive grandiosity) “Victory in Southwark,” 
attributing the modification directly to citizen protests and opining that resident  would 
consider the extra $5 million in city funds now necessary – because the new plan required 
the relocation of the Frankford El – to be “a bargain compared to the price they had been 
asked to pay in neighborhood obliteration.”24  While this particular change did not end 
the controversy over the Delaware Expressway by a long shot, it was nevertheless t  
first time the mayor and City Council had authorized a significant expressway alteration 
because of popular discontent. 
The 1961 route change brought to light once again the ongoing tension between 
business interests, who wanted the road completed as quickly as possible and preferred a 
route that would not encroach on the waterfront, and residents, who delayed progress 
with protests and sought to push the route farther toward the water to minimize its impact
on homes and churches.  Business groups, irritated with delays stretching back to 1956, 
became more vocal in the spring of 1961.  In April, the Old Christ Church Neighborhood 
Businessmen’s Association urged rapid construction of the expressway, claiming that the 
delay was harming businesses and depressing real estate values.25  A month later, it 
joined with several other groups – including the Arch Street Businessmen’s Association, 
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the Chestnut Street Association, the Philadelphia Produce Exchange, and the Philadelphia 
Warehousemen’s Association – to form the Delaware Expressway Realization 
Committee.26  The Committee, which boasted of 948 members, argued that the Delaware 
Expressway, when completed, would relieve the Schuylkill Expressway of excessive 
traffic, benefit business and create jobs in the industrial areas of South Philadelp , 
provide a boundary for proposed waterfront development, and create a major portion of 
an expressway loop around the city.  As the group told Dilworth: 
We speak with the united voice of hundreds of businesses 
representing the livelihood of thousands of Philadelphians 
and millions of dollars invested in Philadelphia.  Our voice 
is the voice of those who will be most directly and 
drastically affected by the construction of the Expressway – 
those owners, landlords and tenants who must eventually 
relocate, but who can make no adequate plans because of 
the present state of uncertainty.  Ours is the voice of those 
who will not in the end actually lose their places of 
business, but who are stalemated because as yet they have 
no assurance that this will be the case.  Ours is the voice of 
those who are now forced to exist in an area which will not 
return to desirability until the Expressway becomes a 
reality.  It is the voice of those who have plans for the area 
which will not be implemented until the great upheaval and 
disturbance that necessarily accompany heavy construction 
is finished.  And, finally, ours is the voice of a great body 
of businessmen in center city and the Food Distribution 
Center who recognize the many benefits which will accrue 
to all upon the final completion of the Delaware 
Expressway.27 
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The Chamber of Commerce, which helped to create the Realization Committee and 
maintained a close relationship with it, also lent its voice to the effort.28  The Chamber 
estimated that the expressway would not be completed until 1967 while lamenting that it 
was “needed now instead of five years hence.”  “The overcrowded Schuylkill expressway 
is particularly in need of immediate relief, but it doesn’t seem in sight,” complained the 
group.29  
In the midst of the tug-of-war over the Delaware Expressway, there aros the first 
strong stirrings of dissent about Philadelphia’s transportation priorities.  In 1960, the City 
Planning Commission issued its Comprehensive Plan for the City of Philadelphia.  
Although the document was by definition comprehensive, it included a heavy emphasis 
on transportation planning.  Above all, the plan showed Philadelphia’s city planners to 
have been, along with much of the nation, on a highway craze in the late 1950s.  The 
Commission’s highway plan, some of which was based on the Urban Traffic and 
Transportation Board’s 1955 recommendations, would have crisscrossed the region with 
an immense tangle of expressways.  Planners envisioned no less than four concentri  
loops around Center City in addition to radial highways that would have distributed 
traffic in every conceivable direction.30 
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Most comments on the Comprehensive Plan were positive.  The Evening Bulletin 
gave the Planning Commission a representative compliment when it assured its rea ers 
that “the transportation headache of the 1960s will be soothed by 1980.”31  In 1962, 
however, the Citizens’ Council on City Planning issued its analysis of the Comprehensive 
Plan, and it was decidedly less complimentary with respect to both the planning process 
and its results.  The Council began by accusing the Planning Commission of making all 
of the decisions itself rather than coming up with alternatives from which elected officials 
could choose, thereby overstepping its bounds as an advisory body with no actual 
policymaking authority.  Next, the Council noted that 59% of all public funds needed to 
implement the Plan would be devoted to transportation.  This high figure, the Council 
believed, was due to an overemphasis on “the relatively expensive facilities for private 
transportation (expressways, streets, highways) rather than on public mass transit which 
is a more efficient and economical means of transportation and which, in terms of 
passenger-carrying capacity, can be provided more inexpensively.”  The Council poi ted 
out that 45.7% of the total plan cost was devoted to roads while transit would receive 
only 13.5% of the money.  Moreover, the Council doubted that the huge system of 
expressways proposed in the Plan could be completed by the goal years of 1980-1990.  
Recognizing that the proposed expressway system would encourage those entering the 
city from the suburbs to do so by car, the Council suggested building additional public 
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transit facilities, and recommended deemphasizing expressways to avoid exacerbating 
traffic in already congested areas.32 
The Citizens’ Council’s position on the Comprehensive Plan showed the 
evolution of its approach to planning and its conception of its own role since the 1940s 
and 1950s.  In short, the Council became in the early 1960s an engine helping to drive the 
shift toward greater democracy in planning.  As the group explained, “The whole concept 
of citizen participation in the local planning process has recently been undergoing serious 
re-evaluation in the face of new citizen movements now taking place in sectors of the 
community where in the past there was little or no expression of public concern.”  As a 
result, where the Council’s role had been largely to publicize the actions of the City 
Planning Commission, it now saw itself as being responsible for “the review and 
constructive criticism of city plans and the development of greater citizen partici tion in 
the planning process.”  The new role of the Council was therefore two-fold:  to assist its 
member organizations with planning issues, and to act as an independent agency and 
study planning proposals to ensure sound and responsible planning for the Philadelphia 
region.33 
Despite the Citizens’ Council’s aggressive new stance, planners failed to h ed its 
warnings about overreliance on expressways, and for the time being, the 1960 
Comprehensive Plan remained the chief blueprint for Philadelphia’s transportation future.  
Although they did not share the same philosophy about expressways, both the Citizens’ 
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Council and the Chamber of Commerce agreed that the Plan had not addressed fully the 
movement of goods, in addition to people.  As the Council said, “the Plan does not 
indicate that any substantial consideration has been given to goods-handling, such as 
location of truck terminals, availability of rail facilities to serve industrial areas, rail-to-
truck transfer arrangements, connections with the Port, and the like.  Since these factor  
are critical to Philadelphia’s economy, they should be treated more fully in the Plan.”34   
Despite approval by all three levels of government for the 1961 route change, 
construction of the Delaware Expressway could not begin right away.  There were still 
other issues to hammer out, including a funding agreement between the city, the state 
highway department, and the BPR, and the approval of the Fairmount Park Commission 
for a piece of the expressway slated to cut through Franklin Delano Roosevelt Park deep 
in South Philadelphia.35  Those in favor of the Delaware Expressway experienced 
anguish at slow progress and mounting delays, while business owners, residents, and 
clergy railed against the uncertainty to which they were subjected.  By 1963, the lack of 
discernable progress on the project became a political liability for city and state officials 
alike.  In July, Democratic mayor James H.J. Tate – the former president of City Council 
who replaced Dilworth in 1962 when the latter resigned to run for governor – accused the 
state highway department of using “indefensible stalling tactics” to delay $40 million in 
Delaware Expressway construction funds in favor of other road projects within the 
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state.36  State highway secretary Henry Harral (a Republican) fired back, claiming that 
Tate was seeking to use state officials as scapegoats in order to bolster his re lection 
campaign.  Denying that his department had downgraded the expressway, Harral 
attributed the delay to a dispute between the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and 
the Bureau of Public Roads.37  Harral’s explanation did not placate Tate, who in 
September offered that the expressway would be completed more quickly under a 
Democratic gubernatorial administration than it had been under the leadership of the 
“Republican foot-draggers in Harrisburg.”38  Meanwhile, Harral assured the public that 
the Philadelphia section of the expressway would be in operation by 1967, a prediction 
that turned out to be off by more than a decade.39 
The Chamber of Commerce continued to push for quicker completion of the 
expressway, appealing directly to federal highway officials in the spring of 1963.  James 
Summy, the chairman of the Chamber’s Streets and Highway Committee, wrot  to Rex 
Whitton asking that the BPR depart from its usual policy of prohibiting the state from 
seeking bids for construction contracts until a particular segment of the route had been 
approved fully for construction.  Summy emphasized the expressway’s importance to the 
business community, writing: 
The Delaware Expressway is the most important single 
highway project in the nation’s fourth largest metropolis 
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which contains nearly four per cent of the entire national 
economy.  It is vital to this major economy which is vital to 
the national interest.  Responsible estimates of two years 
ago still appear valid although not updated with any new 
surveys.  They indicate that every month of delay on the 
Delaware Expressway occasions business losses in Greater 
Philadelphia of $3.6 million40 
  
The Chamber’s plea was to no avail, however. 
Uncertainty about the future continued to plague homeowners in the highway’s 
potential path.  The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority told homeowner Karl 
Weigold in December 1962 that his home would be taken and that he should purchase 
another one.  Along with this advice came a rather short timetable – an assessment of his 
existing home by March 1963, payment of compensation by April, and a moving 
deadline of September.  Weigold did purchase another house, only to be told by the 
Redevelopment Authority in February that progress on the expressway had slowed and 
that no compensation would be immediately forthcoming.41  Other citizens in the same 
boat threatened to bring legal action against the RA and then to press their case with 
Republican governor William Scranton.42  Tate’s only reply was a vague assurance that 
he would investigate the possibility of the RA acquiring residents’ homes early, but it 
seems the city took no action in this regard.43 
In early 1963 David Smallwood was already beginning to exhibit signs of the 
frustration that led to his departure in 1970 as Commissioner of the Department of 
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Streets.  In an exasperated letter to Tate, he recapitulated the alterations that had been 
made to the route of the Delaware Expressway, resulting in running the highway to the 
west, rather than the east, of the Shot Tower (constructed in 1808 to make shot used in 
the War of 1812) in order to prevent the isolation of the historic structure; taking fewer 
certified historic homes; eliminating what would have been isolated residential pockets 
east of the highway; and saving approximately 450 homes over the route first proposed.  
Remarking on the “considerable effort and persuasion on the part of the City to gain hese 
costly concessions from the State and the Bureau of Public Roads,” Smallwood asserted 
that this section of the expressway “has had more study, re-study and concession to local 
objection of any similar length of the entire highway.”  Now that these concessions had 
been made, he felt, the highway was well-located and in a position to serve as a useful
buffer between residential and industrial areas.44  Smallwood’s message was clear – the 
public had had its say, City Hall had been responsive, and now it was time to move 
forward.  What he did not yet realize, however, was that the first cracks in the façad  of 
the expressway planners’ dominance had done permanent damage.   
Closing the Loop:  The Crosstown Expressway 
 
While controversy raged over the Delaware Expressway, Philadelphians paid little 
attention to the Crosstown Expressway, next on the list for construction in the city’s 
highway plan.  Eventually, however, the Crosstown became the most controversial 
transportation project in Philadelphia history. Since the 1940s, city planners had intended 
to build an east-west highway along the southern border of Center City, linking the 
Schuylkill and Delaware Expressways and creating a downtown expressway loop.  
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Philadelphia’s government, focused heavily on downtown renewal in the postwar period, 
saw the Crosstown Expressway as an integral part of its plan to revive Centerity as a 
haven for white-collar business.  Viewing the neighborhoods within the proposed 
highway corridor as slums, officials intended that the Crosstown clear these ar as while 
easing traffic congestion by taking cars off the city streets and providing a connection 
between other major expressways.   Had it been built, however, the Crosstown would 
have cut a wide swath through a series of poverty-stricken neighborhoods that were 
populated almost entirely by African Americans.  It would also have operated as a 
daunting racial barrier, cutting off the expressway corridor from the central business 
district. 
To the shock of many, community opposition defeated the Crosstown 
Expressway, and the road was never built.  Its defeat – or rather its three separate defeats 
between 1968 and 1973 – exemplified the democratization of Philadelphia’s 
transportation politics in the 1960s and 1970s.  At the dawn of the 1960s, however, this 
transformation was only just beginning.  The Crosstown was in the earliest stages of 
planning, and none of its backers had any inkling of the trouble that lay ahead. 
The idea for the Crosstown had existed since 1946, and was first shown to the 
public in the City Planning Commission’s 1949 annual report.  The first detailed 
treatment of the highway plan, however, appeared in the Urban Traffic and 
Transportation Board’s 1955 Plan and Program.  Beginning in 1947, planners wanted to 
build the expressway along Lombard Street, on the southern edge of downtown.  Studies 
the Planning Commission conducted during the late 1940s and 1950s, however, made it 
clear that Lombard would not provide a suitable route.  For one thing, the street was 
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home to several entities – including Graduate Hospital, a Bell Telephone exchange, a 
Philadelphia Electric substation, and Abbotts Dairies – that the Planning Commission did 
not want to disrupt.  Moreover, engineers and planners came to the conclusion that the 
highway would need to be wider than first thought, which would require building it 
between two streets rather than on one street alone.   
As a result of the problems with the Lombard route, in 1959 the Planning 
Commission shifted the proposed route south to encompass the block between South and 
Bainbridge Streets.  The new route had several advantages from a planning standpoint:  it 
was a narrow block, continuous across Center City, and fairly close to the central
business district.  Particularly important was the fact that acquiring the rig t-of-way for 
the new route would be less expensive, which would make it easier for local planners to 
obtain approval from the always budget-conscious state and federal governments, which 
were likely to share the condemnation costs.  Planning Commission Executive Director 
Edmund Bacon liked the South-Bainbridge route because it would eliminate what he 
called “blighted conditions” in that part of town without using redevelopment funds.  In 
short, when Streets Commissioner David Smallwood made the new route public in 
October 1959, Philadelphia’s planning community was solidly behind the decision.  The 
Planning Commission then incorporated the new route into its 1960 Comprehensive Plan 
as well as its 1963 Plan for Center City.45 
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Although planners had already studied the Crosstown route extensively, 
Smallwood and other city officials believed that work on the expressway would not begin 
for at least a decade.  The main issue was money; with the Schuylkill Expressway nearing 
completion and planning for the Delaware Expressway well underway, the Pennsylvaia 
Department of Highways could not predict exactly when funds would be available for the 
Crosstown Expressway.46  City officials assumed, however, that the Crosstown could not 
be started until the Delaware Expressway was completed – a date believed to be no 
earlier than 1971.  Funding for the project presented a significant hurdle for Philadelphi  
and the state because the road, while a federal-aid highway, was not to be part of the 
Interstate Highway System and was eligible only for 50% rather than 90% federal 
funding.47 
Knowing that the highway’s construction was not imminent did not prevent city 
officials from becoming impatient with respect to the preliminary planning and funding 
processes.  In the early 1960s, David Smallwood and other highway boosters became 
annoyed with the state’s failure to commit money to the project.  In 1962, the Chamber of 
Commerce of Greater Philadelphia raised the long-familiar complaint that the s ate was 
shortchanging Philadelphia in terms of highway funding.48  Despite the complaints of 
those eager to see Crosstown Expressway plans put in motion, the financial burdens 
presented by the Delaware Expressway prevented the state from coming up with the 
needed funds for several years more. 
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In its earliest stages, the Crosstown Expressway generated next to no public 
protest, despite the fact that it was slated to tear through several residential 
neighborhoods.  In all likelihood, the lack of protest was attributable to the fact that the 
expressway seemed a remote possibility due to its high cost and its low priority in the 
minds of state highway officials.  Moreover, controversy over the Delaware Expr ssway 
captured the public’s attention and the newspaper headlines in those years.  Nevertheless, 
the planners’ decision to locate the expressway in the South Street-Bainbridge Street 
corridor set Philadelphia on a path that led, later in the decade, to the greatest 
transportation controversy in its history. 
To Save the Railroads:  PSIC and SEPACT 
  
In the early 1960s, as Philadelphia’s transportation politics began the gradual 
transformation that led to a more democratic planning process, the city’s priorities shifted 
subtly as well, resulting in a greater focus on mass transportation and laying the 
groundwork for a regional transit authority.  From the end of World War II through 
almost the entire 1950s, City Hall paid little attention to Philadelphia’s declining mass 
transit systems.  Cultural attitudes favoring automobiles and highways played an 
important role in this dichotomy, as did the state and federal funds available for highway 
construction and the political difficulties inherent in making improvements to systems 
owned by private companies.  Philadelphia made a concerted effort in the 1950s to 
acquire the Philadelphia Transportation Company and its urban transit system of buses, 
subways, and trolleys, to no avail.  At the close of the decade, the city began Operations 
Northeast and Northwest to provide subsidies to the Pennsylvania and Reading 
Railroads’ faltering commuter operations.  While the measure helped bring some riders 
139 
 
back to the rails, it began a consistent pattern of favorable treatment of the commuter 
railroads – whose affluent, white patrons city officials considered necessary to the 
downtown revival – as opposed to the urban transit system and its poor and working-class 
ridership. 
Philadelphians were well aware of the urgency of the city’s mass transportation 
problem.  In June 1961, legendary broadcaster John Facenda (known to those outside 
Philadelphia as the longtime voice of NFL Films) hosted a one-hour television special on 
WCAU entitled, “Dead End 1975?”  The program included shots of terrible traffic jms
on the recently-completed Schuylkill Expressway and on downtown Philadelphia streets.  
“How can it be,” Facenda asked in his famous baritone, “that modern technology has so 
turned on itself that it is working toward its own destruction?”  “If you’ve ever burned a 
roast because your husband was late for dinner because he was stuck on the Schuylkill 
Expressway for over an hour and a half . . . this program is for you,” he informed his 
viewers.   
After spending some time addressing the city’s traffic and parking problems, the 
show turned to potential solutions.  Taxis could help somewhat, but were often too 
expensive.  Buses provided a more efficient use of space by carrying more passenger , 
but more buses would eventually clog the streets the way cars did, and “it would be the 
same problem all over again.”  The real solution, according to Facenda, was to focus on 
rail transport, which wasn’t affected by traffic problems, could maintain a uniform speed, 
and was slowed rarely by weather conditions.  But, the program acknowledged, “railroad 
commuting has not increased in proportion with population growth or the increase in 
automobile travel in the Philadelphia area in recent years.” 
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To help explain why Philadelphia’s commuter railroads were in crisis, Facenda 
interviewed Pennsylvania Railroad vice-president W.W. Patchell, who said he was 
“discouraged” by the railroad’s losses on its commuter service.  When Facenda aske  
whether the Pennsylvania had “an obligation to offer adequate public service,” Patchell 
agreed, but added, “We’re also supposed to get a return on our investment and make a 
profit out of our business.”  Losses on commuter service were practically inevitabl, 
argued Patchell, because equipment and crews had to be available around the clock fora 
service that was used heavily only 20 hours per week – two hours in the morning and two 
hours in the evening, Monday through Friday.  Without the cooperation of elected 
officials, he said, the railroads could only continue to raise fares.  Even fare icreases 
would not be sufficient, however, because government would never permit fares high 
enough to allow the railroads to reach the break-even point, and even if such fares could 
be charged, they would cause commuters to return to their cars.  A Reading Railroad 
executive Facenda spoke with agreed with Patchell, adding that in any business not 
regulated as extensively as transportation, companies would drop the unprofitable parts of
their business. 
The show did not close with any definite solutions, but Facenda said, “It seems 
certain that railways will have to be relied upon to carry the major burden of commuters 
if they are to be moved rapidly, comfortably, and economically.”49  “Dead End 1975?” 
reflected a growing commitment to rail transit, evidenced by actions the city was already 
taking.  City government and the business community were unwilling to see the 
commuter railroads perish because their primary function – shuttling affluent 
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suburbanites between their homes and Center City – was crucial to the city’s primary 
goal of revitalizing its downtown as a home for white-collar business and upscale 
restaurants, shops, and hotels.50   
In February 1960, the city expanded upon Operations Northwest and Northeast by 
creating the Passenger Service Improvement Corporation (PSIC).51  The PSIC, which 
was to absorb the preexisting Operations and add others, was a non-profit corporation, 
separate from both the city government and the railroads.  Its board consisted of 15 
members:  11 mayoral appointees (including the chair), one representative chosen by 
each railroad, and two members appointed by the Railway Labor Executives Association, 
which represented 23 railroad brotherhood unions.52  The PSIC’s charter application 
explained its purpose as follows: 
To promote, develop, maintain and improve passenger 
service on public transportation facilities to the end that all 
people desiring to enter and leave Philadelphia and to travel 
within Philadelphia will be furnished the best and most 
economical public passenger service; and in furtherance 
thereof, to make studies and plans in the field of transit and 
transportation; and to act as the management agent for the 
City of Philadelphia in connection with the operation and 
financing of passenger transportation facilities and rights.53  
 
Because the PSIC was purely a creation of the city of Philadelphia (which encompassed 
the entirety of Philadelphia County), its subsidies created lower fares only for those riders 
traveling between Center City and outlying areas – such as Chestnut Hill and Northeast 
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Philadelphia – within the city limits.54  City officials hoped to expand the program to 
include the suburban counties as soon as possible, despite the lack of a recent history of 
cooperation between Democratic Philadelphia and its traditionally Republican suburb .  
By the end of 1960, the PSIC had six “Operations” to its credit – entailing lower 
fares and more frequent service – and had received public accolades for its success.55  As 
early as May 1960, it was reported that the first two Operations had resulted in 2,000 less 
cars on the streets, “left home by converts to rail commuting.”56  In September, it was 
estimated that Operation Northeast would attract 405,000 new passengers to its lines, an 
increase of 250%, by year’s end.  PSIC chairman Casimir Sienkiewicz crowed that the 
program’s success “indicated a public response probably without precedent in modern 
railroading.”57  In the first half of 1961, city-subsidized trains carried more than 3.2 
million riders, a 44% increase over pre-subsidy levels.58 
The emphasis on downtown renewal of which the PSIC was a product displeased 
some in outlying parts of the city who felt discriminated against.  Joseph Schafer of the 
United Northeast Civic Association derided the PSIC, claiming that its true purpose was 
“for the welfare of certain bureaucrats to perpetuate themselves in a newly cr ated public 
corporation.”  His substantive criticism was that not all sections of the city would benefit 
to the same extent.  Those in Kensington (the part of Northeast Philadelphia closest to 
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Center City), for example, might resent having their tax dollars used to pay the fares of 
those in outlying parts of the Northeast.  Working-class residents of South Philadelp i  
might not like paying to encourage wealthier people (perhaps from the affluent Chestnut 
Hill area to the northwest) to travel downtown for “amusement and entertainment at 
expensive movies and theaters and then fancy restaurants and lush night clubs.”  Business 
owners throughout the city would be hurt by policies encouraging people to shop at 
Center City department stores rather than neighborhood establishments.  “Local 
merchants also must do business,” he reminded City Council.59 
Schafer’s complaints had no discernable impact on the city’s transportation 
policy.  In fact, his comments were opposed diametrically to Mayor Dilworth’s 
philosophy, which was shared by the city’s business leaders.  “Every great urban area,” 
he said in 1960, “must have a heart. . . . a center for its business headquarters; its 
commerce; its entertainment; its culture; its medicine, and everything else which makes a 
great urban area tick.”  Commuters, he explained, “are very important people to any city, 
because they are, by and large, the more well-to-do, the people who fill our office 
buildings, patronize our fine stores, the restaurants, theatres, etc.”60  Edmund Bacon 
shared Dilworth’s view that reviving the central business district was the key to the city’s 
progress as a whole.  In a 1975 interview, Bacon reflected on the necessity of “holding of 
Center City alive in the face of suburban sprawl” and opined, “I think if we had let Center 
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City go downhill, as really happened in Newark, we would have done a disservice to the 
entire region and everybody in it.”61   
From the very start, Dilworth hoped to remedy the spending imbalance between 
highways and mass transit by lobbying Congress to pass legislation providing fe eral aid 
for PSIC subsidies.62  The concept of federal subsidies for commuter railroads met with 
immediate and stiff resistance.  As historian Stephen Goddard explained, America’s 
growing automobile culture, along with poor railroad service and a long-standing 
perception (more accurate with respect to the nineteenth century than the twentieth) that 
railroads received preferable government treatment helped to create public hostility 
toward the railroads.63  Even the Evening Bulletin was skeptical about the idea of federal 
subsidies.  The paper acknowledged in an editorial that the federal government did 
“invest heavily” in interstate highways that competed with railroads.  These 
contributions, it claimed, were based on national defense and were not made for the 
benefit of any particular city.  Cities, the editorial continued, would not be justified “ n 
going to Washington for the means of bringing their residents from outlying areas to city 
centers.”64 
Not even all railroads supported the idea of federal subsidies.  Those in the east 
were generally in favor of the concept, but western and southern railroads were opposed, 
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perhaps because they would receive less assistance, or because subsidies would have 
made it more difficult for them to abandon unprofitable passenger service.65  
Pennsylvania Railroad president James Symes reminded Congress, however, that “Other 
areas which once had similar rail networks [to Philadelphia’s] permitted them to 
deteriorate by permitting government support exclusively for auto-dominant 
transportation systems, and completely ignored the value of the rail systems and their 
need for similar public support as part of the total transportation system.”66  Initially, the 
chances of Congress passing legislation to subsidize commuter railroads seemed b tween 
slim and none, due in part to the hostility of members of Congress from rural areas to the 
concept of federal transit aid for large metropolitan areas.  As one western congressman 
put it, “The cities for years have been after us for billions of dollars in slum clearance 
money to halt the flight of their people to the suburbs.  Now they want more billions from 
us to carry the people to and from the suburbs.”67   
Dilworth’s appearance on NBC’s Today show in February 1960 to promote the 
idea of federal subsidies for rail transit provoked angry responses from across the nation, 
like the one from a Florida resident who wrote the mayor, “GET OFF MY BACK! . . . I 
see no reason why my taxes from Florida should help you solve the [transportation] 
problem through the Federal Government.”68  Not all correspondents were so hostile.  
Dilworth did receive some supportive letters, complimenting him for his “courage” in 
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asking for federal rail subsidies despite widespread opposition and “cries of 
‘socialism.’”69  Some who admired the mayor’s stance even suggested he run for 
governor (which he did, unsuccessfully, in 1962).   
In addition to scarce funding, the PSIC’s biggest limitation was its inability to 
provide subsidies for those portions of the commuter rail lines outside the city limits.  
Dilworth and other city officials knew that in order for the subsidy program to serve its 
true purpose – getting affluent suburbanites to use the commuter rails to come downtown 
to work, shop, and dine – Philadelphia would have to form an alliance with its suburban 
counties to expand the program.  “There is no doubt,” Dilworth said, “that the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area is a physical entity, and that no part of it can long remain 
healthy unless all parts of it are healthy.”70   
The initial reaction from suburban politicians, however, was one of skepticism 
over both the legality and the cost of the PSIC.71  In March 1960, Delaware County 
refused to join a city-suburb alliance.  State senator and chair of county commissioner  
Robert Watkins explained, “We would never agree that our county become a member of 
a corporation on transportation that Philadelphia is running.”72  Montgomery County – 
home to the area’s wealthy Main Line – was also initially hostile; a report the county 
commissioned advised it to refrain from joining the PSIC to avoid “partisan political 
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domination.”73  The railroads were concerned about the potential impact of politics upon 
the program as well, delivering to Dilworth an ultimatum that they would withdraw 
immediately from the PSIC at the first hint of political interference.  ThePennsylvania 
and Reading were, the mayor acknowledged, “worried about reports that PSIC will be 
scrapped for a transit authority or some other type of public agency that is subjectto 
political control.”74  Such fears were not totally unfounded, as the newspapers reported 
that some in City Council wanted indeed to turn the PSIC into a public agency.75 
The passage of the Housing Act of 1961 – the first piece of federal legislation to 
address urban mass transit directly – may have helped to break the impasse between
Philadelphia and the counties.  Spurred by the severe decline of commuter railroads, the 
Act allowed for low-interest loans for purchasing equipment and making improvements, 
as well as funds for a demonstration program.76  Hoping undoubtedly to benefit from the 
new federal program, representatives from Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester and Montgomery 
Counties signed the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Compact (SEPACT) – a 
counterpart to the PSIC – on October 4, 1961, with Delaware County continuing in its 
refusal to join.  Over the next few years, SEPACT created several additional subsidy 
Operations, including Operation North Penn-Hatboro, Operation Levittown, Operation 
Southwest, and Operation Main Line.77  In 1962, some in Delaware County reconsidered 
                                                     
73 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 7 April 1961, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
74 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 9 August 1960, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
75 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 10 August 1960, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
76 Edward Weiner, Urban Transportation Planning in the United States:  History, Policy, and Practice 
(New York:  Springer, 2008), 28-29. 
77 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 16 February 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
148 
 
joining, but Watkins remained steadfast in his opposition, asserting that the railroads had 
unfairly shifted to Philadelphia’s suburban counties the responsibility to provide service 
and that non-riders objected to subsidizing those who did use the service.  Moreover, he 
said, if Philadelphia wanted more shoppers, it should build more parking lots downtown, 
explaining that his wife wanted to be able to park near the stores at which she shopped, 
finding it inconvenient to take a taxi between the railroad station and the department 
stores, especially while carrying packages.78  Delaware County never joined SEPACT. 
While the PSIC and SEPACT Operations provided the commuter railroads with 
some relief, the subsidies did not cover losses completely, and it was clear that the 
railroads needed more assistance in order to survive.  In early 1962, the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission found, in dismissing various complaints stemming from a 
1960 fare increase, that the Pennsylvania and the Reading both “earned less than a fair 
return” on their passenger business between 1945 and 1960, and that “all available 
information indicates deficit operations in the future.”  In making its ruling that the 1960 
fare increases were appropriate and lawful, the PUC emphasized the need for 
Philadelphia to improve its commuter rail service: 
Philadelphia possesses a system of electrified suburban rail 
lines which, in terms of area coverage and convenience of 
downtown terminals, is unsurpassed in any other 
metropolitan area of the nation.  This rail network radiating 
from center city is a valuable transportation asset to the 
lower Delaware Valley which is undergoing vigorous 
expansion and development in its suburban areas.  
Suburban rail service, however, must be considerably 
improved if it is to attract and hold additional patronage 
from suburbanites.  Speed, comfort, and convenience must 
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be enhanced over present levels to compete with improved 
automobiles and highway facilities.79  
   
On October 23, 1962, almost exactly a year after the creation of SEPACT, the federal
government stepped in with crucial aid pursuant to the aforementioned Mass 
Transportation Demonstration Grant program of the Housing Act of 1961.  The Federal 
Housing and Home Finance Agency granted SEPACT $3.1 million to be matched by 
$1.5 million in local funds for a three-year trial program.80  Although the federal funds in 
question were “demonstration grants,” intended merely to demonstrate the efficacy of 
SEPACT’s subsidy Operations, the money was in fact keeping the commuter service
alive.81 
SEPACT, the alliance between Philadelphia and its suburban counties aimed at 
saving the region’s commuter rail systems, was the direct precursor to the creation of the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority in 1964.  The Urban Traffic and 
Transportation Board had advocated a regional transit authority back in 1955 and Mayor 
Tate supported the idea even before he took office in 1962.  (In 1960, while Tate was still 
president of City Council – and Dilworth’s heir apparent – the Ev ning Bulletin 
contrasted the two men by explaining that Dilworth thought like an executive, creating 
the PSIC and then encouraging the suburbs to join in a similar alliance, while Tate 
thought like a legislator, favoring a five-county transportation agency created by the state 
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legislature.)82  Proponents of such a regional authority pointed out that privately-owned 
transit was subjected to such heavy government regulation as to eliminate the benefits of 
private ownership; that automobile use was subsidized to such an extent that mass transit 
would never survive unless it were also subsidized, an outcome that would be much more 
politically viable under public ownership; that a publicly-owned system would be more 
efficient at eliminating redundant service and adding service where it wasmost needed; 
and that multimodal service would improve as a result of eliminating competition 
between bus lines and rail lines, for example.83  
Of course, policymakers had to consider how a new regional mass transit agency 
would be funded.  Experts were divided on how much government support would be 
necessary to augment revenue derived from the fare box.  Another issue concerned the 
role of the state in such an agency; historically, mass transit funding had come only from 
local governments, and more recently, the federal government.84  Mayor Tate began 
campaigning actively for a regional agency in mid-1963, telling Governor Scranton that 
such an agency would provide residents of Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, Montgomery 
and Delaware Counties with “speedy, economical and attractive service,” that would 
result in more riders for mass transit and fewer cars on the roads.85  In an effort to drum 
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up public support for the idea, Tate sent the newspapers a lengthy letter setting forth his 
reasoning, writing: 
I believe that a regional transit authority offers real hope for 
a fast, economical, efficient, and adequate five-county 
transit system.  It should be able to meet all its operating 
expenses from the fare box, while still financing some 
capital improvements.  Divested of the profit motive, 
exempt from certain taxes, and able to avoid wasteful 
duplication, the new authority will be able to achieve 
savings that will go into better service.  Operating as a truly 
efficient, regional transit system and dedicated to serving 
the public as its primary interest, the new authority may 
well be able to arrest the downward trend of transit riding 
and to lure some drivers off the overcrowded highways.86 
 
Tate’s letter was so long that the Inquirer declined to publish it.  As the editorial page 
director told Tate, “You know that we are always glad to hear from you.  We are even 
gladder when you hold your enthusiasm down to, say, one page or less.”87 
Philadelphia was the last major metropolitan area in the United States not to have
a public transit authority of any kind, but Mayor Tate hoped it would be one of the first to 
have a regional authority.88  Tate’s publicity blitz included a 1963 report, commissioned 
by his office, entitled “The Public Transit Authority:  A Study of Five Cities,” which 
investigated public transit authorities in Chicago, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Cleveland, and 
Toronto and laid out additional arguments for a such an authority in southeastern 
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Pennsylvania.  The report asserted that the public had lost faith in the Philadelphia 
Transportation Company, which had failed to provide adequate service and had made 
improvements only when coerced by the city; that the PTC’s parent company, National 
City Lines, Inc., was not concerned with regional transportation issues; that a private 
company was incapable of self-financing improvements but aroused hostility when 
subsidized by the government; that the federal government was much more likely to 
provide financial assistance to a public agency; and finally and perhaps most importantly, 
that the Philadelphia metropolitan area was growing and was desperately in n ed of a 
single, coordinated agency to run its transportation systems.89   
Mayor Dilworth had tried for years to effectuate a city takeover of the PTC, but 
when he resigned to run for governor in 1962, his successor Tate made clear that he was 
firmly against having the city acquire the urban transit system, preferring a re ional 
authority instead.90  Tate’s plan found strong support from important constituencies, 
including Philadelphia’s business community and the Citizens’ Council on City 
Planning.91  The Chamber of Commerce, despite its strong advocacy of expressway 
construction, had begun recently to press for more balance between highways and mass 
transit.  Its statements on mass transportation focused almost exclusively on the 
commuter railroads, as opposed to the PTC’s urban transit system.  The Chamber had 
supported both the PSIC and SEPACT, seeing the latter as “a good interim step in solving 
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the regional transportation problem.”92  The Greater Philadelphia Movement wanted a 
regional authority as well.93   
In late December 1963, the state legislature complied with Philadelphia’s wishes, 
passing the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act, which created a regional 
transportation authority for Philadelphia and its four suburban counties.  Known as the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority or SEPTA, the authority was 
governed by an 11-person administrative board and was considered an agent of the state 
of Pennsylvania.  The legislature gave the new authority a broad range of powers, 
including the power to determine routes and services, to make plans for the improvement 
of mass transit, and to apply for and accept grants from federal, state and local 
governments.94 
James McConnon, who was SEPTA’s first vice-chairman (1964-68) and second 
chairman (1968-78), stressed that “SEPTA came about because of the decline of the 
commuter rail system. . . . Historically, it was directly derived from that.”  SEPTA 
existed, at least at first, solely for the “purpose of enabling the region to get [federal] 
funds to support the commuter railroads.”  The key to getting the enabling legislation 
passed, according to McConnon, was that by the terms of the law, neither the county 
governments nor the state government “was going to have to put any money in.”95  It was 
not long before it became evident that SEPTA could not survive without state and county 
                                                     
92 Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, Description of Mass Transportation Council, 1961-1962, 
Papers of the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
93 Greater Philadelphia Movement, Minutes of Executive Committee meeting, 12 June 1963, Papers of the 
Greater Philadelphia Movement, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
94 Pennsylvania Economy League and Bureau of Municipal Research, “Citizens’ Business Newsletter,” 23 
December 1963, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 145, Philadelphia City 
Planning Commission. 
95 James McConnon, Interview by author, Digital recording, Philadelphia, PA, 4 March 2009. 
154 
 
financial contributions, but by then, the authority was well established and allowing it to 
die would have created political liabilities for those involved.  As 1963 came to a close, 
with SEPTA slated to become a functioning authority in January 1964, Philadelphia 










In the 1960s, American democracy expanded dramatically as previously neglected 
and oppressed social groups – including African Americans, women, Native Americans, 
students, and others – made great strides toward attaining increased participation in civic 
life, greater representation in government, better treatment under the nation’s lws, and a 
higher degree of control over decisions affecting their lives.  The social movements 
historians identify as such a salient feature of the decade resulted in challenges to the 
imposition of top-down authority and hierarchy in virtually every area of American l fe.   
Transportation politics were among the many facets of U.S. society affected by 
greater democratization in the mid-1960s.  The most obvious manifestations of this 
transformation were so-called “freeway revolts,” which entailed large goups of citizens – 
such as neighborhood associations, religious congregations, historic preservationists, 
environmentalists, or citizens’ planning organizations – banding together to oppose the 
construction of an expressway slated to tear through one or more urban neighborhoods.  
This phenomenon occurred with varying degrees of success in major cities across the 
nation including San Francisco, Baltimore, New Orleans, Washington, D.C., and Boston, 
just to name a few.1  As highway historian Raymond Mohl explained, these revolts were 
very much a product of the political ethos of the 1960s and had their greatest success in 
the latter part of that decade and in the early 1970s: 
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As a collection of discrete, bottom-up movements 
beginning at the neighborhood level, the freeway revolt 
shared many aspects of sixties countercultural and change-
inducing activity. Typical of the time was rejection of top-
down decision making, the normal practice of the highway 
establishment in routing and building highways. Freeway 
fighters sought citizen participation in important decision 
making on expressway routes and urban policy. However, 
the citizen army of homeowners and neighborhood groups 
usually came up against an inflexible bureaucratic force of 
state and federal highway engineers and administrators 
reluctant to yield professional and legal authority to popular 
protesters. Only when decision making on controversial 
interstate routes became politicized and subject to litigation 
in the late 1960s and after did freeway revolters achieve a 
measure of success and satisfaction.2 
 
As Mohl explained, freeway revolts were directed primarily against the virtually 
untrammeled authority over highway construction that state and federal highway 
engineers enjoyed.  From its inception in 1916, a federalist system governed the feral-
aid highway program, whereby the federal government provided a portion of the funds, 
but route selection, design, right-of-way acquisition, and construction were the states’
responsibilities (with varying degrees of local input), subject to federal approval.  Despite 
a system under which ostensibly authority was decentralized, in reality the federal 
highway engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads dominated the process of highway 
construction in the United States until the mid-1960s.  The Bureau derived its power from 
a carefully-maintained reputation for apolitical expertise as well as its role in overseeing 
the creation of stronger highway departments on the state level in the early years of 
federal-aid road construction.  Most state highway engineers had close relationships with 
BPR engineers, sought their advice consistently, and adopted their mindset regarding the 
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purposes of highway construction.  The result was an engineer-dominated highway 
planning regime that for decades focused almost entirely on the movement of automobile 
traffic while ignoring social, aesthetic and environmental factors.  Historians Paul Barrett 
and Mark Rose summed up the situation:  “Engineers and their numbers were in 
charge.”3 
State and federal highway engineers began to lose their dominance over road 
building in the mid-1960s, when the process became less technocratic and more 
politicized.  Changes within the federal government’s transportation bureaucracy 
coincided with growing citizen discontent, altering the course of expressway politics and 
resulting in a shift in emphasis away from highway building and toward urban mass 
transportation improvements.  Most significantly, the BPR was in 1966 placed within the 
new U.S. Department of Transportation; now subject to much greater oversight, the 
Bureau was stripped of the near total autonomy with which it had operated for so long.  
The nation’s first Secretary of Transportation, Alan Boyd, and his successor John Volpe, 
were sympathetic to the concerns of highway protestors and moved toward a true 
decentralization of authority so that local opinion, rather than the technical analyses of 
federal engineers, would become the primary factor governing highway planning.4  In 
addition to curtailing the engineers’ power and moving expressway construction into the 
                                                     
3 Paul Barrett and Mark H. Rose, “Street Smarts:  The Politics of Transportation Statistics in the American 
City,” Journal of Urban History 25, no. 3 (March 1999):  415; Mark H. Rose, Interstate:  Express Highway 
Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville:  University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 1 1-12; Mark H. Rose and Bruce E. 
Seely, “Getting the Interstate System Built:  Road Engineers and the Implementation of Public Policy, 
1955-1985,” Journal of Policy History 2, no. 1 (1990):  33-37; Bruce E. Seely, Building the American 
Highway System:  Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1987), 231-32. 
4 As Zachary Schrag explained, prior to becoming Secretary of Transportation, Boyd had been chair of the 
Civil Aviation Board, and therefore lacked intimate ti s with highway engineers.  He surrounded himself 
with people likely to question the conventional wisdom regarding expressway construction, such as his 
assistant general counsel for litigation, Peter Craig, who had been an anti-freeway activist in Washingto , 
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realm of local politics, the Department of Transportation gave strong support to new
federal legislation aimed at improving urban mass transit.  Such legislation culminated in 
what was possibly the clearest indication of shifting priorities on the federal level – a 
1973 provision allowing states to receive federal money for mass transportation 
improvements by cancelling interstate highway projects.5 
Mirroring the national trend, Philadelphia’s transportation politics also became 
more democratic in the mid-1960s, allowing for greater input by those affected directly 
by planning decisions.  The high point of the move toward greater democracy was 
Philadelphia’s own freeway revolt, which began in 1964, reached a fever pitch in 1967, 
and in 1968 achieved the first of the three defeats of the Crosstown Expressway that were 
needed to kill the controversial road for good.  The expressway’s final cancellation in 
1973 spared thousands of African Americans, many of them living in poverty, from 
losing their homes, and prevented the construction of a racial barrier that would have 
separated the neighborhoods in the expressway corridor from downtown.  The mid-1960s 
also saw the beginnings of a successful movement by affluent residents of Philadelphia’s 
Society Hill neighborhood to have a portion of the Delaware Expressway in their area 
lowered and topped with a landscaped cover for aesthetic and historic preservation 
reasons.   
The Crosstown Expressway proved exceptional, however.  The democratization 
of Philadelphia’s transportation politics, unlike that of many other cities, did not result in 
substantial gains in power by grassroots citizens’ organizations.  Instead, the city’s white-
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collar business interests, represented in large part by the Greater Philadelp i  Movement, 
the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, and the Chamber of Commerce of 
Greater Philadelphia, took the reins and emerged as the dominant force shaping 
transportation planning.  These were the same organizations – the directors of which were 
drawn from fields such as retail, banking, real estate, insurance, and law – that had 
controlled the city’s redevelopment since the end of World War II.  As a result, they 
already had close ties to City Hall and were well positioned to exert strong influence in 
the area of transportation as well.  The Citizens’ Council on City Planning was moved in 
1966 to declare with some measure of concern that quasi-public corporations such as 
OPDC possibly had “more effect on the physical development of the city than all of the 
plans of the Planning Commission.”6  The consequence of the emergence of business 
interests as more powerful actors in the field of transportation politics was that 
Philadelphia’s priorities, which were already focused on revitalizing the urban core rather 
than outlying neighborhoods, underwent little discernable change.  Those standing 
outside the tight alliance between City Hall and the large business interests – specially 
racial minorities and the poor – were unable to exert a great degree of long-term 
influence over transportation planning decisions that impacted them directly. 
As was explained in earlier chapters, Philadelphia’s business and government 
establishment had been concerned about the decline of mass transportation (authority 
over which had remained in local hands throughout the postwar period, in contrast to 
expressways) since the mid-1950s, well before the problem garnered significant national 
attention.  The changes that occurred in the realm of national transportation politicsin the 
                                                     
6 “Report of the Evaluation Committee of Citizens’ Council on City Planning,” Draft report, January 1966, 
p. 13, Papers of Walter Phillips, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA.  
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1960s allowed the city and the region as a whole to expand on earlier efforts to improve 
the area’s mass transit. A crucial piece of legislation was the Urban Mass Tr nsportation 
Act of 1964 (UMTA), which authorized federal money to aid cities in upgrading their 
mass transportation infrastructure.  In anticipation of greater federal aid, the Pennsylvania 
legislature, at the urging of Philadelphia’s City Hall and its business community, created 
the regional transit authority SEPTA to act as a conduit through which federal grants
would pass to the region’s mass transit systems.  SEPTA, which began operations early i  
1964, was an outgrowth of the region’s existing subsidization of the Pennsylvania and 
Reading Railroads’ commuter operations through the Passenger Service Improveent 
Corporation and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Compact, and took over 
those subsidy operations in 1965.  Although the new authority in 1968 acquired the city’s 
urban mass transit system of buses, subways and trolleys, it maintained the bias toward 
the commuter railroads that its origins suggested.  Business and political leaders in 
Philadelphia had since the 1950s perceived the maintenance of the commuter railroads, 
which brought suburban workers and shoppers downtown, to be necessary to the 
preservation of the central business district.   
Although SEPTA’s disparate treatment of the commuter railroads and urban 
transit system did not cause major controversy right away, in 1964 Philadelphia planted 
the seeds of future conflict when it asked the federal government to help it fund the 
Center City Commuter Connection, a downtown rail tunnel that would unify the region’s 
two separate commuter railroad systems.  The project stalled during the 1960s, but 
became the subject of a heated debate in the 1970s, when funds were scarce and the 
urban transportation infrastructure was deteriorating rapidly.  Many urban residents came 
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to believe that SEPTA and their own city government cared more about helping affluent 
white suburbanites get to work than about the transportation needs of the inner-city 
residents.   
The years between 1964 and 1968 were notable for the democratization of 
Philadelphia’s transportation politics, in keeping with the national trend, as local interests 
gained greater influence over transportation planning decisions.  Although some power 
did devolve to grassroots citizens’ organizations, resulting in the city’s temporary 
abandonment of the controversial Crosstown Expressway, white-collar business interests 
focused on downtown revitalization emerged as the most important actors in the 
transportation arena.  Because Philadelphia’s planning regime was already focused on the 
renewal of Center City as a vibrant central business district, transportation planning 
priorities did not change in any meaningful way.  The southeastern Pennsylvania region 
did in this period take advantage of changing priorities at the federal level to make great 
strides toward improving its mass transportation, but it did so in a way that set the stage 
for future conflict over the prioritization of affluent suburbanites over the inner-city 
working class and poor.     
The Battle of Society Hill:  The Delaware Expressway   
In the mid-1960s, affluent white professionals in Philadelphia’s Society Hill 
neighborhood, many of whom were affiliated with the city’s large corporate interests, 
began a successful campaign to have a portion of the Delaware Expressway built below 
ground and topped with a landscaped cover.  Although the city had experienced some 
opposition to expressway construction in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Society Hill fight 
was qualitatively different, and represented a new kind of expressway battle.  Earlier, 
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those living in the paths of the Schuylkill and Delaware Expressways had objected, 
understandably, to routes that were slated to destroy their homes and churches.  In 
contrast, the Society Hill protestors were focused on larger issues of how expressways 
impacted cities in terms of environment, aesthetics, and historic preservation.  While 
some tried to characterize their movement as a group of wealthy people desiring to 
insulate themselves from inconvenience, Society Hill residents skillfully promoted the 
notion that they were acting primarily to preserve some of the most historic grund in the 
United States – a strategy that garnered them national support and was crucial to their 
success.  While the democratization of transportation politics, a federal government that 
was more responsive to local concerns about highways, and a national base of support 
were all vital factors, the fact that the Society Hill protestors had intimate ties to the 
business-government coalition that ran the city’s redevelopment may have been most 
important to the overall result. 
The campaign to modify the design of the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill 
took place within the context of an urban renewal program in which the city, the federal 
government, and private interests had invested large sums of money, elevating 
dramatically the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood.  The new residents who 
sought to have their portion of the expressway modified (including descendants of the 
Founders) were part of the city’s establishment, enjoying close connections to centers of 
power in both business and government.  What happened in Southwark, a less affluent 
area immediately to the south of Society Hill in which a large number of homes and 
churches were lost to the expressway, illustrated the significance of class in shaping 
transportation decisions.  Southwark had not yet become gentrified and was populated 
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mostly by working-class whites whose socioeconomic status and eastern European 
ethnicity left them further removed from City Hall and corporate boardrooms.  Despite 
possessing historic value, Southwark lacked the famous institutions, such as 
Independence Hall, that gave Society Hill’s quest national appeal.  As a result, Southwark 
residents failed in their copycat effort to have their portion of the Delaware Expr ssway 
lowered and covered, and the expressway impacted the community severely. 
In the fall of 1964, the Delaware Expressway made a leap forward when the first 
section of the road, running six miles from Bucks County to Woodhaven Road in 
Northeast Philadelphia, opened for traffic.7  The controversial Center City section of the 
highway, however, was about to enter a new and even more contentious phase.  The 
epicenter of the controversy was Society Hill, a historic but physically deteriorated 
neighborhood hugging the Delaware River on the eastern side of Center City 
Philadelphia.  In the mid-1960s, the area was undergoing a renaissance as Philadelphia’s 
city government began efforts to draw affluent professionals back to the city.  At he 
forefront of the effort was Edmund Bacon, the executive director of the City Planning 
Commission, who had been focused since 1949 on renewing Society Hill.  A November 
1964 profile of Bacon in Time explained that “Society Hill is studded with 18th century 
houses and historic landmarks, and Bacon opened up vistas around them by chopping out 
factories and dingy warehouses, threading greenery through them and building new 
houses in harmony with the eighteenth century beauties.”8   
                                                     
7 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 11 September 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
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Society Hill Towers, a trio of high-rise apartment buildings designed by I.M. Pei, 
also helped to spur the area’s renewal.  Local attorney Stanhope Browne of Dechert, 
Price & Rhoads, who led the effort to get the Delaware Expressway modified, moved 
from affluent Chestnut Hill to Society Hill with his wife in October 1964, taking the 
twelfth apartment to be rented in the Towers.  Although the Towers caused some 
controversy, Browne agreed with Bacon that they were crucial to the neighborhood’s 
redevelopment.  Getting affluent professionals to move to Society Hill, “with a very iffy 
situation, with no stores and shops, empty streets at night, it was going to take a long 
time, and it might just peter out,” he said.  “You had to bring in a lot of people fast.”9  
One observer referred to pre-renewal Society Hill as “a bombed out area,” with fe  
stores and poor schools, badly in need of outside assistance to become attractive as a 
residential area.10      
The city’s Redevelopment Authority placed primary responsibility for directing 
the Society Hill renaissance in the hands of the Old Philadelphia Development 
Corporation, a private group run by, as Browne put it, “the power elite of the city,” 
including bank presidents and heads of major corporations.  OPDC was an outgrowth of 
the Greater Philadelphia Movement, the powerful group of corporate presidents 
established in 1948 to spearhead reform of the city charter and accelerate Philad lp ia’s 
postwar development.  GPM preferred to oversee development on a grand scale, often 
helping to create new organizations to deal with specific projects.  At a 1956 meeting in 
Mayor Richardson Dilworth’s office, Dilworth, GPM member Harry Batten of 
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advertising agency N.W. Ayer, and powerful real estate mogul turned chairman of the 
City Planning Commission Albert Greenfield (whose company owned a lot of property in 
the southeastern quadrant of Center City) hatched the idea for OPDC, which was to be a 
quasi-public corporation composed of both corporate executives and top city officials.11   
The new organization’s first role was as the official consultant to the 
Redevelopment Authority on the Society Hill project, and its main responsibility was to 
sell crumbling houses to buyers who agreed to restore them.12  The process of urban 
renewal forced out most of the previous residents, including a small number of African 
Americans but mostly working-class whites of eastern and central European desce t.  
OPDC’s focus was on restoring houses rather than tearing them down, so existing owners 
were spared losing their homes to eminent domain if they promised, at a minimum, to 
restore the façade.  Despite being offered low-interest loans to do so, most did not.  Asa 
result, the neighborhood gentrified quickly.13 
Society Hill’s renewal set the stage for the expressway controversy.  Affluent new 
residents began to realize that the elevated expressway engineers had planne for their 
section would have a blighting effect on the area – by creating an unsightly and noisy 
barrier between the city and its waterfront – and thus interfere with redevelopm nt plans.  
The earliest protests against the elevated expressway were not highly organized, but 
nevertheless caught the attention of city and state officials, perhaps because the citizens 
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involved were prominent and were already allied with the Redevelopment Authority and 
OPDC.   
In October 1964, property owners, residents, and real estate developers in Society 
Hill began to object to the “Chinese Wall” that would be created by elevating the 
expressway up to 25.5 feet above ground between Dock and Lombard Streets.14  
Commissioner of Streets David Smallwood was quick to dismiss this characteriz tion, 
claiming that the concept of a wall was misleading because there were to be underpasses 
to the waterfront at both Dock and Spruce Streets.15  Despite the fact that his department, 
while participating in the highway planning process, lacked final authority over issues 
such as route and design, Smallwood proclaimed that the elevated design would not be 
changed.  Democratic mayor James H.J. Tate, who had replaced Dilworth in 1962, felt 
differently, and he persuaded the state highway department to agree to study the issue.16  
Republican Pennsylvania Secretary of Highways Henry Harral, perhaps recognizing the 
near unanimity of local opposition to an elevated highway, promised immediately to 
eliminate the “Chinese Wall” from the Society Hill plans.  The Philadelphia Inquirer 
listed possible alternatives as a highway at grade level with overpasses to th  waterfront; 
a slightly elevated highway with overpasses or underpasses; or a tunnel through t e 
area.17  
                                                     
14 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 18 October 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
15 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 1 November 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
16 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 18 December 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
17 Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 December 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
167 
 
Only a few days after Harral’s promise, however, his department reneged, 
refusing to have its engineering consultants make a full restudy of the expr ssway in 
Society Hill.  William Day, the president of OPDC, complained that “the position taken 
by the highway officials completely overlooks the importance of the urban renewal 
program and the hundreds of millions of dollars of government and private money being 
invested” in Society Hill and nearby projects, such as the waterfront area known as 
Penn’s Landing.18  The state’s position, he lamented, “was taken despite the leadership 
and strong position of Mayor Tate” who had advocated strongly for a review of this 
portion of the highway.19  In addition, the drumbeat of criticism from Philadelphians 
concerned about the historic properties that would be destroyed by the expressway 
continued.  The Philadelphia Society for the Preservation of Landmarks called the 
Delaware Expressway “the greatest single massacre of old Philadelphia houses ever 
proposed.”  The expressway would take 173 certified historic buildings between 
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Lombard Street and Washington Avenue, the group claimed, 73 of them built prior to 
1800.20   
After having been met by initial resistance from the state highway department, 
Philadelphia politicians and business leaders turned to the federal government for help.  
In January 1965, former Philadelphia mayor and current U.S. senator Joseph Clark joined 
with William Rafsky, the former city Development Coordinator turned executive vice 
president of OPDC, to meet with federal highway administrator Rex Whitton.  Clark and 
Rafsky appealed to Whitton on behalf of Society Hill residents and city officials who 
were concerned about the potential blighting effect of the expressway.21  It seems that 
Clark and Rafsky were able to convince Whitton of the merits of their position, as 
Whitton announced on February 1 that engineering firm Ammann & Whitney had 
conducted a study to determine whether a ground-level expressway would be feasil , 
reporting in the affirmative.22  Two days later, bending apparently to pressure from both 
Philadelphia and the federal government, Harral approved a new design that would lower 
the Delaware Expressway from 25 feet to two or three feet above street level.23   
Harral’s concession, although ensuring a major change in the design of the 
expressway, did not end the Society Hill controversy, which instead became more heated.  
Soon afterward, the Society Hill Civic Association arranged for Edmund Bacon, along 
with a state highway engineer, to present to area residents a model of the redesigned 
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expressway.  When Bacon had finished his presentation, a prominent Philadelphian 
named Jared Ingersoll stood up to speak.  Ingersoll, a Pennsylvania Railroad executiv  
descended from a signer of the Constitution, whose wife Agnes served on the board of 
OPDC, was a pioneer of the Society Hill renaissance, being one of the first citizens of 
note to restore a house in the neighborhood.  Ingersoll let Bacon know in no uncertain 
terms that Society Hill residents were still not satisfied with the expressway design and 
intended to fight him on it.24 
Bacon had told Time in 1964, “If you wait until someone else does a plan, you’re 
licked.  We always have a proposal ready.”25  Those who wanted to challenge Bacon’s 
expressway design took this philosophy to heart, realizing that their quest would be futile 
unless they had an alternative proposal ready to go.  Fortuitously, a group of young, 
socially-conscious architects, who according to Browne were not part of “the 
architectural establishment of Philadelphia,” also opposed the expressway design and had 
recently come up with a plan.  Led by Frank Wiese and calling themselves the 
Philadelphia Architects Committee, the group had sketched designs for an expressway 
built entirely below ground in Society Hill and topped with a cover.  Almost immediately 
afterward, in March 1965, members of the Society Hill Civic Association who opposed 
Bacon’s plan for the expressway formed the Committee to Preserve Philadelphi ’s 
Historic Gateway (CPPHG), with Browne in the lead.  As Browne recalled, the arc itects 
had a good plan but lacked experience with politics and public relations, areas in which 
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many members of the CPPHG were well-versed.  As a result, the two groups “ ushed into 
each other’s arms.”26 
  The Architects Committee and the CPPHG proposed to drop the expressway into 
a tunnel 30 feet below ground from Arch to Pine Streets – a distance of six blocks.27  
Composed of bankers, lawyers, businessmen, publishers, insurance executives and the 
like, the CPPHG garnered immediately high-profile supporters including Mayor Tate and 
both of Pennsylvania’s U.S. senators, Joseph Clark and Hugh Scott.28  The Citizens’ 
Council on City Planning also lent its support to the effort.  In accordance with its more 
activist role in the 1960s, the Council took note of the “great and possibly growing gap 
between community-wide planning programs and the interests and concerns of 
neighborhoods or various groups within political jurisdictions.”  The Council’s support 
for a depressed Delaware Expressway in Society Hill was based in part on “  risi g 
awareness that the concern of planning must not be restricted to physical developmnt 
alone but that it must deal with the social and economic as well.” 29  Mayor Tate assured 
Citizens’ Council president Samuel Ballam that he did “not intend to see historic values 
sacrificed to engineering expediency.”30   
Moreover, the CPPHG enjoyed very strong support from OPDC, the extremely 
powerful group that was in charge of Society Hill’s urban renewal.  Stanhope Br wne 
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remarked that the Delaware Expressway battle in Society Hill was “a three-pronged 
fight,” with the Architects Committee providing the technical expertise, the CPPHG 
acting as the public face of the movement, and OPDC, which attempted to avoid public 
controversy, exerting its influence behind the scenes.  The low-key manner in which the 
CPPHG conducted its activism – treating officials in a collegial manner rather than 
marching, picketing, or shouting – was reflective of the extent to which the group’s 
members were tied to, and part of, the city’s establishment.  As Browne said, “We had to 
be very gentlemanly and ladylike. . . . You were never going to get Mrs. Ingersoll to go 
camp out on the governor’s front yard.  That wasn’t our style.”31    
Edmund Bacon was one of the few among Philadelphia’s elite who was not on 
board, telling Jared Ingersoll that he did “not think it would be either wise or practical to 
try to depress the Delaware Expressway at this point.”32  Around the same time, Bacon 
told Time that burying the expressway would cut off the driver’s view of the redeveloped 
Society Hill, a statement that aroused indignation in Philadelphia attorney William Logan 
Fox, who wrote Bacon, “I had supposed Society Hill was to be made a good place in 
which people may enjoy living.  I had not supposed it was to be in the nature of a zoo – to 
be viewed by the passing motorist.”33  Other than the comment to Time, Bacon said 
almost nothing in public about his opposition to depressing the Delaware Expressway, 
perhaps because he realized he was facing stern opposition and did not want to tarnish his 
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sterling reputation as the maestro of Philadelphia’s postwar development.34  Mayor Tate 
explained later that Bacon and William Rafsky of OPDC had a “major clash” over the 
issue, but Tate pressured Bacon to present a united front, particularly once the possibility 
of federal assistance for the project arose.35    
Despite Bacon’s influence over Philadelphia planning, the CPPHG and the 
Architects Committee were effective because they had all of the elements needed for 
success:  a solid plan, political clout, powerful allies, and a perhaps most importantly, a 
shrewd strategy.  From the beginning, the Society Hill activists knew they needed to 
counter the perception that, as Stanhope Browne put it, “those rich people in Society Hill 
want their view of the water.”  In the first place, said Browne, not everyone in Society 
Hill was wealthy.  Furthermore, “hardly anybody” had a river view in the first place, 
except for some residents of Society Hill Towers who were too high up to lose their 
views regardless of what happened with the Delaware Expressway.  Refuting the charg  
that the CPPHG was looking out only for the rich was not enough, however.  The 
activists knew they would need an affirmative argument with broad appeal in order to 
garner widespread support for their expressway plan.  The CPPHG therefore aticulated 
its cause as being “about the historic district [and] not about Society Hill.”  Activists 
emphasized that the area through which the expressway was to pass – just a few blocks 
from Independence Hall – was “the place where Philadelphia was born, and because of 
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what happened here, it’s the place where the United States was born.”  As Browne 
recalled, “we wrapped ourselves in the flag.”36        
The CPPHG’s tactic of emphasizing Society Hill’s historic value proved to be 
extremely persuasive.  Before long, historical societies, civic associations, women’s 
clubs, and veterans’ groups had endorsed the plan.  The city’s labor unions, realizing they 
stood to prosper from the additional construction the plan would require, also came on 
board – helping undoubtedly to dispel the notion that only the rich would benefit – as did 
the Chamber of Commerce.37  With the mayor and OPDC firmly behind the concept of a 
depressed and covered expressway, it was not long before the CPPHG achieved concrete
results.  In late March 1965, bowing to the weight of political pressure, Henry Har al 
promised that the state would conduct a study of the issue.38 
By the end of April, the expressway activists had made significant progress.  Both 
the state and federal governments had approved building the Delaware Expressway 
below ground through Society Hill, while leaving the issue of a cover up in the air.39  
While the Society Hill activists could certainly claim much of the credit, correspondence 
between Mayor Tate and Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation made clear that the 
state’s members of Congress also played an important role in acting as liaisons between 
the city and the state and federal governments.  A grateful Tate thanked federal official 
Rex Whitton for his “enlightened handling of the problem,” remarking that “it would 
                                                     
36 Stanhope Browne, Interview by author, Tape recording, Philadelphia, PA, 27 January 2009. 
37 Stanhope Browne, Interview by author, Tape recording, Philadelphia, PA, 27 January 2009. 
38 Henry Harral to James Tate, 29 March 1965, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City 
Archives, RG 60-2.5, Administration of James H.J. Tate. 
39 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 11 April 1965, 30 April 1965, George D. McDowell Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
174 
 
have been disastrous if an elevated highway had been allowed to desecrate what is 
destined to become one of the most beautiful historic areas in the United States.”40   
The announcement that the Delaware Expressway would be lowered but not 
necessarily covered presented a crisis for the CPPHG, the leaders of which had to decide 
whether to accept their partial victory, or fight on.  The decision, according to Stanhope 
Browne, rested on whether the group could count on the continuing support of OPDC in 
pushing for the expressway cover.  William Rafsky of OPDC expressed concern that the 
Architects Committee, being composed mainly of young and relatively inexperi nc d 
architects, lacked the requisite credibility.  Obtaining greater technical expertise was 
difficult because the engineers whose opinions carried the most weight were aligned with 
state and federal government highway departments and not citizens’ groups.  The 
CPPHG solved this dilemma when it reached out to Earl Allebach, a highly respected 
civic engineer who was retired and therefore not beholden to any government agency.  
When Allebach approved what the Architects Committee had proposed, a relieved OPDC 
board gave its blessing to continuing the fight.  Immediately upon hearing what Allebach 
had to say, board member Stuart Rausch, president of the Philadelphia Saving Fund 
Society (the nation’s oldest mutual savings bank), picked up the phone and called 
Republican governor William Scranton, informing him that Philadelphia still wanted the 
Delaware Expressway covered.41   
The cover issue turned out to be extraordinarily contentious, with Henry Harral 
the main opponent in the CPPHG’s eyes.  As Browne related, “We had to have a villain, 
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and we decided to make Henry Harral the villain.”42  Harral said that a six-block cover 
from Arch to Pine Streets would cost $70 million extra; the CPPHG said it would cost 
only $17 million.  By December 1965, engineers for both sides had completed their 
estimates, and the gap had narrowed considerably, with the state claiming a cost of $25.2 
million and the CPPHG predicting $11.2 million but willing to accept the state’s higher 
estimate.  Harral, believing that covering a highway was not the business of the state or 
federal governments, balked at contributing state funds to the project and refused to 
attempt to convince the federal government to provide the funds either.43  The Evening 
Bulletin reflected the opinions of many when it editorialized that the idea of a covered 
expressway was too important to abandon, especially in light of the fact that 
Philadelphia’s historic district would be a focal point of bicentennial celebrations in 
1976: 
This is an important issue, of even some national 
importance.  Will the United States, one might ask, be 
proud to show the world its birthplace in the planned 1976 
commemoration, cheek by jowl with a ten-lane highway 
carrying 100,000 cars, trucks and buses a day?  Can 
Philadelphia afford a virtual moat separating its developing 
riverfront from its center and historic nucleus, creating 
monstrous traffic bottlenecks and preempting 15 acres of its 
prime land?44 
 
The Bulletin editorial reflected an important shift in the CPPHG’s strategy.  
Realizing that convincing the state to build an expensive expressway cover would be an 
uphill battle, OPDC advised the Delaware Expressway activists to make their campaign 
                                                     
42 Stanhope Browne, Interview by author, Tape recording, Philadelphia, PA, 27 January 2009. 
43 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 20 December 1965, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
44 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 20 December 1965, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
176 
 
national in scope, continuing to press the theme of preserving America’s historic 
treasures.  An important ally in this regard was Harry Batten, the head of powerful local 
advertising agency N.W. Ayer and founding member of OPDC.  Batten gave the CPPHG 
invaluable public relations advice, such as helping the group create a booklet with visual 
aids showing the relationship between the expressway and the neighborhood’s historic 
buildings and advising the group to change its name to the Committee to Preserve the 
Nation’s Birthplace (CPNB), a snappier name with explicit national appeal.45 
The newly-named CPNB had a simple yet highly effective strategy for garnering 
and demonstrating national support for its cause.  Early on, Martha Schober, one of the 
founders of the CPPHG, had sought the advice of the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation.  The National Trust agreed to help by releasing to Schober its entire list of 
member organizations.  Once it became clear that the CPNB would need national support 
in order to win its fight for the cover, it sent letters to the organizations on the list asking 
them to endorse formally the concept of a six-block cover for the Delaware Expressway 
in Society Hill.  With the CPNB not asking for money or any effort beyond a signature on 
a form, the pitch worked beautifully.  Moreover, casting the appeal in terms of the 
preservation of historic treasures was – at least to those who weren’t being asked to pay 
for it – relatively non-controversial.  As Browne recalled, “people fell over th mselves to 
sign this thing.”46  As a result of its efforts, the CPNB was able to create a letterhead 
containing an impressive list of endorsing individuals and organizations from across the 
country, including national organizations such as the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, the American Institute of Architects, and the American Association for 
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State and Local History, Philadelphia groups like the AFL-CIO Philadelphia Council, the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and the Philadelphia chapter of the Pennsylva ia 
Society of Professional Engineers, in addition to historical societies and preservation 
groups from at least 22 different states and Washington, D.C.47 
Although the CPNB framed the issue as one of historic preservation, money was 
the central issue for Henry Harral.  The federal government’s Highway Trust Fund, he 
claimed, was already having trouble meeting increased interstate highway costs.  Funding 
a cover for the Delaware Expressway would therefore mean cutting back on funds for 
other planned Philadelphia highway projects.48  Harral’s warning did not stop City 
Council from passing a resolution asking Governor Scranton to use his influence to seek 
federal funds for the cover.  The Delaware Expressway in Society Hill, City Council said, 
would create “an ugly, noisy, open ditch if not properly constructed fully below grade 
and covered by a concrete roof to be landscaped, providing 15 acres of parks.”49  Senator 
Clark added his strong support, pledging to ask Scranton personally to support the 
cover.50  Clark’s announcement was soon followed by an endorsement from his Senate 
colleague Hugh Scott.51  One of the few dissenting local views came from Streets 
Commissioner David Smallwood.  Smallwood, who was impatient and already frustrated 
by slow progress in expressway construction, objected on the grounds that a cover would 
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delay the completion of the expressway.  Mayor Tate brushed aside Smallwood’s 
concerns, pointing out that Smallwood had been opposed to any changes to the road from 
the very beginning.52 
While the cover issue was debated in Philadelphia, Harrisburg, and Washington, 
another potential problem was bubbling just under the surface in Southwark, a white, 
working-class area on the Delaware River, immediately to the south of Society Hill.  Like 
Society Hill, Southwark had a long history, having been settled by Swedes in 1653 and 
experiencing dramatic growth in the mid-eighteenth century.  In the 1960s, the 
neighborhood was mostly white, with Catholics of eastern European descent, such as 
Poles and Russians, predominating.53  When the Society Hill activists began their 
campaign, Southwark residents began to wonder why no one was considering putting the 
highway underground in their area as well.  Southwark’s attempt to get the expressway 
design modified failed, and the reasons are not difficult to understand.  In contrast to 
Society Hill, Southwark had not yet undergone a transformational cycle of urban renewal 
and gentrification.  (Part of Southwark did experience renewal in the early 1970s, 
becoming known as Queen Village – a development that had consequences for the 
Delaware Expressway later on.)  In the meantime, Southwark remained a relatively 
humble neighborhood whose working-class residents were not part of the close alliance 
between Philadelphia’s major business interests and its government.  Without urban 
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renewal, without the backing of OPDC, and without nationally-recognized historic 
structures such as Independence Hall, Southwark’s attempt to have its stretch of the 
expressway tunneled was doomed to failure.    
In March 1965, Edward Parnum, the secretary of Gloria Dei Church (which, also 
known as Old Swedes’ Church and dating to 1700, was the oldest church in 
Pennsylvania), asked Grant Simon of the Philadelphia Historical Commission, “While the 
protests which have been made by the residents north of Pine Street to have the 
Expressway tunneled seem to be having consideration, is there any reason why this
possibility should not be carried out at least as far south as Washington Avenue?”54  
Simon agreed, and in early April, just before the state approved an underground route 
through Society Hill, both the church and the Historical Commission demanded that the 
underground portion be extended south to Washington Avenue, just south of the church 
grounds.55   
At the beginning of 1966, a copycat group formed, calling itself the Committee 
for the Preservation of Philadelphia’s Historic Southwark (CPPHS).  On January 4 the 
CPPHS held a meeting attended by 100 people and presided over by Gloria Dei rector 
Reverend John Craig Roak.  At this meeting, Southwark residents railed against both 
state and city officials for a highway plan that would destroy over a hundred historic 
homes in the area and isolate Gloria Dei.  Those at the meeting adopted a resolution 
appealing directly to the federal government, the final approval of which would be 
needed for any modification, calling on the Bureau of Public Roads to consider a 
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depressed expressway through Southwark that would be covered for the quarter-mile 
between Bainbridge Street and Washington Avenue.56  The group released a statement 
the same day requesting that interested citizens send letters and telegrams both to federal 
highway administrator Rex Whitton and state highway secretary Henry Haral.  “The 
alternatives are clear,” the press release blared, “UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION of 
an historic heritage – or – an act of SIGNIFICANT PRESERVATION AND 
BEAUTIFICATION.” 57   
Neither the City Planning Commission nor the Pennsylvania Department of 
Highways responded favorably to entreaties from Southwark.  David Hamme of the 
Planning Commission, in recounting the events of the CPPHS meeting to Edmund Bacon, 
made note of Roak’s “long and intemperate attack” on the Commission, which contained 
“many factual errors.”  Roak and others were given a private audience with the Planning 
Commission a year and a half before the plan for the Delaware Expressway in Southwark 
was published, said Hamme, and no significant changes to the plan had been made since 
that time.  Moreover, he reminded Bacon, five public meetings had been held to explain 
the plan and more than 25 meetings had been held with various community groups in the 
area.  “It was from these meetings,” he explained, “that the plan actually evo ved.”58  
David Smallwood, unsurprisingly, was annoyed with the Southwark protests, informing 
Mayor Tate that the expressway design in this area was “a completely acc pted concept” 
until a depressed and covered expressway became a possibility in Society Hill.  Acting as 
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though it were entirely up to him, Smallwood lectured the mayor that “The design, 
location and treatment of the Expressway in [Southwark] is a closed matter.”59   
Harral responded to the protests by proclaiming that he was going “full speed
ahead” on the Delaware Expressway through Southwark.  Like Smallwood, Harral m de 
sure to point out that Southwark residents hadn’t sought major modifications to the 
expressway design until those in Society Hill had.  Once the Society Hill activists made 
some progress, he remarked, those in Southwark “rightly decided to see if they can’t pull 
a power play too.”  Despite the implications to the contrary, Harral said he felt the 
Southwark protests were just as legitimate, but nevertheless couldn’t help mentioning that 
compared to Society Hill residents, Southwark denizens “are not as well organized and 
do not have such powerful backing.”60  Frustrated by Harral’s attitude, Roak turned to 
Congressman William Barrett.  Acknowledging that “we do not have [Society Hill 
backer] Alcoa Aluminum or a ‘silk stocking’ group behind us,” Roak told Barrett that the 
CPPHS was backed by several important institutions, including churches and 
neighborhood organizations, the Philadelphia Historical Commission, and the Ca olic 
Standard and Times newspaper.  “What we cannot understand is why we cannot reach 
Mayor Tate and Senator Clark,” he wrote.61  A few days after Roak’s letter, the Episcopal 
Diocese of Pennsylvania, motivated primarily by the expressway’s impact on Gloria Dei 
Church, directed a formal protest to state and local authorities.62 
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Throughout 1966, the rumblings from Southwark continued.  In June, the editorial 
board of the Evening Bulletin supported depressing and covering the expressway through 
the area, comparing its historical value to that of the Georgetown section of Washington, 
D.C.63  In the meantime, residents picketed both City Hall and a temporary state highway 
department office – consisting of a table and chair in front of a condemned house on 
Front Street – manned for three hours a week by a state employee.64  D spite the protests, 
the City Planning Commission rejected formally in August a request to recommend a 
change in the Delaware Expressway route through Southwark.65  At a press conference, 
Roak ripped into Bacon for the Planning Commission’s refusal:  “We accuse Edmund 
Bacon of preventing the free exchange of ideas and comments on this matter.  We accuse 
him of not caring or being concerned with truth in this matter.”66  Deacon Richard 
Stevens of Emanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church told Bacon that those present at Roak’s 
press conference “were apalled [sic] that the City Planning Commission would turn down 
an appeal to discuss possible alterations in the plans of the Expressway in Southwark, in 
light of the volume of protest.”  With respect to officials’ claims that depressing the 
expressway in Southwark presented a danger of flooding, Stevens pointed out that no 
such concerns had been raised with respect to Society Hill and asked, “Can it be that th  
soil characteristics change so radically in only a few hundred yards of distance?”67  
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Southwark’s fight to have the Delaware Expressway depressed and covered was 
not successful, despite garnering more high-profile support in 1967, nor was the effort, 
ongoing since 1960, to keep the expressway from taking a large number of Southwark 
homes.  In March, City Council requested that the state highway department change the 
route to save more homes, and Senators Scott and Clark both intervened, with the former 
seeking to get President Lyndon Johnson involved, and the latter reaching out to 
moderate Republican governor Raymond Shafer.68  The aforementioned efforts came to 
naught, as the Evening Bulletin reported soon afterward that the state’s land acquisition in 
Southwark was on schedule despite the protests.69  Things went downhill quickly from 
there.  In May, evictions began, accompanied by sympathetic press reports of elderly 
residents crying as they packed up their belongings and the tale of a widow whose 
husband dropped dead of a heart attack immediately upon receiving an eviction notice.70  
In July, officials abandoned a plan to save some of the historic Southwark homes in the 
path of the expressway when the city, state and federal governments could not agree on 
it.71  In November, workers began demolition.72  The battle to keep the Delaware 
Expressway from ravaging this humble, working-class, South Philadelphia neighborhood 
had failed.  The result was a lingering sense of resentment, from Southwark and other 
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quarters of the city, against the more prosperous and influential residents of Society Hill, 
who were much more successful in altering the course of the expressway. 
While Southwark fought its losing battle, the Society Hill effort toward getting an 
expressway cover made progress.  In 1966, however, matters for a time looked grim.  The 
Bureau of Public Roads rejected the notion of federal funding for the cover on the 
grounds that covering a highway was a matter for the state.73  While Smallwood fumed 
that the cover controversy had delayed the expressway by at least 18 months, others 
raged over the government’s failure to step up to the plate to protect one of the country’s 
most historic areas.74  The Society Hill fight caused many to consider not just the 
implications of one particular stretch of the Delaware Expressway, but of thena ion’s 
highway program as a whole.  As the Evening Bulletin editorialized: 
Sentiment is growing in Congress for some form of control 
over the road-builders, both state and federal . . . [Members 
of Congress] are concerned that inadequate planning and 
single-minded concentration on engineering requirements 
are resulting in the wholesale defacing of cities, the 
disruption of neighborhoods, and the ravaging of historic 
sites and parklands.75 
 
In 1966, America’s highway politics were in the embryonic stages of a transition 
to greater democracy, spurred in part by the Bureau of Public Roads becoming part of the 
new U.S. Department of Transportation, which was more receptive to local opinion about 
expressway construction.  For advocates of the Delaware Expressway cover, how ver, 
change was not coming quickly enough.  Some used brutal language in expressing the 
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need for more government action to ameliorate the effects of road-building on America’s 
cities.  Former mayor and then-school board president Richardson Dilworth exclaimed, 
“The stupidest people in the world are highway secretaries and the U.S. Department of 
Roads [sic].  They can’t think of anything except spreading more miles of concrete.”76  
Senator Clark concurred, saying, “It is time that Congress took a look at the highway 
program, because it is presently being operated by barbarians, and we ought to have some 
civilized understanding of just what we do to spots of historic interest and great beauty y 
the building of eight-lane highways through the middle of our cities.”77 
  Some federal officials agreed that the U.S. government needed to take action.  
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall was a crucial supporter of the Delaware 
Expressway cover, putting a high priority on protecting the Independence Hall are .78  In 
June, Senators Clark and Scott introduced a bill, with Udall’s support, to place the 
expressway cover under Interior’s control.  Governor Scranton supported the bill, despite 
Harral’s opposition.79  The Evening Bulletin expressed hope for the bill’s passage:  
“Congress should realize that what is at stake here is not just a length of highway in a 
city’s downtown section but a priceless piece of historical geography.  From the river 
straight up to Independence Hall must be regarded as a single piece of hallowed national 
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ground.”80  Soon after, cover advocates gained another powerful ally when Housing and 
Urban Development Secretary Robert Weaver expressed his support and suggested a 
federal task force to address the issue of funding.81   
The prospects for a federal task force on the expressway cover brightened soon 
afterward, and it is quite possible that the First Lady of the United States w s partly 
responsible.  Lady Bird Johnson, already a well-known advocate for the beautification of 
the nation’s highways, came to Philadelphia to attend a Pennsylvania Horticultural 
Society luncheon in her honor on the occasion of the Society’s opening a new garden in 
Independence National Park.  The Committee to Preserve the Nation’s Birthplace ad 
lobbied without success to make a presentation at the luncheon, held at Philadelphia’s 
famous Old Original Bookbinder’s seafood restaurant.  Undaunted, Harry Batten 
arranged to be seated next to the First Lady and was, over lunch, able to pique her interest 
in the Delaware Expressway cover issue.  Learning that the CPNB’s model was located at 
Society Hill Towers, practically next-door to Bookbinder’s, Johnson agreed 
enthusiastically to have a look at it.  Batten and Browne escorted her to the Towerswith 
anxious Secret Service agents, unhappy at the sudden change in plans, in tow.  Although 
no one knew for sure whether Mrs. Johnson spoke to the president about the matter, 
Lyndon Johnson suggested soon afterward that Vice President Hubert Humphrey look 
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into the issue.82  In July, Humphrey requested formally that Interior, HUD, and 
Commerce come together to form the federal task force that Weaver had suggested.83   
By January 1967, Mayor Tate was able to report a “solid commitment” from 
Humphrey that the expressway would be covered, at least partially, in Society Hill. 84  A 
month later, the task force (consisting of HUD secretary Weaver, Interior s cretary Udall, 
and Transportation secretary Alan Boyd)  released its report, recommending that the 
Delaware Expressway be depressed and covered from Delancey Street to Ch stnut Street 
(approximately two and a half blocks, or three-tenths of a mile).  Engineers Ammann & 
Whitney projected the cover to cost $9 million, and the task force recommended that two-
thirds of this amount come from the federal-state highway program on a tradition l 90-10 
basis, with the rest provided by the city and certain non-highway federal programs, such 
as HUD’s Open Space program and Interior’s Land and Water Conservation Fund. 
In explaining its recommendation, the task force took note of previous federal 
assistance aimed at fostering Philadelphia’s development while preserving its historic 
character, such as the restoration of Independence Hall and the expansion of the national 
park surrounding it, the building of a new U.S. Mint, and urban renewal assistance to the 
Society Hill area.  “An incompatible design of the expressway,” the report proclaimed, 
should not be allowed to dilute “the full benefits of both governmental and private 
investment in the area.”  The expressway cover would “represent a positive and 
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innovative contribution to the improvement of the quality of the urban environment,” 
while failure to take action would restrict opportunities for further development. 85 
Philadelphians who supported the cover rejoiced – even though the task force had 
proposed covering only two and a half blocks rather than the six the CPNB had wanted – 
as the Evening Bulletin proclaimed, “Victory in Expressway Fight.”  “It now looks,” the 
paper predicted, “as if the Delaware Expressway will be the first United States urban 
highway to be designed right.”  The Bulletin praised the federal task force as “a fantastic 
example of how three levels of government plus citizen participation can cooperate on  
specific project.”86  The seeming resolution of the cover issue made national news, with 
the New York Times characterizing the situation as an example of the “urban hostility to 
expressways . . . rising in volume and emotion” that was delaying highway construction 
to the extent that the federal government had begun to warn cities “against hasty planning 
that ignores esthetic, social and economic considerations.”87   
Mayor Tate dampened the excitement very quickly, however, for just a few days 
before the Times report, he had reconsidered the city’s financial contribution to the cover, 
thinking out loud that the money might be better spent on housing in poverty-stricken 
North Philadelphia.88  Recent political developments shed light on Tate’s apparent 
change of heart.  On November 7, 1967, Tate won his reelection campaign over 
Republican Arlen Specter in Philadelphia’s closest mayoral election in 32 years.  Specter 
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had been a heavy favorite to win the election, largely because the city’s Democratic Party 
was divided bitterly, with much of the political establishment defecting to Specter’s 
camp.89  Observers credited Tate’s narrow victory to his strong support from Catholics, 
African Americans, and organized laborers, who turned out in large numbers.  Tate, after 
winning what he called “the fight of my life,” credited organized labor as the “deciding 
factor” in the election.   
Although many unions supported the cover, Tate may have felt that he had been 
deserted by those identified most strongly with the project – the city’s upper crust. 
Described by the Inquirer as “the personification of rowhouse Philadelphia,” Tate grew 
up working-class and attended local schools, starting with parochial school and then 
moving on to St. Joseph’s College and Temple University Law School.  He then worked 
his way up the political ladder, starting in 1939 as a research clerk in the Court of 
Common Pleas and then spending several years in the state legislature before returning to 
Philadelphia to join City Council, of which he eventually became president, allowing him 
to succeed Richardson Dilworth as mayor in 1962 when Dilworth resigned to run for 
governor.  Tate, who lived in the North Philadelphia neighborhood of Hunting Park a 
mere dozen blocks from where he was born, ran a campaign with a populist tinge to it, 
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and the defections of many top Democrats to Arlen Specter may have contributed to what 
seemed to be his turn away from the city’s elite.90   
Alarmed cover proponents begged Tate not to jeopardize the project.  Responding 
to Tate’s comments that he had done enough for the “establishment” in Society Hill, 
attorney and Chamber of Commerce president John Bracken stressed to the mayor that 
the campaign for the cover “was no Society Hill effort.”  “The people there,” he 
continued, “merely sparked a drive that was picked up by civic and patriotic 
organizations throughout the City of Philadelphia and throughout the entire country.”91  
Likewise, Stanhope Browne and his vice-chair Gregory Harvey continued their efforts to 
submerge the issue of class, insisting that the cover “is not for the purpose of helping the 
residential areas of Society Hill,” being intended instead to preserve the waterfront and 
Independence Park.92  In response to these entreaties, Tate backpedaled a bit.  His deputy, 
Anthony Zecca, explained to Bracken that the newspapers had misconstrued Tate’s 
remarks.  In fact, the cover was one of many projects being reevaluated due to funding 
limitations.  While Tate was still very much in favor of the cover, said Zecca, no final 
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decision could be made until it and other projects were studied further.93  By January 
1968, Tate had changed his mind back (if he had ever changed it in the first place), and 
was once again on board in full support of the expressway cover.94 
In early 1968, it appeared that the issue of covering the Delaware Expressway in 
Society Hill had been resolved once and for all, but reluctant state highway officials, who 
still prioritized building highways quickly over everything else, had another wrinkle in 
store.  After city, state and federal officials had agreed that the cover wuld be built, 
engineering studies had shown it to be feasible, and the federal task force had create  a 
reasonable funding plan, a dispute arose over whether the covered section of the 
expressway would constitute a “tunnel.”  This was a potential problem, because if that 
part of the highway were deemed a tunnel, trucks carrying hazardous materials would not 
be able to use it, state officials argued, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the federal 
Hazardous Substances Transportation Board.95  For a time, it appeared that the project 
was in serious jeopardy, as both state officials and highway builders expressed doubt as 
to its feasibility.96  The Committee to Preserve the Nation’s Birthplace, however, 
compiled evidence that there were “no legal or engineering impediments” to vehicles 
carrying hazardous materials along that portion of the expressway.97  On the advice of 
Earl Allebach, Stanhope Browne spoke to members of a professional association of 
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tunnel designers in Boston as well as Ole Singstad, who had designed the ventilation 
system for New York’s Holland Tunnel.  All of the experts Browne consulted concurred 
that worries about hazardous materials were, as Browne put it, “nonsense.”98  As a result 
of the CPNB’s research, the issue simply faded away by mid-1968.  Nevertheless, 
because of this and other delays related to logistics and funding, the covered section of 
the expressway was not completed for almost another decade. 
The battle over lowering and covering the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill – 
the bulk of which was fought in 1964-68 – was a new kind of expressway protest.  For 
the first time, activists expressed strong objections to a Philadelphia expressway for 
reasons other than the buildings it would demolish in its path.  Those who sought to alter 
the Delaware Expressway’s design were concerned about the blighting effect, both 
visually and environmentally, the road would have on one of the nation’s most historic 
areas.  Of course, the Society Hill activists were particularly poised for success:  they 
were mainly white, affluent professionals with strong ties to the city’s government and 
business community.  Moreover, the existence of several historical sites – including 
Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell – in Society Hill gave the expressway fight 
national importance.  In short, these protestors had powerful allies in both the city and 
federal governments from the very start, an advantage that enabled them to overcome the 
state’s resistance to expensive design modifications. 
Southwark residents’ failure either to have the expressway rerouted significantly 
so as not to demolish so many homes or tunneled to minimize visual blight and pollution 
provided a stark counterpoint to what occurred in Society Hill.  In twentieth-century 
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America, urban expressways often exposed racial inequities.  With respect to the 
Delaware Expressway, however, class and ethnicity, rather than race, were the most 
relevant factors.  The white, working-class residents of Southwark, who stood outside the 
city’s tight business-government alliance, were unable to mobilize enough support at the 
highest levels to accomplish their goals.  Moreover, Gloria Dei Church and the other 
historic buildings in Southwark did not carry the same weight as Independence Hall, 
depriving the neighborhood of national attention for its cause.  It would be a mistake to 
conclude, however, that only expressway protests emanating from affluent, white areas of 
the city could be successful in the mid-to-late 1960s.  The events surrounding the 
Crosstown Expressway in this period proved as much. 
 “Let the People Have a Victory”:  The Crosstown Expressway   
The Crosstown Expressway proved to be the most controversial transportation 
project ever proposed for the city of Philadelphia.  Since 1959, planners had expected the 
road to run the length of the city, from river to river, along the South Street/Bainbridge 
Street corridor, as the southern portion of an expressway loop around Center City.  The 
neighborhoods in what was referred to as the Crosstown corridor were mostly African 
American and low-income.  South Street, once the heart of the city’s African American 
culture and life, had in the eyes of many observers deteriorated in the years since the war, 
leading the Planning Commission and others to believe that the highway would remove 
what they viewed as blight while serving a vital transportation need by easing traffic 
congestion on downtown streets. 
To the shock of many, the expressway was never built, due primarily to 
overwhelming citizen opposition.  Philadelphia’s freeway revolt was made possible by 
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the democratization of transportation planning in the 1960s – a product of the era’s 
cultural upheaval whereby authority and expertise were challenged at every turn.  In a 
bygone era, engineers and planners had drawn a line on the map along South Street, 
connecting the Schuylkill and Delaware Expressways, without considering the road’s 
potential effects on those who lived and worked along that line.  By the mid-1960s, 
before a drop of concrete could be poured for the Crosstown, people in cities across 
America were awakening to the destructive effects of urban expressways.  As authority 
over highway planning moved into the realm of local politics, citizens pressured elected 
officials to think beyond the goal of moving automobiles from Point A to Point B, and to 
consider expressways’ potential social, environmental, and aesthetic impacts. 
The Crosstown Expressway revolt was the high point of the democratization of 
transportation politics in Philadelphia, providing perhaps the most important exception to 
the overall dominance of the city’s business community in setting planning priorities and 
achieving its desired results.  Business interests, led by the Chamber of Commerce of 
Greater Philadelphia, saw the road as a vital transportation project, hoping that it would 
ease Center City traffic congestion by allowing cars to cross the city without using local 
streets, thereby contributing to the postwar downtown renaissance.  Planners agre d on 
the expressway’s traffic benefits, and also saw the project as a way to clear what they felt 
were blighted residential areas using state and federal highway money rath r than urban 
renewal funds. 
Proponents of the Crosstown, however, were faced with several daunting factors 
springing from a more democratic planning process and an increased awareness of th  
often disastrous effects of urban highways.  The proposed residential displacement of 
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thousands of low-income African Americans aroused intense opposition, not only from 
those who lived in the expressway corridor, but from socially-conscious whites who 
objected on grounds of social justice.  Federal legislation played an important role as
well; of particular significance was a 1968 law forbidding the use of federal fundsor a 
highway project until the state (which acquired the right-of-way for a new highway and 
was therefore the entity responsible for displacement) had presented an adequate plan for 
relocation of those affected.  The relocation issue proved to be one of the most serious 
obstacles to the Crosstown Expressway’s completion.   
Changing views about race relations as a result of the national movement for 
African American civil rights, which reached its crescendo in the 1960s, impacted the 
fate of the Crosstown as well.  In postwar America, urban expressways often divided 
cities into segments, walling off African American neighborhoods from central business 
districts in the process.  Historians such as Alison Isenberg and Robert Self have argued 
that such barriers were not accidental, but rather were intended to provide visual cues to 
developers about where to concentrate their investments, as well as to keep non-white 
shoppers away from downtown in the hope that segregation would make urban retail 
establishments more attractive to suburban whites, women especially.99  The proposed 
Crosstown Expressway would have separated a long and predominantly African 
American residential corridor from the central business district and its ajoining affluent, 
white neighborhoods.  In the 1960s, however, the civil rights movement forced the issue 
of racial segregation to the forefront of American consciousness.  To a nation that had 
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just witnessed the Freedom Rides, Bull Connor’s brutal attacks on demonstrators in 
Birmingham, the March on Washington, and the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
the notion of an urban expressway as an obvious racial barrier was becoming less and 
less acceptable. 
Events in Philadelphia’s own history of race relations helped to bring about the 
Crosstown’s demise.  On a late August evening in 1964, Philadelphia police responded to 
a call of a car blocking an intersection in North Philadelphia – a poverty-stricken area 
that was home to an overwhelming majority of the city’s African Americans.  Upon 
finding a married couple having an argument, the officers at the scene attempted to pull 
the woman out of the vehicle and were met with kicks and punches.  The officers called 
for backup, but the situation spiraled out of control quickly.  Before long, residents of the 
area were smashing police cars with bricks and bottles thrown from rooftops, destroying 
storefront windows and looting the goods inside, overturning cars, and setting fires.  In 
addition to a staggering amount of property damage, the final tally included 150 injuries, 
including 35 to police officers, and 165 arrests.100 
North Philadelphia, where the riot occurred, was home to an area that some called 
“the Jungle” – a two and a half square mile section spanning 10th to 33rd Streets between 
Poplar Street and Lehigh Avenue.  As historian Matthew Countryman explained, the 
Jungle received its derogatory name because of its “grinding poverty and racial 
homogeneity.”  South Philadelphia was neither quite as poor nor as racially segregat d as 
North Central Philadelphia, but still possessed the potential for racial violence of its own.  
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In May 1967, for example, a dispute between the owner of a hardware store on South 
Street and a black customer led to a “mini-riot of bottle tossing,” which newly-appointed 
Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo stopped by sending in 500 police offers in riot gear.  
Rizzo’s crackdown led to widespread protests led by the city’s Black Power and NAACP 
activists, directed at what they perceived to be brutal and racially-motivated police 
tactics.  Another South Philadelphia mini-riot occurred in July, sparked by the arrest of a 
black teenager after a protest at another store.  Again, Rizzo summoned hundreds of riot 
police to dispel the crowds.  The proximity of whites and African Americans in South 
Philadelphia also caused trouble, including bouts of violence, between students at the 
area’s high schools in the late 1960s.101           
In the late 1960s, opponents of the Crosstown Expressway warned city officials 
that displacing a huge number of poor African Americans in South Central Philadelphia 
for the benefit of affluent whites could lead to racial violence.  The 1964 North 
Philadelphia riot, the smaller outbreaks of racial tension and violence in South 
Philadelphia, and major riots in other cities such as Newark and Detroit provided context 
for these warnings and helped to convince decision-makers that the expressway was 
unworkable.  It was no coincidence that officials first decided against the expressway in 
1968, the same year President Johnson’s Kerner Commission summed up the cause of 
urban riots with its famous declaration that the nation was “moving toward two societies, 
one black, one white – separate and unequal.”102  The Crosstown Expressway, like a 
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horror movie monster, had to be killed three times before it died for good.  The 1964-
1968 period witnessed the first of those three times.  
In the early 1960s, the Crosstown Expressway project stalled due to a lack of 
funding.  In 1964, a frustrated David Smallwood accused state officials of failing to live 
up to their “moral obligation” to expedite studies on the road.103  It seemed that the state 
had other priorities, however.  Whereas Smallwood felt that the Crosstown was of vital
importance, Pennsylvania Secretary of Highways Henry Harral was more inte sted in a 
Tacony Creek Freeway for Northeast Philadelphia and a City Line Avenue bypass to ease 
congestion in the northwest.104  As late as mid-1965, the state released a six-year 
improvement plan for Philadelphia that made no mention of the Crosstown, leading 
Smallwood to vent his fury.  Calling the report “ridiculous” and “very distressing,” he 
lamented that the state was “completely oblivious to the urgent highway needs of 
Philadelphia.”  Without the Crosstown, he complained, the city would be left with a 
Delaware Expressway interchange at South Street and no major route to carry traffic west 
across downtown.105   
Smallwood’s mood did not improve when Harral explained that the Crosstown 
would be part of the next federal-aid highway program, slated to begin in 1973.  Harral
pointed out that obtaining sufficient funding for the highway would be extremely difficult 
due to its location through a densely populated urban area; the road was expected to cost 
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an unbelievable $20 million per mile, largely due to condemnation costs.106  Soon 
afterward, however, matters improved considerably when the Pennsylvania legislature 
put forth a plan to borrow money to speed up the state’s highway program, with $89.4 
million earmarked for Philadelphia and $60 million of that money designated for the 
Crosstown Expressway.  The State Highway Commission approved the plan, and by 
October 1966, the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (DVRPC) had 
approved and forwarded to the federal government a plan for the expressway.107  Federal 
approval was required, because although the Crosstown was not to be an interstate 
highway, Pennsylvania intended for it to be part of the primary federal-aid highway 
system, entailing 50% federal participation.108 
While government officials were trying to resolve the financial side of the picture, 
other obstacles arose.  As the highway became more than just a line on a planner’s map 
and moved closer to reality, citizens’ opposition to the road increased markedly.  Prior to 
                                                     
106 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 25 July 1965, 29 August 1965, George D. McDowell Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
107 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 11 October 1965, 13 October 1965, 27 October 1966, George D. 
McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban 
Archives, Philadelphia, PA.  The Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission was the successor to the 
Penn-Jersey Transportation Study, which was founded in 1959 “to plan a coordinated highway and public 
transportation system to promote and serve a desired pattern of regional development” in a nine-county 
area spanning southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.  Renamed the DVRPC in 1965, the 
organization began to function as a regional planning commission that year in response to a 1962 
amendment to the Federal Aid Highway Act requiring hi hway projects in metropolitan areas to be based 
on cooperative regional planning.  The DVRPC, which continued Penn-Jersey’s heavy emphasis on 
transportation planning, was strictly an advisory agency, with all actual planning authority continuing to 
rest in the hands of state and local officials.  The commission’s primary functions were to ensure 
compliance with federal regulations requiring comprehensive regional planning as a condition for grants 
and to act as a conduit for those grants.  Penn-Jersey Transportation Study, PJ News 2, no. 11 (Aug.-Sept. 
1963), City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.5, Administration of James 
H.J. Tate; Penjerdel Council of Governments, “Preliminary Findings and Recommendations, Penjerdel 
COG, Delaware Valley Regional Governance Study,” Report, 7 August 1970, City of Philadelphia, 
Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.5, Administration of James H.J. Tate; Delaware Valley 
Regional Planning Commission, “Transportation in Motion:  An Annual Transportation Report of the 
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission,” Annual report, 1973, Pamphlet Collection, Temple 
University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
108 Federal Highway Administration, “Flash Report,” 9 May 1968, Central Correspondence, 1968-1978, 
Records of the Federal Highway Administration, RG 406, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
200 
 
1964, public protest against the road was minimal.  In early 1964, residents of the Grays 
Ferry neighborhood – one of the few sections in the expressway’s path that contained a 
substantial number of whites – formed the Schuylkill-Grays Ferry Neighbors 
Association.  The purpose of the group, which represented the area bounded by 22nd 
Street, the Schuylkill River, Washington Avenue, and Spruce Street, aimed not to stop
the road from being built, but rather “to deal with the problems which result from [its] 
construction.”109 
When public hearings on the expressway were held in May 1964, the first 
significant stirrings of citizen opposition became visible.  While the Schuylkill-Grays 
Ferry Neighbors Association continued to take a moderate approach, others were not as 
accommodating.  Roger Kolm, a member of engineering firm Modjeski and Masters – 
which had completed a major study of the proposed expressway – testified that the road 
would take 1,725 homes, resulting in howls of protest from the approximately 500 
members of the public present.  In addition, two clergymen expressed their opposition to 
the expressway.110  Democratic committeewoman and Crosstown Expressway opponent 
Lenora Berson (the wife of state legislator Norman Berson) wrote in her 1969 
Philadelphia Magazine article “The South Street Insurrection,” that much of the early 
opposition to the highway came from middle-class African Americans who lived to the 
                                                     
109 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 7 April 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA.  Census tract 
30-B, which included the area delineated above, had in 1960 a total of 9,240 residents, 1,566 of whom were 
white.  See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “U.S. Censuses of Population and 
Housing:  1960”; [document on-line]; available from 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/41953654v8ch06.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 
September 2009.  A Philadelphia Inquirer article from 1968 identified a different group from the same 
area, the Grays Ferry Community Council, as one of the predominantly white groups fighting the 
Crosstown Expressway.  Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 January 1968, George D. McDowell Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
110 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 27 May 1964, 28 May 1964, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
201 
 
south of the proposed route.  These residents, she explained, “had witnessed the havoc 
wreaked in other stable Negro neighborhoods by sudden and large influxes of low-
income blacks” caused by urban renewal projects that displaced people without adeq ate 
provision for their relocation, and the “terrible social disorganization” that had 
resulted.111  At a public meeting held by the predominantly black Rittenhouse 
Community Council, residents voiced their complaints, with one comparing the proposed 
highway to the Mason-Dixon Line, saying it would “separate the rich people from the 
poor and property values will decrease,” a proposition David Smallwood rejected.112  It 
was notable that Mayor Tate paid special attention to the highway’s potential impact on 
the substantial number of whites in Grays Ferry, asking Henry Harral if thatportion of 
the route could be changed so as not to “destroy a good, stable community.”113  Senator 
Hugh Scott asked the same of federal highway administrator Rex Whitton, but Whitton 
told him that the suggested alternative of Grays Ferry Avenue was “less desirable.”114 
Although the Crosstown had begun to arouse the ire of those who lived and 
worked in its path, opponents were generally not in 1964 determined to wipe the highway 
off the map.  The protestors’ activities instead centered on advocating design changes to 
the project, including depressing and covering the expressway (as was being discussed 
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with respect to the Delaware Expressway), building relocation housing on top of the 
highway, and finding a way to bridge what some called a “Chinese Wall” between low-
income, largely black areas of South Philadelphia and the affluent, white Center City 
neighborhoods immediately to the north.115  When funding for the expressway itself was 
in doubt, however, none of these proposals was likely to gain much traction, and indeed 
none of them did.   
By 1966, inspired by the early stages of a move toward greater democracy in 
America’s transportation planning, and influenced quite possibly by the progress Society 
Hill residents had made in altering the Delaware Expressway, opponents of the 
Crosstown Expressway became more aggressive, now focusing on eliminating the 
expressway from the city’s plan entirely.  In May of that year, 400 resident  of Grays 
Ferry attended a public hearing; the Evening Bulletin reported that they “booed and 
jeered engineers from the State Highways Department who told them not to make major 
repairs to their homes which lie near the route of the proposed Crosstown 
Expressway.”116  The murmurs of opposition in 1966 turned into full-throated shouts by 
1967, and for the first time, the Crosstown Expressway became a major controversy.117  
The Evening Bulletin seemingly could not decide where it stood on the matter, changing 
its tune over the course of a few months.  In early 1967, the paper acknowledged that 
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most of the estimated 8,000 people the highway would displace were low-income African 
Americans and admitted that “the Crosstown Expressway as a divider of affluent society 
from poverty areas [is] an indefensible concept.”  If the expressway were built, the paper 
asserted, it would constitute “a physical expression of social amputation.”118  Former 
mayor Richardson Dilworth, who was now the president of the Philadelphia School 
Board, added his voice to those who felt the expressway would constitute an 
unacceptable racial barrier.  Such a barrier, said Dilworth, “would have a very harmful 
effect upon educational programs and upon the degree of integration that we are striving 
to maintain and develop throughout the school system.”119   
Only a few months later, the Evening Bulletin shifted to a tone of sympathy for 
the planners and engineers responsible for determining where the highway should be 
built.  “There is no dispute that [the expressway] is needed,” stated an April 1967 
editorial, which reflected accurately the reality that not one of the many studie  and 
reports prepared on the issue had questioned this basic assumption.  Planners and 
engineers, the paper continued, “try to lay out a route dispassionately, where it will do the 
most good at the least cost and the least harm to those whose buildings and homes lie in 
the route’s path,” but were nevertheless beset by “public clamor.”  The unfortunate result 
was that “years go by while alternate routes are studied and objections met.  Costs go up 
and the roads are not built.”  “The Crosstown Expressway,” concluded the Evening 
Bulletin, “should not be delayed, and delayed and delayed.”120 
                                                     
118 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 6 January 1967, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
119 Richardson Dilworth to G. Holmes Perkins, 5 May 1967, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, 
City Archives, RG 145, Philadelphia City Planning Commission. 
120 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 15 April 1967, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
204 
 
The Citizens’ Council on City Planning straddled the fence, still favoring the 
expressway in general, but backing off a bit from its previously unqualified support and 
asking for those in the road’s path to be protected.  By 1967, the Council still wanted the 
expressway, but noted that it had received “numerous communications from persons and 
organizations who are concerned over the potential impact of planned expressways upon 
their communities and homes.”  The planning of new highways, the Council stated, must 
take into account “their total impact upon the physical, social and economic character of 
the City.”  With respect to the Crosstown specifically, the Council stressed that the city 
should ensure that all residents and businesses could be properly relocated and consider 
depressing and covering the highway to ensure that it would not become a barrier 
between communities.121   
In March 1967, the Citizens’ Council reached out to community groups in the 
path of the Crosstown Expressway, acknowledging that it had “not been as active on this 
matter as we, and perhaps you, would have liked” and promising “from now on to give 
this matter priority attention.”  The Council also circulated a proposed statement for 
community leaders to discuss with their groups with the aim of producing a document 
that all groups could endorse and send to city officials.  The statement’s main thrust 
contained echoes of the 1962 Port Huron Statement, in which Students for a Democratic 
Society called for “a participatory democracy,” influencing profoundly the way people 
thought about their relationship with government.  All affected by the proposed 
expressway, advised the Council, “must participate actively and meaningfully in the 
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review of the state’s proposals and in the development of the policies and plans submitted 
to City Council.”122  For the Citizens’ Council on City Planning – once a staunch 
advocate of all that the Planning Commission proposed – to be parroting Tom Hayden 
represented a remarkable change indeed.  
Despite the urging of the Citizens’ Council, planners did not pursue vigorously 
relocation plans for those who would be displaced by the highway.  The managing 
director of the Philadelphia Housing Authority slammed the Planning Commission for 
having made “no serious effort” in this regard.123  A Philadelphia Inquirer editorial gave 
reason for pessimism when it told the story of a woman who, after her house was 
condemned as unfit, was unable to find a new one for five months.  When she did find a 
new house, it was not much better than her old one, and was in the path of the Crosstown 
to boot.  The city already had 6,185 pending applications for public housing, the Inquirer 
reported, and only 75 vacancies.124   
Because of the dire circumstances surrounding relocation, the Planning 
Commission had begun to explore the idea, rejected previously, of covering the 
expressway and selling the air rights to private developers who would put residential and 
commercial buildings on top of the cover.  The idea didn’t go far, however.  William 
Rafsky, the executive director of the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, 
explained that the high cost of land made private developers unlikely to be interested in 
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the air rights.  Patrick McLaughlin, the city’s development coordinator, agreed with 
Rafsky that the cost of a highway cover, estimated at $30 million, would make the air
rights prohibitively expensive.  Despite the bleak financial picture, Mayor Tate 
announced that he was committed to constructing low-income public housing on top of 
the expressway and said he intended to explore the idea of a state subsidy to help attract 
private builders.125  Bernard Meltzer, a real estate expert who later became chairman of 
the Planning Commission, said that of course everyone would prefer “a tunnel topped 
with houses, stores and parks” to “a depressed open ditch,” but acknowledged that 
financial realities made the possibility of the former scenario remote.126   
While city officials and others debated solutions to the relocation problem, 
opposition to the expressway became more organized.  In May 1967, fifteen local 
activists established the Citizens Committee to Preserve and Develop the Crosstown 
Community (CCPDCC), an anti-expressway coalition made up of groups from the 
proposed expressway corridor.127  The group’s attorney and one of its main 
spokespersons was 31-year old Robert Sugarman, a white man whom Philadelphia 
Magazine described as “a shaggy-haired lawyer who practices by day in the old-line firm 
of Dechert, Price & Rhoads.”  Sugarman first became aware of the issues surrounding the 
Crosstown Expressway when he looked at an apartment on Lombard Street and was 
assured by the realtor that the neighborhood would soon be “protected” by the 
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expressway from the lower-income areas to the south.128  Recoiling at the idea of such 
“protection,” Sugarman in April 1967 organized a public forum on the Crosstown under 
the auspices of the Society Hill Residents Association – an event that helped to draw
media attention to the highway opposition and stoke the flames of controversy.129  Once 
the CCPDCC was formed, it held a press conference at which it demanded that planning 
for the Crosstown Expressway cease until solutions to the problems of relocation and 
neighborhood redevelopment were hammered out.130 
The CCPDCC began immediately grassroots efforts to organize the communities 
in the proposed expressway’s path, a task that proved difficult despite the fact that two of 
the group’s most prominent leaders were African Americans who headed mostly black 
neighborhood organizations – George Dukes of the Rittenhouse Community Council, and 
Alice Lipscomb of the Hawthorne Community Council.  Both activists had deep roots in 
their communities.  Lipscomb was an indefatigable advocate for better housing who 
pushed city officials for better enforcement of building codes and often went house-to-
house helping Hawthorne residents fix up their homes.  Her actions were responsible fr 
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the construction or rehabilitation of 350 housing units for her neighbors.  When she 
passed away in 2003, Pennsylvania’s governor, Edward Rendell (a former Philadelphia 
mayor), remarked, “Nobody fought harder for her neighborhood than Alice Lipscomb 
did.”131   
Dukes, a former teacher, served in the Air Force during the Korean War.  A 
Republican, he twice won party nominations in the early 1970s – once for the state senate 
and once for city commissioner – but lost the general election both times.  In addition to 
founding the Southwest Community Council, which aided local residents with housing, 
Dukes served as director of civil rights for the Environmental Protection Agency.132  
Despite the intense involvement in the Crosstown fight of these two prominent and 
highly visible activists, the CCPDCC was not very successful in its efforts t  mobilize the 
low-income African Americans who lived in the expressway corridor.  The Ritt nhouse 
and Hawthorne groups represented by Dukes and Lipscomb, however, were among those 
that joined predominantly white neighborhood groups in an interracial rally at City Hall 
to protest the Crosstown Expressway in November 1967.133  
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DeLois Cuthbert, the co-chair of the CCPDCC’s Subcommittee on Community 
Involvement, informed community leaders that “No group has ever been successful in 
stopping a road or expressway once it’s been planned.  Our task will not be easy because 
in order to be successful, we must involve all the people along the proposed route.”134  At 
one of the initial meetings of the Program Subcommittee, volunteer Trixie Farrar w s 
dismayed to see that “there were no residents of the community present.  Their inclus on 
at this point did not seem a major concern of the group present. . . . It was assumed by the 
group that indigenous participation would increase.”135  In the summer of 1967, Farrar 
elaborated on some of the problems the organization was facing.  The CCPDCC’s 
program was written entirely by professionals and community workers with little 
involvement by anyone who lacked a professional interest in the area or in city polit cs.  
The non-professional residents of the area “had very few comments to make on it other 
than to nod approval,” she remarked.  A proposed community survey about the 
Crosstown Expressway went nowhere because some thought it would alarm and upset 
people, an attitude Farrar felt was “terribly paternalistic.”  The leadership of the 
organization, she pointed out, had spent more of its time trying to get media attention 
than on grassroots organizing, and had failed to give non-professionals positions of 
responsibility in the group.  To make matters worse, members of the group were often 
divided by loyalties to their own ethnic communities, and when the executive committee 
was made more diverse in order to represent all citizens affected by the highway, 
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conflicts increased.  In short, for its first few months of existence, the CCPD “did not 
function too well.”136 
Despite her criticisms of the movement’s leadership, Farrar recognized that there 
were inherent difficulties involved in trying to organize the residents of the Crosstown 
corridor.  South Philadelphia, she noted, was “not ‘hungry’ – or nearly as volatile as 
North Philadelphia,” where racial segregation and poverty were significantly worse and a 
major race riot had broken out in 1964.  In the areas of the CCPDCC’s concern, she 
wrote, “there are fewer blatant reasons for the creation of a social movement.”  Farrar 
also acknowledged that social action was riskier for working-class and poor African 
Americans than it was for middle-class whites, and that the organization’s programs 
could fail to find broad appeal for this reason.  She did advocate continuing to try, 
however, if for nothing else than to inform the residents of what was going on and to 
learn their views to the extent possible.137  Farrar also pressed those in power to open up 
their meetings and discussions to allow more community involvement in the decision-
making process. 
Not everyone was enthusiastic about more citizen participation, however.  Some 
local officials clung to the view, now becoming obsolete, that plans should be made by 
experts and experts alone.  When Farrar met with L.M. Loy of the Department of City 
Streets, he “was not at all receptive.  He spent a long while telling me his doubts about 
citizen participation.  His general approach is typical – present a final plan to the 
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community and let them work from there.”  When Farrar pointed out that such an 
approach could preclude “meaningful citizen participation,” Loy responded that “the 
process of involving citizens was too long and frustrating.  His main job was to get the 
cars through an area and to gain the most in user benefits.”138 
Although the CCPDCC stumbled in its early attempts at grassroots organizing and 
promoting civic involvement, its leaders carried on with efforts at delivering their 
message to city planners and elected officials.  One tricky issue, however, as that the 
organization had not agreed on a single message.  Some of the group’s leaders favored 
blocking the Crosstown Expressway entirely, while others were more concerned with 
making sure that the road was planned in a way that would aid the area’s redevelopment.  
Early on, the latter position seemed to be the dominant one.  A report by the Program 
Subcommittee that was sent to Edmund Bacon in July 1967 asserted that “the impact 
upon the neighboring communities of the expressway and the dislocation caused by it 
will be devastating, unless comprehensive plans for the joint development of highway 
and neighborhood, and for the physical and social revitalization of the entire area are 
developed before proceeding with plans for the road.”139 
Later on that year, the CCPDCC’s position hardened into more of an anti-
expressway stance.  Robert Sugarman was one of the first people with a public platform 
to question whether the highway was actually necessary.  Not only were there no studies 
of how the highway would impact the surrounding community, he pointed out, no 
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computerized traffic models had been created to determine how Philadelphia’s highway 
network would function without the Crosstown Expressway.140  Mayor Tate was 
sympathetic to the CCPDCC’s views, but only to a point, agreeing at a minimum that the 
highway should not proceed until the government had figured out how to relocate 
displaced residents.  Tate’s insistence on a solution to the relocation problem was no 
doubt influenced by a confidential police report in his possession that identified South 
Street as a likely site for a riot.141  In November, the day before his reelection to a second 
full term as Philadelphia’s mayor, Tate accused state officials of trying to embarrass him 
by continuing to plan for the Crosstown Expressway and appraising properties along the 
route when he had indicated that such activities should halt until a relocation plan had 
been worked out.142   
As mentioned, Tate won reelection in 1967 by a razor-thin margin, and observers 
saw the working-class vote as crucial to his success.  A few days after Tte’s reelection, 
he gathered his cabinet together for a meeting at which Executive Director of the City 
Planning Commission Edmund Bacon, Commissioner of Streets David Smallwood, and 
Managing Director Fred Corleto argued that the city should move forward with plans for 
the Crosstown Expressway.  Tate ended the discussion quickly by announcing that he no 
longer favored the construction of the expressway.  “Let the people have a victory,” he 
told his cabinet.  Robert Sugarman later cast some light on Tate’s thinking, explaining, 
“The Mayor is a kind of populist.  He thinks of himself as being against the interests.  He 
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felt in the last campaign the people were with him against the interests.”143  The Evening 
Bulletin dropped a bombshell on the city with its November 10, 1967 headline:  “Tate 
Suggests Crosstown Expressway May Be Abandoned.”144 
Tate’s grand pronouncement did not spell the end of the Crosstown Expressway, 
however.  Neither the city nor state governments took any immediate action to dele e the 
expressway from official plans.  As a result, lobbying continued from those on both sides 
of the issue.  State highway official William Lamb tried to rally the Citizens’ Council to 
stronger support for the expressway at a mid-November meeting.  Lamb, an engineer, 
spoke in highly technical terms, referring often to the various studies of the road that had 
been completed over the years.  The statement Lamb delivered to the Council seems, 
when read today, to be shockingly tone-deaf and out of touch with the reality of late 
1960s urban America and changing national expressway politics.  One particular setion, 
in which Lamb appealed to his listeners to accept the judgments of those with more 
expertise, bears quoting at length.  After informing the Council that the Planning 
Commission was “represented by some distinguished, highly qualified, professional 
men” including the “internationally recognized” Edmund Bacon, he continued: 
When a doctor vaccinates against tetanus it hurts.  It does 
not follow that the doctor doesn’t know it hurts, nor that he 
enjoys hurting you.  It does follow that he is trying to avoid 
a greater hurt in the future.  When planners and highway 
engineers propose a highway that forces the relocation of 
people, it hurts.  It does not follow that planners and 
highway engineers are unaware that it hurts, that they are 
not compassionate, nor that they enjoy hurting people.  It 
does follow that in their informed professional judgment 
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they are avoiding a greater, more severe, economic and 
emotional hurt affecting a larger number of families in the 
future.  You are the leadership of the community.  Your 
leadership should be in the direction of doing what is best 
for the community.  This philosophy does not lend itself to 
opposition for opposition’s sake.  You, as leaders, have a 
responsibility to determine factually, objectively what 
direction your leadership should go.  If you study the facts, 
I am convinced that you will concur with the professional 
men in the field that the Crosstown is, indeed, a very 
worthy, essential project to the continued growth of 
Philadelphia.145 
 
Lamb’s reference to the Citizens’ Council as “the leadership of the community” 
was somewhat myopic.  In truth, the Council’s leaders were primarily well-to-do white 
males drawn from the city’s business, media, labor and academic communities.  They 
were not at all representative of the low-income African Americans who were most 
threatened by the Crosstown Expressway.  In any event, Lamb failed to sway the 
Council’s board of directors, which in 1968 was still generally in favor of the highway 
but insistent that the “human issues” surrounding the expressway’s construction had t  be 
dealt with first.146 
One prominent source of opposition to the concept of the Crosstown Expressway 
came from one of the experts most responsible for its existence, demonstrating the extent 
to which the culture surrounding urban transportation planning was changing in the 
1960s.  Robert B. Mitchell – who had been the executive director of both the City 
Planning Commission (1943-48) and the Urban Traffic and Transportation Board (1953-
55) and now taught city and regional planning at the University of Pennsylvania – sent 
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Tate an impassioned letter begging him to abandon the expressway once and for all.  
When the Crosstown Expressway was first conceived, he explained, “planners tended to 
think almost entirely in terms of physical form.”  Mitchell denied the claims of some 
highway opponents that the expressway was intended as a racial barrier, asserting, “We 
were thinking mainly only of the transportation effects of a highway, as many highway 
engineers still do today, and did not really consider the social effects.”  Now, said 
Mitchell, he was horrified at the potential destruction of South Street, which was “a 
community center for many people” with “great symbolic significance.”  Most 
importantly, he argued, Philadelphia could not afford “one more symbol of separation 
between the black community and City Hall. . . . At this point in time the preservation of 
interracial relations and of equal justice to groups of citizens with little economic power 
is of primary importance.”147 
Highway proponents and opponents continued to battle over the Crosstown 
Expressway in 1968.  The Evening Bulletin changed its editorial position once again, 
echoing Mitchell’s claim that the planners who first dreamed up the expressway had 
focused exclusively on physical form to the detriment of those whom the expressway 
would affect most directly.  “Times have changed,” the paper asserted, as planners “have 
come to see that land use planning in the past has benefited only the affluent, often 
victimized the poor, and in fact contributed to the present urban crisis.  Boiled down, 
what all this means to Philadelphia is that the Crosstown Expressway as presently 
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planned is obsolete.”148  Some city officials, however, continued to believe the 
expressway would be built.  Fred Corleto and David Smallwood claimed that the city was 
continuing “to support the Crosstown Expressway as a vital link in the Regional 
Expressway System” and was “giving no thought to its abandonment.”149   
Meanwhile, Tate had softened his stance somewhat since his post-reelection 
pronouncement, at least in public.  In March, he told those assembled in his reception 
room that the Crosstown was “dead or dying a slow death,” but later that same day, in 
front of television cameras, he tempered his remarks, saying only that “there must be 
some rethinking on the part of the State Highway Department.”150  Either way, Tate’s 
position drew fire from state officials.  Highway secretary Robert Bartlett opined that 
deleting the Crosstown would have a “wide-ranging impact on the transportation network 
in the Philadelphia area.”151  An official in Governor Raymond Shafer’s administration 
went so far as to accuse Tate of abandoning the Crosstown Expressway as a way of 
backing out of the city’s commitment to fund its share of the Delaware Expressway 
cover.  “Maybe he hasn’t got the money,” the official said, “and if that is the case, he 
should say so.”152  
State officials who were putting heat on Mayor Tate to move ahead with the 
expressway found support within the federal government.  The CCPDCC appealed 
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directly to Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd, telling him that the purpose of th  
Crosstown Expressway “was to create a buffer zone between an all white and a mostly 
Negro community.”153  But Boyd gave short shrift to arguments that the Crosstown 
would constitute an unacceptable racial barrier.  “Separating white and black may not be 
a particularly bad thing,” he remarked, explaining that all cities had ethnic, rac al and 
religious groupings and that it would be harmful if a highway were to interfere with these 
“logical divisions.”  Boyd rebuffed assertions that the highway would constitute a “ghetto 
wall,” and decried the “tendency to talk and act as if the only place highways go is 
through black property.”154  Boyd’s remarks were surprising in light of his role as one of 
the individuals most responsible for the new federal transportation planning regime, 
emerging in the 1960s, that gave significant weight to local opinion and treated the 
complaints of urban highway protestors with sympathy.155 
Those who were studying the situation on the ground were concerned about the 
potential reaction to the expressway of area residents and were especially worried about 
the possibility of racial violence.  Francis Lammer, the executive director of the 
Redevelopment Authority, wanted to make a study of the area to aid in relocation plans 
should the expressway be built, but he and his staff,  influenced by the epidemic of urban 
riots that shook the United States in the late 1960s, were concerned about the threat of 
physical violence.156  Development Coordinator Philip Kalodner did not assuage 
Lammer’s fears when he reported that some residents of the area had made “radical 
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proposals . . . such as organizing children to block off South Street traffic” – a situation 
that could get out of hand quickly.157 
Robert Sugarman felt that fears of urban unrest were more than justified.  He told 
Cushing Dolbeare, Managing Director of the Philadelphia Housing Association, that the 
Crosstown Expressway created the possibility that Philadelphia would soon face a riot 
similar to those that Newark and Detroit experienced in 1967.  While only 10-15% of 
“ghetto residents” in Detroit had participated in that riot, Sugarman explained, this was 
most likely because the grievances in that city were “relatively undefined.”  He saw 
Philadelphia’s situation as much closer to Newark’s, when approximately 50% of area 
residents participated in a riot stemming partly from “the proposed dislocation of a 
substantial portion of the Negro community for a medical school.”  Philadelphia simply 
could not afford to have “white governmental officials deliberately affronting and turning 
off the Negro citizenry,” Sugarman warned, predicting that this “arrogance,” if l ft 
unchecked, would “lead to the 1968 crisis.”158 
Dolbeare, a former speechwriter for Hubert Humphrey who had worked on low-
income housing in Baltimore and Philadelphia since the early 1950s, was opposed to the 
Crosstown Expressway because of the people it would displace.  She later remembered 
the proposed highway “as another example of the kind of plan which is carried out for the 
benefit of middle and upper-income people, with very severe negative effects on lower-
income people.”159  She took heed of Sugarman’s warning, and the Housing Association 
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passed it on to the Philadelphia Crisis Committee, which had been created to deal with 
racial problems in the city.  “We cannot ignore the similarity,” a Housing Association 
representative told the Crisis Committee, between Newark’s proposal to displace part of 
its black community “and the proposal to dislocate so many persons, most of whom are 
black, from the route of the Crosstown Expressway.”160 
Clarence Farmer, the executive director of the city’s Commission on Human 
Relations, eased fears of violence somewhat when he conducted a small survey of 
residents in the South Street/Bainbridge Street area and concluded that a larger re ocation 
study could be completed safely.  He told Francis Lammer that while there was 
“considerable resistance” to the expressway throughout the Crosstown corridor, that 
resistance took two forms.  The first was the “strident” resistance of CCPD  leaders 
which, Farmer felt, lacked “widespread support in the community.”  The second and 
more pervasive type of community opposition took the form of anxiety over relocation 
rather than vehement antagonism to the highway itself.  While there was always  
possibility that violence could break out, Farmer’s gauging of residents’ atti udes led him 
to believe that such an outcome was unlikely.161 
The Redevelopment Authority’s Centralized Relocation Bureau did conduct its 
study of the Crosstown area in March 1968, surveying two-thirds of the households in the 
area, and the results were “extremely grim.”  Adequate relocation of those who would be 
displaced by the Crosstown Expressway, the study concluded, would be next to 
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impossible.  The statistics were discouraging, to say the least.  A large percentage of 
residents – 43% of families and 61% of individuals – were supported completely by fixed 
incomes such as public assistance, pensions, or Social Security, and many others had 
some employment but still needed supplementary income.  Of those whose incomes were 
known, it was estimated that 72% would be unable to afford an average moderately-
priced rental home.  Of the 1,725 households that would likely be displaced by the 
expressway, 1,332 would need “some form of subsidized housing,” and probably only 
half would be able to receive such assistance.  The impact of dislocation would fall 
almost entirely upon African Americans, who constituted 90% of the households 
surveyed.162  Other experts, including a Wharton professor, prepared an additional 
analysis for the CCPDCC that bolstered the CRB’s conclusions, indicating that of the 
6,500 people who would probably be displaced, 85% would be black and more than 50% 
would be below the poverty line.  Moreover, the city already faced a shortage of 50,000 
low-income housing units.163     
Motivated largely by the seemingly intractable relocation problem, Mayor Tate 
demanded in April 1968 that the state remove the Crosstown Expressway from its 
highway program and “cease and desist from any and all efforts” to proceed with the 
                                                     
162 Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia, Centralized Relocation Bureau, “Crosstown 
Expressway Survey,” Report, 29 March 1968, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, 
RG 60-2.5, Administration of James H.J. Tate; Emily Achtenberg to Cushing Dolbeare, 10 April 1968, City 
of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.5, Administration of James H.J. Tate. 
163 Harriet Johnson and Thomas A. Reitner, “A Technical Critique of the Proposed South Street – 
Crosstown Expressway, by Harriet Johnson, M.C.P. with Thomas A. Reitner, Ph.D., Associate Professor, 
Wharton School, U. Pa., Prepared for the Citizens Committee to Preserve and Develop the Crosstown 
Community,” Report, March 1968, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-
2.5, Administration of James H.J. Tate. 
221 
 
project.164  In explaining his decision, Tate proclaimed to the Fair Housing Council of 
Delaware Valley that he intended “to keep placing immediate human values above all 
others for the duration of my Administration.”  The city was, he believed, “reaping a 
bitter harvest from the seeds of dissent which were sown in the early stages of urban 
renewal when the human requirements were placed in a secondary position.”165  Despite 
Tate’s demand, the State Highway Commission refused to go further than halfway, 
voting to defer rather than delete the project so that officials could continue to work on 
relocation and other issues.166  At the local level, Tate had more influence, ordering the 
City Planning Commission to remove the Crosstown Expressway from the city’s plans 
and ending, apparently, any chance that the highway would ever be built, for the state 
could not proceed with the road without an agreement with Philadelphia.167 
The relocation problem would have presented a legal obstacle to the completion 
of the Crosstown Expressway if federal funds were to be used for the project.  The 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, in accordance with the federal government’s 
increasing sensitivity to the social effects of expressways, declared that “the prompt and 
equitable relocation” of those displaced by federal-aid highways was needed “to insure 
that a few individuals do not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs 
designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.”  To achieve this policy goal, the Act 
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prohibited the use of federal funds for highway projects unless the state had a plan in 
place before uprooting residents to provide them with “decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwellings” comparable to those they had occupied previously.168  Interestingly, several 
months prior to the passage of the 1968 Act, Pennsylvania withdrew its request for 
federal assistance with right-of-way acquisition, intending to finance the acquisition 
entirely with state funds.  Whether or not the state took such action in anticipation of 
more stringent federal relocation requirements is unclear, although the Federal Highway 
Administration took note of the fact that Philadelphia hadn’t approved the Crosstown due 
to the state’s failure to come up with an adequate relocation plan.169 
In its eulogy of the highway, the mercurial Evening Bulletin switched its position 
once again, now bemoaning the state of affairs that had cost Philadelphia an 
expressway.170  The expressway, said the paper, had become “a symbol of human rights 
over property rights.”  While the issues raised were valid, they nevertheless “obscured the 
needs of the whole city, the entire region.”  Could Philadelphia ever achieve progress, 
asked the editorial, if it could not resolve conflicts that plagued all major public works 
projects?171  William Lamb was aghast, calling the loss of the Crosstown “a tragic thing . 
. . almost inconceivable.”  The highway was “vital to the economic growth of the entir
metropolitan area,” he pointed out, because “nothing is more essential or vital to 
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economic growth than transportation.”172  A forlorn headline in the Evening Bulletin 
reflected, “Dream Highway Went Nowhere for 23 Years, Ending in Detour of Civil 
Rights and Politics.”173 
While the defeat of the Crosstown Expressway represented a lull in the power of 
Philadelphia’s business community over transportation planning, the city’s business 
leaders seem not to have made strenuous efforts in favor of the road during 1964-1968.  
After Tate killed the highway in 1968, the powerful Greater Philadelphia Movement, 
rather than issuing a forceful protest, was open to the possibility of helping to devel p the 
South Street corridor rather than running an expressway through it.  In fact, the GPM 
held a board of directors meeting to discuss the issue on the same day that Stanhope 
Browne, who led the fight to have the Delaware Expressway lowered and covered in 
Society Hill, joined the board.174  Robert Sugarman and George Dukes of the CCPDCC 
visited the GPM board and struck a conciliatory note, saying that they were not 
necessarily opposed to having a Crosstown Expressway under any circumstances, but felt 
that planners had failed to prove the need for it or to consider alternate routes, in addition 
to the city and state’s failure to resolve the relocation issue.  Sugarman told the board that 
his group was “interested in working with the community and with the businessmen in 
resolving this problem.”175  The GPM board continued to hold internal discussions on 
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developing the area and looking at other potential expressway routes, such as Washington 
Avenue, but seems not to have engaged city officials directly on these matters.176   
Although the Greater Philadelphia Movement did not in the summer of 1968 
make a strong push to get City Hall to reconsider the Crosstown Expressway, ne board 
member Stanhope Browne was concerned by some of the assumptions he heard at his 
very first meeting.  Reluctant to make waves so soon after joining the organizatio , and 
cognizant of the fact that Robert Sugarman, a fellow attorney at Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 
represented the CCPDCC, Browne sent a private letter to GPM executive director 
William Wilcox.  In the very long missive, Browne challenged what he felt were 
unproven assumptions about expressways on the part of GPM members, including the 
beliefs that more expressways in Center City would ease traffic congestion, and that the 
city could solve the relocation problem with enough effort.  Most importantly, Browne 
stressed that the expressway had “become a symbolic issue for the black community,” 
which saw the issue “as a question of providing highways for white suburbanites, to 
make it easier for them to live out in the suburbs and yet use the city, as against the needs 
of the black ghetto dwellers.”  Mayor Tate, he believed, had the right idea in cancelling 
the project.177  In the end, Browne’s private urgings were to no avail, as the GPM would 
in 1969 take a more active role in pushing the city to move forward with the Crosstown 
Expressway.    
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In the summer of 1968, it seemed that the Crosstown Expressway was dead, but 
the uncertainty surrounding the project had left considerable damage in its wake.  The 
Office of the Development Coordinator asserted that due to the threat of the expressway, 
properties in the area had “seriously deteriorated.”  The decline occurred because “those 
businessmen who could afford to move elsewhere did so; those who could not afford to 
move either remained without making improvements to their properties or closed as 
business dwindled and property values deteriorated.”  The result was that South Street, 
“which had been one of the City’s outstanding retail and wholesale areas,” could claim 
this status no more.178  One business owner who signed their letter “A South Street 
Football,” told Mayor Tate much the same thing, complaining that many business owners 
wanted to sell their businesses and retire, but could find no buyers due to the threat of 
highway construction.  As a result, businesses deteriorated while owners waited to make 
repairs out of concern that the buildings would soon be torn down, depriving them of 
their investments.  The letter writer asked Tate angrily, “How do you rehabilitate these 
men and women who have endured with patience for the past few years, not having the 
ability to sell what they have acquired, not being able to maintain businesses and 
properties without interference?”179  A glum article in the Philadelphia Tribune told of 
the demise of the Royal Theatre – once a popular entertainment venue for the city’s black 
community – as one of the more upsetting manifestations of the area’s decline.  Som 
merchants, the paper reported, believed that the city’s expressway plans were part of a 
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“conspiracy” to drive out businesses and acquire property at bargain prices in order to sell 
it to developers.180 
Despite the grim condition of South Street and much of the Crosstown corridor, 
Philadelphia’s first true expressway revolt had succeeded, at least for thetime being.  For 
the first time in the city’s history, citizens had convinced elected officials to wipe a 
proposed highway off the map, reflecting a significant change in urban planning culture
over the span of just a few years.  The Crosstown Expressway fight in 1964 through 1968 
was, without a doubt, a grassroots effort, yet it seems that many of the activists who 
carried out the day-to-day activities of the CCPDCC, the group that existed ostensibly to 
represent the residents of the Crosstown corridor, were middle-class professionals rather 
than the low-income African Americans that formed most of the corridor’s population.  
The evidence shows that the campaign against the Crosstown succeeded in this period 
despite the failure of its leaders – among the most important of which were Alice 
Lipscomb and George Dukes – to mobilize those who stood to be affected most deeply 
by the expressway.  Grassroots upheavals not related directly to the Crosstown – 
including incidents of racial violence in Philadelphia and elsewhere – may have been just 
as important as the anti-expressway movement itself. 
The first iteration of the Crosstown Expressway revolt was not entirely unique, 
having counterparts in several other American cities where grassroots organizations 
fought planners, engineers, and government bureaucrats to prevent the construction of an 
urban highway.  In several other places, however, freeway protestors were able to 
influence the city establishment to the extent that it not only agreed to cancel or modify a 
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particular project, but adopted an anti-expressway stance generally.  Such was t e case in 
Boston, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, for example.  Philadelphia’s freeway 
revolt, however, failed to alter the city’s fundamental transportation planning priorities 
and did not even ensure the permanent demise of the Crosstown Expressway itself.  A 
seemingly unquenchable desire for the highway on the part of the business community, 
city planners, and some government officials meant that its opponents would be required 
to defeat the project twice more before achieving a final victory.    
The Turn to Mass Transportation      
From 1964 to 1968, the power of urban planners and engineers to build highways 
where and how they pleased was on the wane.  This was particularly true in Philadelp ia, 
as the campaign to lower and cover the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill made great 
headway and the Crosstown Expressway was defeated for the first time.  As expre sway 
construction became more problematic, Philadelphia’s city government began to increase 
its focus on mass transportation.  Although City Hall and the business community had 
been concerned since the 1950s about the demise of mass transit, there was little they 
could do about it prior to the mid-1960s.  Events on the federal level, such as the passage 
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, provided new opportunities, however.  
Philadelphia and its suburban counties responded by creating the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, which acted as a conduit for federal grants, took 
over existing commuter railroad subsidy programs, and began efforts to acquire the 
Philadelphia Transportation Company’s urban mass transit system.  In 1964, Philadelp ia 
also sought federal funding for the Center City Commuter Connection, a downtown rail 
tunnel intended to unify the region’s two separate commuter rail systems.  This project, 
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more than anything else, helped to create the perception that Philadelphia’s mass 
transportation planning was biased strongly in favor of affluent, white suburbanites wh l  
paying inadequate attention to the needs of the inner-city poor.    
1964 was a watershed year for mass transportation in Philadelphia, as the newly-
created Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority became operative on 
January 15.  The fact that commuter railroads in Philadelphia had been receiving 
subsidies from the Philadelphia and suburban governments for several years, with 
positive results, undoubtedly made a regional public transportation authority easier to 
swallow for those who might have been wary of the concept.  Observers credited the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Compact with paving the way for SEPTA and, 
as City Solicitor David Berger put it, “the beginning of a new era of Philadelphia-
Suburban County cooperation.”181  Likewise, the Evening Bulletin proclaimed that 
without SEPACT, the region could never have experienced “the cooperation between, 
and the breaking down of antipathies among, the counties of Greater Philadelphia.”182 
The region’s five county governments – Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, 
and Montgomery – joined together in SEPTA primarily for the purpose of funneling 
federal aid to the commuter railroads to prevent what was otherwise expected to be their
imminent demise.  To that end, SEPTA expected that one of its first items of business 
would be the acquisition of both the Passenger Service Improvement Corporation and 
SEPACT so that it could merge, take over, and expand their railroad subsidy operations.  
Railroads were not to be SEPTA’s sole focus, however.  Those who created the authority 
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also envisioned that it would take over eventually the Philadelphia Transportation 
Company and the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company in order to assume 
control of the area’s subways, buses, and trolleys; the only question was when these 
acquisitions would occur.  SEPTA began negotiations with the PTC right away, 
beginning a process that was at first expected to be completed quickly but in fact lasted 
until 1968.183  Getting SEPTA up and running and involved in both commuter railroad 
and urban mass transit operations was an urgent priority for Mayor Tate, who warned that 
with delays, “I am afraid we will be doomed to slow stagnation as our taxable rel state 
is eaten up by highways, parking lots and service stations, more and more of our 
resources become allocated to traffic signals and cars whiz by our stores and shopping 
centers without stopping.”184 
While SEPTA was getting on its feet, proponents of mass transportation were 
excited by developments at the national level.  On July 9, 1964, President Lyndon 
Johnson signed into law the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, calling it “one of 
the most profoundly significant domestic measures to be enacted by the Congress during 
the 1960s.”  “Congressional support of transportation,” the president continued, “has 
been a major constructive influence on the progress and development of our American 
society and our American economy.”185  The Act authorized the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency to provide funds to both public and private mass transportation 
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companies through state and local governments.186  The initial outlay was $375 million, 
and it was hoped that Philadelphia would receive $36 million of those funds.187  In fact, 
Mayor Tate announced the day before the bill was signed that Philadelphia had already
applied for its first grant under the new law.  A press release from the mayor’s office 
trumpeted Tate as “a prime mover” of the bill, as he had testified before both the Hous  
and Senate about the need for federal urban mass transit legislation.188  Tate was ecstatic 
about the legislation and proud of the role he played in lobbying for it.  He attended the 
signing ceremony and afterwards planned to frame a photo of the president signingthe 
bill along with one of the pens Johnson had used.189 
In many respects, the mass transit situation in Philadelphia and its suburbs seemed 
to be looking up in 1964 due to the creation of SEPTA and the passage of the Urban 
Mass Transportation Act.  Moreover, the PSIC and SEPACT continued to report 
overwhelmingly positive results of their Operations, which they credited for drawing 
national attention to the concept of federal assistance for regional rail trans t and helping 
to convince Congress to pass the UMTA.190  In January 1964, for example, Bucks County 
Commission chairman John Bodley noted that the Pennsylvania Railroad had 
experienced a 64% increase in ridership since November 1962.  “This astounding gain in 
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rail passengers,” he said, “is sure proof that improving public transportation with lo  
fares and better service will draw more riders to it, thus alleviating congestion on our 
over-crowded highway network.”191 
At the same time, however, PSIC and SEPACT officials realized that much more 
needed to be done to sustain and build upon the progress they had made in improving the 
region’s commuter rail service.  In April 1964, SEPACT urged a “complete 
modernization” of the region’s rail system, including completing the electrification of the 
system, new rail cars, and improvements to both tracks and stations, among other things.  
All of this was estimated to cost $103 million in addition to the $27 million that had 
already been committed and invested, primarily by the city of Philadelphia, since 1961. 
Although the project required a serious investment, things could have been much worse 
had the region’s railroad infrastructure not been relatively well-maintained.  San 
Francisco was rebuilding its rail system, which it had allowed to deteriorate severely, at 
the staggering cost of $979 million for 75 miles of track.  SEPACT estimated 
Philadelphia’s cost to be only 3.6% of San Francisco’s.192 
But improving the rail system would not be enough.  Philadelphia was in danger 
of losing its commuter railroads entirely, and the danger was not confined merely to the 
deterioration of the physical infrastructure.  For years, both the Pennsylvania and Reading 
Railroads cut service and increased fares in response to the losses they suffer d on their 
commuter operations.  PSIC and SEPACT Operations provided some relief, as 
government subsidies reduced the railroads’ losses and provided improved service.  But 
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the subsidies were far from a cure-all for the railroads’ systemic ills.  The Reading, in 
fact, stated its intention to drop commuter rail service completely unless it could be 
relieved of all of its losses, a situation that SEPACT found untenable: 
Discontinuation of commuter rail services would be 
disastrous for metropolitan Philadelphia.  Loss of 
commuter services would require inordinately large 
expenditures for alternative transportation facilities.  
Discontinuation of service would disrupt the economic 
growth of the region; it would reduce property values and 
tax collections in communities served by rail lines.  
Discontinuation would eliminate a mode of transportation 
that, when called upon during storms or other emergencies, 
has proven itself capable of carrying two or three times its 
normal burden of passengers.193 
 
With such a potential disaster looming on the horizon, SEPTA placed a high 
priority on a merger with PSIC and SEPACT, intended to allow the new authority to deal 
more directly with commuter rail issues.  SEPTA general counsel Lewis Van Dusen 
acknowledged the importance of merging with the commuter rail corporations so that
southeastern Pennsylvania could “speak with one voice” when dealing with government 
agencies on railroad matters.194  Compared to SEPTA’s efforts to take over the PTC, the 
integration of commuter rail entities was accomplished with lightning speed.  By 
September 1965, SEPTA had entered into management agreements with both the PSIC 
and SEPACT to transfer to SEPTA those organizations’ responsibilities for rail 
Operations in Philadelphia and the suburbs, respectively.195  In doing so, SEPTA 
inherited a headache, and an expensive one to boot.  The Reading Railroad quickly let it 
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be known that it wanted $36 million in government subsidies so that it could improve 
commuter service and wipe out its operating deficit.  In addition, the Reading reiterated 
its threat to drop commuter service entirely if it did not receive the requested 
assistance.196  SEPTA also faced the pressure of high expectations.  As news station 
KYW put it, “Now that the Transit Authority no longer is a paper organization, we can 
find out if the region’s confidence and hopes are well placed. . . . If it succeeds, the 
Transit Authority can be a model for the solution of many problems that threaten the 
region’s future.”197  
By February 1966, SEPTA had entered into agreements with both the 
Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads to bring the entire Philadelphia-area commuter 
railroad system under contract for subsidy Operations.198  The new relationship proved 
beneficial.  At the end of the first year of the new subsidy programs on the Reading lines 
(known collectively as “Operation Reading”), weekday passenger traffic had grown 
substantially and the railroad’s overall operating deficit had shrunk.  The parties 
attributed the positive results to a new fare system which distributed costs more 
equitably; improvements in service and schedules; and better cooperation between labor 
and management.199  Roderick Craib, a public relations man for the Reading, noted that 
PSIC/SEPACT programs between 1958 and 1964 had increased ridership nearly 50%, 
but had not resulted in major deficit reductions due to increased service and lower fares.  
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The difference now was the federal aid SEPTA was funneling to the railroads pursuant to 
the UMTA.  Craib hailed southeastern Pennsylvania as “one of the first regions in the 
nation” to try to correct the imbalance between spending on highways and rail facilities 
“so that all forms of transportation would be developed efficiently as part of a complete 
transportation network.”200 
Craib was correct – although it had a long way to go, the region was indeed 
moving toward a truly integrated transportation system.  SEPTA laid out its blueprint in 
September 1966 when it announced a $458 million capital program with the goal of 
creating “a coordinated public transportation system to serve the entire five-county area, 
permitting persons to travel conveniently throughout the region, eventually with only one 
ticket needed for any trip.”  In announcing the program, SEPTA chair Casimir 
Sienkiewicz portrayed it as an alternative to expanding the region’s expressway network; 
according to the press release, the cost of highways sufficient to replace the area’s mass 
transit system would be more than $1 billion.  Most of the money to implement the 
improvements to the commuter rail system was to come from state and federal grants.  
While the Pennsylvania and the Reading would continue to operate the railroads, they 
would agree to meet SEPTA’s service standards in return for having all of their 
commuter service losses covered. 
The capital program also contemplated large expenditures for improvements to 
the urban mass transit system, financed by a combination of federal, state and local grants 
in addition to the system’s operating revenues.  The plan called for significant 
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improvements to the urban mass transit infrastructure, including the extensions of the 
Broad Street Subway into Northeast Philadelphia and South Philadelphia and the 
replacement of the Frankford El viaduct.  Moreover, SEPTA planned to modernize transit 
equipment and make improvements to the suburban bus and trolley lines.  The authority 
was also interested in improving the city’s subway concourses, which, it admitte , many 
considered “neither clean enough, comfortable enough, safe enough, nor appealing to the 
eye.”201           
Although SEPTA had grand plans for the future of urban mass transit in 
Philadelphia, the PTC resisted the authority’s attempt to take it over – something that had 
to be accomplished before anyone would consider spending the large sums the capital 
program contemplated.  According to then-SEPTA vice chairman James McConnon, the 
political dimensions of SEPTA’s effort to take over the PTC were somewhat different 
from those surrounding its assumption of responsibility for the commuter railroad 
subsidy programs.  In the case of the railroads, the city’s business community took he 
lead, wanting to preserve the rail lines that filled downtown office buildings with 
suburban workers.  The Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, for example, had 
since the early 1960s pushed for more aid, including state and federal subsidies, for the 
railroads.202  With respect to urban mass transit, however, the business community was 
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not as visible.  Instead, Mayor Tate, who represented the constituency that made up most 
of the system’s riders, placed himself at the forefront of the effort.  Perhaps equally 
important was the transit union’s insistence that a public takeover be accomplished, 
because SEPTA’s enabling legislation required the authority to fund fully the workers’ 
pension program in the event SEPTA bought the PTC.203   
Despite substantial political pressure on SEPTA to accomplish the takeover, it 
took several years and a court order for Philadelphia to have a publicly-owned mass 
transportation system.  As was mentioned earlier, the city’s 1907 agreement with the 
PTC’s predecessor, Philadelphia Rapid Transit, contained an option clause that included 
a formula for setting the purchase price.  When the parties failed to reach agreement on 
their own by June 1965, SEPTA notified the PTC of its intent to exercise its option under 
the 1907 agreement to purchase the company as of July 1, 1966.204  In response, the PTC 
repudiated the agreement, leading to a lawsuit by the city of Philadelphia and SEPTA to 
affirm the validity of the purchase option and compel the sale of the transit company.  
SEPTA also filed a suit to compel the PTC to allow SEPTA to examine its property and 
financial records – a step that was necessary before SEPTA could sell bonds to advance 
its purchase of the PTC.205 
While the lawsuit was pending, the PTC and its president, Albert Lyons, fought 
SEPTA’s takeover attempt by appealing to the court of public opinion.  As part of the 
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company’s public relations campaign, Lyons sent prominent Philadelphia citizens a l tter 
pointing out the evils of government ownership and operation and claiming that the 
community would best be served by a continuation of private ownership of mass transit.  
The letter included proofs of two advertisements for which the PTC had already 
purchased space in local newspapers.  The first advertisement, headlined “What does 
government-owned transit cost the taxpayer?” reported that transit agencies in New York 
City, Pittsburgh and Boston were suffering losses that forced taxpayers in those cities to 
“dig deep” to cover them.  The second one, entitled “Is Government Ownership the 
Magic Answer to Urban Transportation Problems?” asserted that in other cities, “transit 
riders often get less for their fares than do riders in Philadelphia.”206  
The PTC’s publicity campaign evoked a heated response from SEPTA chairman 
Casimir Sienkiewicz, who pointed out that in 1963, the Pennsylvania legislature had 
called Philadelphia’s mass transit “underdeveloped, uncoordinated [and] obsolete” and 
concluded that these problems could not be solved by a private company.  It was this 
belief that spurred the legislature to create SEPTA in the first place, said Sienkiewicz, 
and now the PTC was refusing to cooperate out of a simple desire for more money.  “The 
only profit which PTC has made in recent years has come out of increased fares and 
decreased service,” he fumed, asserting that the company had “not taken one concrete 
step during the past ten years to improve the overall service to the people of 
Philadelphia.”207 
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James McConnon agreed wholeheartedly that the PTC’s resistance was simply a 
ploy to extract more money from SEPTA, remarking that the PTC “had no interest 
whatever in keeping [the transit system] going.  They were running it into the ground.”  
At the same time, however, the PTC’s difficult financial situation deprived it of leverage.  
As McConnon put it, “You can only extort when you’ve got the gun.  They didn’t have 
the gun.”208  Perhaps realizing that delaying the inevitable was only hurting the company, 
the PTC’s Executive Committee struck a deal with SEPTA in November 1965 to sell the 
company for $59.75 million.  The agreement was subject to approval by PTC 
stockholders as well as the court, and was also contingent on SEPTA’s ability to finance 
the purchase through the sale of revenue bonds.209 
A group of dissident PTC shareholders opposed the deal, intervening as 
defendants in the still-pending lawsuit and seeking to have the court declare the purchase 
option invalid.  In July 1966, however, the Court of Common Pleas ruled that the option 
was valid, as was Philadelphia’s transfer of that option to SEPTA.  The purchase price 
under the option formula was $54 million, with the result that the dissidents had 
succeeded only in costing themselves and their fellow shareholders several million 
dollars by voiding the original purchase agreement.  When the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed the ruling in July 1967, the battle was essentially over.210  After four years 
of negotiation and legal wrangling, the PTC passed formally into public ownership on 
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September 30, 1968.211  Philadelphia, the last holdout among major metropolitan areas, 
had at last a publicly-owned mass transportation system.   
The mechanics of the transfer were as follows:  SEPTA purchased the PTC, 
leased its assets to the city of Philadelphia, and then leased them back from the city along 
with the planned extensions of the Broad Street Subway for an annual rent of $14.7 
million.  The reason for the leaseback arrangement was that public transit agecies were 
known, from the experiences of other cities, to run chronic deficits.  Structuring the deal 
this way limited SEPTA’s financial commitment to its annual rent, with the city agreeing 
to pick up the tab for any difference between net revenues and rental payments.  The 
money to cover any such difference would have to come either from fare increases or 
public subsidies.  “Either way,” the Evening Bulletin pointed out, “the public pays.”  The 
deal was, however, reflective of Philadelphia’s status as home to most of the population 
that SEPTA would serve.  While the arrangement did not give the city veto powers over 
fares, the extension of service to the suburbs, or personnel decisions, observers believed 
that it would nevertheless give Philadelphia more control over its mass transporttion 
than ever before.212 
Although proponents of mass transit had reasons to rejoice, the picture in the 
wake of the PTC takeover was not entirely rosy.  The biggest problem, according to 
McConnon (who became SEPTA chairman in 1968, the year of the takeover), was that, 
“The minute the pensions were funded, we lost all of the most experienced and ablest 
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employees.  They had been holding off retiring until the pensions were funded.  As soon 
as the pensions were funded, they all retired.”  Hiring and training new employees 
created “a tremendous expense problem for the authority.”  Labor issues also presented a 
huge political problem for Mayor Tate.  On one hand, Tate counted the labor unions as an 
important part of his constituency.  The union’s constant demands for pay increases, 
however, created the need for more revenue.  When SEPTA sought to increase fares to 
offset its higher costs, Tate pressured the authority not to do so in order not to upset his 
even larger constituency of mass transit riders.  The inherent political tension between 
wages and fares strained relations between Tate and McConnon over the years. 
Problems with workers and unions were far from the only issues confronting 
SEPTA in its new role as owner and operator of the urban mass transit system.  Part of 
the PTC’s strategy during the years it was in a purchase price dispute with SEPTA was to 
make its balance sheet look healthier than it really was by deferring maiten nce, which 
allowed it to show phantom profits.  The PTC’s gambit led to complacency among 
politicians, who believed that the transit system was making money and would, once 
taken over, practically run itself.  As McConnon put it, “part of the mythology at that 
time was that there would be no public money needed.”  The reality, however, was grim.  
Because “the PTC had stopped putting money into the system,” the urban transit system 
“was really on the rocks when [SEPTA] took over.”  The PTC had not only stopped 
maintaining the system, but “had simply stopped paying any attention to the public” as 
well, with the result that the “whole relationship to the passengers had become virtually 
non-existent.”  Now that it was in charge, SEPTA became the target of public complaints 
about service, equipment, employees, and fares.  Prior to 1968, when all SEPTA did was 
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administer the commuter rail programs, it enjoyed a favorable public image, but after the 
PTC takeover, “the world changed,” and public relations became a significant headac  
for the authority.213     
In addition to the problems cited above, the delay SEPTA experienced in 
acquiring the PTC was costly for the city of Philadelphia, which lagged far behind other 
municipalities in federal funding.  Although it was the fourth-largest city in the nation, 
Philadelphia ranked only eleventh in federal transportation grants by the end of 1968, 
receiving only $4 million out of the approximately $450 million the federal government 
had handed out since 1965.  In addition to the slow PTC takeover, problems with the 
proposed Center City Commuter Connection – a tunnel that would connect eventually the 
Penn Central and Reading Railroads – were responsible for the shortfall in federal 
subsidies.214   
The Commuter Connection, a major part of urban planners’ vision for 
Philadelphia since the late 1950s, was intended to remedy a significant limitation 
hampering Philadelphia’s commuter rail service.215  The fact that the region was served 
by two competing railroads – the Pennsylvania and the Reading – was both a blessing 
and a curse.  On one hand, the area had more rail lines, extending in more directions, than 
just about anywhere else in the United States.  On the other hand, the two railroads 
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operated as completely separate systems, using separate stations, with no way for 
passengers to connect directly from a Pennsylvania line to a Reading line and vice-versa.  
To make matters even more difficult, the Center City stations for each railroad – 
Pennsylvania Suburban Station and Reading Terminal – were dead ends for all lines, 
meaning that valuable time was lost waiting for trains to turn around and begin another 
run out to the suburbs.   
Urban planners and government officials wanted to solve the dilemmas posed by 
having separate rail systems by building a tunnel that would connect them – the 
heretofore “missing link” – thus allowing Pennsylvania customers to switch easily to 
Reading lines and vice-versa.  The result would be, for the first time, a completely unified 
commuter rail system, achieved through either the formation of a new operating company 
or the use of operating agreements between the two railroads.  Once the tunnel was 
completed, passengers would be able to travel from one end of the system to another – 
Norristown in the northwestern suburbs to Fox Chase in Northeast Philadelphia, for 
example – without needing to emerge from underground and walk several blocks in order 
to change trains.  All inbound and outbound trains would stop at three stations – 30th 
Street Station and Suburban Station, both owned by the Pennsylvania, as well as Market 
East, a new station on Market Street east of City Hall intended to replace the aging 
Reading Terminal.216   
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The city’s consulting engineers approved a design for the tunnel in early 1962, a 
significant step toward obtaining federal aid for the project.217  Engineering, although 
enormously complicated, would turn out to be the easy part, relatively speaking.  The real 
problem, as was often the case for Philadelphia transportation projects, was funding.  The 
city made its first request for federal funding on July 8, 1964, asking the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency to assist with the project under the UMTA on the day before 
Johnson signed the bill into law.218  From the beginning, Philadelphia planners 
envisioned that the bulk of the money for the tunnel would come from the federal 
government with additional funding to come from the city and the railroads.219  The 
tunnel project was presented as the centerpiece of SEPTA’s aforementioned $458 million 
capital project announced in 1966, with SEPTA describing it as “a focal point for the 
entire regional public transportation system, where connections between rail, bus, trolley, 
and subway would be conveniently and rapidly made, for trips to and from all points.”220 
The Commuter Connection was much more than just a transportation project, 
however.  Some of the strongest proponents of the tunnel and the new rail station to 
which it would connect saw the project as the best way to spur the development of retail 
and office space in the deteriorating Market East area.221  According to James 
McConnon, the stimulation of business activity was the prime motivation for the 
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undertaking, with the corporations who owned properties in the area generating the 
necessary political pressure.222  The Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, which 
had up to this point focused mainly on the renewal of Society Hill, created in 1965 the 
Market Street East Committee, which included representatives from the major downtown 
department stores, such as Lit Brothers, John Wanamaker, Gimbel Brothers, and 
Strawbridge and Clothier.  The Committee’s main goal was to lure retail customer  – 
many of whom now did their shopping in the suburbs – back downtown by building a 
new shopping center that would “rival or surpass any suburban center.”223  The results of 
a survey the Committee sent to merchants in the Market East area revealed that r tailers 
“were concerned at the decline in quality of stores in Market Street, and with the loss of 
‘quality’ shoppers.”224  The worry over “quality shoppers” had obvious racial overtones.  
As Alison Isenberg explained in her history of postwar central business district renewal, 
“Many supporters of urban renewal in the 1950s hoped to reverse the trend of nonwhite 
shoppers downtown with the demolition of close-in black neighborhoods, new highway 
construction, and drastic downtown rebuilding.  These actions were taken in the name of 
business district improvement and the attempt to bring back the white suburban 
shopper.”225 
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In the case of Market East, OPDC saw the commuter tunnel and railroad station 
as linked intimately with redevelopment of the area as a bustling retail center.226  The 
linkage of the two commuter railroad systems would allow passengers on any train, 
whether on a Reading or Pennsylvania line, to reach Market East with ease from any 
suburban point of origin.  In addition to Philadelphia’s business community, the city’s 
construction unions were strongly in favor of the tunnel because of its potential for large-
scale job creation.227  Although the business and labor communities did not exert strong 
political pressure right away, in the 1970s they became the key constituencies that helped 
the tunnel move past political and financial obstacles to its completion.  As will be 
explained later, the tunnel’s non-transportation benefits later became the subject of 
controversy when the federal government balked at using transportation funds for what 
seemed to be a neighborhood redevelopment project. 
Early on in the funding process, the tunnel encountered trouble.  In early 1966, 
the Evening Bulletin reported that the city stood to lose as much as $6 million in federal 
funds because it lacked a comprehensive regional plan for mass transportation mee ng
the requirements of the Urban Mass Transportation Act.  Without such a plan, the tunnel 
would be eligible for only one-half federal financing rather than two-thirds.228  A year 
later, in March 1967, Philadelphia still lacked a plan that complied with the requirements 
of the Act and was projected to be $7 million short of what it would need to construct the 
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tunnel.229  Walter Johnson, the executive director of the Delaware Valley Regional 
Planning Commission, which was responsible for publishing a regional transportation 
plan, expressed certainty that the federal government would come through with the full 
amount of the requested grant.230  Unfortunately, Johnson’s optimism was misplaced, as 
the federal government soon afterwards revealed that it would make only a partial 
commitment because the DVRPC had yet to become a permanent agency.  Once New 
Jersey, which had resisted making the agency permanent, gave its agreement to enter into 
a permanent arrangement with Pennsylvania and the DVRPC adopted a long-range 
transportation plan, the city would then be able to apply for the remaining funds.231 
As 1967 turned into 1968, the issue of funding for the tunnel seemed no closer to 
resolution.  In April, the railroads balked at paying the rental fee for the tunnel, 
demanding that it be included in SEPTA subsidies.232  This announcement was followed 
by a statement from Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd that his department had made 
no commitment to approve federal funding for the project.  City Transit Engineer Edson 
Tennyson perhaps betrayed his true opinion as to whom the tunnel would benefit when he 
said that the tunnel would have a better chance of approval once the federal mass transit 
program moved from HUD into the new Department of Transportation.  Boyd was “a 
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more efficient business-like type,” he explained, while HUD was more interested in 
“poor people and the urban image.”233 
  Tennyson’s prediction seemed unwarranted when city and SEPTA 
representatives met with the Department of Transportation in August and failed yet again 
to secure a funding commitment.  Multiple obstacles existed, including the lack of 
agreements to ensure compliance with the requirement that labor rights not be injured by 
a federally funded project, the need for assurance that commuter railroad service would 
be maintained on a long-term basis, and a protest from the Philadelphia Suburban 
Transportation Company that its Red Arrow lines would be injured by the tunnel which, 
it claimed, was designed “to increase the measure of competition between the railroads 
and existing transit carriers.”  At the same time, Red Arrow objected to SEPTA’s seeking 
state and federal aid to purchase new commuter railroad cars, which it called “a 
continuation of the policy of aiding a competing carrier to the detriment of comparative 
service to the patrons of Red Arrow Lines.”234   
Red Arrow’s complaints echoed grievances that both it and the PTC, prior to its 
acquisition by SEPTA, had held for years.  From the PSIC’s inception in 1960, both 
companies had charged the city government with favoring commuter railroads over their 
bus, trolley and subway lines.  In 1962, the PTC had complained that the city was trying 
to prevent it from expanding its bus service because it was afraid of competition 
detracting from its railroad subsidy programs.  “The city’s position is a curious one,” the 
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company charged.  “It promotes one type of public transportation – the railroads – even at
the cost of large sums of tax-supported subsidies.  On the other hand, [the city] resists 
progress in express bus operations which . . . are operated without any city subsidy, and 
achieve the same objective of cutting down the volume of auto traffic.”235  Later on, the 
companies’ ire was directed at SEPTA, which Red Arrow once called “nothing more than 
a funnel through which federal, state and local funds pass to the Pennsylvania and 
Reading Railroads.”  Meanwhile, SEPTA ignored the PTC and Red Arrow, allegedly to 
depress their value and make them easier to acquire.236  As late as 1967, when SEPTA’s 
battle to acquire the PTC was still underway, Albert Lyons threatened to seek an 
injunction to halt state subsidies to SEPTA if the competitive imbalance between urban 
mass transit and commuter railroads were not remedied.237  SEPTA chairman James 
McConnon scoffed at the notion that government aid to the commuter railroads put the 
PTC and Red Arrow at a competitive disadvantage, stressing that the railroads served a 
completely different constituency with the possible exception of a very few passenger  in 
Delaware County who might have been inclined to switch from a Red Arrow bus to a 
train to get to the city.238   
At a meeting of SEPTA and city officials in February 1968, Deputy City Solicit r 
Jerome Shestack suggested that the federal government be asked to waive in the case of 
Red Arrow the requirement that federal funds – such as those to be spent on the tunnel – 
not be used to the disadvantage of private transit companies.  Tennyson estimated that 
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competition from SEPTA was costing Red Arrow $125,000 per year and that this number 
could be used to forge a settlement of the transit carrier’s complaint.  Some at the 
meeting expressed the opinion that what Red Arrow was really after was permission to 
run its bus lines into the city in order to level the competitive playing field.239  When Tate 
and others asked why Red Arrow should not be given license to operate wherever it 
wanted in order to improve service for all Philadelphians, Tennyson responded that this 
would cost the city millions due to increased competition with the PTC (at this time very 
close to being acquired by SEPTA) and the railroads.  If Red Arrow were allowed to run 
a few buses into Center City, however, Tennyson was confident that the company would 
drop its objection to the commuter tunnel.240  While Red Arrow’s protest did present a 
temporary stumbling block to the tunnel, it became a moot point when SEPTA acquired 
the company and its suburban transit lines in 1969, taking another significant step toward 
the creation of an integrated regional transportation system.241    
In the meantime, tunnel delays prior to the DOT’s assumption of the federal mass 
transit program had caused Mayor Tate to lose patience with HUD’s mass transport tion 
director, William Hurd.  In a letter to Philadelphia’s congressional delegation sent a day 
after meeting with federal officials, Tate called Hurd “obviously antagonistic” and 
“dissatisfied with the manner in which Philadelphia’s requests [for funding for the tunn l] 
had been made.”  The city had reached accords with the PTC, SEPTA, and both 
                                                     
239 Red Arrow lines operated in suburban Delaware County, with the result that a Red Arrow passenger 
desiring to travel into the city was forced to transfer to a PTC line and pay a separate fare.  SEPTA 
eliminated this problem by acquiring the PTC in 1968 and Red Arrow in 1969.  
240 Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Minutes of meeting with SEPTA and city officials, 
28 February 1968, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.5, Administration 
of James H.J. Tate. 
241 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 2 August 2 1969, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
250 
 
commuter railroads, Tate pointed out, but had received “little in return” from the federal 
government.242  “This is most unfortunate,” he concluded, “and I do hope that some effort 
will be made to clear the air and give Philadelphia the relief we so badly need at this 
level.”243  Soon afterwards, Tate and McConnon wrote directly to Hurd, begging his 
assistance.  The commuter connection tunnel was “the keystone of this region’s entire 
program of public transportation improvements,” they told him, and would be “the most 
important element in a major confluence of transportation services to be developed in 
Center City Philadelphia.”244 
Still, no progress on federal funding for the tunnel was forthcoming.  By 
December 1968, Tate’s patience was reaching its limit.  Blaming tunnel delays in part on 
McConnon, Tate demanded the SEPTA chairman’s resignation.  McConnon had aroused 
Tate’s ire by opposing the establishment of a separate corporation to run the commuter 
rail lines in the event that SEPTA acquired them – a mechanism the federal government 
was demanding in order to protect railroad workers’ federal retirement benefits.  
SEPTA’s suburban representatives opposed such a corporation, not wanting to become 
involved with railroad labor issues.245  McConnon refused Tate’s demand that he resign, 
blaming both Tate and the railroad unions for holding up the tunnel.246 
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At the close of 1968, proponents of mass transportation in the Philadelphia region 
were frustrated by the fact that plans for the Center City Commuter Connection – 
intended to be the centerpiece of SEPTA’s major capital improvement program and the 
key to the creation of a unified regional commuter railroad system – were stuck in 
neutral.  The city’s attempt to come to an agreement with the federal government on 
funding for the tunnel had run up against several obstacles, placing the project’s future in 
doubt.  Tunnel enthusiasts didn’t realize it in 1968, but there were even rougher waters 
ahead, for when the project did get closer to reality, more financial problems and public 
opposition to the tunnel complicated matters further. 
Despite the difficulties in moving forward with the tunnel, Tate and others who 
shared his goal of an integrated regional transportation system could look back over the 
previous five years with pride at what they had accomplished.  The notion of the city 
acquiring for itself the PTC’s mass transportation system, which so many had regarded as 
folly, had been put to rest forever.  In its place had arisen a regional mass transit authority 
with the potential one day to provide Philadelphia and its growing suburbs with seamless 
service.  SEPTA took a major step toward realizing this potential when it concluded in 
1968 its long battle to acquire the PTC.  Just as important, the federal government had 
awakened finally to the problems facing urban America in the 1960s, including the 
desperate need for improved mass transportation.  The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964, combined with the creation of SEPTA, ensured a crucial flow of federal money 
into the Philadelphia region for transportation projects.  It would be another decade and a 
half before the region would have its integrated transportation system, but by the late 





“We are Fighting for a Community”:  The Expressway Revolt Succeeds, 1969-1973 
 
 
Between 1969 and 1973, the democratization of transportation politics in 
Philadelphia reached its apex, as citizen discontent over the proposed Crosstown 
Expressway resulted in the project’s final cancellation, sparing thousands of African 
Americans, many of them living in poverty, from losing their homes.  The city’s 
abandonment of the Crosstown in 1973 was a substantial victory for the anti-expressway 
activists who fought for a decade to convince elected officials to look beyond the 
efficient movement of automobile traffic to take account of highways’ social, eonomic, 
and environmental impacts.  On the other side of the equation were the City Planning 
Commission and the business community, represented most prominently by the Chamber 
of Commerce, both of which saw the expressway as a necessary tool for the relief of
traffic congestion, essential to the renewal of Center City as an economically v able 
downtown, and a means to clear what seemed to them a corridor in physical decline.  The 
defeat of the Crosstown was a victory for democracy in terms of both process and re ult; 
those who opposed the road had their voices heard and, despite lacking affiliation with 
the city’s business and government elites, achieved their goal of wiping the expressway 
from the map.1 
                                                     
1 The Crosstown’s defeat also reflected the increasing prevalence in the late 1960s and early 1970s of 
concerns over the environmental effects of highway construction.  As historian Mark Rose noted, 
beginning in the mid-1960s, “proponents of environme tal preservation identified the Interstate system 
with gashes in the earth, with destruction of the pristine beauty of mountainsides and wildlife habitats, nd 
with despoliation of the air.”  Mark H. Rose, Interstate:  Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville:  
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 101.  The Nixon administration responded to such concerns with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which required the filing of environmental impact statements 
before any federal action likely to have a significant environmental effect, adding another dimension to the 




Not all constituencies benefitted equally from the more inclusive transportation 
planning process that began in the mid-1960s and peaked with the Crosstown’s 
cancellation.  Class, as much as race, proved to be a major determinant of the degree to 
which various groups could alter transportation plans to their benefit, as controversies 
over the Delaware Expressway ramps demonstrated.  Shortly after the cancellation of the 
Crosstown Expressway, residents of Society Hill and Queen Village – a newly-
gentrifying portion of Southwark – began a campaign to eliminate certain Delawar  
Expressway entrance and exit ramps that, without an interchange with the Crosstown, 
would have dumped huge volumes of traffic onto narrow, residential streets.  They were 
opposed by state highway officials and large business interests, such as the Old 
Philadelphia Development Corporation and the Chamber of Commerce, which sought to 
prevent further delays to the expressway’s completion and retain the ramps, the 
elimination of which they perceived as harmful to the city’s economic development.2    
While those who protested the Delaware Expressway ramps had some success in 
achieving their goals, their victories served at the same time to demonstrate the limits of 
the democratization of Philadelphia’s transportation politics.  Just as the resid nts of 
                                                                                                                                                             
sensitivity to the air pollution created by automobile traffic impacted Philadelphia in 1972, when objections 
raised by the Environmental Protection Agency played a role in the Crosstown Expressway’s demise. 
2 The Queen Village protestors, who were generally not as wealthy or as connected to City Hill and 
Philadelphia business as were residents of Society Hill, bore strong similarities to a small group of white 
residents and business owners who moved to the eastrn end of South Street during the Crosstown 
Expressway controversy.  Both groups were representative of a 1970s trend whereby young, white, 
educated professionals returned to urban neighborhoods, restored homes, and attempted to foster a sense of 
community.  Many of these newcomers formed grassroot  rganizations to fight the plans of the 
government bureaucrats, city planners, and real estte developers who had controlled urban renewal since 
the end of World War II.  Seeking “neighborhood power,” local activists in many cities sought to replace 
the domination of big business with a grassroots approach to redevelopment.  Suleiman Osman, “The 
Decade of the Neighborhood,” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound:  Making 




Society Hill were able to have a portion of the expressway lowered and covered whil  
their less affluent neighbors in Southwark were not, the Queen Village protesto s had 
more success in their fight than did the white working-class residents of Port Richmond, 
a Northeast Philadelphia neighborhood that failed in its earlier effort to prevent an off-
ramp from bisecting a playground. 
As pressure both from below (in the form of citizen protests) and above (in the 
form of a federal bureaucracy more sympathetic to those protests) forced Philadelp ia to 
curtail its expressway construction, the city and its region shifted more attention to mass 
transportation.  The turn to mass transit, however, did not entail a significantly wider 
distribution of transportation benefits across social groups.  On the contrary, middle-class 
and affluent whites, along with the business community, continued to be the biggest 
beneficiaries of transportation policies.  In the specific instance of the commuter tunnel, 
organized labor benefitted as well.  That benefit, however, extended only to workers 
actually employed in building the tunnel and not to the broader working-class 
communities in Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.  The financial difficulty in which 
Philadelphia found itself in the 1970s, along with many other U.S. cities, placed both its 
commuter railroad and urban transit systems in crisis.  By making its highest priorities 
the acquisition of the bankrupt commuter railroads and the construction of the expensive 
Center City Commuter Connection, City Hall and SEPTA ensured that less affluent urban 
transit customers would continue to be saddled with an antiquated and crumbling system.
“A Crosstown Expressway should not be built” 
 
Although citizen opposition defeated the Crosstown Expressway in 1968, 
resulting in Mayor Tate’s order to have the project removed from the city’s plan and the 
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state’s formal deletion of the road from its plans in January 1969, the matter was far from 
over.3  Philadelphia’s business community – the Chamber of Commerce in particular – 
continued to push city officials to resurrect the Crosstown Expressway plans.  At the
forefront of the pro-Crosstown movement was John Bracken, who had been named 
president of the Chamber of Commerce specifically because he had supported Tate’s 
reelection bid in 1967.  Tate’s victory over Republican Arlen Specter, made narrow by 
the defection of much of the city’s Democratic establishment to Specter’s camp, had 
caused Tate to pull back from the business community, at least in the Chamber’s view.  
Andrew Young, a former president of the Chamber, recalled of Tate’s time in office that 
“City Hall was a vacuum.  As a matter of fact, you couldn’t get a phone call throug .”4  
Putting Tate ally Bracken in charge, the Chamber felt, would give the group better access 
to the mayor.5   
The Citizens’ Committee to Preserve and Develop the Crosstown Community 
accused the Chamber of using “misleading, misinforming tactics” in tryig to convince 
residents that they would be compensated well by the federal government if they 
relocated to make room for the expressway.  Anti-highway leader Alice Lipscomb 
alleged that welfare recipients, a category into which many corridor resident  fell, were 
ineligible for relocation payments under the Federal Highway Act of 1968 – an allegation 
that was technically inaccurate, although those living in poverty were not likely to receive 
                                                     
3 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 7 January 1969, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
4 Andrew Young, Interview by Walter Phillips, Transcript, 12 October 1978, p. 4, Walter Phillips Oral 
History Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
5 Lenora Berson, “The South Street Insurrection,” Philadelphia Magazine (November 1969):  176, Papers 




large payments.6  A Chamber spokesperson denied any attempt to deceive, calling it 
“unfortunate” if people had misunderstood federal regulations regarding how much 
money they would receive.7 
The April 1969 creation of the Citywide Coalition to Oppose the Crosstown 
Expressway (CWCOCE), made up of 28 civic, religious and civil rights groups including 
the American Friends Service Committee, the Philadelphia chapter of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, and the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, 
illustrated that many in Philadelphia – including those living outside the proposed 
expressway corridor – still considered the Crosstown to be a significant threat.  As was 
true of the CCPDCC, the CWCOCE included some predominantly African American 
groups; in addition to the local chapter of the SCLC, the Council of Black Clergy, the 
Tri-State NAACP (a regional office covering Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware), 
and the Citywide Black Community Council were members.8  There is a lack of 
evidence, however, to demonstrate that these groups participated actively in the anti-
Crosstown effort; it seems, rather, that their main contribution was to lend their names. 
                                                     
6 As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the Federal Highway Act of 1968 declared Congress’ intent “to insure 
that a few individuals do not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit 
of the public as a whole.”  In keeping with this policy, the Act authorized federal payments (separate from 
compensation paid for property seized via eminent domain) to reimburse people displaced by federal 
highway projects for expenses incurred in relocating.  In addition, the Act provided for payments to 
homeowners of up to $5,000 in the event the acquisition price of their home was not adequate for the 
purchase of a comparable home, and payments of up t $1,500 for non-owners who had occupied the 
dwelling from which they were displaced for at least 90 days, if such a payment was necessary to allow 
them to rent a similar dwelling.  Contrary to Lipscomb’s assertion, the Act did not contain a provision 
excluding welfare recipients from receiving either r location payments or replacement housing payments.  
Because welfare recipients were mainly renters of inexpensive houses and apartments, however, they were 
likely to receive payments much lower than those to homeowners and more affluent renters.  Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1968, Statutes at Large 82, sec. 30, 830-32 (1968).   
7 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 13 April 1969, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
8 Lawrence Geller, “25 Groups Blast Crosstown Xway,” Philadelphia Tribune, 26 April 1969, p. 1. 
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African American organizations’ seeming lack of interest in the Crosstown fight 
was in no way reflective of a weak civil rights movement in Philadelphia, which in fact 
had a vibrant movement, including a strong interest in Black Power, throughout the 
1960s.  From the end of World War II until the mid-1960s, the Philadelphia branch of the 
NAACP was the most important civil rights organization in the city, and Cecil B. Moore, 
elected its president in 1960, was Philadelphia’s most prominent African American 
activist, noted for his ability to mobilize the working class.  The NAACP focused much
of its attention on jobs and desegregation; its two main activities in the mid-1960s were a
campaign to get City Hall to enforce the antidiscrimination provisions in the city charter 
by refusing to deal with construction firms and unions that excluded black workers, and 
an effort to desegregate Girard College, a city-founded but privately-run boarding school 
for orphans located in North Philadelphia.  In the later years of the 1960s, the local 
NAACP lost membership and influence, in part because the national office electd to 
break up the branch into smaller neighborhood units.  Black Power organizations – such 
as the Black People’s Unity Movement, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 
and the Black Panthers – were extremely active in late 1960s Philadelphia, however.  
These groups aimed primarily to stop police brutality and establish community co trol 
over the police, organize the city’s black youths, and help African American 
neighborhoods gain more control over their public schools and introduce black studies 
courses into the curriculum.  As a result of their work on these causes, during what 
historian Matthew Countryman called an “explosion of civil rights protest in 
Philadelphia,” African American civil rights and Black Power activists may simply have 
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lacked the time and resources to devote much attention to the Crosstown Expressway 
battle, particularly when groups existed whose sole mission was to fight the ighway.9             
The fact that African American civil rights organizations did not engage fully in 
the Crosstown fight may help to explain why the CWCOCE’s day-to-day activities seem 
to have been dominated by whites.  CWCOCE activist R.W. Tucker, a Quaker who 
belonged to the Philadelphia Quarterly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, 
penned a memo on this topic that contained echoes of earlier accounts of CCPDCC 
meetings.  Of an early meeting of the CWCOCE, Tucker wrote, “It was an all-white 
gathering and some distress was expressed over this, though at least two black people 
were not there because of flu.”  But, noted Tucker, the racial homogeneity of the 
CWCOCE was not necessarily a problem, as the organization was not created “to rally
the South Street black community” – something the CCPDCC was already working on, 
albeit with limited success.  Rather, the Citywide Coalition, as its name suggsted, was 
intended to drum up support beyond the Crosstown corridor and obtain more 
“organizational support” for its cause.  Because the Coalition already had, according to 
Tucker, “very good contact with the existing black and other neighborhood groups,” the 
prevailing feeling was that the CWCOCE “should be white – that is, white and relatively 
influential organizations should be its affiliates.”10   
Tucker’s lack of concern over the CWCOCE’s racial homogeneity might be 
construed as a lack of sensitivity toward African Americans throughout the city who 
might have opposed the Crosstown Expressway.  His deep commitment to racial justi e, 
                                                     
9 Matthew J. Countryman, Up South:  Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 120-22, 136, 70, 208, 213-14, 228, 230-31, 282, 286-87.  
10 R.W. Tucker to Paul Turner, et al., undated, Papers of the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, 
Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
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however – as evidenced by his other writings – makes it more likely that he was making a 
pragmatic judgment that a white group would be most successful at influencing a 
business-government establishment that was also mostly white, rather than xpressing a 
paternalistic desire to exclude African Americans from the political process.  In any 
event, the CWCOCE appears to have remained overwhelmingly white, as minutes of a 
meeting in February 1970 reflected another all-white gathering.11 
Seymour Toll, president of the Citizens’ Council on City Planning, announced the 
creation of the CWCOCE, explaining that the groups that comprised it had “long admired 
the stand taken by the community groups living in the area through which this road will 
pass,” but that “other citizens groups concerned with the future development of the city 
as a whole must unite to express their concern with the direction events are taking.”12  
Activists had concrete reason for concern, as James Tate, the most powerful Crosstown 
Expressway opponent of all, backtracked again on what had appeared to be a final 
decision.  In March 1969, he had asked Managing Director Fred Corleto to meet with the 
Chamber of Commerce to hear the group’s views on the matter.  The ensuing discussions 
led to the creation on April 25 of the Crosstown Expressway Study Committee, known 
commonly as the Corleto Committee, which explored the possible reinstatement of 
expressway plans.13 
                                                     
11 Citywide Coalition to Oppose the Crosstown Expressway, Meeting minutes, 9 February 1970, Papers of 
the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
12 Seymour Toll, Statement, 23 April 1969, Papers of the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, 
Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 23 April 
1969, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University 
Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
13 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 26 May 1969, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
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The Chamber of Commerce was pleased that the Crosstown Expressway was 
once again a possibility.  Philadelphia’s large retailers, the department stores in 
particular, hoped that the expressway would eliminate competition from smaller stor s on 
South Street and make it easier for wealthy suburbanites to drive downtown to shop.  
Harry Reichner, the Chamber’s traffic and transportation expert, said, “If the major retail 
stores, such as Gimbels, Lit Brothers, Wanamakers and Strawbridge, have to depend 
solely on those shoppers who already live in town, they will be treading water.  They 
need the affluent customers who live in the suburbs.  And let’s be honest about it, these 
shoppers won’t come to town on mass transit no matter how we improve it.  They will 
only arrive by automobile and we have to do everything we can to make it easier for 
them.”14  The Greater Philadelphia Movement agreed wholeheartedly, passing the 
following resolution in May 1969:  “GPM endorses the urgent need for the construction 
of a Crosstown Expressway at once.  Time is of the essence!”15 
As soon as Corleto began his talks with the Chamber and even prior to the Corleto 
Committee’s formation, Crosstown opponents got nervous.  Some of the most visible 
discontent came from the African American clergy in and around the Crosstown corridor.  
On March 13, the Citywide Black Community Council and a group of clergy calling 
themselves Ministers of the Crosstown Expressway Area sponsored a protest meeting at 
Waters Memorial Church, an African Methodist Episcopal church near 10th and South 
Streets.  At the meeting, ministers discussed organizing 23 local churches into a protest 
                                                     
14 Lenora Berson, “The South Street Insurrection,” Philadelphia Magazine (November 1969):  89, Papers 
of the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
15 Greater Philadelphia Movement, Minutes of Executive Committee meeting, 14 May 1969, Papers of the 
Greater Philadelphia Movement, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
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organization.  If they were unable to stop the Crosstown by appealing to Mayor Tate, 
they said, they would take to the streets with protest demonstrations.16        
It appears that the ministers neither formed an active protest organizatio  nor 
sponsored street demonstrations.  However, Reverend E.G. Williams of Waters Memorial 
Church, who felt that the expressway was a means of moving African Americans farther 
away from affluent Society Hill, was named to the Corleto Committee, the composition 
of which was somewhat balanced between pro- and anti-expressway forces.17  On 
Williams’ side were CCPDCC leaders Alice Lipscomb and George Dukes, South treet 
barbershop owner Stanley Thomas, and University of Pennsylvania housing expert Louis 
Rosenberg.  Committee members John Bracken and Richard Herman from the Chamber 
of Commerce, state Secretary of Highways Robert Bartlett, state Secrtary of Community 
Affairs Joseph Barr, and Hannah Share, who represented some white business owners in 
the area, favored the project.  Despite the even split among regular committee members, 
Chairman Fred Corleto backed the expressway, giving the pro-highway group a 6-5 
advantage.18 
Anti-Crosstown Expressway activist Paul Turner felt that Corleto didn’t know 
much about the highway and was trying simply to stall the issue until Tate figur d out 
what to do, but added, “the truth is that no one knows what the Mayor wants, including 
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Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA; Lenora 
Berson, “The South Street Insurrection,” Philadelphia Magazine (November 1969):  178, 181, Papers of 




the Mayor, who I suspect simply doesn’t want to commit himself.”19  Lenora Berson 
wrote in Philadelphia Magazine that at first many considered the Corleto Committee “a 
kind of elongated public hearing,” at which “the opposition would be heard but they 
would not be allowed to interfere with any predetermined decisions.”  Such skepticism 
was soon tempered, however, when it became apparent that the committee was in fact 
“conducting a genuine in-depth review of a major public policy.”20 
As was portended by the emergence of the Citywide Coalition, protest against the 
expressway became more widespread in 1969, extending far beyond the expressway 
corridor.  As for South Street itself, the Evening Bulletin called it “a street of black rage 
and white despair, of rates and rotten housing, of gang warfare and hoodlum terrorism, of 
bad dreams and broken promises.”  From the birth of New York’s Harlem Renaissance in 
the 1920s until World War II, many had referred to South Street as “Philadelphia’s 
Harlem.”  Now, reported the Bulletin, African American residents of the area hoped to 
create a new “promenade of Negro culture” on South Street if the threat of the Crosstown 
Expressway could be removed once and for all.21  White liberals from Center City 
continued their activism, many of them opposing the Crosstown Expressway for reas ns 
of social justice but also because of the air pollution, parking problems, and street 
congestion they believed it would bring to their neighborhoods.  The Society Hill Civic 
Association voted 103-9 against the expressway, with chairman Stanhope Browne – the 
leader of the effort to have the Delaware Expressway lowered and covered in Society Hill 
                                                     
19 Paul Turner, “Turner Log,” Memo, 28 May 1969, Papers of the Housing Association of the Delaware 
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20 Lenora Berson, “The South Street Insurrection,” Philadelphia Magazine (November 1969):  181, Papers 
of the Housing Association of the Delaware Valley, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, 
Philadelphia, PA.  
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– calling the project “another instance of the oil, rubber, trucking and commercial 
interests – the highway lobby – banding together and encouraging the highway 
departments to do what they do best – lay down miles of concrete through communities 
that don’t need and [don’t] want the road.”22   
Whereas it was difficult to find vocal supporters of the Crosstown Expressway 
among the African American community, some Philadelphia whites did want the road.  
Hannah Share, Corleto Committee member and chair of a group called Citizens of the 
Crosstown Corridor, presented a statement to the Committee in which she claimed to 
represent 500 members, including residents, property owners, and businesses in or near 
the highway corridor, all of whom saw the Crosstown Expressway as the only solution to 
what they construed as the area’s decay.23  Lenora Berson’s Philadelphia Magazine 
article alleged that some realtors had promised whites who bought homes between South 
and Pine Streets “that their newly refurbished town houses would eventually be protected 
from the jungle to the south by a concrete stockade filled with a fast-flowing stream of 
cars and trucks.”  (As was explained above, anti-Crosstown Expressway leader Robert 
Sugarman reacted with horror at the notion of such “protection” when buying his home 
on Lombard Street.)  These residents were joined in support for the expressway by some 
white South Street business owners who Berson said were “intimidated by vicious roving 
gangs and insulted by the increasing hostility of their black clientele.”24  Land speculators 
also wanted the road badly, having bought up many crumbling properties along the route 
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for practically nothing in hopes of a windfall profit from state condemnation.  Despite the 
lack of unity among the city’s whites, participation in the anti-expressway movement by 
liberal groups such as Americans for Democratic Action, the Housing Association of the 
Delaware Valley, and the Citizens’ Council on City Planning made the Crosstown 
Expressway – in Berson’s words – “a kind of litmus test for liberalism.”25 
With anti-Crosstown sentiment spreading, it seemed as though Fred Corleto 
wanted expressway proponents, especially John Bracken, to know that getting the 
Crosstown Expressway built would be an uphill battle.  Corleto got this message across 
by keeping the Chamber of Commerce updated on citizen opposition to the Crosstown 
Expressway.  In April 1969, for example, he relayed to Bracken an account from Gordon 
Cavanaugh, the city’s Deputy Managing Director for Housing, of the aforemention d 
March 13 protest meeting at Waters Memorial Church.  The plan of which the ministers 
spoke at that meeting, Corleto told Bracken, “reflects the continued opposition of the 
residents and leaders in this area.  I am certain you are interested in being made aware of 
the local reaction to the reconsideration of the construction of the Crosstown 
Expressway.”26   
The city’s clergy continued to press for an end to Crosstown Expressway plans, as 
36 of them wrote jointly to Tate in May, admonishing him that it would be “grossly 
immoral” to proceed with the road because of the people it would displace and the racial 
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barrier it would create.27  The churches endorsing the letter were scattered throughout 
South Philadelphia; some resided within the Crosstown corridor itself, while otherslay 
farther to the south but may have drawn some of their congregants from the highway 
corridor.  Several different denominations were represented, including heavily black 
Baptist and African Methodist churches in addition to predominantly white Roman 
Catholic parishes.28  John Bracken pushed back against the clergy’s objections, writing to 
one of the signatories, Reverend James Hagan, to argue that the highway was crucial to 
Philadelphia’s economy, for “we must have trucks passing through the City to serve our 
Port, our City industrial facilities and our retail stores.”  Bracken also objected to Hagan’s 
charge that the Chamber was representing the interests of racists rather th n poor African 
Americans by pushing a project that would separate the latter from downtown.  
Disavowing any racist intent on the part of Crosstown backers, Bracken wrote, “I can 
state unequivocally that to my knowledge, nobody has ever pushed construction of the 
Crosstown as a racial barrier.”29 
In part because of the race issue, tensions often ran high during the Corleto 
Committee’s proceedings, as the expressway’s fate – in limbo for so many years – was an 
emotionally charged issue for city residents and government officials alike.  A local 
Black Power youth group known as the Young Afros appeared before the committee in 
July 1969.30  The group’s leader, James Lester, criticized the Committee for requiring his 
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organization to write a letter asking to come to the meeting, arguing that citizens should 
be allowed to present their opinions at any time of their choosing.  Lester also protested 
the location of the Committee’s meetings at City Hall, saying that they should be held in 
the areas affected directly by the proposed expressway.31   
In August, the Committee entertained statements from community leaders on both 
sides of the issue, including former city planner Robert Mitchell, who had urged Mayor 
Tate so passionately in 1967 to drop the expressway.  At the Committee’s September 
meeting, however, it was revealed that the transcript of the previous meeting was 
incomplete, leaving out a substantial part of Mitchell’s remarks.  The omission led to a 
heated argument – during which Bracken fueled the fire by calling Crosstown opponent 
George Dukes a “boy” – including accusations that pro-highway members of the 
Committee had altered the transcript deliberately.  “Obviously it was a blat nt example of 
how uptight Highway Department and Chamber people were put by the Mitchell 
presentation,” remarked anti-expressway activist Paul Turner.32  Whether the omission 
was intentional was unclear, but soon after, Corleto asked Mitchell for a written copy of 
his remarks, claiming that the tape from the August meeting could not be transcribed 
fully.33  The entire incident revealed the extent to which nerves had become frayed as 
distrust grew between pro- and anti-highway forces.      
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Nerves were frayed further on December 30, 1969, when the Evening Bulletin 
published a picture of new directional signs being placed on an unopened section of the 
Delaware Expressway in Center City.  To the horror and astonishment of many, one of 
the signs said “To I-695/Crosstown Expressway.”  When asked about the sign, a baffled 
Corleto sputtered, “That’s wrong.  That could start a controversy.  That could mean . . . I 
don’t know what that means, I’m confused.”  Wes Simmet, an engineer with the state 
highway department, explained that “as far as the highway department’s concerned, some 
day there will be a Crosstown and we can just cover up the sign until then.”  He added 
that putting up the sign now made sense from an engineering perspective – the beam on 
which the sign hung needed to be strong enough to support four signs, and it would cost 
the state money to use a lighter beam and then replace it later.  The Bulletin reporter 
failed to call Simmet on his nonsensical explanation and ask him why the state did not 
use a heavier beam but omit the Crosstown sign for the time being.34  Just two days later, 
however, heart rates in Philadelphia returned to normal when the state took the sign away 
and explained that it had been a mistake.  Paul Thomas, a district engineer for the state 
highway department, emphasized that the sign “should not be construed as an attempt by 
the State Highways Department to influence the Mayor’s Crosstown Committee, City 
officials or the public.”35 
State officials’ claims of innocence rang hollow, for it remained clear that the 
State Highway Department was very much in favor of building the Crosstown 
Expressway.  Just a few weeks before the flap over the highway sign, state officials had 
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agreed to the Corleto Committee’s suggestion of another study of the need for the 
expressway so that “local community opposition can be reduced or eliminated.”  The 
language of this statement conflicted with an earlier pronouncement by state Secretary of 
Highways Robert Bartlett that any study made would not take the expressway’s 
construction for granted.36  By admitting that the new study was aimed at overcoming 
community opposition, the state sent a strong signal that the study would be less than 
fully objective.  In the meantime, residents of the area were frustrated by the fact that the 
continuing threat of highway construction was holding up badly needed redevelopment.  
As an official with the Department of Housing and Urban Development told the City 
Planning Commission in 1969, the federal government could not authorize federal 
renewal funds for the South Central or Grays Ferry areas until it was clear wh ther or not 
the expressway would be built through those neighborhoods.37 
The pressure on Philadelphia to come up with a decision one way or the other on 
the Crosstown Expressway increased in early 1970 when HUD warned that if no definite 
expressway route had been chosen by September 1, the entire South Central area of the 
city would lose federal renewal funds.38  Meanwhile, the fate of the expressway hung in 
limbo, as the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, or PennDOT (which had just 
replaced the Pennsylvania Department of Highways) had not yet signed a contract f r a 
new Crosstown Expressway study, and the Corleto Committee was unwilling to make a 
final decision without one.  The Inquirer cited the huge number of studies that had 
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already been made on the proposed expressway throughout the 1960s and lamented, “the 
thing isn’t one bit closer to a construction start than it was in 1960.”39  One reason for the 
delay in beginning the newest study, to be performed by Alan M. Voorhees & Associate  
for $450,000, was that Robert Bartlett, supported by Mayor Tate, was trying to secure
federal support for the study.  The Federal Highway Administration declined to 
participate, as administrator F.C. Turner explained to Tate, because of the persistent local 
opposition to further studies, which many citizens perceived as delaying progress n 
other development projects.  “In such an atmosphere,” said Turner, “the Federal presence 
too often is a complicating factor.”40  Bartlett tried to get the FHWA to reconsider its 
decision, telling division engineer George Fenton that the residents of the Crosstown area 
supported the survey, which drew an angry rebuke from George Dukes of the CCPDCC, 
who was “shocked” that Bartlett would “willfully persist in misstating” his group’s 
position.41 
The CWCOCE continued in 1970 to plot ways to bring about the expressway’s 
demise so that renewal funds could be used to rehabilitate the area.  Things were etting 
desperate.  In July, two Inquirer reporters walked through the South Street/Bainbridge 
Street corridor to get a first-hand look at conditions and speak to the residents.  What they 
found was grim.  The area, they wrote, was “seedy and dilapidated,” with most of the 
houses “in bad condition and occupied by transients and the very poor.”  “The stores are 
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uninviting.  Razed buildings give the blocks the appearance of dentures with missing 
teeth.”  One demoralized merchant told the reporters, “We’ve been here 40 years.  It was 
a wonderful old neighborhood.  Now the old customers have moved.”  Some small 
pockets – such as the area between 4th and 8th Streets – were improving a bit, with cheap 
rents attracting younger business owners hoping to spur a revival, something one of the 
older merchants called “a false hope.”  From 8th to 19th Streets was virtually devoid of 
commerce but for a small amount of activity around Broad Street.  Yet another merchant 
summed up the problem caused by uncertainty over the Crosstown Expressway:  “We 
don’t know where we stand.” 42 
As activists tried to put an end to the uncertainty plaguing the prospective 
highway corridor, one area of concern was tension between the CWCOCE and the 
CCPDCC.  George Dukes said he was worried that the CWCOCE would undermine his 
group and that he did not want the other group to assume a leading role in the expressway 
fight.  It seemed to some in the CWCOCE that Dukes was worried about his own 
leadership being threatened “and is not as worried about not having the Crosstown built 
as he is about his position.”  To soothe tensions, some members of the CWCOCE 
suggested that the group change its name to the Citywide Coalition to Support the 
Citizens Committee to Preserve and Develop the Crosstown Community, but the 
unwieldy name was never adopted.43  The CCPDCC, perhaps wanting to avoid blurring 
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the lines between itself and the CWCOCE, reorganized itself to exclude any groups not 
located in the expressway corridor.44 
CWCOCE members discussed several strategies for squelching a revival of the 
expressway, including protesting the Corleto Committee meetings to try to get them 
opened to the public, holding a fundraising benefit, having spokespersons appear on talk 
shows to debate expressway advocates, publishing pamphlets, and trying to find 
businesses opposed to the Crosstown Expressway in order to undermine John Bracken’s 
contention that the business community was united behind the project.45  While most 
established business leaders were in favor of the expressway, the next generation had its 
doubts.  In September 1970, the city’s Junior Chamber of Commerce – an organization 
for young professionals focused on developing leadership skills through service – 
released a position paper asserting that the Crosstown would exacerbate traffic problems; 
make truck deliveries to downtown more difficult by increasing the number of cars in the
city; and be seen “as a means of making Center City an enclave for the white and well-to-
do.”46   The Junior Chamber’s statement conformed nicely to the CWCOCE’s most 
important message:  that “the need for the highway has never been demonstrated, that it 
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would not solve Philadelphia’s traffic problems but would instead worsen them, and that 
it would create a human disaster which Philadelphia cannot afford.”47 
Quaker and CWCOCE member R.W. Tucker agreed that construction of the 
highway would be nothing short of a disaster that was to be avoided all costs.  His 
antipathy toward the project was strong enough to cause him to propose measures of 
which he admitted his fellow Quakers would not approve.  The black community in the 
Crosstown area, he felt, was “increasingly embittered and radicalized” and saw the 
expressway “as the other half of a white man’s pincers movement whose purpose is to g t 
rid of what is possibly the oldest and most stable urban black community in America.”  
Building the expressway could lead only to either an immediate “urban insurrection” or 
“apathy and despair,” which would ultimately foment violence as well.  The threat of 
violence could be used to discourage those interested in the highway, Tucker advised.  A 
potential contractor could be visited and told that “the people in the area just will not 
tolerate this road being built,” which would have the effect of getting some to drop out of 
the bidding and others to raise their cost estimates.  Tucker went further, however, 
discussing the possibility of carrying out “a-violent” activities, which he defined as 
“violence against property used for evil ends, but carefully not against people.”  Such 
activities could include anything from “mass pilferage of construction materials” to 
“dynamiting bulldozers,” methods that Tucker found unobjectionable in situations where 
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the democratic process had broken down and “a-violent” activities constituted the only 
alternatives to violence against people.48 
Fortunately, events soon obviated the need for either violent or “a-violent” 
protest.  In August, PennDOT signed a contract with the Voorhees firm for the Crosstown 
Expressway study, although the late date meant that the city would fail to meet the 
September 1 deadline for HUD funding.49  In November, his study complete, Alan 
Voorhees dropped this bombshell on the Corleto Committee and PennDOT:  “A 
Crosstown Expressway should not be built.”  The highway, he explained, “would not be a 
worthwhile investment” compared to other possible transportation projects because it 
would not be “a cost-effective means of serving the purpose for which it was originally 
intended.”  The Crosstown Expressway would be “poorly located,” Voorhees felt, and 
would fail to “attract a large volume of through traffic,” making it inadequate for regional 
traffic demands.  Instead, Voorhees recommended an elevated spur connecting Grays 
Ferry Avenue with the Schuylkill Expressway and other improvements to both roads in 
addition to Washington Avenue, all of which he believed would provide more cost-
effective transportation benefits than would the Crosstown Expressway.50  Voorhees’ 
conclusion that the proposed expressway would not attract enough through traffic 
represented a radical departure from the 1950s, when transportation consultant Michael 
Rapuano listed as a selling point for the Schuylkill Expressway the fact that 85% of its 
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traffic would be bound for the city.  By 1970, planners and engineers had attained a 
greater awareness of the ways in which highways generated their own dema d and often 
increased, rather than alleviated, traffic congestion – an understanding Voorhees’ report 
reflected.    
Immediately upon getting the Voorhees report, the Corleto Committee voted 10-1 
on December 1, 1970 to kill the Crosstown Expressway, leading the Evening Bulletin to 
proclaim:  “The Crosstown Expressway is dead.”51  Voorhees admitted that he was 
“probably the first transportation consultant ever to recommend that a highway not be 
built,” which was made all the more surprising by the revelation that had he made a 
positive recommendation on the Crosstown, the city would have hired him for more work 
at possibly double his original contract.  For Voorhees, the Bulletin noted, honesty was 
perhaps the best policy, but was nevertheless a “costly policy.”52  Although the main 
thrust of the Voorhees report was that the Crosstown Expressway would increase 
congestion by funneling traffic into Center City rather than serving through traffic, 
citizen opposition had clearly played a role in the expressway’s demise as well.  
Somewhat puzzlingly – given that despite the involvement of African American leaders, 
the low-income residents of the Crosstown corridor seemed not to have participated 
actively in the anti-expressway campaign – the Bulletin offered this epitaph:  “It was the 
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campaign waged against it by poor, black residents of the Crosstown community that 
really brought the highway down.”53 
The Inquirer emphasized, without specifying as to race, that its interviews with 
those involved “point up clearly that it was local citizen protest, more than anything else, 
that delayed construction of the Crosstown Expressway long enough for it finally to be 
killed.”  The events surrounding the Crosstown presaged a new kind of transportation 
politics, which gave rise to mixed feelings:  “Some are not happy about it, arguing that 
neighborhood groups almost always take a narrow view and refuse to consider the 
regional necessities.  Others say it is immensely useful, contending that neighborhood 
preservation is at the heart of our cities.”  Harry Reichner of the Chamber of Commerce 
summed up the situation by claiming, “The pendulum has swung from ‘The highway 
department can do no wrong’ to ‘The citizens groups are always right.’”54  
The Voorhees study focused mainly on the traffic and economic aspects of the 
Crosstown Expressway while making some reference to “the extensive and adverse non-
transportation impacts which would be imposed on the community.”55  But soon after, 
Voorhees told the Corleto Committee that the impact on neighborhood residents was 
uppermost in his mind when he decided to reject the Crosstown Expressway.  The 
highway, he estimated, would have displaced 2,050 households containing 5,360 people.  
Most of those displaced would have been African American, and Voorhees believed that 
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an influx of black refugees into neighborhoods populated by whites, such as nearby 
Grays Ferry, would have exacerbated existing racial tensions in the area.56  Undoubtedly, 
the specter of racial violence following riots in Philadelphia and other cities – which 
Crosstown opponents had raised in convincing City Hall to drop the project in 1968 – 
informed Voorhees’ analysis as well. 
In the wake of the expressway’s 1970 defeat, public attention turned to what 
would become of the Crosstown corridor.  The Philadelphia Tribune lamented that 
“South Street has suffered tremendously over a long period of time because of the 
indecision . . . Many businesses pulled up their stakes and located elsewhere . . . Many of 
the buildings along the street from 6th and South to the River are in shambles.”57  
Crosstown Expressway booster Bernard Meltzer, now chairman of the City Planning 
Commission, said in a newspaper editorial that the area would either remain “a slum” or 
be turned into an asset by private development.  The construction of public, low-income 
housing in the area would be the worst thing that could happen, he felt.  This type of 
development would prevent the southward expansion of the Center City residential 
district, resulting in more affluent whites fleeing to the suburbs and the further decline of 
the city.  The Crosstown corridor had several things going for it, including its location 
within walking distance from Center City and its status as one of the few areas into which 
Center City – bordered by rivers on the east and west – could expand.  Allowing market 
forces to operate, said Meltzer, would produce the best results in terms of increasing the 
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city’s real estate and wage tax bases.58  After being let down by the city’s failure to build 
the Crosstown Expressway, however, Meltzer did not have high hopes for the area’s 
progress, believing that it would be allowed to decline even further.59 
Although no one knew it then, Meltzer’s December 1970 editorial was an omen of 
the next great battle in the war over the Crosstown Expressway.  It appeared – for at least 
the second time – that the Crosstown Expressway was gone for good, but Meltzer was 
working on a plan to revive it yet again.  In January 1972, Philadelphia’s new Democratic 
mayor Frank Rizzo – the police commissioner whose tough tactics against Afr can 
American protestors helped to spark the city’s Black Power movement amid claims of 
police brutality – took office after being elected to replace Tate, who had been elected to 
the maximum two consecutive terms.  In March, Rizzo began publicly to discuss the plan 
known as Southbridge.  Described by some as a “city within a city,” Southbridge was to 
include two uncovered four-lane highways – one running west along Bainbridge Street 
and the other running east along South Street.  In the space between the two highways 
would be constructed a massive new commercial and residential development, with 
houses and apartments for 10,000 people of various income levels plus offices and 
commercial buildings expected to create 20,000 new jobs.  Although city officials 
believed that Southbridge would displace 2,000 low-income residents, this was to be 
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more than offset by the 3,600 low-income people the new housing would accommodate.  
In addition to the residential and commercial buildings, Southbridge would be home to a 
park, a middle school, and 13,000 new parking spaces.60 
Even before the city revealed the Southbridge plan formally on April 22, the new 
mayor knew the plan would be highly controversial.61  Rizzo proclaimed that if the 
community rejected the new plan, he would comply with its wishes, but said he believed 
the response would be favorable.62  One strong early objection came not from the 
community but from EPA regional administrator Edward Furia, who expressed “grave 
doubts” about running a huge number of cars through a densely populated area in a city 
with already dangerously high air pollution levels.63  Meltzer took no heed, however, and 
continued to press for Southbridge.  Claiming that he didn’t care “one way or the other” 
about the highway, Meltzer asserted that the highway was only a means to get federal 
funds to help with the rest of the development:  “To get the benefits, I need the highway.  
So I’m for the highway.”  On the subject of community opposition, Meltzer offered that 
the poor African Americans living in the Southbridge corridor would be in favor of the 
plan.  Opposition, he believed, came mainly from white liberals “who patronizingly 
speak for the black community.”64 
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Meltzer’s charge raised some hackles.  One Philadelphia architect urged Mayor 
Rizzo to disregard it, stating, “As a white member of the community, the Crosstown 
simply does not make sense!”65  The characterization of white liberals as speaking for 
black citizens may have had some basis in reality given corridor residents’ s eming lack 
of involvement with both of the major anti-Crosstown Expressway groups.  In any event, 
George Dukes, Alice Lipscomb and the rest of the CCPDCC continued to fight on behalf 
of black residents of the Southbridge corridor.  In early April, after a meeting with 
Meltzer, Lipscomb told Rizzo she was upset by the fact that Meltzer’s plan “is simply to 
move Negroes because he thinks the land will be valuable to developers.”  Although the 
community had come up with its own renewal plans for the neighborhood, the Planning 
Commission had taken no action upon them.  “Why is it,” Lipscomb asked the mayor, 
“that we cannot go ahead with the community’s plans?  Why do we have to always be 
moving poor and black people?”66 
When the city announced the Southbridge plan formally later that month, more 
citizen opposition poured forth.  The very next day, 15 civic groups held a protest rally at 
the Theater of the Living Arts on South Street between 3rd and 4th Streets.  As one of the 
protestors put it, “We are not just fighting against the expressway.  We are fighting for a 
community.”  Rizzo held quite a different view of the community, saying in an interv ew 
that South Street was “frightening – empty stores, the horrible condition of the buildings.  
They should be torn down.  I don’t think it’ll ever be rejuvenated.”67  Some merchants – 
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particularly those who had been in the area for some time and had watched the 
neighborhood deteriorate – agreed strongly with Rizzo.  According to an informal survey
by the Evening Bulletin, however, residents of the corridor opposed Southbridge 
“overwhelmingly,” as did some merchants who had come to the area more recently in 
hopes of taking part in its redevelopment.68 
Samuel Bortnick, a longstanding South Street merchant, sent a letter to all of the 
major Philadelphia newspapers revealing that he had long been opposed to the Crosstown 
Expressway but had finally changed his mind.  Unlike Alice Lipscomb, who blamed city 
government and the Planning Commission for the lack of progress in the area, Bortnick 
put his blame squarely on the neighborhood groups themselves.  “I had hoped that 
perhaps the concerned groups would really be able to accomplish something concrete,” 
he wrote, “but, unfortunately, the many vocal, militant and bleeding heart organizatio s 
have done NOTHING in the last five years but talk.  I do not believe that the new hippy 
businesses and communes will be able to do anything to either improve the area or better 
living conditions for the local residents.”  Bortnick reserved his final shot for the “Center 
City intellectuals” who had done “nothing for 20 years.”69  
Samuel Bortnick did not speak for all South Street merchants, as was made clear 
by Barney and Tobias Weinstein, the co-chairmen of the Established Merchants of South 
Street, who opposed the Southbridge plan vehemently.  Blaming the area’s deterioration 
on the constant threat of destruction that had loomed for decades, the Weinsteins made an 
impassioned plea for the restoration of South Street’s former grandeur, writing to Rizzo: 
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We have been here a long time.  This street is more than 
just a street to us.  There is a heart and a soul and a song 
here.  This street is our life as well as our livelihood.  Ask 
yourself, or a relative of yours who is “39 plus” about 
South Street, and there will appear a glint in his eye of fond 
memories and a hustle and bustle of business activity that 
many shopping centers of today would envy. . . . We say it 
is time to stop holding up progress.  We are for progress, 
but progress does not mean highways only.  Personally, 
most of the merchants would be proud to enlarge and 
continue to make South Street “The Street For All The 
People.”70 
      
The largest forum for the expression of public opinion on Southbridge was a 
public hearing the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission held at the 
Philadelphia Civic Center on April 26, 1972, just a few days after the formal unveiling of 
the plan.71  The hearing was drawn-out, contentious, and occasionally raucous.  It began 
in the early afternoon, recessed briefly for dinner, and continued into the early hours of 
the following morning as speaker after speaker took the podium to rail against the 
project.  So many people wished to speak that attendees wishing to stay for the whole 
hearing were required to move their cars before the Civic Center garage closed at 
midnight.72  A wounded Meltzer, reminding his audience that “there was a time when if 
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you said you were chairman of the Philadelphia Planning Commission people would bow 
down to you,” was met with derisive laughter from the assembly.73 
Meltzer’s primary goal at the hearing was to disabuse his audience of the notion 
that they were there “this afternoon and tonight to discuss a highway known as the 
Crosstown.”  The Crosstown, he stressed repeatedly, “is dead.”  Southbridge, on the other 
hand, while containing a highway, was really an “urban plan . . . for housing; for parking; 
for mass transit; revitalization of a commercial area; it is a highway plan; it is a plan for 
open green spaces; it is a plan to provide employment for the area; it is a plan to provide 
significant, new municipal revenues . . . it is not a highway plan.”  In trying to explain his 
curious statement that Southbridge was “a highway plan” and “not a highway plan” at the 
same time, Meltzer admitted that “as a highway plan, the Crosstown stinks,” and 
reiterated that he wanted to keep the highway only to obtain federal funding for the 
project “so that Philadelphia doesn’t pay hundreds of millions of dollars for this plan.” 
Although some – including representatives of the Philadelphia Department of 
Streets, the Citywide Coalition for a Crosstown Expressway (not to be confused with the 
Citywide Coalition to Oppose the Crosstown Expressway), and Citizens of the Crosstown 
Corridor – spoke in favor of Meltzer’s plan, a large majority of speakers opposed it.  Ira 
Brind, chairman of the CWCOCE, expressed skepticism about the legality of Meltzer’s 
plan, saying the only “imaginative” thing about it was that “he wants to use the Hig way 
Trust Funds to build houses instead of highways.”  To applause, Brind said that Meltzer 
“ought to go to Congress, go to the President, and get them to change the rules and 
regulations of the Highway Trust Funds so that they can use that money for housing, and 
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let’s not build any more highways, and let us not have to attach housing projects and 
high-rise buildings to Highway Trust Funds.  It just isn’t going to work.”  EPA 
administrator Edward Furia came to the hearing to reiterate his prior concern:  “To my 
knowledge, from an environmental standpoint, there is no way to design the so-called 
‘Southbridge’ highway, housing project, whatever project, such that it will not have a 
devastating environmental effect.”  Countering Meltzer’s claim that more study was 
needed, Furia asserted, “there is no technology available at this time” to remove air 
pollution from a highway. 
Other speakers focused their remarks on the residents the Southbridge project 
would displace.  Stephen Lockwood – whom the Corleto Committee had placed in charge 
of finding a consultant and who had recommended the Alan Voorhees firm – unleashed a 
blizzard of statistics to illustrate the dire situation in which these people would be placed.  
The Southbridge area was 85% black, more than 60% of residents were over 50 years 
old, 85% did not own their dwelling, and 60% were on public assistance or a fixed 
income.  Most of the households, Lockwood asserted, could not afford more than $50-60 
per month in rent.  In short, he said, the situation would not be like “the relocation 
caseloads that exist in other parts of Philadelphia.  The people are older, black, single, 
poor, living alone in rented quarters on fixed incomes.”   
Shirley Dennis, the managing director of the Housing Association of the 
Delaware Valley, took a more emotional approach.  Her incredulity that “in 1972, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania should be embroiled in a debate over whether or not to 
continue the practice of ‘Negro removal’ in the guise of urban renewal” met with 
applause.  “This city has historically and relentlessly moved its Black population out of 
284 
 
the way for institutions, highways, society hills, shopping centers, police stations, and 
playgrounds,” she railed.  Alleging that African Americans were dislocated constantly 
while white Philadelphia residents were bought out on generous terms “to move to the 
shelter and protection of the suburbs,” Dennis called for an end to “this racism and 
exploitation of the people.”  Another Housing Association executive presented the 
statement of chairman (and future Philadelphia mayor) Wilson Goode, which asserted, 
“What will be built will be determined by what is most profitable for developers, not by 
the paper idea before us.” 
Leaders of the anti-Crosstown Expressway citizens’ organizations had their say as 
well.  CCPDCC leaders Alice Lipscomb and George Dukes played on similar themes.  
Lipscomb assailed the Planning Commission, claiming that “Every time they have an 
idea to build something, the first thing they have to do is say, ‘You have to get all the 
colored people out of the community.’”  Dukes compared Southbridge to Manifest 
Destiny and Indian removal.  What Meltzer really wanted, he said, was “to start moving 
black folks,” along with poor whites, out of the area.  Reverend George McMillan, 
president of the Forgotten Community Association, spoke in even harsher terms, alleging 
that Southbridge would lead to “more overcrowd conditions, more gangs, and more 
crime,” creating “one of the greatest disasters in the history of Philadelphia.”  The plan 
would divide the community, he said, and cause “more racial unrest than this city has 
ever seen.”  The reverend concluded with this parting shot:  “A Southbridge in South 
Philadelphia?  God forbid.”74 
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After the public hearing, some tried to counter the (accurate) perception that most 
of those at the hearing had opposed the Southbridge plan.  Mayor Rizzo, Democratic 
governor Milton Shapp, and Chairman Meltzer received letters claiming that 
gubernatorial representative John Blum had at the hearing “acted as chief prosecutor and 
judge” and “humiliated” those favoring the project; that most at the hearing supported 
Southbridge but were drowned out by a minority that “heckled to a point far past 
rudeness”; that Southbridge opponents were “super-liberals,” “unwashed hippies,” 
“pseudo-intellectuals,” and “rabble rousers . . . who incite hatred of ‘whitey’ and the 
police”; that opponents of the plan were seeking financial gain for themselves; and that 
the hearing had been dominated by “dirty barefooted hippies, who were doing all the 
shouting and carrying on.”75 
Despite the assertions of some proponents, the handwriting was on the wall for 
Southbridge.  It was clear to most that a new day had dawned in Philadelphia’s culture of 
city planning.  The Evening Bulletin’s editorial page summed up how things had 
changed, referring to the prestige of the City Planning Commission – exemplifi d by 
Edmund Bacon’s 1964 appearance on the cover of Time– as from “another age . . . The 
Age of Innocence”: 
It was a time when most people thought slum clearance was 
wonderful and never thought of what happened to the 
people who had lived in the slums.  It was a time before we 
worried about pollution and noise.  It was a time when 
those who made fortunes in redevelopment were honored 
as leading citizens.  It was a time when people believed 
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what city officials told them. . . . Promises are not believed 
any more.  The Planning Commissions of the fifties and 
sixties simply don’t look as good today as they did in their 
own time.  We have learned a lot in recent years.  We have 
learned that sometimes when city officials say they are 
going to do something for us . . . it turns out they do 
something to us.76 
 
The paper’s reference to 1964 – the year in which Lyndon Johnson announced his War 
on Poverty and Philadelphia suffered a race riot born of segregation and poverty – as a 
time when most people “never thought of what happened to the people who had lived in 
the slums” was a bit myopic.  But by 1972 it was difficult for anyone to ignore the 
distrust of government bureaucrats and so-called experts that had been building since the 
early 1960s. 
The Crosstown Expressway was in its final death throes, but the end was drawn 
out, in keeping with the expressway’s tortured history.  In May, those opposed to the 
expressway continued a public-relations blitz.  Business owners in the eastern part of 
South Street, between 3rd and 6th Streets, attempted to show Meltzer and the DVRPC that 
a vibrant community still existed there, holding an evening festival where businesses 
remained open, pushcart vendors sold food, stands sold craftwork, and bands played live 
music until midnight.77  George Dukes took to the airwaves on radio station WCAU, 
assailing planners for “acting as if they have just discovered an uninhabited area between 
South and Bainbridge Streets that can only be developed by their urban Disneyland plan.”  
Meltzer, he claimed, “proposes to use unavailable highway money to build an 
unnecessary road – in order to clear land to build housing too expensive for the people 
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who need it, parking for enough cars to asphyxiate Center City, and offices that . . . c n 
never be filled.”  Taking aim at those who sought to justify Southbridge by calling the 
surrounding neighborhoods “blighted,” or “slums,” Dukes argued that South Street would 
no longer be a “decaying community” once the Planning Commission stopped driving 
businesses and people away and allowed the community to rehabilitate itself with federal
money.78  While Dukes and Lipscomb gave Frank Rizzo a petition with 2,000 signatures 
opposing the highway, the mayor continued to resist, even floating the idea of a citywide 
referendum on the question.79   
At the same time, Governor Shapp urged the DVRPC to drop the Crosstown from 
its regional plans in accordance with the wishes of most of those at the public hearing.  
Shapp’s aide John Blum told the DVRPC that the Southbridge plan was simply not 
feasible because it called for $50 million in Highway Trust Fund money to be used for 
non-highway purposes – a plan the federal government would reject.  The state, he sid
had “no responsible choice other than to act now upon this long delayed issue, and no 
technical or other justification for any course other than to delete the Crosstown.”  
Moreover, he reminded the DVRPC, the Voorhees study had already proven the 
expressway to be unfeasible, and to refuse to accept this conclusion would only hurt “a 
community which has already suffered too much, partly as a result of our delay.”80  The 
governor sent his own letter to the DVRPC the same day, stressing that “a great majority” 
of those at the public hearing had expressed “intensive and substantial” resistanc to the 
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expressway, and that those who lived in the area wanted rehabilitation, not relocation.  
Governor Shapp also reminded the DVRPC of the EPA’s serious concerns about the air 
pollution the expressway would create.81  
The concern Shapp and his aide expressed over the feasibility of Southbridge was 
more than justified.  Correspondence amongst federal officials from April 1972 made
clear that they viewed Meltzer’s plan with extreme skepticism, particularly with respect 
to his desire to use highway money for things other than highways.  Federal officiaDick 
Griffin told Undersecretary of Transportation James Beggs, “The problem lies in 
Philadelphia’s proposal that Federal Highway funds be used to purchase a 100 yard wide 
median strip – which in turn would be given to the city for urban redevelopment 
purposes.  This is apparently illegal within the context of existing statutes.”  Other federal 
highway officials agreed that no special funds for Southbridge were available under 
existing laws and that for this reason the Department of Transportation “should be 
essentially negative in its informal reactions to the latest Expressway plan.”82  As 
mentioned earlier, it was not only transportation officials who were unimpressed with 
Southbridge.  Edward Furia of the EPA continued his criticism, visiting the GPM board
of directors to tell them that the DVRPC was focusing too much on highways rather than 
mass transit and that his agency intended “to take a hard line” on the matter.83 
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When the DVRPC voted 11-7 to retain the Crosstown on its plans, Rizzo called it 
a “victory for the people,” while Shapp slammed the decision as leaving a “dark cloud”
over the area and claimed that it might delay the completion of I-95 because the state 
would not know whether to build a Crosstown interchange or not.84  The DVRPC’s 
refusal to delete the Crosstown appeared to be political.  Upset with the Pennsylvania 
state government’s alleged domination of the DVRPC, some members from the suburban 
counties rallied behind Philadelphia in its efforts to prevent Shapp from killing the 
project.85  The Crosstown Expressway’s continued presence on the regional 
transportation plan prevented federal funds from being available for urban renewal, while 
at the same time, Shapp’s opposition meant that Southbridge would not go forward.  This 
situation, as radio/TV news station KYW noted, threatened the Crosstown area with 
“years of stalemate.”  Renewal without the highway would be preferable, opined the 
station, but above all else a compromise had to be reached to keep the area from sinking 
still further into physical decline.86 
Incredibly, the stalemate dragged on for more than another year until Rizzo broke 
it, making good at last on his promise that he would respect the wishes of the community.  
More community meetings convinced the mayor that those who lived and worked in the 
area did not, by and large, want the Southbridge project.  As a result, Rizzo asked the 
DVRPC in October 1973 to delete the project from its regional plan.87  “This action,” 
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said the mayor, “will ease the minds of residents, erase the cloud of uncertainty th t has 
been hanging over this South Philadelphia community for more than 20 years, and allow 
major improvements and new development to begin immediately.”88  It took two months 
from Rizzo’s announcement, but on December 20, 1973, the DVRPC removed the 
Crosstown Expressway from its 1985 Regional Plan.89  The idea of building a southern 
leg to enclose Center City in a loop of expressways, conceived more than a quarter of  
century earlier, was put to rest, once and for all.  Philadelphia had experienced a full-
fledged expressway revolt, and though the battlefield sustained heavy damage, the rebels 
had emerged victorious. 
Philadelphia’s downtown business community was stung by its defeat.  Stewart 
Rausch – the chairman-elect of the Chamber of Commerce as well as one of the leaders, 
in his role with OPDC, of the campaign to have the Delaware Expressway lowered and 
covered in Society Hill – gave a press conference in mid-1973 to express his displeasure.  
He railed against “the apparent unwillingness of public official[s] to mesh the needs of 
the region with those of small pressure groups whose personal interests are advers ly 
affected by regional transportation plans.”  Predicting that the omission of the Crosstown 
Expressway would hurt Philadelphia’s economy, Rausch said that companies who had 
invested in the area would engage in “rethinking” about investing further, and that other 
companies who might have brought new jobs to the city might change their plans.90 
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The battle over the Crosstown Expressway – including the three separate times 
community opposition defeated the project – was by far the high point of the 
democratization of transportation politics in postwar Philadelphia.  The fight not only 
spanned two eras, but played a major role in driving the shift from one to the next.  When 
planners and engineers first conceived the Crosstown, they thought almost entirely in 
terms of moving automobile traffic, giving little if any thought to the way the expressway 
would affect the human beings in its path.  Seeing an area that appeared to be in physical
decline – like much of urban America after World War II – the planners thought not of 
neighborhood redevelopment, but of an expressway that would provide transportation 
benefits and clear what they viewed as slums at the same time.  Crucial to the 
expressway’s fate, however, was its place third in line behind two larger expressway 
projects – the Schuylkill and the Delaware.  Because of the Crosstown’s lower priority, 
the city had trouble arranging the necessary funding to move the project forward 
expeditiously.  While the expressway hung in limbo, the culture and politics surrounding 
highway planning changed dramatically due to developments on the national level, but 
also to residents’ dissatisfaction with the recently-completed Schuylkill Expressway and 
the ongoing planning and construction of the Delaware Expressway, itself plagued by 
controversy. 
By the time planners were ready to put the Crosstown Expressway into motion in 
the mid-1960s, they faced a world far different from the relatively serene, insulated 
atmosphere of urban planning in the 1940s and 1950s.  The emergence of protest 
movements challenging top-down authority and hierarchy in all areas of American life, 
the struggle for racial justice, and emerging concerns about harm to the environment 
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meant that highway planning would never be the same again.  Citizens’ groups formed 
quickly, determined not merely to influence the route selection or design, but, for the firs  
time, to wipe the proposed highway off the map.   
Despite the involvement of prominent African American leaders, the anti-
expressway activists seemed not to have achieved large-scale success at mobilizing the 
poor and working-class African Americans making up the majority of the Crosstown 
corridor’s population.  In fact, internal memos and meeting minutes from both major 
advocacy groups – one based in the Crosstown corridor and one citywide – revealed 
activists’ frustration with the lack of diversity among the participants.  Moreover, these 
groups had to deal with opposition from within the white community – from the Chamber 
of Commerce and business owners who saw the expressway as a tool of downtown 
renewal and the solution to physical deterioration; from land speculators hoping to profit 
from condemnation; and from government officials at the city and state levelswho 
remained convinced of the Crosstown Expressway’s transportation benefits.  Despite 
these obstacles, the anti-expressway activists took advantage of the 1960s’ burgeoning 
culture of resistance to authority to convince officials that the Crosstown Expressway 
would be a disaster for the community and its residents, who wanted desperately to 
renew, rather than abandon, their crumbling neighborhoods.  Although renewal would be 
an uphill battle, Philadelphia had experienced nothing short of a revolution. 
    “An Accumulation of Frustrations”:  The Delaware Expressway 
 
While the defeat of the Crosstown Expressway represented the apex of the 
democratization of Philadelphia’s transportation politics, concurrent developments 
concerning the Delaware Expressway demonstrated the limits of that democratization.  In 
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particular, class distinctions, even more so than racial ones in this specific context, played 
a major role in determining the extent to which various constituencies were able to 
mitigate the expressway’s effects upon their neighborhoods.  Affluent Society Hill’s 
effort, ongoing since the mid-1960s, to have its portion of the Delaware Expressway 
lowered and topped with a landscaped cover came to a successful conclusion.  Queen 
Village, a rapidly-gentrifying portion of Southwark, made progress in its campaign to 
eliminate certain expressway ramps that would have flooded its streets with traff c, 
despite the failure of working-class whites in Port Richmond to prevent a similar ramp 
from tearing through a children’s playground. 
During the final, apocalyptic stage of the Crosstown battle, work on the Delawar  
Expressway progressed, but did so at a rate that was maddeningly slow in the eyes of its 
proponents.  A combination of funding problems, bureaucratic red tape, and continuing 
citizen opposition to the expressway’s design caused the project to crawl along at a 
snail’s pace, dashing hopes that it would be completed by 1976, in time for Philadelphia’s 
celebration of the nation’s bicentennial.  The main problems were reaching an accord for 
funding of the Society Hill cover, and opposition from the city’s waterfront communities 
to the prospect of entrance and exit ramps funneling traffic to and from the Delaware 
Expressway through narrow, residential Center City and South Philadelphia streets.  As a 
result of these and other issues, the expressway was not completed until 1979, more than 
a decade later than planners had hoped. 
Despite the recommendation of a federal task force in 1967 that at least part of the 
Delaware Expressway be covered in Society Hill, the struggle was not quite over.  The 
task force report, although persuasive, was not binding, and a firm agreement for funding
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the cover between all of the entities involved – Philadelphia City Council, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Highways (PennDOT as of 1970), and the U.S. Departments 
of Transportation, Interior, and Housing and Urban Development – was not forthcoming 
immediately.  As time dragged on, the projected cost of the cover rose, largely due to 
inflation.  At the same time, budgetary constraints at all levels of government presented 
difficulties, calling into question the abilities of the federal, state and local governments 
to meet their recommended funding commitments for the cover.  In particular, the 
Vietnam War drained federal resources, slowing down Great Society programs and 
jeopardizing the most important source of interstate expressway funding.  Pennsylva ia 
had lost $65 million of the $258.3 million it expected for 1968 due to a 25% cutback in 
federal highway funds .91  Commissioner of Streets David Smallwood grew more and 
more frustrated by the delays that were holding up a highway he felt the city needed 
badly.  Earlier projections had placed the completion date of the Delaware Expressway at 
1967, 1972, and 1974.92  In April 1969, however, Smallwood opined that the expressway 
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would not be completed until 1976, blaming the delay mainly on the cover controversy 
and calling even the 1976 projection very optimistic.93 
As it turned out, Smallwood was right to be pessimistic, as his 1976 projection 
ended up being off by three years.  But Smallwood was not present to witness the 
opening of the final Center City stretch of the expressway in 1979.  In February 1970, the 
Evening Bulletin reported Smallwood’s resignation due to “an accumulation of 
frustrations,” including his exasperation with the slow progress being made on the 
Delaware Expressway as well as opposition to the Crosstown Expressway.94  The 
resignation may have been a cover story to shield the outspoken Commissioner of Streets 
from embarrassment, however.  Six years later, Mayor Tate told civic leader Walter 
Phillips that he had fired Smallwood for insubordination.95  Not long after Smallwood’s 
departure, the Philadelphia Inquirer remarked bemusedly, “Expressway Taking Longer 
to Construct Than Chinese Wall,” explaining that “China’s Great Wall was built by hand 
at an average of 31 miles a year.  The Delaware Expressway is being built by machine at 
an average of 2.9 miles a year.”96 
In late 1970, the Delaware Expressway cover issue reached a crisis point.  The 
primary sticking point was that the state and federal agencies involved were refusing to 
guarantee that they would increase their financial commitments to cover increased 
construction costs.  Tate had set a deadline of December 15 for an accord on this point, 
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and when the deadline passed without such an agreement, he called on the state to 
proceed with construction of the Society Hill section of the expressway without e 
cover.97  In responding to charges of defeatism from the Inquirer, Tate explained that it 
had been four years since the task force report had appeared to resolve the funding issue, 
yet there still existed no firm commitment from the state, Interior, or HUD on even the 
original funding amounts the task force had recommended.  In the meantime, the 
estimated cost of the project had risen from the $9 million the task force had projected to 
over $28 million.  The issue was not defeatism, said Tate, but “facing reality.”  “We 
cannot continue to view the inaction on this vital project indefinitely while a few hope, 
and the great mass of our citizens are denied the use of a completed Delaware 
Expressway,” he concluded.98   
Television and radio network KYW agreed with Tate, citing the five-year delay, 
the huge increase in construction costs, and the danger of not having a completed 
expressway in time for the bicentennial celebration of 1976.99  Moreover, without firm 
commitments from the state and federal governments, City Council was skittish about 
committing money from its own budget for the cover.  As City Council president Paul 
D’Ortona told Managing Director Fred Corleto, the lack of an agreement on funding was 
sure to “lead to a new round of negotiations” between city, state and federal offici ls 
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“based on revised – and higher – costs.  No thank you!  Get your costs.  Get your 
commitments.  Then come to City Council.”100 
Stanhope Browne and the Committee to Preserve the Nation’s Birthplace 
continued to press their case with all parties.  The CPNB circulated a newslett r asking its 
members to write to City Council urging passage of a bill authorizing the expenditur  of 
the city’s share of funds for the cover.  The newsletter stressed again that the cover would 
serve primarily to preserve the city’s historic areas and benefit its tourist b siness, rather 
than help Society Hill residents in particular.  In addition, the CPNB pointed out that the 
cover would provide needed space for the city’s bicentennial celebration while helping to 
create jobs and increase tax revenue.101   
On December 30, 1970, Browne wrote to Tate to protest his decision to proceed 
on the expressway without the cover, asking him to reconsider his position and predicting 
that federal funds would come through in the near future.102  Tate was not persuaded, 
however.  He responded to Browne that the cover was “no closer to success than it was 2 
years ago,” that state officials had deliberately delayed the project, and that the city had 
been “let down badly by you and your group.”103  Tate did not clarify why he was upset 
with Browne and his committee, although it seems possible that he blamed the CPNB for 
failing to persuade the state and federal governments to commit their shares of the cover 
funds.   
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Fortunately, events in early 1971 vindicated Browne’s optimism.  The Old 
Philadelphia Development Corporation, which had been a strong ally of cover proponents 
from the start, stepped in when PennDOT proposed building the highway without the 
cover but with footings to allow a cover to be added in the future.  Stewart Rausch, chair 
of OPDC’s Delaware Expressway Committee, met with Federal Highway Administrator 
Frank Turner, telling him that Philadelphia citizens interested in historic preservation 
(meaning, presumably, the CPNB) would file a lawsuit if the state built the expr ssway 
without the cover.  William Rafsky, the executive vice-president of OPDC, told 
Republican senator Hugh Scott about the meeting, and soon after, Scott, Pennsylvania’s 
other Republican senator Richard Schweiker, and Governor Shapp met with U.S. 
Secretary of Transportation John Volpe to discuss the matter.  After the meeting, Volpe 
wrote Scott, “I have personally reviewed the details of this project and am committed to 
finding a way to provide the cover.  Accordingly, I have instructed the Federal Highway 
Administrator to approve Interstate financing for the entire Delaware Expressway 
facility, including the cover.”104   
The cover, in other words, was to be funded on the traditional 90-10 federal-state 
basis along with the rest of the highway.105  As Federal Highway Administration division 
engineer George Fenton explained to new PennDOT secretary Jacob Kassab, the money 
from Philadelphia, Interior, and HUD called for by the task force report would no longer 
be needed.  Although cover advocates in Philadelphia had focused most of their 
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arguments on historic preservation, the Department of Transportation was motivated by 
concern for the environment, justifying its decision to fund the cover by reference to th  
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which encouraged federal agencies to find 
less harmful alternatives to projects with heavy environmental impacts.106  Six long years 
after activists raised the issue of covering the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill, the 
funding dilemma was solved, or so it seemed. 
At a PennDOT meeting in September 1971, Stanhope Browne presented a 
statement on behalf of the Committee to Preserve the Nation’s Birthplace endorsing the 
cover design under consideration.  In doing so, he stressed yet again that “contrary t 
certain misrepresentations of this committee’s position,” the group’s reasons for 
supporting the cover related “to the city and state as a whole, and indeed to the nation, 
and are not put forth in the interest of any particular section of the city.”  Browne ended 
his statement with a stern warning to those who would seek to squelch the cover:   
Should such an attempt be made, I here pledge that the full 
force of this committee, all of our constituent organizations 
and all of our friends will be brought to bear to stop that 
attempt dead in its tracks.  We would win again, and the 
only purpose to be served by an eleventh-hour attempt to 
remove the cover would be still further delay.107 
 
Browne’s admonishment was not the result of paranoia.  Despite the CPNB’s 
attempt to emphasize historic preservation and downplay the benefit to affluent residents 
of Society Hill, the cover issue sparked some degree of class resentment.  In the spring of 
1972, Joseph Schafer, an executive of multiple civic groups in working- and middle-class 
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Northeast Philadelphia, wrote to both Volpe and Vice President Spiro Agnew on behalf 
of his organizations, objecting to the use of federal highway funds for the tunnel.108  
Although Schafer’s efforts had no effect, the project’s final stages did not go exactly as 
planned.  Despite the federal government having assumed most of the financial 
responsibility for the cover, PennDOT ran into financial troubles in the 1970s and was 
never able to come up with its full share of the cost.  As a result, the Center City portion
of the expressway opened in 1979 without the completed cover the federal task force had 
envisioned.109  As of 2010, rather than the continuous cover from Delancey to Chestnut 
Streets the task force had called for, the Delaware Expressway was topped by two 
separate covers, one spanning Delancey to Dock Streets and the other Gatzmer to 
Chestnut Streets, with a large gap in between.  The covered portion was approximately 
two-thirds of what it would have been had the state been able to construct a single, 
continuous cover.  At the time, Stanhope Browne was disappointed not to have gotten the 
full six blocks his group had sought initially to have covered.  Later, he came to believe 
that the Society Hill activists had scored a great victory, considering the obstacles they 
had faced, in getting the highway depressed and a portion of it covered.110 
The battle of Society Hill was not the only one of its kind.  Although the “typical” 
1960s freeway revolt centered on the destruction of homes – especially in African 
American neighborhoods – issues of historic, environmental, and aesthetic preservation 
were often at play as well.  In New Orleans, for example, opposition to the proposed 
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Vieux Carre riverfront expressway came from those who feared it would destroy the 
unique character and atmosphere of the historic French Quarter.  Similarly, many freeway 
opponents in San Francisco were middle-class whites who believed that highways would 
serve suburbanites at the expense of the urban values and culture that made their city 
special.111  What was especially interesting about the Society Hill revolt, however, was 
that it was carried out by people with exceptionally close ties to the city’s pro-highway 
business and government establishment – ties that aided them immeasurably in achiev g 
their goals.  An unintended byproduct of their crusade, however, was a contribution to the 
wresting of power over highways away from planners and engineers, making the 
planning process more democratic and susceptible to influence by a wider array of social 
groups.  In disputes over the Crosstown Expressway and other aspects of the Delaware 
Expressway, many of those who had backed the Society Hill effort found themselves at 
odds with the freeway protestors they had helped to inspire.  
The depressing and covering of the Delaware Expressway in Society Hill was 
perhaps the most complicated obstacle to completion of the highway, but other 
difficulties arose.  Specifically, some neighborhoods raised objections to the placement of 
entrance and exit ramps – always a topic of contention when it came to building interstate 
highways through densely populated urban areas.  Rather than passing through a small 
portion of the city, the highway ran the length of Philadelphia’s waterfront – a distance of 
30 miles.  As a result, several different neighborhoods – with varying ethnic and 
socioeconomic compositions – had a stake in where the ramps were placed, with none 
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wishing to have its narrow residential streets burdened with traffic generat d by the 
expressway.  As with the expressway cover, the question of ramp placement pitted 
neighborhoods against one another, and different outcomes in different areas fueled 
lingering class-based resentments. 
Northeast Philadelphia, a vast section of the city with suburban-style housing, 
populated mostly by working- and middle-class whites, was one area of controversy.  As 
was the case in Southwark, the prospect of an expensive project to depress and cover the
expressway in Society Hill raised eyebrows in areas such as Kensington, just to the 
northeast of Center City, where homes were slated to be razed to make way for the road.  
As one resident in the path of the highway put it, “A lot of people around here aren’t 
getting enough for their homes.  I think they’re cutting prices down so they can put that 
cover on the expressway down at Society Hill.”112  More controversy arose in the 
Northeast when the state announced plans in 1967 to open a southbound exit ramp at 
Allegheny Avenue in the Port Richmond neighborhood.  The state highway department 
had requested the ramp in 1966, and the Bureau of Public Roads had approved it quickly, 
stating, “There is a need for a southbound off-ramp in this area as this is a highly 
developed industrial and residential area of Philadelphia.”113   
Local leaders such as city councilman Joseph Zazyczny objected immediately, 
accusing the state highway department of having kept them in the dark about plans for 
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the ramp, which would run through the middle of a children’s playground.114  Mayor Tate 
announced that the city would attempt to stop the ramp, while civic organizations pledged 
to close the ramp with a human blockade should the city’s efforts fail.115 
Right away, it was apparent that class distinctions would play an important role in
the way those affected by the ramp perceived the issue.  Port Richmond’s working-class 
residents wondered openly why the state and city had bent over backwards to modify the 
Delaware Expressway to the liking of those in Society Hill, while the statew s now 
endangering their children by running an expressway off-ramp through a neighborhood 
playground.116  As was often the case when it came to Philadelphia’s transportation 
planning, however, neighborhood residents and business interests found themselves on 
opposite sides of the issue.  The Northeast Chamber of Commerce quickly threw its 
support behind the ramp, calling it “a boon to the people and industry of the area.”  The 
best solution, in the Chamber’s view, was to close the east side of the playground so 
children would not be required to cross in front of the ramp to reach it.  “We cannot 
visualize children running back and forth in front of the ramps from one playground to 
the other, especially when one playground is only grass,” offered Chamber spokesman 
Bruce Beaton.  Beaton also opined that the city should look into relocating the 
playground because it was located in an industrial area, evidently not realizing the 
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significance of dismissing part of the playground as “only grass,” when for many children 
it was the only grass within walking distance of their homes.117 
Needless to say, Port Richmond residents did not take kindly to the Chamber’s 
assessment of the situation.  Zazyczny, who in addition to serving on City Council was a 
co-coordinator of the Richmond Committee for Community Improvement, accused 
Beaton of treating the neighborhood like a colony and displaying “a lack of consideration 
of the human aspect of the structure of the city.”118  The community won a temporary 
victory in late September, when highway secretary Robert Bartlett told a neighborhood 
delegation that the Allegheny Avenue ramp would remain closed, and that a previously-
abandoned exit at Wheatsheaf Lane, about a mile north, would be completed instead.119 
Port Richmond’s victory was short-lived, as the state in 1969 reversed its decision 
to close the ramp, allegedly at the behest of the federal government.  On December 1, 
1969, three days before the ramp was to be opened, 100 neighborhood residents, mostly 
female, took up positions at the foot of the ramp in protest.  The following day, Zazyczny 
and a group of community representatives that included leaders of churches and civic 
groups met with district engineer Paul Thomas of the state highway department.  What 
one newspaper described as an “emotional meeting” produced no results.  Thomas 
informed the delegation that he was under orders from Bartlett to open the ramp, and that
Pennsylvania stood to lose the federal government’s entire contribution to the 
expressway, comprising 90% of the construction costs, if the ramp were not opened.  
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Jack Dempsey, the president of the Richmond Committee for Community Involvement, 
threatened continued picketing and protests, particularly if the ramp were opened without
adequate safeguards to prevent cars from careening off the ramp and into the 
playground.120 
On December 4, the ramp was opened with no discernable protest, but later that 
afternoon, 50 demonstrators blocked the ramp, and their numbers swelled to 200 by the 6 
p.m. rush.121  A few days later, the protestors changed their tactics, trying to expand their 
base of support by handing out circulars urging residents to “Help Stop This Farce in 
Richmond,” and listing telephone numbers for concerned citizens to call in order to join 
the effort.122  What seemed to be a more peaceful form of protest did not last, however.  
On December 15, after a meeting of a neighborhood Polish-American club, 
approximately 100 people walked from the meeting and took up a position blocking the 
expressway ramp.  Police used their cruisers to prevent traffic from exiting the 
expressway onto the ramp in order to prevent injuries or fatalities.  Joseph Zazyczny 
blamed the situation on the trucking interests, which he felt were the primary 
beneficiaries of the ramp, the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, and 
highway secretary Bartlett, whose dire proclamations of losing federal funding he termed 
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“a farce.”  Things turned ugly when protestors hanged Bartlett in effigy from a pole at the 
foot of the ramp.123 
   In an effort to rebut Zazyczny’s criticisms, state officials provided him with 
documentation of the federal order to open the Allegheny Avenue ramp, telling him that 
the federal government had threatened to withhold $4.5 million in funding for the Port 
Richmond section of the expressway.  Upon reading the letter, however, Zazyczny 
asserted that it said only that consideration should be given to opening the ramp and did 
not make a demand.  Moreover, Zazyczny claimed, it was evident that the state had not
brought the community opposition in Port Richmond to the attention of federal 
officials.124  Nevertheless, Paul Thomas continued to insist that the Bureau of Public 
Roads would pull its funding commitment if the ramp were not opened.  As a result, the 
protestors lost the support of Mayor Tate, who said he could no longer continue to object 
to the ramp under the circumstances.  As a small concession to the neighborhood, the 
state installed a traffic light at the bottom of the ramp.125 
A review of correspondence regarding the Allegheny Avenue ramp suggests that 
the Pennsylvania Department of Highways did, as Zazyczny charged, mischaracterize the 
Bureau of Public Roads’ position on the matter.  In early December 1969, Democratic 
congressman William Green (who served as Philadelphia’s mayor from 1980 to 1984) 
wrote to Paul Green, the congressional liaison for the Federal Highway Administration, 
asking him bluntly if the federal government would indeed withhold funds for the 
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expressway if the ramp were not opened.126  Paul Green’s reply seems not to have 
survived, but R.R. Bartelsmeyer, the Director of Public Roads, sent William Green an 
additional response in late December.  “In recognition of local concern,” he wrote, “we 
have advised the State that we would be receptive to a request from the Department of 
Highways to keep the ramp closed if there were good and justifiable reasons for 
depriving the public of its use. . . . We feel, however, that as the ramp was intended to 
serve the public and public highway monies participated in the cost of its construction, 
the public should be permitted its use unless there is justifiable reason otherwise.”  
Bartelsmeyer’s letter contained no threat to withhold federal funds should the state fail to 
open the ramp.127     
Bartelsmeyer’s letter failed to budge state highway officials.  Disappointed, 
Zazyczny said in early 1970, “I have to admit that the ramp off the southbound lane onto 
Allegheny Avenue is there and has to be accepted.”  He did, however, express a desire to 
have the ramp closed until the nearby Bridesburg-Delair Bridge (as of 2010 known as the 
Betsy Ross Bridge) could be completed, which would lessen the traffic burden on 
Allegheny Avenue considerably.128  Even this hope was dashed, however, and the 
Allegheny ramp remained open.  A letter-writing campaign Port Richmond 
schoolchildren directed at government officials did not do the trick.  Republican senator 
Richard Schweiker told the children that he had spoken with the U.S. Department of 
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Transportation about closing the ramp, but the talks did not bear fruit.129  If the federal or 
state governments had intended to do anything about the ramp, they probably would have 
done it in April 1970, when a truck smashed into a guardrail on the ramp, almost falling 
into the playground below.  While this incident stoked more community opposition to the 
ramp, it failed to move state highway officials, who said that such accidents were not 
preventable and that the ramp would not be altered.  As the always sympathetic district 
engineer William Lamb put it, “Everyone must realize that accidents will happen.”130 
A few years later, the complex issue of where to place expressway ramps reared 
its ugly head in affluent Society Hill and the less wealthy areas to its s uth as well.  Much 
like the expressway cover, the ramp issue created antagonisms between differt 
neighborhoods based on class differences, real or perceived.  The problem began in South 
Philadelphia, where in February 1973 the City Planning Commission held a meeting to 
seek citizen input on planning issues.  According to Planning Commission chairman 
Bernard Meltzer, it was the first time the Commission had gone into a city neighborhood 
to ask the residents what was on their minds.  The Evening Bulletin saw Meltzer’s 
“interest in citizen participation and direct democracy” to be “admirable,” ut noted that 
“some of the planning commission’s staff had misgivings over the South Philadelphia 
meeting.  They saw it, essentially, as looking for trouble.  And if trouble means upsetting 
neatly arranged, or even arduously negotiated, understandings with citizens’ groups, they 
got it.”  The primary concern of those attending the meeting was the amount of traffic 
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that the Delaware Expressway entrance and exit ramps would generate in their 
neighborhoods and how local streets would absorb the traffic.131 
Within a few days, qualms about the expressway ramps had spread to Washington 
Square, part of the Society Hill neighborhood.  Both Washington Square and South 
Philadelphia residents complained that the ramps would create too much traffic and 
pollution in their areas.132  Merchants worried that the heavy traffic would keep 
customers away from their stores.  Among the planned ramps to which residents objected 
were those at South and Bainbridge Streets that would have connected the Delaware and 
Crosstown Expressways.  Now that the Crosstown Expressway was not going to be built, 
residents argued, there was no longer a need for ramps at those locations.  If the state 
persisted in building those ramps, narrow local streets would be forced to carry the taffic 
the Crosstown would have borne, a situation residents thought untenable.133  One 
newspaper columnist wondered openly whether the South and Bainbridge Street ramps 
could be the city’s revenge on the community for opposing the Crosstown Expressway, 
or were being built in case the Crosstown could be revived some day, or, as a third 
possibility, were designed to flood the neighborhood streets with traffic so that residents 
would beg for the Crosstown to be built.134   
The Evening Bulletin took the residents’ side in opposing the building of 
expressway ramps that would dump traffic into the riverfront communities of Society 
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Hill, Queen Village, and Pennsport.  Meltzer, the paper noted, was not entirely 
unsympathetic, and had advised community groups in the area to seek federal funds to 
have the ramps connected solely with Delaware Avenue, a larger thoroughfare that could 
handle traffic exiting the Delaware Expressway more easily than could other l cal 
streets.135  No such agreement was reached, however, and in March the newly-formed 
Neighborhood Preservation Coalition (NPC), made up of 14 Center City and South 
Philadelphia civic groups, turned down a compromise proposal from the state to redesign 
the ramps.136   
The ramp issue caused some political sniping back and forth between city and 
state officials.  When Governor Milton Shapp agreed with residents of Society Hill and 
Queen Village that ramps should not be built in those areas, Philadelphia’s managing 
director, Hillel Levinson, exploded.  “What he did was a minor disaster,” Levinson raged, 
“and I hope we can salvage it.”  Shapp’s stance, he continued, “has the effect of 
stiffening the back of the community. . . . I can only assume that, by that type of 
bolstering of their position, they will be less amenable (to negotiation).”137  An aide to 
Shapp called Levinson’s comments “erroneous, ridiculous” and “a cheap attempt to 
blame Harrisburg for a Philadelphia problem.”138  Philadelphia, he claimed, was passing 
the buck by pretending that the ramp issue was out of its hands.  The truth was that the 
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state and federal governments could not build the road without city approval.139  That 
having been said, of course, it was not likely that Philadelphia would have been willingto 
forego state and federal funding, thus leaving the expressway unfinished, over the ramp 
issue.   
Those who protested the Delaware Expressway ramps were not as well-connected 
to City Hall and large business interests as were the expressway cover activists.  
Although some of the anti-ramp activists were from Society Hill, the real th  epicenter of 
the movement was Queen Village, a much more modest area.  The neighborhood lay 
immediately to the south of Society Hill, running from the Delaware River waterfront 
west to roughly 8th Street.  Queen Village was actually part of Southwark – the South 
Philadelphia neighborhood that had tried with little success throughout the 1960s to keep 
the Delaware Expressway from tearing through its homes and churches, and had also 
engaged in the late 1960s in a failed quest to mimic Society Hill’s effort to have te 
expressway depressed and covered.  In the early 1970s, however, part of Southwark 
underwent gentrification and became known as Queen Village, a “superimposed” name 
that many Philadelphians believed real estate agents created to draw people to the area.140 
Queen Village was still in the early 1970s in the midst of its transition from a 
working-class to a more affluent neighborhood.  In 1970, just before gentrification took 
hold, the area (exclusive of one large housing project) had a median income of $5,500, 
compared with $8,180 for all of South Philadelphia and $13,343 for Center City.  The 
pre-renewal median house value in Queen Village was lower than that for Philadelphi  as 
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a whole, and only about one-fifth that of Society Hill.  The neighborhood was also fairly 
diverse, being roughly 56% white and 44% black (again excluding the housing project, 
which was 80% black).  The black population, however, was concentrated in the western 
portion of the neighborhood, farther from the riverfront.  The white population consisted 
largely of Irish, Italians, and Poles, many of whom were first- or second-ge eration 
immigrants.  Once gentrification began to take hold in the early 1970s, house prices rose, 
with real estate taxes following suit, creating hardship for some of the older residents and 
causing tension between old-timers and newcomers.  When it came to the Delaware 
Expressway, however, both old and new residents were for the most part opposed to the 
ramps.141        
Unlike the Society Hill activists, who in advocating an expressway cover had pled 
their case politely in the halls of power, the people fighting the ramps took to the streets 
in protest, much as those in Port Richmond had done a few years earlier.  In late May, 
200 people from Society Hill and Queen Village picketed at 3rd and Lombard Streets, and 
a day later at 3rd and Spruce Streets. 142  NPC spokesman Conrad Weiler urged citizens to 
refuse to pay their property taxes until the city agreed to eliminate the ramps, lthough it 
is unclear whether anyone took his advice.143  The Queen Village Neighborhood 
Association (QVNA), a group belonging to the NPC, held a “Block the Ramps Block 
Party” to raise money for the fight, complete with live entertainment, a bake s le, a raffle, 
and an arts and crafts show. The group also held a mock funeral for the ramps; the cars 
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making up the funeral procession displayed signs reading “Ashes to Ashes, Dust to
– No I-95 Ramps for Us.”  An incendiary editorial in the QVNA’s June 1973 newsletter 
compared the building of the ramps to rape, complained that highway planners wanted 
“YOUR parking spaces so these can be turned into a moving lane of trucks, buses and 
cars,” and asserted that residents forced to park farther from their homes would have their 
cars stolen or vandalized.  The screed culminated in the stark statement, “I-95 + RAMPS 
= DEATH!” 144  The NPC put out a flyer pointing out that at the same time the city 
planned to increase real estate tax assessments, Bernard Meltzer had admitted that the 
ramps would lower property values in the surrounding area.  Feeling that neither Mayor 
Rizzo nor Governor Shapp had responded forcefully enough to the ramp issue, the NPC 
announced its intent to focus on the “bottom” of the political structure – the local party 
committeemen and women.145 
Although community opposition to the ramps was strong, powerful forces were 
putting pressure on elected officials to press forward in spite of the protests.  Letters in 
favor of quick completion of the expressway, including the Center City ramps, poured 
into Mayor Rizzo’s office from the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, the 
Penn’s Landing Corporation, the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, the 
Philadelphia Convention & Tourist Bureau, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the 
Philadelphia Chapter of the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association.  The thrust of the 
letters was that the Center City ramps were necessary to the area’s industry and 
commerce and would provide crucial tourist access to Independence National Park nd 
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the redeveloped waterfront area at Penn’s Landing for the bicentennial celebration and 
beyond.146  Proponents of the ramps also pointed out that the surrounding communities 
had raised no objections to the ramps when they were first proposed, but residents replied 
that their approval had been predicated on the existence of the Crosstown Expressway, 
which would have carried the traffic that was now going to be dumped onto city 
streets.147 
In the summer of 1973, seeing that neither street protests nor six months of 
negotiations with government officials had succeeded in stopping the ramps, the NPC 
turned to the courts, filing a federal lawsuit against PennDOT to stop the construction of 
the Delaware Expressway in Philadelphia.  The NPC centered its suit on allegations that 
the traffic the expressway ramps would funnel into city streets would violate federal air 
pollution standards, create unacceptable noise levels, and jeopardize the area’s historic 
buildings.  Joining the lawsuit on the NPC’s side were Henry Cianfrani, the chair of the 
Pennsylvania Senate Appropriations Committee, and state representative Samuel
Rappaport, whose district included the Fifth Ward (covering the eastern half of Center 
City all the way to the Delaware River waterfront).148  As expected, the Chamber of 
Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, the Greater Philadelphia Movement, the Old 
Philadelphia Development Corporation, and the Penn’s Landing Corporation opposed the 
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lawsuit on the basis that the expressway and ramps were needed for the area’s 
development.149   
In an apparent reversal of its editorial position from March, when it opposed the 
construction of ramps that would dump traffic into riverfront neighborhoods, the Evening 
Bulletin fretted over the lawsuit, pointing out that it would probably delay the completion 
of the expressway past 1976 and increase its construction costs.  Furthermore, the paper 
intoned, “It is not reasonable to deny motorists access to the Penn’s Landing area.  
Philadelphia’s redeveloped riverfront is too much of a magnet for visitors and business 
firms – as it was always intended to be.”150 
Adding its voice to those decrying the NPC’s lawsuit was the local branch of the 
American Automobile Association.  Its president, John Herd, asserted that the Delaware 
Expressway had been “held up for five or more years by self-serving interests” and that 
“a minority must not be allowed to stand in the way of any project designed to benefit 
millions of other Philadelphia citizens.  If Philadelphia is to attain or retain its status as a 
major city it must think and act as a major city and not a loose conglomeration of local 
neighborhoods with only local interest.”151  According to the NPC, however, its 
opponents were concerned about only their own gain, rather than the development of the 
city as a whole.  After a meeting in Harrisburg to discuss the ramps with PennDOT 
secretary Jacob Kassab, the NPC held a press conference at which it derided Chamber of 
Commerce claims that the ramps were needed to protect the area’s industry.  The 
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Chamber and other groups, said an NPC spokesman, “pretend they are concerned about 
economic development of the area and that they are civic-minded and patriotic and that’s 
just not so.”  The real reason for the ramps, he asserted, was to protect the private 
investments that had been made in the Penn’s Landing redevelopment.152 
While its lawsuit was pending, the NPC and its member groups continued 
negotiations with government officials, to no avail.  In August, representatives of the 
QVNA had a meeting with Mayor Rizzo and Managing Director Hillel Levinson at 
which Rizzo expressed a desire to please those on both sides of the issue.  Levinson 
asserted that the proposed ramps had “no relation to center city traffic,” and that 
improvements such as changing street directions and installing signs and lights could be 
used to improve traffic flow.153  In October, the QVNA rejected a compromise proposal 
put forth by city and state officials that would have shifted the ramps south with traffic 
entering and exiting the expressway on Delaware Avenue, the city’s major waterfront 
thoroughfare.  The prevailing opinion in the area was that “as long as a Ramp complex is 
located anywhere in the community, a large volume of traffic would still find its way to 
and from such an interchange through the narrow streets of Queen Village.”  Moreover, 
residents predicted that Levinson’s proposal of new street directions, signs, and lights 
“would probably be guided by the needs of the highway, not the community.”154 
As 1973 came to a close, the Delaware Expressway in Center City remained 
mired in controversy.  Before expressway proponents had a chance to catch their breath 
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following the resolution of the cover fight, residents of the city’s waterfront 
neighborhoods took to the streets, and then the courts, in an effort to modify the 
expressway’s design yet again.  The city’s business community stood aghast, realizing 
that the NPC’s lawsuit had probably destroyed any hope of having the expressway open 
to traffic by 1976, when Philadelphia would find itself on the national stage as the focal 
point of bicentennial celebrations.  The latest controversy in the expressway’s long and 
tortured history resulted from the Crosstown Expressway’s demise.  This was true both 
indirectly – as citizens awoke to the full potential of protest to modify or even eliminate 
proposed expressways – and directly, as the elimination of the Crosstown created th  
potential for the Delaware Expressway to choke historic and residential streets with 
traffic, noise, and air pollution.  The result was a further delay in the expressway’  
completion lasting six more years, and a battle that persisted to the very day the road 
opened to traffic. 
The Commuter Connection:  A Tunnel to Nowhere   
 
Although America’s postwar expressway boom had a negative impact on mass 
transportation, it was not the case that a decline in expressway construction benefitted 
mass transit automatically.  In tough financial times such as those of the 1970s, it was 
more than possible for proponents of both forms of transportation to struggle at the same 
time.  While expressway planning and construction in Philadelphia stagnated due to the 
cancellation of the Crosstown Expressway and persistent citizen opposition to the 
Delaware Expressway ramps, improvements to the region’s mass transportation systems 
slowed to a crawl as well.  The main culprit was the city’s failure to come to terms with 
the federal government regarding funding for the Center City Commuter Connecti .  
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The city’s business community touted the project’s potential to rehabilitate the fading 
Market Street East retail area, but this strategy backfired, as the Department of 
Transportation expressed doubt that the tunnel’s main purpose was to provide 
transportation benefits.   
The conflict over the tunnel occurred during a time of severe financial instability 
for SEPTA resulting from a deadly combination of rampant inflation, increased lbor 
costs, and a spiraling need to repair and upgrade equipment and infrastructure due to 
years of deferred maintenance under PTC ownership.  SEPTA’s financial problems led to 
a rash of rider complaints about poor service and posed a danger that the region would 
lose its commuter railroads, both of which entered bankruptcy in the early 1970s.  The 
desperate straits in which urban mass transportation found itself created tension around 
the Commuter Connection project.  Poor and working-class city residents – who had no 
choice but to use urban mass transit and therefore constituted most of the system’s 
ridership – argued that SEPTA was discriminating against them by using a massive 
federal grant for the tunnel in order to benefit affluent, white, suburban commuters while 
the urban system crumbled.  This dispute intensified in the mid-1970s, but had its roots in 
mass transit’s travails in the early part of the decade.   
On the whole, the period from 1969 to 1973 was a mixed one from the 
perspective of mass transportation boosters.  The financial difficulties that were the 
period’s most salient feature prevented significant improvements to the region’s mass 
transit systems.  Both SEPTA and the commuter railroads teetered on the brink of 
financial disaster and possibly even extinction.  The authority’s pursuit of theCommuter 
Connection tunnel laid the groundwork for future controversy based on urban residents’ 
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perception that SEPTA cared only about serving white suburbanites.  Despite these 
daunting problems, the mere survival of mass transit during a period of such crisis was an
important accomplishment.  Moreover, the 1973 legislation allowing local governments 
to receive federal funds for mass transit projects in exchange for cancelling interstate 
highways reflected a new belief at the highest levels of government that mass transit was 
a necessary part of the nation’s future.    
Both SEPTA and Philadelphia’s city government made the Center City Commuter 
Connection their top priority in the late 1960s and 1970s.  Its proponents in both 
government and business intended the tunnel not only to unify the region’s two 
commuter railroad systems and bring the Philadelphia area closer to having an integrated 
mass transportation system, but also, in conjunction with the new station that was to be 
part of the project, revitalize the crumbling Market East retail area.  The Old Philadelphia 
Development Corporation’s Market Street East Committee, formed in 1965, continued to 
take the lead on pressing for the tunnel.  As was true of the Society Hill redevelopment, 
OPDC maintained a tight relationship with City Hall with respect to Market Eas .  In 
1969, Edmund Bacon was a regular visitor to the committee’s meetings, requesting that it 
hold monthly meetings and “act as a strong watchdog” for the city agencies i volved with 
the project.  Demonstrating OPDC’s influence, Bacon advised the committee to dir ct the 
city’s Redevelopment Authority to make a study of improvements that could be made for 
the entire Market East area.155 
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Financial problems and other logistical obstacles mired the tunnel project in delay 
after delay, however.  In 1968, for example, the tunnel had been delayed because SEPTA 
had not agreed to create a separate corporation in the event it acquired the commuter 
railroads – something upon which the federal government and the railroad unions insisted 
in order to protect workers’ federal pension benefits.  The unions agreed eventually to 
table the issue of a separate corporation until such time as SEPTA acquired the railroads, 
but this did not put an end to the labor issues.156   
In May 1969, the U.S. Department of Labor refused to approve a labor agreement 
signed by 16 unions, both railroads, and SEPTA because it did not include workers from 
Red Arrow, SEPTA’s urban transit system, or the Camden, New Jersey bus lines.  Many 
were perplexed at the ruling given that the excluded workers were not involved directly 
with the tunnel, but the parties nevertheless expanded the agreement.  When the Labor 
Department certified the agreement in July, one of the last major procedural obstacles to 
federal funding for the tunnel disappeared.157  The tunnel cleared another important 
hurdle in late 1969 when the DVRPC, now a permanent agency, met federal requirements 
by formulating a comprehensive regional transportation plan, holding hearings on the 
plan, and then adopting it formally via resolution.158  Relevant to later protests that 
planners placed too much emphasis on the commuter railroads to the detriment of the 
urban transit system was the fact that the DVRPC’s plan proposed $406 million worth of 
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additions and improvements for urban mass transit and $366 million for the railroads; 
given its projection that the railroads would carry 8% of the region’s transit pasengers in 
1985, the DVRPC was proposing railroad expenditures of ten times more per passenger 
compared to urban transit.159  
Although the parties involved had cleared up many of the issues blocking the 
tunnel, these issues had held the project in stasis for far too long – three years since 
SEPTA became involved and five years since the city’s first request for fede al aid.  In 
the 10 years since the City Planning Commission had endorsed the project, the city’s 
estimate of the tunnel’s cost had doubled, from approximately $40 million to $80 million.  
The tunnel remained Philadelphia’s top transportation priority with the result that other 
regional projects needing federal money encountered substantial delays as well.160 The 
Evening Bulletin continued to support the tunnel, however, pointing out that $80 million 
was “a rather paltry sum compared to the vast amounts being spent on urban highway 
systems that are increasingly choking the cities” and citing the tunnel as an example of 
why a federal trust fund for mass transportation, similar to the Highway Trust Fund 
established by the 1956 Interstate Highway Act, should be created.161 
There was, unfortunately, a lack of agreement between city and federal offici ls 
on exactly what the tunnel would cost.  C. Carroll Carter, Deputy Administrator for 
Public Affairs in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, put the true cost at $125 
million.  The real reason why Philadelphia’s application for federal funds had not been 
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approved, he claimed, was that it had “never nailed down the real cost and effect in terms 
of the total effect to the community.”  Meanwhile, the tunnel delays had been disastrou  
from the perspective of Philadelphia’s overall transit planning.  As of late 1969, the 
Philadelphia region had received only $4.8 million in federal transit aid under the Urban 
Mass Transportation Act, compared to over $100 million each for New York City, 
Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco.162  These numbers had improved by the spring of 
1970, however, as SEPTA received $26.7 million in federal aid for transit, $21 million of 
which the authority used for the purchase of 144 new commuter railroad cars.  The city’s 
application for federal funding for the tunnel, which now requested $87.5 million, was 
still pending.  Nevertheless, Mayor Tate proclaimed that Philadelphia was “getting a 
better break” from the Nixon administration than it had from Johnson’s.163 
Tate’s praise for the Nixon administration proved to be premature.  In August 
1970, the UMTA rejected the city’s application for the tunnel on the grounds that it 
would provide “minimal” transportation benefits.  The federal government took the 
position that the tunnel’s primary purpose was to revitalize and redevelop the Market 
East area and that federal transportation funds could not properly be used for such a 
purpose.  Public Property Commissioner William Costello, despairing that the UMTA’s 
decision was a “death blow” to the tunnel, took issue with the agency’s position, 
emphasizing the tunnel’s transit benefits.164  Simply building more tracks would not 
improve commuter rail service, he asserted.  The real bottlenecks in the rail system 
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occurred when trains entered the Center City stations and needed to turn around, a 
problem that the tunnel would eliminate by allowing trains to pass through the city and 
continue on to other parts of the region.  Moreover, he claimed, the tunnel would allow 
both Penn Central and Reading riders to reach destinations that had been inaccessible to 
them by train.  Penn Central customers, for example, would be able to reach the federal 
courthouse and Temple University, while Reading riders would have direct accessto the 
University of Pennsylvania as well as the G.E. and Westinghouse plants.165 
Some in Philadelphia, such as the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation 
(whose Market East Committee was, as discussed previously, the tunnel’s stronge  
proponent), attributed the federal government’s reticence on the tunnel issue to the 
antipathy of UMTA administrator William Hurd, who allegedly was blocking the tunnel 
out of spite because Tate had accused him in 1968 of holding up the project.166  Hurd 
denied these charges, maintaining that the delays were due entirely to his doubts, shared 
by Secretary of Transportation John Volpe, that the tunnel was truly valuable from a
transportation perspective.  Like Volpe, Hurd emphasized that the federal government 
could not spend mass transportation funds on what appeared to federal officials to be a 
neighborhood redevelopment project.167  SEPTA chairman James McConnon scoffed at 
the federal government’s objections, recalling later, “The fact that it would revitalize the 
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area was not a reason not to do it. . . . That doesn’t mean it’s not a good transportation 
project. . . . My own view of it was, yes, it’s a good transportation project.”168  
 The City Planning Commission did not shy away from the fact that the tunnel 
had significant non-transportation benefits, and in fact released a report analyzing the 
Commuter Connection from a redevelopment perspective.  The January 1970 report 
focused on the need for the tunnel to reduce automobile congestion – a prerequisite for 
redevelopment of the Market East area.  “Thus, the rail commuter connection begins to 
come into focus as being far more important to the City than just a transportation 
improvement.  It is one of the basic transportation foundations to the largest commercial 
improvement program planned by Philadelphia,” the report concluded.169  Despite the 
Planning Commission’s admission that the city was seeking federal transportation funds 
to benefit business development, Volpe softened his position when Senator Hugh Scott 
intervened.  When the city filed a new application in late 1970, Volpe approved it, but 
only partially, finding the project to be only 80% transit-related.170  The approval’s 
conditions included a reduced percentage of federal funding and, most problematically, 
an absolute cap on the federal contribution.  This meant that the federal government 
would not share in covering the inevitable cost overruns a project like the tunnel would 
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face, leaving the city to pick up the tab.  City officials understandably were reluctant to 
proceed with the tunnel under such circumstances.171  
With the federal government still refusing to fund the tunnel fully, the issue 
languished throughout 1971.  At least one federal official felt that the tunnel’s 
redevelopment aspects should not cause the Department of Transportation to view it 
negatively.  Michael Cafferty, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Enviro mental and 
Urban Systems couched his appeal to UMTA administrator Carlos Villarreal in the 
language of federalism, writing, “DOT . . . must be willing, as we say we are, and as 
President Nixon says we must be, to accept local judgments on plans and priorities.”172  
In early 1972, the DVRPC released a report designed to counter the impression that the 
tunnel was a boondoggle, asserting that the project would provide $1.60 in value for 
every $1 spent building it.173  In the meantime, however, Secretary Volpe became 
convinced that the tunnel was too expensive relative to the benefits it would provide.  
According to news reports, Volpe was “adamant” in his opposition to the tunnel and 
insisted that the needed funds, now estimated at over $200 million, could be spent more 
effectively elsewhere.174  As Philadelphia Magazine recalled in “The Black Hole,” a long 
1979 article that was highly critical of the project, Department of Transportation planners 
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felt that “the tunnel bordered on insanity,” because it “would directly affect only about 
9,000 people and relieve traffic congestion by only about 6,000 automobiles.”175   
In May, Governor Shapp weighed in on the matter through an aide, who remarked 
that the city and federal governments should reevaluate the need for the tunnel and that
Volpe’s skepticism over the high cost, now believed to be $250 million, made “very good 
sense.”176  The tunnel looked like it might be dead when Volpe announced DOT’s 
rejection of the project.  Less than two hours after his announcement, however, Mayor 
Rizzo and his aides gave Volpe a 45-minute presentation on the tunnel.  When they were 
finished, Volpe met with reporters and reversed himself, explaining that he had not 
understood fully the tunnel’s significance as a regional transportation project.  Ac ording 
to a later mayoral press release, the presentation had saved the day.177  Rizzo aide 
Anthony Zecca boasted in a 1979 interview, “[Rizzo] talked to him for twenty minutes 
and Volpe came out and says we changed our minds and he resurrected the tunnel.  And 
the records will show you that.”178  While Volpe’s decision was a reprieve for the tunnel, 
it did not come with a guarantee of full financial support, and thus did not resolve the 
nagging issue of how the project would be funded.   
The city remained baffled by the federal government’s reluctance to commit fully 
to the commuter tunnel.  OPDC emphasized that “reams” of information about the 
tunnel’s transit benefits had been sent to DOT and that “literally thousands of hours of 
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planning and hundreds of thousands of dollars expended in planning have demonstrated 
significant transportation benefit to the satisfaction of the railroads, the Delaware Valley 
Regional Planning Commission, SEPTA, and every other public and quasi-public 
transportation and planning agency.”179  Many in city government and elsewhere 
continued to blame William Hurd for the delay.  William White, president of OPDC, 
decried the “unique and discriminatory review procedures” that DOT alleged y had 
applied to the city’s application for funding and stressed that the limits DOT had placed 
upon its approval were “extremely damaging to the project.”180  An OPDC memo put the 
blame squarely on Hurd, citing Tate’s earlier having labeled Hurd “as an obstacle to the 
project and a liar.”  “All of the people who have dealt with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation have indicated that the stumbling block has been Hurd,” the memo 
continued.  Although both Hurd and Volpe denied this, “independent sources have 
constantly confirmed that staff opposition has held up the final approval of the project in 
the form desired by the City of Philadelphia.”181  Kenneth Klein of the Office of the 
Managing Director agreed, asserting that Tate’s attacks on Hurd had “affected [Hurd’s] 
opinion of all projects which he reviews for the City.  This has led to a credibility gap 
between his opinions and ours and he drags his feet to our detriment.”  But, Klein 
admitted, there were other problems with the tunnel, including its high cost and the fact 
that in order to fund the project, the UMTA would have to increase its allocation of 
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transportation money for the Philadelphia region or rescind its approval of other projects 
for which money had been earmarked.182 
The question of exactly whom the tunnel would benefit remained a persistent one 
in the minds of federal officials.  In an amended application filed in April 1972, the city 
stressed the universality of the tunnel’s transportation benefits, writing: 
Although it will be physically located in center city 
Philadelphia, the tunnel will benefit riders from the entire 
five-county area of Southeastern Pennsylvania, and it will 
also be available to serve the commuter rail lines from 
South Jersey and the seashore. . . . Perhaps the best single 
word to describe the object of the Commuter Tunnel is 
versatility:  The ability to board a train at any station on an 
integrated system and debark at any other station.  This will 
provide a new freedom of movement for commuters within 
the Philadelphia metropolitan area and at least four 
suburban counties.183 
 
The amended application was followed by a letter from Mayor Rizzo and SEPTA chair 
James McConnon, reminding Volpe that the tunnel was “the top transportation priority 
for the entire Philadelphia region.”184  The UMTA remained unconvinced, however.  
Weeks after the city submitted its amended application, federal officials were still asking, 
“Who will benefit from the Center City Commuter Connection? . . . [A] corrallary [sic] 
question is whether this level of investment is appropriate if the vast majority of those 
benefiting are the upper-income suburbanites.”185 
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The decrepit condition of SEPTA’s urban mass transit system also gave federal
officials pause.  UMTA administrator Carlos Villarreal sent Volpe a confide tial memo 
laying out his concerns in detail.  Villarreal pointed out that the tunnel would serve only 
about 10% of the region’s transit riders and asserted that “Other facilities – serving 90 per 
cent of the riders – will suffer from continued neglect of maintenance.”  Philadelphia had 
old subway and trolley cars, he continued, and the Frankford elevated line was so 
deteriorated and dangerous that SEPTA was under a court order to fix it.  “It should be 
noted that funding of the tunnel,” he wrote, “will seriously limit further aid to 
Pennsylvania.”186   
Undersecretary of Transportation James Beggs raised the same concern with 
Nixon aide John Ehrlichmann, questioning whether the tunnel should be Philadelphia’s 
top priority “given the dehabilitated [sic] condition of all public transportation there.”  He 
continued on the same theme, writing, 
Our staff feels that the SEPTA system is so poor, that 
additional Federal support could be much more wisely 
spent than on the tunnel project.  Admittedly, setting 
priorities is a local prerogative, and the Mayor has 
reaffirmed that the tunnel is his first priority; however, 
when viewed in the light of the state of the existing 
Philadelphia system, one must question whether all the 
implications have been carefully thought through.187 
  
SEPTA chair James McConnon may have felt the same way.  He always proclaimed 
support for the tunnel in public, recalling later that “Rizzo was always very much 
concerned as to whether I was strongly enough in favor of [the tunnel]” but “I was al ys 
                                                     
186 Carlos Villarreal to John Volpe, 2 May 1972, Office of the Secretary, General Correspondence, 1967-
1972, General Records of the Department of Transportati n, RG 398, National Archives, College Park, 
MD. 
187 James Beggs to John Ehrlichmann, 28 March 1972, Office of the Secretary, General Correspondence, 




in favor of it.”188  Nevertheless, DOT official James Constantino told Claude Brinegar 
(who had just replaced Volpe as Secretary of Transportation) that McConnon felt that 
“transit systems such as SEPTA, badly in need of capital improvement . . . deserve 
priority treatment in the allocation of scarce Federal resources.”189    
In 1973, with the question of federal funding still very much up in the air, yet 
another complication threatened to derail the tunnel project.  For over a decade after the 
Commuter Connection was first proposed, the public remained virtually silent on the 
issue, perhaps because funding difficulties made construction of the tunnel seem unlikely.  
Now, spurred possibly by the federal government’s questions regarding the distribution 
of the tunnel’s benefits, Philadelphia residents began to express opposition to the project.  
Residents of the low-income, African American East Poplar neighborhood in North 
Philadelphia, through which the tunnel would pass, argued that it would destroy their 
only neighborhood playground, at 9th and Parrish Streets.190  John Guinther, a local 
activist, asserted that the tunnel was designed to “serve the upper middle class only, 
which is a nice way of saying ‘whites only’.”191  A consultant’s report, while asserting 
that the tunnel would be beneficial to the city as a whole, acknowledged the damage it 
would do to East Poplar, including not only the destruction of the playground but the 
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noise, dust, and construction waste it would create for the residents of the Richard Allen 
Homes, a public housing project.192  At a public hearing on the tunnel in June 1973, 
Richard Allen residents claimed that the city had made no effort to work with them on 
tunnel plans; likewise, representatives of the Chinatown community, which would also be 
affected, complained that they had not been consulted either.193 
As a result of financial difficulties stemming primarily from federal government 
skepticism and a newly emergent opposition from certain segments of the public, the 
effort to construct the Center City Commuter Connection appeared in 1973 to be an 
exercise in futility.  The project began finally to move forward in the late 1970s, mainly 
because of a more receptive Department of Transportation.  Public opposition to the 
tunnel, however, became only more heated and widespread as the decade progressed.  
Opponents were concerned not only with the impact the project would have on specific 
neighborhoods, but also with the simple fact that any federal money spent on the tunnel 
was money that would not be spent on badly needed improvements to Philadelphia’s 
crumbling urban mass transit system. 
While the tunnel project was foundering, SEPTA found itself in a financial crisis 
that threatened to shut down the authority and deprive the city of its mass transit system.  
As was discussed earlier, the PTC had inflated its balance sheet by deferring maintenance 
prior to its acquisition by SEPTA in 1968, with the result that the authority came under 
immediate pressure to make repairs.  In 1970, after having to negotiate a new contract 
with its workers, SEPTA said it needed to increase fares.  The city’s response was no 
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different than it had been when Philadelphia’s transit was privately-owned, as Mayor 
Tate objected immediately to the fare increase.  Tate, argued the Evening Bulletin, was 
“attacking SEPTA’s management as though it was the old privately-owned Philadelphia 
Transportation Co., bent on ‘plundering the public’s fares.’  This is unfortunate.  SEPTA 
is, or should be, in a partnership relationship with the city, and not its adversary.”194  As 
McConnon recalled with some sympathy, Tate was often in a politically untenable 
position, guaranteed to offend some portion of his constituency either by failing to 
oppose fare increases or by raising city taxes to help fund the authority.195 
Despite his opposition to fare increases, Tate was not hostile to SEPTA.  On the 
contrary, he played an instrumental role in SEPTA’s creation and maintained the deeply-
held belief in the benefits of mass transit that caused him to urge the federalgovernment 
to pass the UMTA in 1964.  In 1970 Tate went before Congress again, this time to ask for 
more federal funding for urban mass transportation.  The mayor began by acknowledging 
the importance of the federal highway program but stressed that highways alone could 
not “solve our total urban transportation problem.”  What was needed, he argued, was a 
federal program for urban transit that matched in significance that for expressways, 
testifying: 
You cannot expect local funds to provide adequate urban 
public transit.  In all of the major cities in this nation, 
private enterprise has totally failed to meet or solve the 
transit problem, not for lack of efficiency, but for lack of 
capital and operating funds to provide the fixed facilities 
and service that the public must have if it is to respond. . . . 
Why should we expect cities to rely on highways alone and 
go without commuter lines, subways, other rapid transit 
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facilities supplemented by crosstown and connecting trolley 
and bus lines?  In my city we have tried to do all we could 
with local funds and efficiency. . . . We need federal aid, 
even with our facilities being most efficient. . . . In the next 
six years Philadelphia alone will need $100 million in 
additional federal transit aid.196 
 
One of the primary reasons that SEPTA needed a huge dose of federal aid was 
that in the midst of its financial difficulties, it began the arduous task of attemp ing to 
take over the region’s commuter railroads, which were themselves in dire stra ts.  In large 
part because of decades of losses from passenger operations, which subsidies had 
ameliorated but not eliminated, the Penn Central went bankrupt in1970 and the Reading 
followed suit in 1971.197  Talks between SEPTA and the railroads began in September 
1971, only a few months before the Reading entered bankruptcy, and were imbued with a 
sense of urgency when Reading president Charles Bertrand threatened to shut down 
commuter service entirely if SEPTA did not assume responsibility for it.  “There are 
people who tell themselves that the good old reliable Reading Railroad will be around 
forever,” he said.  “But don’t you believe it.  We won’t.”198   
Despite these difficult circumstances and the fact that term limits would f rce him 
to depart City Hall in January 1972, Tate maintained his commitment to the region’s 
mass transportation when Frank Rizzo, as mayor-elect, appointed him to the SEPTA 
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board of directors in December 1971.199  The city’s Deputy Commissioner of Transit 
Engineering, Edson Tennyson, joined Tate on the board, having resigned his position in 
frustration over funding problems.  SEPTA, he told Tate, had become “a serious 
problem,” largely because the state had refused to fund it properly.  Tennyson felt his 
efforts on behalf of the city had not produced sufficient results and hoped that he would 
be able to do more by joining the SEPTA board and also taking a new position as Deputy 
Secretary of Local and Area Transportation for the state.200  Some tension between Tate 
and Rizzo rose to the surface when Tate toured various subway stations in his new role as 
SEPTA board member.  Upon descending into one station, Tate commented, “This place 
is like a coal mine.  It’s shameful!”  When reporters asked him why he hadn’t done more 
to improve such conditions while in City Hall, Tate blamed it on his advisors.  An 
annoyed Mayor Rizzo snapped, “Ask the former mayor where he was during the last 10 
years.”201 
By late September 1972, SEPTA had reached tentative agreements with both 
railroads to take over their commuter railroad lines.  Penn Central wanted an increase in 
its subsidies – already totaling $8 million a year – which it claimed werenot covering its 
losses.  When the railroad balked at a SEPTA takeover, the transit agency had to threaten
to cut off commuter rail subsidies entirely to get Penn Central to agree.  The agreements 
with both railroads were contingent on the state continuing to fund SEPTA.  Governor 
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Shapp, however, declared he would not commit to continued support for SEPTA without 
a full review of the agency’s operations and a promise of better rail service.202 
Shapp’s demand reflected the transit authority’s poor performance.  In the early 
1970s, SEPTA came under intense fire for failing to provide the quality of service that 
was expected of it.  In 1972, the transit authority and the city received a huge number of 
letters critical of SEPTA’s overall level of service, rude employees, late buses and 
subways, service cuts, dirty conditions, and graffiti on its vehicles and in its staton .  
One angry citizen wrote to Public Property Commissioner William Costell  vowing to 
“lobby like hell” against more federal transit subsidies “until you and the rest of those 
responsible in government start fulfilling their responsibilities.”203  Costello forwarded 
the complaint to SEPTA General Manager William Eaton, informing him that Rizzo’s 
office had been “virtually deluged” with similar letters.  Government subsidies, he 
reminded Eaton, entitled taxpayers to demand better service.  Costello closed his letter 
with a sternly worded demand for immediate improvements.204  The pressure on SEPTA 
came both from below and from above.  In addition to citizen complaints, SEPTA had to 
contend with the displeasure of both Mayor Rizzo and Secretary of Transportation Volpe, 
who were harshly critical of delayed improvement projects that threatened to allow 
allocated federal funds to go unused.  Rizzo went so far as to threaten to sue the transi 
authority if it did not speed things up.205 
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One important development occurred in late 1972 when SEPTA reached an 
agreement with the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission providing that the 
DVRPC would engage in comprehensive transportation planning for the entire nine-
county Delaware Valley region, and that SEPTA and other agencies would make their 
plans in the context of the regional plans.  While SEPTA would still be responsible for 
both initiating and carrying out plans for improving public transit, the DVRPC would 
ensure that the region met all requirements to remain eligible for federal transit funding 
and that all transportation plans were coordinated in accordance with the overall regional 
plan.206  The cooperative planning arrangement had positive results, including an increase 
in transportation planning efforts and the receipt by DVRPC of federal transportation 
grants it could share with SEPTA.207 
Still, SEPTA’s performance lagged.  In 1974, the Department of Public Property 
released a report in which it praised SEPTA in some areas but was harshly critical in 
others.  The Department compared the authority unfavorably with those in other areas, 
concluding: 
Most people use the rapid transit system by chance rather 
than choice.  The system is considered dirty, dark and 
unsafe.  Unlike Toronto, Chicago or [Pittsburgh’s] PAT, 
SEPTA is tolerated by the community, rather than taken as 
an object of civic pride.  SEPTA management has failed to 
convey to its employees and to the public the fact that 
SEPTA is a public body responsible to all the people.  Yet 
one still hears the term “the company” used in reference to 
SEPTA, which reflects SEPTA’s image as a profit-oriented 
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operation with a self-serving management that has little 
identification with riders or employees.208 
 
The memo reflected accurately the position in which SEPTA found itself in the 
early 1970s – underfunded, subjected to increasing hostility from both government 
officials and the public, and struggling for its very survival.  James McConnon realized in 
the early 1970s that the transit authority’s model, which consisted almost entirely of 
providing commuter service, was not an economical one.  On his travels throughout 
Europe, McConnon saw first-hand how transit systems in London, Paris, and elsewhere 
provided comprehensive transportation service throughout the day, rather than merely at 
two distinct times per day.  In late 1971, therefore, McConnon announced his hope to 
transform SEPTA’s commuter system into a “total transportation complex” for the 
Philadelphia region.  At a luncheon meeting of the Delaware Valley Council, McConnon 
bemoaned the fact that Philadelphia 
has seen the flight of highly productive elements of its 
population to the suburbs, a substantial loss of its industrial 
tax base – 42,000 jobs in just 18 months – and the isolation 
of its center-city district by an extensive area of urban 
blight, housing a substantial number of dislocated under-
privileged people.  Beyond the inner ring of urban blight 
lies the outer ring of suburbia with its constantly increasing 
population extending to the outer boundaries of the 
region.209 
  
In McConnon’s view, the deterioration of mass transportation was both cause and 
consequence of the current state of the urban environment.  Since World War II, he 
continued, “instead of expanding our public transit facilities, we have surrendered our 
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internal transportation needs to the private automobile, adopting express highways as the 
solution to the urban mass transportation problem.”  As a result, “There has been during 
the past 40 years virtually no urban transit development in the Philadelphia metropolitan 
area.”  Less than 20% of the city’s population and less than 10% of the region’s 
population used the urban mass transit system, compared to the Paris Metro’s 60% 
ridership figure.  The ridership numbers were not surprising, because Philadelphia’s 
urban system consisted almost entirely of two high-speed lines – the Market-Frankford 
and Broad Street lines – that intersected only at City Hall.  This limited system stood in 
stark contrast to those of Paris and London, which boasted “a relatively large numbr of 
individual lines intersecting at many points throughout the systems” with the result that 
“any person entering the system at any point can reach virtually any other p int within 
the city by high-speed transportation.”  The rail system, although consisting of twelve 
radial lines, served mainly suburban commuters, and there existed no easy way for most 
city residents to get onto the system to travel out of the city.210  
McConnon’s proposed solution to Philadelphia’s transportation problems was to 
create a “total transportation complex” by implementing four major improvements:  
adding more commuter railroad station stops within the city limits; putting high-speed 
passenger cars on existing freight rail lines; creating high-speed bus routes on major 
streets and possibly even closing some streets to all but bus traffic; and tying together 
disparate elements of the transit system by creating “transit control centers” at major 
interchanges to ensure coordination between different modes of transport.  The plan, said 
McConnon, could be put into action for less than the $1.3 billion being spent to create the 
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Bay Area Rapid Transit System in northern California.  Philadelphia’s transportation 
complex would offer “some real hope for changing transit economics for the better” and 
“insure real mobility to all the people in our metropolitan area.”211 
Unfortunately, at a time when SEPTA was struggling for its very survival, 
McConnon’s idea to create a total transportation complex generated little interest.  As 
McConnon recalled later, “it never really got off the ground; it really didn’t have a 
chance.”212  McConnon was, however, among those who lobbied the federal government 
in the early 1970s to allow the diversion of funds earmarked for highways to urban mass 
transportation projects.  In 1973, Congress passed legislation allowing cities to receive 
general treasury funds to be used for mass transit in exchange for cancelling urba  
interstate highway routes.  The new law represented yet another major crack in the 
dominance of expressway planners and engineers, and just as importantly, allowed 
SEPTA to survive a rocky period in its history.  
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“At the Expense of the Inner-City Poor”:   
The Triumph of the Commuter Railroads, 1974-1984 
 
 
Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, the democratization of Philadelphia’s 
transportation politics, which reached its apex with the final defeat of the Crosstown 
Expressway in 1973, came full circle, regressing to become less democratic nce again.  
The city wound down its expressway era by completing the Delaware Expressway in 
1979, and then turned most of its attention to mass transportation.  Because highways 
often served affluent automobile owners, many of them living in the suburbs, and mass 
transit systems were patronized frequently by the working-class and poor, including a 
substantial number of African Americans, the shift in emphasis from highways to mass 
transit could have entailed a more equitable distribution of transportation resources across 
lines of race and class, as was the case in several other American cities.  No such 
transformation occurred in Philadelphia, however.  In the City of Brotherly Love, larg  
business interests continued to exert powerful influence over transportation planning, 
resulting in policies that remained most favorable to middle-class and affluent whites. 
Until its final days, the Delaware Expressway was a product of Philadelphia’s 
more democratic highway politics.  From 1973 on, the main source of controversy was 
the effort by community groups, mostly in Queen Village, to eliminate expressway ramps 
that would have flooded their narrow neighborhood streets with traffic.  The ramp 
protestors emulated those who had opposed the Crosstown Expressway, who had 
themselves taken cues from the Society Hill activists who sought to have their portion of 
the Delaware Expressway lowered and topped with a cover.  Ironically, the Great r 
341 
 
Philadelphia Movement and the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, both of 
which had supported the Society Hill effort, now opposed the campaign, which they had 
helped indirectly to inspire, to eliminate expressway ramps from a nearby section of the 
same highway.  Nevertheless, the campaign was successful, resulting in the elmination 
of some of the ramps in addition to a pledge from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation to build noise barriers along a section of the road. 
Shortly after the end of the expressway era, Philadelphia witnessed the 
culmination of a quarter-century-long effort to save its faltering commuter railroads, both 
of which had gone bankrupt in the early 1970s after decades of financial instability.  
SEPTA’s urban mass transit system was in dire straits as well.  The transit authority had 
no dedicated, guaranteed source of funding; in addition to acting as a funnel for federal 
transportation grants, it relied on yearly contributions from the state as well as its five 
member counties.  The city of Philadelphia (identical in scope to Philadelphia County), 
by far the largest member of SEPTA as well as home to the greatest amount of tra sit 
service, provided a large percentage of SEPTA’s funding.  Like other cities, Philadelphia 
suffered a budget crunch in the 1970s as the consequences of decades of losing both 
population and jobs to the suburbs, combined with severe inflation, hit home.  While 
Philadelphia’s crisis was not as severe as that of New York City – which avoided 
bankruptcy narrowly in 1975 after President Ford refused the city a federal bailout – t 
was nevertheless significant.   
Despite all elements of Philadelphia’s mass transit needing help, City Hall and 
SEPTA favored the commuter railroads and their affluent white patrons over the inner-
city mass transit system, used primarily by poorer Philadelphians, many of whom were 
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African American.  The city and the authority made their top two priorities the 
acquisition of the commuter railroads and the construction of the expensive Center City 
Commuter Connection.  The bias in the way the city allocated the mass transit resources 
available to it reflected the desires of large business interests, who had since the 1940s 
been concerned with the revitalization of the central business district.  The railroads, 
unlike the subways, buses, and trolleys, were perceived as crucial to keeping Center City 
full of business executives, office workers, and high-end retail shoppers, diners, and hotel 
guests.               
Philadelphia’s actions with respect to mass transportation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s were decidedly undemocratic.  While some business leaders and politicians 
tried to portray Philadelphia as overwhelmingly in support of the tunnel, this was far 
from the truth.  In fact, public opinion ran against the project heavily, at least among 
those willing to express their opinions publicly.  Citizens wrote letters to government 
officials, newspapers, and radio and television stations, formed advocacy organizations, 
and even filed a lawsuit to stop the tunnel from being built.  City residents who had no 
choice but to ride SEPTA’s ancient, neglected urban transit system could not fathom how 
SEPTA and the city could justify using $240 million in federal funds to construct a 
railroad tunnel that would be used primarily by suburban commuters, instead of using 
those funds to improve and maintain the city’s subways, buses, and trolleys.  Mayor 
Frank Rizzo and other city officials claimed that the city had no choice regardin  how to 
spend these federal funds, but the evidence shows otherwise.   
In the end, the city’s business and governmental elites, along with the 
construction unions, steamrolled the opposition, pushing the project through over the 
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vehement objections of most Philadelphians.  When SEPTA assumed control of the 
commuter railroad system in 1983 and the tunnel opened in 1984, the Philadelphia area 
achieved transportation planners’ longstanding goal of creating an integrated regional 
transportation system.   Although the commuter tunnel, by unifying two separate railroad 
systems, was a crucial element of the regional system, many perceived it as having come 
at the expense of an increasingly marginalized urban population.   
“A Reasonable and Dignified End”:  The Delaware Expressway 
 
Philadelphia’s era of major expressway construction was coming to a close in the 
latter half of the 1970s.  Times had changed considerably since the City Planning 
Commission issued its Comprehensive Plan for Philadelphia in 1960.  That plan, had it 
been carried out in full, would have crisscrossed nearly the entire region with pavement, 
with major expressways encircling Philadelphia as well as radiating from it in every 
conceivable direction.  Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, government budgets 
tightened, making extensive highway construction difficult.  At the same time, cultural 
changes, embodied in Philadelphia by fights over the Delaware and Crosstown 
Expressways, made it more difficult for planners and engineers to build highways where 
and how they chose.  Perhaps even more importantly, the city’s business community 
awoke to the reality that highways often created rather than eliminated trffic congestion, 
and that a greater emphasis on rail transit would contribute more to the preservation of 
the city’s central business district than would additional expressways.  As a result of 
these factors, most of the expressways proposed in the Comprehensive Plan were never 
built.       
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Although expressway construction by no means came to a complete stop, the 
city’s only major expressways in the mid-1970s were the Schuylkill Expressway, 
completed in 1959, and the Delaware Expressway, the downtown portion of which was 
still mired in controversy.  The Neighborhood Preservation Coalition, made up primarily 
of civic groups from waterfront neighborhoods, had in 1973 filed a lawsuit to stop 
PennDOT from constructing entrance and exit ramps that would funnel Delaware 
Expressway traffic through narrow residential streets.  While the groups attempting to 
push the ramps through – including the Chamber of Commerce, the Greater Philadelphia 
Movement, the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, and the Penn’s Landing 
Corporation – claimed to be concerned about the impact of expressway delays on the city 
as a whole, the NPC alleged that they represented only the interests of big business and 
were worried only about lost profits.1  
The NPC’s suspicions were given credibility when Penn’s Landing Corporation 
president Thomas McCloskey revealed that the undertaking had stalled due to Delaware 
Expressway delays.  Potential investors, he said, were reluctant to commit financing to 
the waterfront development project until they knew the status of the expressway.  
William Stewart, McCloskey’s business partner, said it would be impossible to attract 
visitors to Penn’s Landing without the highway; meanwhile, Philadelphia ’76, the official 
bicentennial planning agency, took steps to move its history exhibit away from Penn’s 
Landing due to the uncertainty hanging over the area.2  State officials let it be known that 
they considered the NPC’s suit to block the ramps to be the direst threat to the 
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expressway’s completion.  PennDOT head Jacob Kassab offered a compromise that 
would have routed traffic onto Delaware Avenue rather than South and Bainbridge 
Streets, but both sides rejected this idea.  Groups in favor of the ramps proclaimed ther 
willingness to litigate rather than agree to a compromise, and the NPC was equally
unbending, demanding the outright removal of two of the four planned ramps in the 
Society Hill/Queen Village area.3   
Tensions rose when ramp opponents accused the four business groups favoring 
the ramps of “condoning the rape of Philadelphia’s historic area.”  The Evening Bulletin, 
lacking the NPC’s cynicism about the motives of business organizations, opined that the
charge was unfair, asserting that “the whole history of Philadelphia’s efforts to revitalize 
itself has been marked by the fusion of civic-minded business and government to 
accomplish specific projects aimed at betterment of the whole community.”4  William 
Krebs, the president of the NPC, put it bluntly when he said, “it is the Chamber of 
Commerce against the neighborhood people.”5 
In late January 1974, anxious to put an end to the litigation that was delaying the 
Delaware Expressway, Kassab agreed to the NPC’s demand to eliminate two ramps in 
Society Hill and Queen Village and thus replace four ramps on the west side of the 
expressway at Lombard, South, Bainbridge, and Kenilworth Streets with two ramps on 
the Delaware Avenue, or east side, of the highway.  The northbound ramp would be 
placed at Lombard Street, while the southbound ramp would curl over the expressway 
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and deposit traffic on Delaware Avenue between South and Bainbridge Streets.  This 
proposal was focused on sparing the Society Hill and Queen Village sections of the city 
from ramp-generated traffic, a fact that caused discord elsewhere.  “Now that the 
coalition has the state in its corner,” the Evening Bulletin reported, “other civic and 
business groups in affected areas of South Philadelphia are up in arms.”6  A special 
mayor’s advisory committee reported that the NPC’s proposal was unacceptable and 
suggested that negotiations continue for another 60 days in an effort to find a solution 
that everyone liked with a reversion to the state’s original plans if negotiations failed.7  
But the committee’s recommendation came just after PennDOT had spoken and seems to 
have been ignored. 
State Senator Henry Cianfrani, whose district covered both the Queen Village and 
Pennsport sections of South Philadelphia, was not pleased by the compromise, which 
would have left an on-ramp at Morris Street in Pennsport – a mostly white, working-class 
area below Queen Village – as the only southbound expressway entrance between the 
Benjamin Franklin and Walt Whitman Bridges.  As a result, Cianfrani considered 
withdrawing his support from the NPC lawsuit and filing another one on behalf of 
Pennsport.  “I’m not going to save one community at the sacrifice of the other,” he said.  
The Pennsport Civic Association and its 10,000 members had been “very cooperative” 
with the NPC, he explained, “and they got shafted.”8  Cianfrani’s protests bore fruit, as 
almost immediately Mayor Rizzo announced a new agreement that would remove the 
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Morris Street on-ramp in an attempt to quell the controversy and get the Delaware 
Expressway finished before the bicentennial.9  As the grateful president of the Pennsport 
Civic Association told Rizzo, “had this ramp remained, our community would have been 
a disaster area.”10  The decision, said Rizzo, was “in line with the city’s policy of seeking 
community approval of projects which directly affect area residents.”11  To placate those 
who feared that inadequate ramp access would kill the Penn’s Landing development, 
state officials promised that access roads to the waterfront would be provided to avoid 
cutting off Penn’s Landing from Center City, thereby allowing the $100 million 
development project to move ahead and, it was hoped, reach its conclusion by the crucial 
year of 1976.12 
By mid-1974, things seemed to be looking up for highway advocates.  A tentative 
compromise had been reached on the ramp issue, the Society Hill portion of the 
expressway was to be depressed and covered, and to make matters even better, the 
Federal Highway Administration had given Philadelphia a $40 million “bicentennial 
bonus,” to be matched by $4 million in state funds, to ensure that the Delaware 
Expressway would be in shape for the bicentennial celebration.13  As was typical with 
respect to this highway, however, the good times did not last long.  In November, the 
Evening Bulletin reported that due to rampant inflation, Pennsylvania had used up all of 
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its highway funds for the fiscal year.  Officials projected that the lack of funds would 
slow down construction of the expressway near the airport and in Society Hill, among 
other places.14  A worried Frank Rizzo wrote to U.S. Secretary of Transportation Claude 
Brinegar complaining of a “cash flow shortage,” the consequences of which were 
“disastrous.”  How, he asked, could the state obtain additional federal funding to 
complete the Delaware Expressway?15  Brinegar replied that President Ford had directed 
that federal highway funds be deferred during fiscal year 1975 “for the purpose of 
stretching out Federal spending to minimize immediate unfavorable budgetary impact.”  
Despite his bureaucratic language, Brinegar’s meaning was clear – no additi nal funds 
would be immediately forthcoming for Pennsylvania highways.16 
Perhaps because the lack of available funds slowed construction on the Delaware 
Expressway to a snail’s pace (PennDOT revealed in January 1975 that the final link 
wouldn’t be completed in time for the bicentennial), it seems that the parties involved did 
not pursue with urgency the finalization of the ramp settlement.17  In fact, it was not until 
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December 1975 that the NPC, PennDOT, and the city of Philadelphia entered into a 
formal consent decree, ending the NPC’s lawsuit and setting forth the terms under which 
the state would be permitted to open the Center City portion of the Delaware 
Expressway, once it was completed.  The final agreement provided that there would be 
only three expressway interchanges between the Benjamin Franklin and Walt Whitman 
Bridges:  a northbound exit at Front and Morris Streets as well as a southbound exit a 
northbound entrance between South and Bainbridge Streets.  All of the ramps were to 
connect with waterfront thoroughfare Delaware Avenue rather than smaller residential 
streets.18 
The Inquirer hailed the settlement as “a symbol of the neighborhood’s victory 
over highway planners and business leaders who argued vainly that other proposed ramps 
would be good for Philadelphia’s economy and traffic flow.”19  Conrad Weiler, the head 
of the Queen Village Neighborhood Association and later the head of the NPC, recalled 
that the citizen protests and neighborhood demonstrations that took place both before and 
during the lawsuit were responsible for the favorable settlement, “because that’  w t 
helped the politicians to line up on our side.”20  Those on the losing side vented their 
frustration.  “We fought them and lost,” said Jim Martin, the director of the Old 
Philadelphia Development Corporation.  “These people are crazy down there.  They don’t 
seem to understand that traffic is like an octopus.  If you shove it in a box and close off 
some of the holes, the tentacles will pop out someplace else. . . . They used to say when 
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you came to Philadelphia on a Sunday, it was closed.  Now they’re going to say they 
came to Philadelphia and couldn’t get off the expressway.”21 
Although the ramp controversy was over, the battle over the Delaware 
Expressway wasn’t finished quite yet.  Due to the slow pace of construction on the Cen er 
City link of the expressway, things stayed quiet for several years following the 1975 
consent decree.  But the decree itself, while settling the NPC’s lawsuit, plan ed the seeds 
of further controversy with its requirement that the state, prior to opening the expressway, 
construct noise barriers along a significant portion of the route.  PennDOT completed the 
expressway portion in question in March 1979, but had not yet built the barriers.  
Philadelphia, while finally having an expressway that ran the entire length of its 
waterfront, could not rejoice, for the state was prohibited by court order from opening the 
road.  
Philadelphia motorists were chomping at the bit to use the new expressway.  
Especially eager were the people of Northeast Philadelphia, whose automobile travel to 
Center City was made much more difficult by having to exit the expressway at Callowhill 
Street.  In January 1979, before the entire Center City portion was even complete, 
someone moved the barriers aside and a few cars made their way onto the highway.  Tis 
brief, unauthorized experiment was put to an end quickly by NPC head Conrad Weiler, 
who, waving the consent decree, told motorists that they were in contempt of court and 
demanded that the barriers be put back in place.22 
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Once the expressway was completed in March 1979, tensions rose.  As Weiler 
recalled, the issue of whether to wait for the completion of the noise barriers had been 
more or less academic before the highway was actually ready for traffic, but once 
everything else was finished, it became a zero-sum game, with the NPC’s insistence on 
its barriers the only remaining obstacle to opening the expressway.23  City Councilman 
Melvin Greenberg of Northeast Philadelphia led the charge to open the Delaware 
Expressway without waiting for the state to finish the noise barriers.  Greenberg and his 
constituents believed that allowing certain neighborhoods to dictate the terms under 
which the highway could be opened was allowing the many to be inconvenienced to 
preserve the special privilege of the few.  When Greenberg spoke out, using similar logic, 
against allowing neighborhoods to have input on a proposed ordinance regarding 
sidewalk cafes, Weiler struck back, writing in an open letter: 
You would like outdoor cafes in our neighborhood so that 
your constituents can come to town and enjoy themselves, 
and you would like I-95 open in part so that they can have 
an easier time getting into our neighborhood.  The fact that 
both the outdoor cafes and I-95 are bad for us who live her  
and have to suffer the noise, dirt, fights, crime, trash, 
blocked streets, lack of parking, broken curbs, sidewalks 
and pipes, pollution, shouting and other side effects of 
people coming through and into our neighborhood for their 
own enjoyment is apparently of little concern to you or the 
other sponsors of this bill.24 
 
By August, with the barriers still not finished and the otherwise completed stretch 
of expressway standing empty, tempers reached the boiling point.  Councilman 
Greenberg led a 500-person protest meeting in Northeast Philadelphia at which he 
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complained that a handful of people were stopping thousands of drivers from using the 
highway and threatened a “motorized blockade” of downtown if a resolution could not be 
achieved quickly.  PennDOT was eager to open the road as well, and joined by the 
Northeast Chamber of Commerce, asked federal judge Clifford Scott Green to allow 
traffic onto the expressway in spite of the consent decree.25     
Briefly, it appeared that the NPC and PennDOT had reached a compromise 
agreement that would have allowed traffic to use the Center City portion of the 
expressway while construction on the noise barriers continued, but the deal fell apart after 
a few days of negotiations.  An “extremely upset” Greenberg, who had delayed his 
motorcade protest during the negotiations, announced that the protest was back on, 
huffing, “I am not a sucker and I’m not going to be played for one.”26  When PennDOT 
suspended negotiations on August 9, Greenberg and his constituents sprang into action 
the following morning with a motorcade designed to tie up traffic and create unbearable 
noise in Society Hill and Queen Village.  At least 70 cars and a few sixteen-wheeler 
trucks started at the Roosevelt Mall in Northeast Philadelphia, crawled down the 
expressway at speeds as low as 20 miles per hour, exited at Callowhill Street, and then 
drove slowly, with horns blaring, down 2nd Street and up 3rd Street before heading to 
Penn’s Landing for a rally.  Conrad Weiler scoffed at the demonstration, claiming it “had 
no effect on the community” and that the expressway would be opening soon in any case.  
What did concern Weiler, however, was that Greenberg and others were “whipping up 
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public rage,” and that the motorcade had presented “a potential for violence.”27  Weiler’s 
comments were most likely informed by the fact that as the public face of those seeking 
to keep the highway closed, he had been receiving death threats from those wanting to 
use it.28 
The theme of the protests emanating from Northeast Philadelphia was clear:  this 
was a class issue, and it was the affluent, privileged few who were demanding special 
treatment at the expense of the working class.  As the Inquirer reported, many of the 
people it interviewed at the motorcade protest said “they were there to show the ‘upper 
classes’ that they would not be pushed around.”  “Where do these people in Society Hill 
get off?” asked one outraged protestor.  “There’s a double standard in this country.  They 
have money and we don’t.”  Others complained that they lived near the Delaware 
Expressway in the Northeast and had to deal with the same problems those in Society 
Hill and Queen Village were trying to avoid.  As one put it, “We get the noise.  We get 
things flying off the highway you wouldn’t believe, flares and whole logs and whatnot.  
But we live with it. . . . Our houses mean as much to us as theirs do to them.”29  Weiler 
resented the characterization of the dispute as a class war, protesting that Queen Village 
was, despite some renewal, still mostly blue-collar, and that Northeast Philadelphi  
wasn’t entirely working-class either.  As Weiler recalled later, Melvin Greenberg “was 
oversimplifying it on both sides.”30 
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Despite Weiler’s protests, the NPC seemed to be losing the public relations battle, 
as state officials and many Philadelphians wanted the expressway opened.  On August 
13, the NPC was forced to sign an agreement modifying the 1975 consent decree and 
allowing PennDOT to open the Center City stretch of the expressway while continuing to 
build the noise barriers, leading Greenberg to crow, “We won.”31  Judge Green, 
remembered Weiler, “called us into his chambers and he read us the riot act, off the 
record. . . He very kindly said, ok now, the city needs to get this highway opened.  So you 
work this out and everything’s fine; if you don’t work it out, then I’m going to do what I 
have to do.”32  As Weiler explained in the QVNA newsletter, “It was immediately 
obvious that the Judge felt I-95 should open.  Under incredible pressures, a circuslike 
atmosphere, and a great deal of exaggeration, distortion and personal abuse from some 
politicians and media . . . we attempted to negotiate a reasonable and dignified end to this 
chapter of the I-95 fight.”33   
On August 31, 1979, the final piece of the Delaware Expressway in Center City 
opened to traffic.  An exhausting fight, lasting nearly 25 years in its various phases, was 
over.  There was no ribbon-cutting ceremony; there were no speeches.  In fact, only about 
25 people witnessed the opening, most of whom were either reporters, police officers, or 
state highway engineers.  A PennDOT official remarked, “Most of them open with a lit le 
more fanfare, but it was decided to do it this way.”34  It was therefore with a whimper, 
and not a bang, that Philadelphia’s era of major expressway construction came to an end.
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 “A goddamn hole in the ground”:  The Commuter Connection 
 
As Philadelphia began to move away from expressway construction as a result of 
cultural, political, and budgetary factors, the city focused on how to preserve its mass 
transportation systems, all of which were in financial crisis.  The 1970s were not kind to 
the Penn Central and Reading Railroads, both of which went bankrupt, or the urban mass 
transit system SEPTA had acquired from the Philadelphia Transportation Company, 
which was losing money and deteriorating rapidly.  Philadelphia and SEPTA made it 
clear that they were most concerned with preserving the commuter railroads, which both 
City Hall and the business community had since the 1950s believed to be vital to the 
health of the central business district.  The Center City Commuter Connection, the 
enormously expensive tunnel designed to link the two commuter rail systems, remained 
the region’s number one transportation planning priority. 
The Old Philadelphia Development Corporation’s Market East Committee, which 
the city placed in charge of spearheading the Market East renewal project, had been 
pushing the tunnel since 1965.  The tunnel and the new train station that was to 
accompany it would allow workers and shoppers from anywhere in the region to 
disembark in the heart of what was now a deteriorating retail district.  OPDC and the 
area’s retailers, including several large department stores, hoped to make a new shopping 
center, called The Gallery, the centerpiece of the area’s commercial r vitalization, and 
felt that the venture could not succeed without suburban customers.  Other private 
investments, in office buildings and the like, were made in reliance on the tunnel project.  
With both big business and the city’s labor unions – desperately in need of work – in 
favor of the tunnel, City Hall found itself under intense pressure to seek federal funds for 
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the project.  Philadelphia joined with the suburban counties making up SEPTA to ensure 
that the tunnel was the transit authority’s top priority in the 1970s.   
Philadelphia residents, however, began to rebel against the idea of the commuter 
tunnel because they perceived it as a boondoggle aimed at benefitting big business and a 
handful of suburban commuters at a time when a financial crisis was pushing SEPTA’s 
urban transit system, under strain ever since the PTC takeover, to the breaking point.  
Moreover, the Department of Transportation was refusing in the early 1970s to commit 
the full federal funding necessary for the project to move forward on the grounds that the 
tunnel appeared to be more about neighborhood redevelopment and business growth than 
about transportation.   
The tunnel controversy reached its apex in the years between 1975 and 1977, as 
many citizens and much of the local media portrayed SEPTA and city officials as 
choosing to spend federal funds on the tunnel rather than on the crumbling urban transit 
system.  Officials denied making any such choice, contending that the Departm nt of 
Transportation and the Urban Mass Transit Administration had earmarked funds for the 
tunnel specifically and that these funds could not be used for any other purpose – a claim 
that seems in retrospect to have been false.  In the end, despite the belief of manythat the 
tunnel was not cost-effective from a transportation standpoint, the combined weight of 
big business and political pressure overcame resistance to the tunnel within both 
Philadelphia and the federal government.  Ground was broken for the project in 1978, and 
by 1984 the Philadelphia region had an integrated mass transportation system – a system 
weighted heavily toward commuter rail travel that favored affluent suburban whites over 
poor, working-class, and minority inner-city travelers. 
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In the mid-1970s, the tunnel appeared to be going nowhere.  William Grabske, 
Mayor Rizzo’s transportation deputy, fretted over a 1974 speech by new president Gerald 
Ford in which he stated that the federal government should not be in the business of 
funding transportation projects that were really aimed at economic development or 
increasing urban density.  The president’s attitude, Grabske worried, could jepardize 
efforts to find funding for the tunnel.  Moreover, the UMTA recommended that the tunnel 
project be subjected to a three-week review by the Department of Transportation’s 
Systems Center, the track record of which suggested that it would recommend against 
funding the tunnel.  These developments, said Grabske, constituted a “major setback.”35  
When the Transportation Systems Center released a generally favorable report, however, 
Grabske was pleasantly surprised, calling it “a highly professional and technically 
competent review.”  While taking issue with some of the report’s assumptions, Grabske 
nevertheless claimed that the report “provides conclusive evidence that the Center ity 
Commuter Connection is a sound public investment decision.”36 
Despite the TSC report, the staff of the UMTA remained strongly opposed to the 
Commuter Connection.  An internal memorandum from October 1974 set forth the 
agency’s objections: 
Taken in isolation the connector tunnel may make sense.  
When set in the context of Philadelphia’s broader transit 
picture, it looks highly suspect.  After all, what we are 
talking about is a $260 million project that will affect 
Philadelphia’s commuter rail riders – only 8% of the area’s 
total transit ridership.  Furthermore, the connector will 
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expand capacity to permit total transit ridership to increase 
.014% more than it would have without the connector by 
1985.  Spending more than one-quarter of a billion dollars 
on this magnitude of ridership expansion seems luxurious, 
particularly when other high volume segments of the 
system are crying out for capital investment.37 
 
Meanwhile, proponents of the tunnel continued to emphasize to the federal government 
that the project was designed to benefit the entire region and not just the city.  William 
White of OPDC told Secretary of Transportation Claude Brinegar that the tunnel was 
“much more than a Center City improvement effort or a Center City development 
catalyst,” but rather would be almost like creating an entire new transportation system for 
the area.38  The favorable TSC report and the efforts of both city officials and private 
citizens notwithstanding, 1975 dawned without an agreement on funding the tunnel.  
When President Ford nominated Philadelphia lawyer William T. Coleman for Secretary 
of Transportation (making him the second African American cabinet member in U.S. 
history), many worried that Coleman’s appointment could spell doom for the tunnel, 
reasoning that it would look like favoritism for him to award his home city a huge and 
controversial transportation grant immediately upon taking office.  Thus, the race was on 
to reach an accord for federal funding before Coleman assumed his new position.39   
According to Mike Mallowe, who penned “The Black Hole,” the highly critical 
1979 review of the tunnel that ran in Philadelphia Magazine, the UMTA’s doubts about 
the tunnel’s cost versus its transportation benefits were overridden by political 
considerations with the strings being pulled by President Ford himself.  Allegedly, 
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prominent Philadelphia Republicans told the Republican National Committee that Ford’s
ability to carry the city (whose political landscape Democrats had dominated sinc  1951) 
– and thus the state of Pennsylvania – in the 1976 election would hinge on federal 
approval of the tunnel.  Ford, who took his marching orders supposedly from the RNC, 
felt according to Mallowe that “if the decision-makers in Philadelphia were in favor of 
the tunnel, then the tunnel had to be a good thing.”  As a result, the UMTA, at the behest 
of both the White House and the RNC, requested more information from Philadelphia 
about the tunnel’s costs and benefits in early 1975.  Philadelphia’s response included, for 
the first time, an estimate from SEPTA that the new equipment it would need to utilize 
the tunnel’s full benefits would cost an extra $393 million.  This shocking piece of 
information had no effect because, said Mallowe, with the UMTA receiving under orders
from the White House and the RNC, “common sense no longer mattered.”40   
Just a few days before Coleman took office, the UMTA sent Philadelphia a memo 
approving the tunnel in principle and laying the groundwork for the negotiation of a 
formal contract.  Even after the approval memo, UMTA administrator Robert Patricelli 
“made one final plea for sanity,” according to Mallowe, telling Philadelphia officials that 
they should ask instead for federal funds for urban transit improvements.  Whereas the 
UMTA was funding urban projects in other areas and was assisting with the constru tion 
of new subways in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and San Francisco, “Nowhere was there a 
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commuter tunnel like Philadelphia’s on the drawing board.”41  Philadelphia ignored 
Patricelli’s entreaty, however. 
Mayor Rizzo, who was under pressure from the city’s labor unions, which formed 
a major part of his political base, rejoiced at the 10,000 construction jobs the tunnel was 
expected to create and proclaimed that the project would “create a comprehensive 
regional rail network capable of dealing with our mass transit needs for the next 50 
years.”42  Secretary Coleman, however, was upon taking office concerned about 
appearing to show favoritism toward his home city, and refused to give Philadelphi 
everything it wanted.  By October 1975, the estimated cost of the 1.7-mile tunnel had 
risen to an astounding $300 million.  The federal government was willing to cover 80% 
of the cost, or $240 million, with $180 million up front and the remaining $60 million 
once all state and local funds had been committed to the project.  There was still concern, 
however, that the state would renege on its pledge to cover 10% of the costs, or $30 
million.  Harrisburg had appropriated only $9 million so far, and if it failed to approve the 
remaining $21 million, the city would find itself on the hook for that amount plus any 
cost overruns should the tunnel’s price rise even higher than $300 million.43    
The DOT’s financial arrangement – dubbed by some the “Coleman Rule” – 
whereby the federal government still refused to commit to covering increased costs above 
and beyond its initial commitment, caused city officials to fear that the tunnel would 
remain a dream.  The city’s finance director, Lennox Moak, opposed the tunnel for this 
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reason, considering it unacceptable for Philadelphia to enter into an open-ended funding 
commitment.44  As William Grabske pointed out, the DOT’s “limited funding” concept 
had never been used with respect to such a massive project as the Commuter Connection.  
There were several ways, in addition to the rampant inflation of the 1970s, in which costs 
could increase – utility relocation costs, larger than estimated condemnation awards, 
unknown conditions underground which could make construction more complicated, and 
other unforeseen delays.45  One local community newspaper asserted that the tunnel 
would be “Philadelphia’s very own Vietnam,” explaining, “Like American higher-ups 
ignoring reports of Viet Cong strength, tunnel supporters, for reasons of their own, are 
looking right past the single overwhelming reason for halting construction before it 
begins:  the cost will be staggering, possibly twice the estimated $300 million.”46 
Coleman defended his refusal to fund cost overruns, pointing out that the DOT 
had taken this position with respect to Atlanta’s mass transit system, MARTA, with good 
results.  “I feel that as a public servant my duty is to spend the federal taxpayers’ money 
wisely,” Coleman explained.  “I do not think anyone can read the history of escalation of 
costs in large public works projects, many of which costs should have been predicted 
prior to the time the project was started, and then continue to have respect for a public 
servant who did not take all possible steps to prevent this disastrous trend.”47  Just days 
after this pronouncement, however, the Coleman Rule was put to the test when a report 
from the Greater Philadelphia Partnership (formerly the Greater Philadelphia Movement) 
                                                     
44 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 14 December 1975, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
45 William Grabske to Philip Carroll, Hillel Levinson, and Lennox Moak, 18 November 1975, City of 
Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.6, Administration of Frank L. Rizzo. 
46 the new paper, 25 November 1975, SEPTA Collection, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE.  
47 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 18 February 1976, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Newsclipping Collection, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, PA. 
362 
 
revealed that the tunnel’s cost had already risen from $300 million to $307.7 million.  
OPDC’s Market East Committee, which continued to spearhead the drive for the tunnel, 
had seen a draft of the report in late 1975 and was not pleased.  Jim Martin met with 
members of the GPP to express his “concern at negative connotations in the study.”48 
The Inquirer noted that the cost would most likely rise even higher due to “legal 
delays related to condemnation, delays in the delivery of materials, work slowdowns or 
strikes, poor cost estimating, revised labor contracts, as well as change orders during the 
course of construction.  Any large public works project is susceptible to these 
‘unknowns.’”49  In response, Coleman violated his own policy by agreeing to rewrite the 
contract to reflect the new estimate of $307.7 million.50  Just months later, he made a 
partial concession, agreeing to pay 80% of all cost overruns due to inflation, acts of God, 
increases in condemnation costs and other unanticipated costs that could be attributed to 
federal actions or inactions.  The federal government’s capitulation on this point was an 
absolute necessity to proceeding with the tunnel project, as the city had refused to sign an 
agreement without such protection.  The Market East Committee hailed the “major bre k 
through [sic] in the former fixed funding rule.”51  Coleman’s change of heart did not lead 
to the immediate negotiation of a final agreement for the tunnel, however.   
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Just when it appeared that Philadelphia was making major progress in its long, 
hard fight to obtain federal funding for the Center City Commuter Connection, the project 
met its greatest resistance from the urban transit riders of Philadelphia, in large part 
because of the aforementioned financial crisis in which SEPTA found itself in the 1970s.  
SEPTA admitted in the mid-1970s that since World War II, Philadelphia’s mass transit 
“systems fell apart and ridership went from masses to minorities . . . those few who could 
not afford a car, or were too old, young, or infirm to drive one.”  Although this trend was 
beginning to reverse, these were “awful” financial times, leaving SEPTA to face “a 
mammoth mandate and a worldwide mess.”52     
In a time when the urban transit system was under great strain, it was no surprise 
that many Philadelphia residents objected to a huge expenditure for a commuter rail 
tunnel.  In December 1975, residents protested to City Council that the money the cit
would spend on the tunnel would mean fewer funds for badly needed neighborhood 
improvement projects.  Father Joseph Kakalec, president of the Philadelphia Council of 
Neighborhood Organizations, urged that federal money be used for improvements to the 
city’s mass transit system rather than the tunnel.  The tunnel, he argued, was “of limited 
and questionable value to the City and unquestionably of no value to the City’s 
neighborhoods.”  These protests had little effect, however, for the same day that City 
Council heard the residents’ objections, its Committee on Public Works approved $20 
million to purchase properties needed for the tunnel, and two weeks later the entire City 
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Council gave its assent.53  In response, the protests became more organized, and in March 
1976, a coalition of four neighborhood groups from North Philadelphia – the Northwest 
Task Force on Abandoned Housing, the East Poplar Stop the Tunnel Committee, the Ad 
Hoc Committee for Logan, and Neighbors United for Action – took up the cause.54 
It had seemed as if the transit authority’s financial picture – the main factor
driving the tunnel protests – might improve when Congress passed the National Mass 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, which for the first time provided federal 
transportation grants to be used for mass transit operating expenses (in addition to capital 
improvements).  The Act pledged $11.8 billion toward mass transportation, with 
approximately $7.8 billion earmarked for capital improvements and $3.9 billion for 
operating expenses, to be matched by local funds.  SEPTA touted the efforts of its 
chairman in lobbying for the bill, calling James McConnon “the industry’s chief 
spokesman urging the passage of this breakthrough legislation.”55   
Despite the increase in federal assistance, SEPTA continued to operate at a 
deficit.  Former mayor James Tate, disheartened by the lack of progress made by the 
transit authority he had helped to create, resigned in frustration from SEPTA’s board in 
late 1975.  SEPTA, he told Mayor Rizzo, “has not met the challenge originally intended 
by those who drafted and supported the enabling Pennsylvania State legislation in 1963.”  
While eliminating private ownership and the profit motive that came with it was 
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supposed to have resulted in improved service, SEPTA “was never intended to be a 
deficit operation,” he said.  In order to maintain adequate service, Tate concluded, the 
authority would need even more subsidies from all levels of government.56  Apparently 
SEPTA riders agreed with Tate, as throughout 1975 complaints about poor service and 
fare increases continued to pour into Rizzo’s office.57 
The complaints about Philadelphia’s mass transit continued in full force in 1976 
as those inside and outside of government voiced their displeasure.  William Grabske, the 
mayor’s transportation deputy, advocated asking for state aid in buying new cars for the 
Broad Street Subway, which was operated by SEPTA but was actually a city-owned 
facility.  The Broad Street line, Grabske pointed out, had “the oldest subway cars in
America” and constituted a “severe embarrassment to the City and to the Mayor.”58  In 
addition, a new group known as the Transit Action Coalition (TAC) formed in April 
1976, describing itself as “a coalition of individuals and of over forty community and 
consumer organizations working together for better SEPTA service for all, includi g the 
elderly and the handicapped.”  The TAC did not identify, either by name or location, the 
community groups alleged to have joined the coalition’s ranks.59  That September, 
SEPTA made significant cuts to its overnight bus and trolley service in neighborhoods 
throughout the city, impacting primarily blue-collar workers who used the service to 
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travel to late-night or early-morning jobs.60  Soon after, the TAC wrote to Rizzo, calling 
SEPTA’s service “despicable,” demanding the restoration of the eliminated service, and 
proposing the creation of an independent funding source for the transit authority so it 
would not be dependent on the vicissitudes of yearly state, county, and city budgets.61 
A primary goal of the organization was to present its views in person to the 
SEPTA board of directors.  Its initial request met with resistance, however.  SEPTA 
secretary Margaret Nellany told the group that it was not “the policy of the board to use 
the board meetings for public input.”62  The board was not in unanimous agreement with 
this policy.  When McConnon asked board members for their opinions, Harold Kohn 
argued that “since SEPTA is required by law to serve the public, it appears to me that the 
views of the public should be welcomed and entitled to serious consideration.”63  But 
Kohn was in the minority, and McConnon and the SEPTA board remained, in the TAC’s 
words, “insensitive to the public’s needs.”  The organization considered several different 
strategies for getting its point across, including blocking corridors and elevators at a 
SEPTA board meeting, holding their own “board meeting” for the press, a march on City 
Hall, sit-ins at SEPTA facilities and visits to elected officials.64   
In the meantime, the TAC finally made some headway when, after writing to 
Rizzo, its leaders secured a meeting with Deputy Mayor Philip Carroll and SEPTA board 
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member Lawrence Stoltz.65  After the meeting, Carroll and Stoltz asked McConnon to 
hold a special board meeting to discuss some of the issues the group had raised.66  On 
October 27, the TAC presented its grievances to the SEPTA board.  Reverend Maureen 
Doggett told the board that SEPTA’s service was “inadequate in the extreme.  It is dirty, 
undependable, slow and unsafe.  We represent the majority of citizens in the City when 
we say that the taxpayers of this area deserve better .”  Doggett and other TAC members 
presented three specific demands:  the restoration of recently eliminated service; the 
pursuit of a source of permanent funding for the authority; and measures to improve 
safety and security for riders, such as the use of Lexan glass (actually a strong 
polycarbonate, or plastic material) and two-way radios in vehicles.  With regard to 
SEPTA’s funding, the group pointed out that since 1969, the city’s contribution to the 
authority had risen from $2 million to over $20 million, while the state’s had gone from 
$4 million to $54 million, with no one held accountable for how these funds were being 
spent.67 
Unsurprisingly, the TAC also opposed the commuter tunnel, calling it “a slap in 
the face to the citizens of this city” and calling for the money to be spent on urban transit 
improvements.  Chairman McConnon acknowledged that SEPTA was aware of the 
                                                     
65 Philip Carroll to Frank Rizzo, 21 October 1976, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City 
Archives, RG 60-2.6, Administration of Frank L. Rizzo. 
66 Philip Carroll and Lawrence Stoltz to James McConnon, 25 October 1976, City of Philadelphia, 
Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.6, Administration of Frank L. Rizzo. 
67 Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Excerpt of transcript of board meeting, 27 October 
1976, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, RG 60-2.6, Administration of Frank L. 




problems, calling the TAC’s testimony “hard to hear,” and pleading inadequate funding.68  
Shortly after the SEPTA hearing, the TAC sought to expand its influence by conducting a 
march on City Hall in order to attract more people to its cause as well as to inform
SEPTA “that our struggle for better transit in this city will never mellow or be 
compromised” until the group achieved its aims.  The organization claimed that it began 
the march with between 75 and 90 people, gathered more supporters along the way, and 
finished with 300.  The march, claimed the TAC, had “broadened the nature of our 
movement against SEPTA so that it has a city-wide nature.”69         
While SEPTA was struggling to improve the region’s mass transportation systems 
and dealing with an avalanche of criticism, its efforts to acquire the area’s commuter 
railroad operations continued.  The 1972 memoranda of understanding that SEPTA and 
the railroads had signed had not yet been approved by the bankruptcy court, keeping the 
fate of Philadelphia’s commuter service in limbo.  In 1973, however, Congress passed the 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which resulted in the creation of Conrail, a federal 
entity whose purpose was to merge the Penn Central, the Reading, and other bankrupt 
northeastern railroads in order to keep them in business with the caveat that only freight 
operations would be maintained.  The federal government’s position meant that unless 
SEPTA was prepared to take over the region’s commuter rail service by thetime Conrail 
acquired the Reading and the Penn Central, that service would be lost, with devastating 
consequences to the area’s transportation.  In 1975, with the Conrail takeover scheduled 
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for February 1976, SEPTA informed Conrail of its intent to take over the commuter lines 
and was scrambling to apply to the UMTA for the funds necessary to do so.70 
Federal legislation required SEPTA to make a “firm commitment” to acquire or 
lease the parts of the commuter system not included in Conrail’s Final System Plan.  If 
SEPTA failed to give such a commitment, Conrail was authorized to stop service on 
those parts of the system (which would result in a shutdown of the region’s entire 
commuter rail system) on February 27, 1976.  If the transit authority could commit to 
buying the commuter lines by January 8, it would be able to do so at liquidation prices; 
otherwise it would have to buy directly from the railroads’ trustees, who would seek a 
higher price on behalf of the companies’ creditors.71  The bankruptcies of the Reading 
and Penn Central and the resulting opportunity for SEPTA to take over commuter 
railroad service in the Philadelphia region could not have come at a worse time, however.  
SEPTA’s financial woes prevented it from making the necessary commitment, and the 
deadline passed without it having done so.   
With a possible rail shutdown looming, the Evening Bulletin reported with 
exasperation that “SEPTA hasn’t been able to get Philadelphia and suburban county 
officials together on its own, even when the issue is the basic one of discussing their 
relative shares of the transit authority’s deficit.  This is a disgrace.”  The result of this 
lack of cooperation, noted the paper, was SEPTA’s failure to fulfill its destiny “as an 
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effective and truly regional transit authority,” a situation that had “understandably 
puzzled and annoyed” federal officials.72  Thankfully for Philadelphia-area commuters, 
the federal government did not follow through on its threats to discontinue commuter rail 
service.  On April 1, 1976, Conrail assumed control of Philadelphia’s commuter rail 
operations, meaning that for the first time, the region’s commuter rail system was under 
the control of a single entity.  Conrail agreed to operate the lines for the time be ng under 
an agreement whereby SEPTA committed to providing $22.6 million per year in 
subsidies to cover operating costs – an amount that was, in a curious shell game, expected
to be covered by increased federal subsidies to SEPTA.73  Conrail and its workers were 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the railroads, while SEPTA set fares and 
schedules.  The separation of funding and control soon caused controversy, particularly 
with regard to SEPTA’s inability to control labor costs. 
SEPTA’s failure to complete its planned takeover of the region’s commuter rail 
lines may have been a blessing in disguise, as 1976 proved to be a particularly 
tumultuous year for the transit authority.  The trouble began in April, when the city, 
under financial pressure itself, proposed to cut its contributions to SEPTA from $21 
million to $18 million.  Finance Director Lennox Moak advised that SEPTA would need 
to raise its fares from 35 to 50 cents to compensate for the reduction in governmental aid.  
When SEPTA did so, the city’s representatives on the SEPTA board of directors used 
their veto power to nullify the fare increase, completing a strange sequence of events that 
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the Philadelphia Inquirer characterized as “a little hard to follow.”74  Outraged observers 
asserted that the city’s reducing its contributions served to legitimize the state’s failure to 
provide adequate mass transit subsidies.  As the Evening Bulletin pointed out, the state 
was spending more than three times as much on highways as on mass transit while 
keeping the state’s transit subsidies “at the same relatively low level for the third year in a 
row.”75 
SEPTA’s response to the veto of its fare increase was to request that the city
either rescind its veto, or assume responsibility for the transit system.76  The request – or 
ultimatum, as some perceived it – was not received well in City Hall.  Mayor Rizzo 
responded angrily to SEPTA General Manager William Eaton, ruling out the possibility 
that the city would take over the system and chiding SEPTA for its tactics.  The main 
thrust of Rizzo’s argument was that the city was already paying too much to support 
SEPTA and that suburban governments were not pulling their weight.  He wrote Eaton: 
The City of Philadelphia will not, as long as I am the 
Mayor, take over and operate its own transportation system. 
. . . I also wish to inform you, unequivocally and 
categorically, that the City’s two members of the SEPTA 
Board of Directors will continue to exercise their veto over 
any proposal to increase fares.  We will not be intimidated 
by threat or scare tactics.  Your present brinksmanship is 
the result of your own wasteful extravagance while you 
have repeatedly refused to adopt the effective management 
procedures and economies advocated by the City of 
Philadelphia.  The City will not be the scapegoat for your 
failures and should not rectify your lack of performance by 
paying higher subsidies which are already excessive when 
compared to those of the suburban counties.  The City and 
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the Commonwealth are already paying more than their fair 
share, and SEPTA should place its management house in 
order by seeking greater subsidies from the suburban 
counties rather than from the City, State, or fare box.77 
 
The facts regarding city versus suburb contributions were not really on Rizzo’s 
side.  In 1975, SEPTA vehicles traveled 59.8 million miles in Philadelphia and 15.7 
million miles in Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery Counties combined.  
Philadelphia provided subsidies that year equivalent to 22 cents for each resident of the 
city, while Montgomery County paid 26 cents per resident, Delaware County 41 cents, 
Bucks County 71 cents, and Chester County $1.19.  “The suburbs, in short,” pointed out 
the Evening Bulletin, “get a lot less transit for their subsidy dollars than Philadelphia 
does.”78  The Inquirer agreed with Rizzo that the city had some valid complaints 
regarding the level of service SEPTA provided in exchange for government aid, but 
acknowledged that the city could not “reasonably expect the state and the suburbs to 
increase subsidies to SEPTA when the city is decreasing its subsidy.”79  Regardless of the 
merits of Philadelphia’s position, it soon became clear that the city would have to 
contribute more to keep SEPTA alive. 
A few days after Rizzo’s angry tirade to Eaton, Secretary of Transportation 
Coleman informed the city that a SEPTA shutdown could jeopardize federal funding for 
the city’s pet project – the Center City Commuter Connection.  Mayor Rizzo and 
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Governor Shapp had to find a way to keep the system running, admonished Coleman.80  
SEPTA claimed that it was almost completely broke and could guarantee that its 
employees would be paid only until May 29.81  The transportation unions, of course, 
announced that they would not work without pay.  “Is SEPTA crying wolf again?” asked 
the Evening Bulletin.  “Its critics, including Philadelphia and Pennsylvania transportation 
officials, say yes.  SEPTA’s spokesmen say no, they’ve never cried wolf, and the current 
crisis is the most serious ever faced.”82  The problem stemmed largely from increased 
operating costs, which due to inflation had more than doubled over the past six years.  
Passenger volume, meanwhile, had shrunk, and the decrease in revenue from fares meant 
that government subsidies were over a period of several years forced ever higher.  By 
1976, fares covered less than half of SEPTA’s $223.5 million in operating costs.  All of 
this occurred at a time when inflation was stretching governmental budgets to the 
breaking point and Philadelphia was itself in danger of going broke.  When the transit 
authority needed government help the most, therefore, the state and county governments 
began reducing their contributions to its coffers.83 
Despite Rizzo’s anger at SEPTA, he recognized the reality of the situation:  the 
city could not afford a mass transit shutdown and would have to step in to prevent one.  
On May 21, Rizzo announced that “once again” the city was forced to “bail out” the 
transit authority in order to keep it operating until June 30, when more state and federal 
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funds would be available.  Philadelphia agreed to provide $20.9 million to be matched by 
the state on a two-to-one basis in addition to $4 million of unmatched funds.  Rizzo, 
according to the city’s announcement, “said this was brought on by mismanagement as 
well as by insufficient contributions from the other counties, the state and the federal 
government.”84 
The drama over a possible SEPTA shutdown occurred at the same time as, and 
provided the backdrop to, the period of greatest controversy regarding the Center City 
Commuter Connection.  While officials at all levels of government scrambled to try to 
figure out how to keep the region’s mass transit system operating, they also forged ahead 
with the $307 million tunnel project, a fact that caused consternation among many, 
especially those who relied on SEPTA’s urban mass transit system and were fed up with 
the poor service they were receiving.  In October 1976, a group called the Coalition for 
Better Transportation for the City, made up of a handful of unidentified community 
groups, picketed depots and blocked buses, tying up the system and inconveniencing 
thousands of riders before a court injunction put a halt to their activities.85  Just days later, 
Secretary Coleman stoked the fires of controversy when he announced that rather than 
allocating $240 million toward the commuter tunnel, he was considering giving 
Philadelphia a block grant for that amount and allowing the city to spend the money on 
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any transportation projects it wished.86  Jim Martin of OPDC believed that Coleman was 
motivated by “personal dislike for the project.”87 
Coleman’s announcement was followed quickly by cries from tunnel opponents to 
use the money for urban mass transportation projects rather than the Commuter 
Connection.  Managing Director Hillel Levinson, however, made it clear that any block 
grant would be used for the tunnel, provided the city could secure a final agreement 
providing for cost overruns.88  But Levinson’s announcement failed to quell the protests, 
which thanks to Coleman now intensified.  Most of the protests came in the form of 
letters to the media and various government officials, Mayor Rizzo in particul.  A 
representative letter from a member of the Spruce Hill Community Association stated 
that the federal funds “should be used solely for capital improvements in the city’s transit 
system” and, parroting the language Father Kakalec had used earlier, clled the tunnel 
project “of limited and questionable value to the city’s neighborhoods.”  The Commuter 
Connection, continued the author, was “another attempt to subsidize suburban residents 
at the expense of city residents . . . and I object to this use of my tax money.”89  Another 
protestor was even harsher, calling Rizzo “out of step with the people” and the tunnel 
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“grossly unfair . . . because it tends to increase the already lopsided advantage of affluent 
suburbanites . . . at the expense of the inner-city poor.”90   
The letters revealed clearly the tension within cities that regional transportation 
planning – which the federal government had promoted heavily since the 1960s – could 
create.  As a community newspaper pointed out in 1975, “Federal money must be applied 
through the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, and DVRPC will back a 
project that aids commuters over one oriented towards Philadelphia.”91  While the 
DVRPC was an advisory planning agency and lacked actual authority over how to spend 
federal grants, Executive Director Walter Johnson recalled later that the commission’s 
plans were, “for all practical purposes, more than advisory, because neither of the states, 
nor the federal government will fund a project that isn’t on our plans and isn’t included in 
our capital program. . . . Our plans do come with that authority behind them.”92  The 
president of one neighborhood organization spoke undoubtedly for many Philadelphians 
when he told Rizzo, “the city government must be responsive to city residents first and 
regional problems second.”93  Five members of the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives agreed, asking the mayor to divert the federal money to neighborhood 
transit improvements.94  Overall, public opinion in the city stood strongly against the 
tunnel.  Letters to Rizzo’s office critical of the project outnumbered vastly those in favor 
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of it, the same was true of letters to the newspapers, and a Philadelphia Daily News poll 
resulted in a landslide vote of 1,042-29 against the tunnel.95 
Although most protesting was done by mail, some groups did undertake more 
active forms of resistance to the commuter tunnel.  In late October, 150 demonstrators 
from the Coalition for Better Transportation marched on City Hall to demand that the 
federal funds be used for the urban transit system rather than the tunnel.  Although the 
Bulletin said the march “went virtually unnoticed,” the protests continued.96  In 
November, 66 members of Community Organizations Acting Together (COACT) from 
the Germantown, Kensington, Logan, Poplar and West Oak Lane neighborhoods in 
North, Northwest, and Northeast Philadelphia held their own march on City Hall in an 
attempt to see Levinson.97  When five of them were allowed in, their spokesman argued 
that the city could not afford the tunnel, that SEPTA could not afford to operate it, and 
that the money was desperately needed for urban mass transit and neighborhood 
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projects.98  Although these protests were small, the potential for larger marches existed, 
as was revealed by a letter to the mayor opposing the tunnel from the Philadelphia 
Council of Neighborhood Organizations, which claimed to represent 113 different 
groups.99 
As was mentioned above, Philadelphia’s business community was the strongest 
force behind the tunnel because of the project’s potential to revitalize the Mark t East 
retail area.  In fact, according to some close to Frank Rizzo, the mayor was skeptical 
about the tunnel and pursued it only in response to overwhelming political pressure from 
the city’s business interests.  Reportedly Rizzo had derided the tunnel as “a goddamn 
hole in the ground,” that wouldn’t get him any votes from an urban constituency forced to 
use SEPTA’s crumbling mass transit system.  According to Philadelphia Magazine, 
however, business leaders with “an enormous financial stake in downtown development,” 
“wound up besieging” Rizzo to live up to his campaign promise of support for the 
business community.  The magazine painted the issue in stark terms, alleging that “the 
Market Street East renewal project, with the tunnel as a key element, was strictly a 
regional suburban scenario” and that “city shoppers and city transit riders were nev  
really taken into consideration.”100   
In addition to putting pressure on Rizzo, many members of the business 
community wrote letters directly to Secretary of Transportation Coleman urgi g him to 
make a specific grant for the project.  Republican Thacher Longstreth, a two-time 
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candidate for mayor, former city councilman, and head of the Chamber of Commerce, led 
the business effort to get the tunnel built and told Coleman in late 1976 that “anticipation 
of the Center City Tunnel has already put several key office and retail projects into 
motion” and that once it was built, the tunnel would “trigger a series of further exciting 
center-city developments” that would reach into several neighborhoods beyond Market 
East.  The Chamber’s support for the project, he made clear, was based primarily on its 
collective belief that it would “provide an impetus to Center City development resuling 
in many hundreds of millions of dollars of private investment.”101 
At the end of 1976, the city sent Secretary Coleman a list of all development 
activities that could be traced to the commuter tunnel project.  In total, Philadelphia 
claimed, nearly $1.3 billion was or would be invested because of the tunnel – $331 
million in the Market East area (including development completed, underway, and 
proposed), $253 million of development completed or underway in other areas that would 
be served by the tunnel, and $674 million of proposed development in those areas.  The 
Gallery retail complex in Market East was the centerpiece.  Other projects included new 
office buildings (including one at 1234 Market Street, which became SEPTA’s 
headquarters), renovation of existing retail stores, additional parking garages, new 
apartments and townhouses, a restaurant and museum on the waterfront at Penn’s 
Landing, and new medical complexes for the Jefferson, Hahnemann, and University of 
Pennsylvania Hospitals, just to name a few.  The projects listed were so wide-ranging in 
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both geography and purpose that it appeared as though officials attributed virtually all of 
the city’s ongoing development to the Commuter Connection.102   
In a similar vein, the DVRPC released a report in conjunction with transportation 
engineers Simpson & Curtin that emphasized the overall economic impact of the tunnel. 
The project, asserted the report, would stimulate business, relieve the tax burden on city 
residents by encouraging suburbanites to work in the city and pay Philadelphia’s wage 
tax, and help the construction industry.  Without the tunnel, fewer workers would be 
willing to commute into the city, leading to vacant office buildings and higher taxeson 
residents.103  The promotion of the tunnel as a boon to development reflected the fact that 
the DOT under Coleman’s leadership was taking a different approach than it had under 
former Secretary John Volpe, when the perception that the tunnel was more about 
neighborhood redevelopment than about transportation weighed against federal funding. 
By and large, it is fair to say that Philadelphia’s postwar transportation planning 
favored big business at the expense of the working class and poor.  In the particular case 
of the Center City Commuter Connection, however, an important exception to this 
general truism must be acknowledged.  Whereas most Philadelphians opposed the tunnel 
in favor of improvements to SEPTA’s urban transit system, members of the construction 
unions that stood to win jobs building the tunnel felt differently.  The construction sector 
of organized labor, along with big business, formed a major constituency pushing for the 
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project, and in the eyes of some, had even more influence over Rizzo.  As Philadelphia 
Magazine put it, the economic slowdown of the early 1970s, “had hit labor hard and they 
let Rizzo know it.”  If the union officials who provided Rizzo with crucial support lost 
their power, asserted author Mike Mallowe, “so too would go the base of Frank Rizzo’s 
hard-hat constituency.”104 
Frank Rizzo – and his connection to organized labor in Philadelphia – must be 
considered in the context of the city’s racial politics.  As was mentioned above, Mayor 
Tate appointed Rizzo Commissioner of Police in advance of the 1967 mayoral election to 
curry favor with white voters made uneasy by the 1964 North Philadelphia riot and 
subsequent expressions of black unrest.  Rizzo’s methods, characterized by his supporter  
as a “law-and-order” approach and by his detractors as racially-motivated police 
brutality, made him Philadelphia’s most polarizing figure.  As Matthew Countryman 
explained, Rizzo was “the focus of black anger about the persistence of racial inequities 
in the city,” and “the key figure in the resurgence of a racialist politics in Philadelphia’s 
white working-class neighborhoods that demonized black activism as the main threat to 
the local social order.”  A seminal incident in Rizzo’s career occurred in November 1967, 
immediately after Tate’s reelection, when African American students from several city 
high schools marched on the Board of Education building for a Black Power protest rally.  
Rizzo, according to witnesses, ordered his officers to charge the protestors, yelling “Get 
their black asses.”  The commissioner himself participated in what Countryma called a 
“vicious” attack on the protestors, “swinging his billy club freely.”  His reelection secure, 
Tate wanted to fire Rizzo in the wake of the incident, but was forced to reconsider after 
                                                     
104 Mike Mallowe, “The Black Hole,” Philadelphia Magazine 70, no. 7 (July 1979):  158, SEPTA 
Collection, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE. 
382 
 
an outpouring of support for the commissioner from the city’s white ethnic 
neighborhoods.105 
Seeking to become Philadelphia’s mayor in 1971, Rizzo continued to capitalize 
on the white backlash against the civil rights movement, fracturing further the city’s 
liberal coalition, which had, since the days of Joseph Clark and Richardson Dilworth, 
included African Americans and white residents together.  Rizzo ran as “the toughest cop 
in America,” and, according to Countryman, “ran a campaign that explicitly accused the 
city’s liberal elites of cowering in the face of black militants.”  Rizzo won the election 
over Republican Thacher Longstreth by capturing the votes of large white ethnic groups 
such as the Italians, Poles, and Irish as well as those of most white laborers and most 
white working- and middle-class voters who lived in neighborhoods becoming racially 
integrated.  He lost 21 of the city’s 22 mainly African American wards.  Rizzo’s tw -
term tenure as mayor was marked by continuing racial, class, and cultural divisions.106 
Racial tensions in Philadelphia made that city, according to the New York Times, 
“perhaps more than any other major city . . . ripe for Mr. Rizzo’s blunt, ethnic based, law-
and-order appeal.”107  Historian Rick Perlstein called Rizzo “[Richard] Nixon’s sort of 
Democrat.”  It therefore made sense that Nixon – who counted Frank Rizzo as one of his 
strongest supporters – chose Philadelphia as the test case for his strategyto destroy the 
Democratic Party.  Nixon’s “Philadelphia Plan” aimed to use voluntary affirmat ve action 
goals to increase black employment in the construction trades.  While the Republican 
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base would not be pleased, the true intent behind the plan was, as Perlstein explained, to 
drive “a wedge through the Democratic coalition at its most vulnerable joint:  between 
blacks and hard-hats.”108 
Rizzo’s role in Philadelphia’s racial politics and the extent to which he relied on 
the support of organized white workers helps to explain the dynamics surrounding the 
tunnel project.  Philadelphia’s mass transit was patronized heavily by poor and working-
class residents of all races.  It is likely, therefore, that some of thewhit  construction 
workers who later provided most of the labor for the tunnel rode the city’s buses, trolleys, 
and subways as well.  Nevertheless, white construction workers most likely did not 
perceive their interests as aligning with those of the African Americans who also used the 
transit system.  In the difficult economic climate of the 1970s, it seems that most workers 
(along with their union leaders) prioritized the opportunity for steady employ ent over 
improvements to a communal resource such as mass transportation.   
Opposition to the commuter tunnel was interracial, but those who attempted 
actively to prevent its construction formed a small subset of those who merely disfavored 
the project.  The extent to which Philadelphia’s working class was fractured in the 1960s 
and 1970s by the racial divisions that helped propel Frank Rizzo to power and inspired 
Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan most likely prevented working-class whites, whether members 
of the construction unions or not, from deserting Rizzo solely over the tunnel issue or 
forming a broad interracial movement to push for mass transit improvements.  Likewise, 
African Americans were not likely to be inspired to support Rizzo under any 
circumstances, regardless of whether he pushed for major urban transit improvements in 
                                                     
108 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland:  The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York:  
Scribner, 2008), 515, 521. 
384 
 
lieu of the tunnel.  In sum, the political conditions Rizzo had encouraged in the first place 
made it rational for him to prioritize the needs of the business and white organized labor 
communities (whose interests converged in this instance) and ignore the interests of other 
working-class Philadelphians who used mass transportation, counting on the fact that 
racial tensions made whites unlikely to turn on him and blacks unlikely to support him in 
any case.109                                 
Many perceived the battle lines as drawn clearly – the question was whether 
Philadelphia should use the forthcoming $240 million federal transportation grant for the
commuter tunnel or for other urban mass transit projects.  In fact, however, a controversy 
existed over the nature of the grant itself and whether Philadelphia would have a choice 
in how to use that grant.  After Coleman’s October 1976 statement, most of the public 
believed that how to use the grant was entirely up to the city.  Mayor Rizzo and other city 
officials denied this interpretation, insisting that DOT had not authorized the use of 
tunnel funds for other projects.110  KYW, a prominent local television and radio news 
organization, ran editorials stating that Rizzo’s position “doesn’t seem to fit the facts.”  
When KYW called Coleman’s office for clarification, it was told that “the federal money 
is available for the tunnel or any other appropriate transit improvements Philadelphia 
wants.”  Rizzo, the station speculated, “doesn’t want to use the money to fix up SEPTA – 
which is what you want.  Maybe the Mayor wants to stick with that tunnel.”111  SEPTA 
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chairman James McConnon, who was in favor of the tunnel, recalled nevertheless that 
those who claimed that the money couldn’t be used for other transportation projects 
“were just trying to make sure it didn’t happen.”112  
Others jumped in to defend Rizzo’s position, however.  City Transit Engineer 
Edson Tennyson criticized KYW’s editorials, admitting that there was “a modicum of 
legal truth” in the statement that the money could be used for other purposes, but insisting 
that “it is not practical.”  Any attempt to divert the federal grant, he explained, would 
require new studies, approvals, and legislation to provide local matching funds.  This 
lengthy process could result in Philadelphia losing the money entirely, because “the 
currently available federal funds could be exhausted before the eligibility of alternate 
projects could be cleared.”113  Augustine Salvitti, the executive director of the 
Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, also admonished KYW for implying that the 
$240 million federal grant was all the federal money available to Philadelphia when in 
fact Coleman had said the city would receive $560 million over the next four years.114  
As the battle raged on over the nature of the federal grant and how it should be used, 
SEPTA’s financial crisis continued, which only added to the tension.  By the end of 1976, 
the authority was running on fumes, with a $14 million deficit, and facing a possible 
shutdown in the spring of 1977.115 
By the end of 1976, sources were telling the Ev ning Bulletin that “the city 
convinced Coleman that it would be impossible to use the $240 million in federal funds 
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earmarked for the tunnel, for other transit projects.”  City and federal officials would 
soon finalize a deal for the tunnel, the paper reported, that would include a promise by the 
federal government to pay cost overruns due to inflation while leaving the city 
responsible for increased costs caused by mismanagement.116  Martin Feldman of 
COACT wrote to Coleman, denouncing the city’s attempt to justify the tunnel “throug  
these lies about ‘private investment.’”  “It is inexcusable for you to agree to this wasteful 
project knowing that the citizens of Philadelphia are so strongly opposed,” he continued.  
“You will be making a very tragic mistake if you sell the neighborhoods down the river 
by sneaking this project throughout [sic] during the last 30 days of your job.”117 
Despite needing to be convinced that the money could be used only for the tunnel, 
Coleman had his own reasons for favoring the project.  According to Philadelphia 
Magazine, Coleman saw the Commuter Connection as “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity 
for Philadelphia’s construction industry to increase its minority representation 
dramatically.”  The Secretary insisted, therefore, that the final agreement for the tunnel 
include provisions mandating that African Americans would be involved in substantial 
numbers in all phases of the project’s construction.  By 1979, however, what the 
magazine called “Coleman’s black power vision” had “faltered badly,” as the city’s
construction unions had failed to include more African American workers and contracts 
awarded to black-owned business constituted a miniscule percentage of the project’s total 
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cost.118  Two years later, the situation had not improved.  The P iladelphia Tribune 
reported that the tunnel had produced only 1,000 total jobs, a mere 10% of what had been 
projected.  African Americans had been promised 4,000 jobs but had received only 250.  
According to the paper, “reliable independent sources” estimated that black contractors 
had received only $1 million out of the $30 million of business that had been pledged to 
them.  An attorney studying the matter on behalf of the Public Interest Law Center of 
Philadelphia alleged that major contractors were “playing a game” by hiring black 
subcontractors and laborers to comply with federal requirements and then laying them off 
quietly.119 
In January 1977, the long battle over the tunnel neared its end when Rizzo and 
Coleman signed a contract finalizing the $240 million federal funding arrangemet for 
the project.120  The final agreement included as exhibits nearly 50 pages of letters 
addressed to Rizzo and Coleman, most of them from business leaders, creating a concise 
historical record of exactly who was providing the necessary political pressure.  Among 
the letters were pleas for the tunnel from banks (First Pennsylvania Bank, Philadelphia 
National Bank, The Girard Company, the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, Continental 
Bank, and Colonial Mortgage Service Company), insurance companies (Penn Mutual 
Life Insurance Company and Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company), retailers 
(Gimbels, Strawbridge & Clothier, John Wanamaker, and The Gallery at Market East), 
realtors and real estate developers (Lanard & Axilbund and Franklin Town Corporation), 
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as well as the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, the Chamber of Commerce, and 
the OPDC Penn’s Landing Corporation.121   
In his remarks at the news conference announcing the agreement, Coleman 
pointed out that “Federal transit investments can have economic and social impacts on 
their host cities in addition to their direct transportation benefits. . . . While important 
transportation-related benefits will flow from this project, much of its justifica ion has 
always been argued to lie in its employment and economic development impacts.”122  
Among the conditions upon which Coleman approved the tunnel were pledges that $170 
million more would be invested in commercial development and office construction over 
the next four years and that the mayor and City Council would finance public 
improvements in the area.123  Rizzo remained less than thrilled about the tunnel, feeling 
that political realities had forced the project down his throat.  As the story goes, once 
Philadelphia had inked the deal with the DOT, the mayor called Managing Director Hillel 
Levinson and engineer George Shaeffer into his office and told them, “I don’t give a 
damn what you guys do with it.  I don’t care where you dig or what streets you close, but 
I’m just warning you that that tunnel better not fuck up the Mummers Parade.”124   
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Both before and after the city signed the tunnel agreement, Rizzo’s office was 
deluged with mail, with city residents remaining largely opposed to the tunnel and 
business owners and labor leaders expressing heartfelt gratitude.  Rizzo also wrote to 
officials of the Plumbers Union, the Wharf and Dock Builders, the Roofers, the Laborers, 
the Laborers District Council, and the Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades 
Council, thanking them for their support.125  The city’s media were generally quite 
critical of the commuter tunnel and the process by which it was approved, as transcripts 
from radio and television editorials from late 1976 to early 1977 made clear.  Perhaps the 
harshest was television station WCAU, which in November 1976 urged city officials to 
use the federal grant for urban transit improvements, editorializing: 
If you’re a commuter, you already know what riding 
SEPTA is like.  The subway and the el cars are strewn with 
filth, drunks, graffiti and junkies.  The dark, dank stations 
reek of who knows what, and shelter muggers and rapists.  
If you take the bus, you stand for endless periods of time 
waiting for late vehicles with broken windows, faulty 
heating and seats filled with noisy ruffians looking for 
trouble.  If you’re forced to take a trolley, you endure the 
exquisite torture that only a clanking ride on these antiques 
can provide. . . . Mayor Rizzo, the people of Philadelphia 
don’t ride a chauffeured limousine to work!  Hundreds of 
thousands of them take public transportation.  They don’t 
care about the convenience of a few suburban commuters 
who have to take a bus between the Reading Terminal and 
Suburban Station.  They have to take SEPTA all the time.  
So here’s your choice, Mr. Mayor:  Satisfy big business 
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interests and suburban commuters, or help the little people 
who need SEPTA to get around this city.126 
       
KYW defined the issue in simple terms:  “The People Against the Tunnel.”  
“Well, the big shots who are used to running Philadelphia don’t like interference from the 
neighborhood people,” the station fumed.  “City Hall is counting on the neighborhood 
people to give up the fight and go away, and it wouldn’t be the first time that’s happened. 
. . . But this time is going to be different.”127  WCAU complained of “an erosion of 
participatory democracy,” claiming that the tunnel deal was made “in the dark, behind the 
closed doors of City Hall . . . without any attempt on the part of the City Administration 
to determine what the public wants.”128 
KYW was right – tunnel opponents weren’t ready to give up the fight just yet.  
But now the battle shifted from the court of public opinion to a court of law.  The tunnel 
agreement was followed by a lawsuit, filed in federal court by a coalition of groups – 
including the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations, the Poplar Stop the 
Tunnel Committee, the Coalition for Better Transportation in the City, the United 
Northeast Civic Association, and the North Philadelphia branch of the NAACP – seeking 
to block the tunnel.129  The involvement in the suit of plaintiffs from both the African 
American Poplar neighborhood and predominantly white Northeast Philadelphia reflected 
the continuing interracial nature of opposition to the tunnel.  One of the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers was Robert Sugarman, fresh from his successful fight to block the Crosstown 
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Expressway.130  Back in September 1976, Sugarman had outlined some of his many 
arguments against the tunnel to UMTA administrator Robert Patricelli, alleging that the 
UMTA had ignored its own technical reviews, which had recommended against building 
the tunnel; that the agency had also failed to consider alternate mass transit projects as 
was required under federal law; that it had ignored the results of an investigation into 
discrimination against minority and low-income groups; that the sole public hearing held 
on the tunnel in 1974 had been “a farce”; and that the decision to build the tunnel had 
been made before an Environmental Impact Statement had been completed.131 
The crux of the tunnel lawsuit was that the UMTA’s grant to Philadelphia was 
illegal because it was based on “politics rather than policy.”  The plaintiffs relied on both 
internal UMTA memos expressing doubt about the tunnel as well as the expert opinions 
of consultants who felt the project was a waste of money.  Moreover, the lawsuit claimed, 
the tunnel would preclude millions of dollars in needed improvements to SEPTA’s urban 
transit system with the result that railroad passengers would get $3,000 per year in federal 
subsidies while urban riders would get only $187.  One especially egregious exampl was 
the elimination of a planned two-way radio system on city buses designed to protect
operators and passengers from the violent crime now plaguing the system.132  A study 
commissioned by Philadelphia’s Institute for Civic Values predicted that over the ensuing 
six years, only 15% of needed improvements to the city’s buses, subways, and trolleys
would actually receive funding, while nearly all requested railroad projects would be 
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approved, with the result that a mere one-third of transportation money spent in the 
region would benefit city neighborhoods.  “The decision to fund the tunnel,” the study 
concluded, “is a decision to put the needs of suburban commuters above those of 
residents of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.”133 
Edson Tennyson – one of the city officials who had argued vehemently that 
Philadelphia could not use the federal grant for projects other than the tunnel – continued 
to fight the characterization of the tunnel as solely for the benefit of suburban commuters.  
“The fact is,” he wrote, “that 67 percent of the commuters use city stations.  The 
commuter lines and the commuters on them support center city land and building values 
that pay the taxes to fund the schools, the police, and other city functions so essential to 
low-income neighborhoods which cannot pay enough in taxes to support what they 
need.”  Tennyson had a warning for those Philadelphians who sought to stop the tunnel:  
“Remember the mythology about the king who killed the goose which laid golden 
eggs?”134   
When the City Solicitor’s Office looked like it might lose the tunnel case, the 
Chamber of Commerce urged Mayor Rizzo to hire outside counsel.  The prominent firm 
of Wolf Block Schorr and Solis-Cohen took over the defense with positive results for the 
city.135  The goose to which Tennyson referred was spared the axe when federal judge 
Raymond Broderick (who was the Republican nominee for governor of Pennsylvania in 
1970, losing to Democrat Milton Shapp) dismissed the tunnel lawsuit in September 1977, 
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based primarily on his ruling that Secretary Coleman’s finding that the city had the 
financial ability to live up to its contract with the DOT was not arbitrary or cap i ious 
(the usual standard of review for agency decisions).  Joseph Kakalec, one of the leaders 
of the plaintiffs’ coalition, called Broderick’s decision “a blow for the neighborhoods.”136     
Because City Council had in April voted 14-2 to ratify Rizzo’s agreement with 
the DOT, no procedural obstacles to the tunnel remained.137  The plaintiffs appealed 
Broderick’s ruling, claiming that the tunnel embodied racial discrimination by 
prioritizing white railroad passengers over black bus and subway riders, but the federal 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the appeal immediately.138  On June 22, 
1978 – one day after the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeal and twenty years after the 
Urban Traffic and Transportation Board proposed the Center City Commuter Connecti  
– the city held a groundbreaking ceremony for the tunnel at 9th nd Arch Streets.  Mayor 
Rizzo put on a jubilant face, proclaiming that “the people who mark dates in 
Philadelphia’s history should write June 22, 1978, with all the other dates, including the 
4th of July.”139   
In 1981, with construction well underway, the Inquirer paused to reflect on the 
history of the tunnel and bestowed much of its praise on former mayor Richardson 
Dilworth, who had in the 1950s understood how important to the city’s health the suburbs 
were becoming.  “He wanted to make it easy and pleasant for suburban residents to come
to the city to work and shop and spend money,” the paper editorialized.  “A good railroad 
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system with convenient access to attractive stores and offices and restaurant  nd historic 
places would advance the objective, promote regionalism, and strengthen the city’s 
economic base.”140  But Philadelphia Magazine pointed out a couple of years earlier that 
although Dilworth had seen the value of the commuter tunnel, he “was no fool and he had 
never spent one dime on the idea.”  The magazine quoted a planner who had worked with 
Edmund Bacon on the tunnel idea as calling the project a “god-awful civil engineering 
nightmare.”141 
Nightmare or not, the tunnel finally was becoming a reality, but Philadelphia’s 
commuter railroads – without which the tunnel would be useless – were still in turmoil.  
After escaping death in 1976, the railroads faced another possible shutdown in the spring 
of 1977, but this outcome was averted when SEPTA executed another agreement with 
Conrail that March, extending their arrangement for another year.142  Trouble remained 
on the horizon, as the federal government made it clear it did not intend to subsidize 
commuter railroads indefinitely.  The UMTA threatened to begin to reduce aid in October 
1978 and end it entirely in September 1980.  Democratic Pennsylvania congressman 
Robert Edgar of the House Surface Transportation Subcommittee bemoaned the fact that
his committee was dominated by rural interests who were unsympathetic to mass transit 
in large metropolitan areas.  In addition, he said, Democratic president Jimmy Carter’s 
administration had “shown little sensitivity to the transit issue.”  The problem existed on 
the state and local levels as well.  Faith Whittlesey, chair of the Delawar  County council, 
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complained that “there is no group lobbying for mass transit” and that legislators were 
unwilling to do anything that would take money away from highways.  Mass transit, she 
asserted, “has always been at the bottom of the list of priorities.”143 
Although SEPTA’s relationship with Conrail continued, the two entities fought 
constantly over how much the commuter railroads cost to operate and how much money 
SEPTA would be required to contribute.  Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that 
Conrail was responsible for the daily operation of the commuter lines; although SEPTA 
set fares and schedules, there was little it could do to reduce costs, short of cutting 
service.  For example, Conrail’s employees were still protected by work rules that had 
become antiquated, such as a guarantee of overtime pay for working more than 100 miles 
in a day, which dated from the days before trains were electrified, when they rarely 
covered more than that distance.  Rules such as this cost the railroads between $5 and 6 
million a year, claimed SEPTA.144   
As a result of inflated costs, SEPTA was forced to raise fares 65% in nine months 
in 1979-80.  Conrail remained inflexible about reducing costs, however, leading the 
Evening Bulletin to remark that “Conrail is basically a freight railroad.  It has no love for 
commuter trains, which are more of a headache to it than anything.”  What Conrail 
needed to realize, said the paper, was that running the commuter lines was part of the 
price it paid for the taxpayer support it received for its freight service.  Calls for SEPTA 
to take over the railroads intensified.  In the fall of 1980, the Pennsylvania House 
Committee on SEPTA joined the chorus.  As the Ev ning Bulletin pointed out, the 
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existing situation, whereby SEPTA funded the railroads but had little control over their 
operation, was “untenable.”145 
The situation worsened in 1981 when the Republican administration of President 
Ronald Reagan – which was hostile to mass transportation in general, and rail service 
especially – entered office.  The president proposed to “dismantle Conrail immediately” 
and end all federal operating subsidies for mass transit by 1985.  Reagan’s budget 
proposal included the line, “There is no reason for someone in Sioux Falls to pay federal 
taxes so that someone in Los Angeles can get to work on time by public transportation.”  
Observers noted that the federal government was now reevaluating how rail transit would 
fit into the nation’s overall transportation infrastructure.  “From now on,” the 
Philadelphia Inquirer reported, “Amtrak and Conrail must compete with trucks, airline, 
bus and even automobile transportation systems for federal dollars.”146  Other federal 
officials chimed in, such as Robert Blanchette, the director of the Federal Railroad 
Administration, who remarked that commuter rail service was “a drain on Conrail” and 
that the federal government should not “run Philadelphia and fund it.”147  Claiming that 
losses on commuter service had cost Conrail $80 million over 5 years, the FRA wanted 
Amtrak to take over the service, a proposition SEPTA opposed because Amtrak’s main 
focus was intercity service.148  Reagan’s Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis (who 
was the Republican nominee for governor of Pennsylvania in 1974, losing to incumbent 
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Milton Shapp) wanted SEPTA and other transit authorities to take over the nation’s 
commuter lines immediately.149 
 Northeastern politicians reacted with horror to Reagan’s plans for mass 
transportation.  Toby Moffett of Connecticut, a member of the House Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Commerce, protested that Reagan wished “to cut out so much that we 
would not have train service.”  Subcommittee chair James Florio of New Jersey called 
the administration’s plan “catastrophic” for his region of the country.  SEPTA chair 
David Girard-DiCarlo expressed pessimism as well, remarking, “I don’t thi k hat public 
transit in the Philadelphia area will succeed unless there are some hard decisions made.  
This region faces a moment of truth, and I’m a little scared about this region facing this 
moment of truth.”150  The transit authority’s general manager, David Gunn, agreed.  The 
Philadelphia region’s commuter railroads would grind to a halt in 1982, he claimed, 
without a wage freeze, modernized work rules, and a complete switch to electric s rvice.  
Increasing fares would be counterproductive, as experience had shown that commuters 
would find other ways to get to work.151  
Unsurprisingly, railroad workers formed a large and vocal constituency opposing 
the federal government’s plans to abandon rail transportation.  In April 1981, an 
estimated 15,000 Conrail and Amtrak workers from New England, Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
and Ohio came to Washington, D.C. by bus and train to demonstrate at the Capitol 
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against proposed budget cuts, disrupting commuter rail service in several areas.  
Following the demonstration, Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation expressd strong 
support for the workers and pledged to protect Conrail from the Reagan administration’s 
axe.152  Ironically, railroad employees were a major part of the problem, as the escalating 
cost of labor, which SEPTA was powerless to control, was one of the main factors 
putting Philadelphia’s commuter rail system in jeopardy.153  
Meanwhile, SEPTA and Conrail continued to disagree over how much in 
subsidies SEPTA would be required to contribute to keep the railroads running.  In mid-
1981 the parties were $6 million apart in their negotiations, with Conrail demanding $99 
million and SEPTA offering $93 million.  When SEPTA asked the suburban counties to 
help make up the shortfall, it was rebuffed.  “We can no longer subsidize inefficiency,” 
proclaimed SEPTA board member Robert Thompson of Chester County.  “We cannot be 
bled to death by outdated work rules.”154  In June, Conrail announced its intent to 
discontinue running Philadelphia’s commuter system as soon as possible – meaning as 
soon as the Interstate Commerce Commission allowed it to do so.  David Gunn lamented, 
“We have a better-than-even shot of losing commuter rail service in Philadelphia.”155   
As a result of ever higher fares and poor service on the commuter lines, 
aggravated commuters began to abandon the system, many of them joining van pools.  In 
one year, SEPTA lost 20% of its rail riders, making the future of the railroads even 
bleaker.  Not only would the suburban counties not agree to higher direct subsidies, they 
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rejected a regional transportation tax as well.  An utterly exasperated SEPTA chairman 
David Girard-DiCarlo described his interactions with suburban politicians as follows:  
“Elected officials will say, ‘we don’t want you to cut that service and we don’t want you 
to raise that fare,’ and I say, ‘okay, fine, now I want more money.’  ‘Well, it’s out of the 
question,’ they say.  ‘Not enough people care.’  ‘Let me see if I have this exactly righ .  
Not enough people care for you to want to pay [for] it, but enough people care that you 
want me to keep running it.’  ‘That’s right,’ they say, ‘you got it.’”156   
The region’s commuter rail service hung by a thread, as Conrail and SEPTA 
signed short-term agreements to keep the trains running through December 31, 1981, and 
then March 31, 1982.157  Another potential shutdown loomed in the spring of 1982, 
however, when Conrail again threatened to drop the service.  The area’s commuters 
begged government officials to find a way to keep the trains running.  A citizen attending 
a public hearing in Norristown spoke for many of the region’s 45,000 commuters when 
he said, “The public wants and desperately needs the regional rail system.  It is a 
tremendous public asset which should not be carelessly destroyed.”158  Federal legislation 
called for Conrail to cease its commuter operations on January 1, 1983, with a new 
Amtrak subsidiary to step in and run the lines temporarily until SEPTA could take them 
over.  SEPTA, however, opposed this arrangement, with its management of the opinion 
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that the authority would be able to control labor costs adequately only if it took over the 
lines right away – a goal that was still out of reach financially.159 
After several more months of wrangling between Conrail and SEPTA, the 
commuter railroads’ fate came closer to a resolution in September 1982 when the SEPTA 
board voted to run the trains itself beginning on January 1, 1983 – the date Conrail was 
scheduled to stop its service.  James McConnon, the former chairman of SEPTA, 
attributed the board’s sudden willingness to execute the takeover to an increased funding 
commitment from the state of Pennsylvania, spearheaded by Republican governor Dick 
Thornburgh, a mass transit advocate.  The success of the SEPTA takeover, however, was 
contingent on the authority’s ability to resolve its pending disputes with the railroad 
unions over wages and work rules.160    
 The labor problem was a major one, because the unions were threatening to go on 
strike the minute SEPTA took over the commuter lines.161  In December 1982, SEPTA 
won an important victory when an emergency board Reagan appointed to deal with the 
labor dispute decided that the antiquated work rules under which Conrail had operated 
the commuter lines should not apply once SEPTA took over.  SEPTA, the board ruled, 
“should be viewed as a transit operation and not as a railroad,” such that commuter rail 
operations should be considered part of the authority’s overall transit program and not 
subject to special railroad labor rules.162   
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The legal victory, while improving SEPTA’s bargaining position, did not preclude 
a strike.  Many observers, including the Delaware Valley Regional Planning 
Commission, still considered a January 1 rail shutdown likely.163  David Gunn admitted 
that he didn’t know how many workers would show up to run the trains on New Year’s 
Day and announced that SEPTA would have to shut down the lines for two weeks to get 
things sorted out.164  In response, commuters filed a class action lawsuit asking the Court 
of Common Pleas to enjoin the transit authority from interrupting service.  The judge 
obliged, ordering SEPTA to maintain as much service as possible.  To comply, SEPTA 
announced that it would at first run a limited schedule on seven of its twelve commuter 
lines.165 
At 6:05 p.m. on December 31, 1982, the last Conrail train left Reading Terminal 
and headed for West Trenton.  As the Philadelphia region’s commuters held their 
collective breath, the Paoli local, under SEPTA control, began operation at noon on 
January 1, 1983.  “So far so good,” reported a wary yet optimistic Philadelphia 
Inquirer.166  The significance of the moment was lost on no one:  for the first time in 
history, the Philadelphia area had a unified regional transportation system under the 
control of a single entity.  The railroads’ transition was not as smooth as the events of that 
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first day might have suggested, however.  On March 15, 1983, the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers began a strike that lasted for 108 days, impacting the region’s 
commuters severely and forcing SEPTA to modify some of its work rules.167 
Now that SEPTA controlled the region’s commuter railroads, the last piece of the 
puzzle for an integrated mass transportation system was the completion of the Cen er 
City Commuter Connection, which had been under construction since 1979.  In March 
1984, with the tunnel almost finished, George Wilson of the Inquirer editorial board 
stopped to reflect on whether the project was worth its price tag, now estimated to be 
$325 million.  “The tunnel’s long-time critics will argue that no one needs it and it should 
never have been built,” he wrote.  “As one who has supported the tunnel from the outset, 
I would contend that both the city and the suburbs can benefit from the tunnel and it 
should have been built decades ago.”  But Wilson defined the Commuter Connection’s 
benefits to the city largely in economic terms, asserting that the tunnel had a re dy “gone 
a long way toward paying for itself” due to the investment it had spurred in the Market 
East area, including a new mall, department stores, and office buildings.168  Tunnel 
opponents, rather than claiming that “no one” would benefit from the tunnel, had from 
the beginning been opposed to the expenditure of transportation funds on a project aimed 
at helping big business.  That argument, clearly, had not prevailed. 
Both SEPTA and city officials continued to emphasize the tunnel’s transportation 
benefits, however.  Democratic mayor Wilson Goode (the city’s first African American 
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mayor, who served from 1984 to 1992 and earned his second term by defeating former 
mayor Rizzo) proclaimed, “We’ll probably have the most advanced transportation 
network in the country.”169  SEPTA’s train operations director John Tucker hailed the 
tunnel as creating “the first totally unified regional rail system in North America.”170  The 
tunnel also, in the eyes of the Inquirer editorial board, represented the end of “an era of 
coherent planning” in Philadelphia.  Edmund Bacon and the Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission had shaped the city’s development in the 1950s and 1960s, the paper 
asserted, but planning had changed dramatically by the time Bacon stepped down from 
the Planning Commission in 1970.  Planners’ growing social awareness, a greater
emphasis on “poor and powerless” urban residents, and a shift to federal block grants had 
stripped Philadelphia of the incentive to plan coherently, the paper lamented.171  Many 
Philadelphians, however, saw the Commuter Connection as a powerful illustration of the 
fact that coherent planning could often run roughshod over the interests of those without 
political power. 
On November 12, 1984, the Center City Commuter Connection opened officially 
for business.  In roughly 100 years, Philadelphia had gone from a system in which dozens 
of private companies owned franchises to run individual streetcar lines to an integrated 
system whereby the area’s buses, subways, trolleys, and now-unified commuter rails 
were under the control of a single regional transportation authority.  A ceremony at the 
new Market East station marked the occasion with a band and a cake in the shape of a 
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commuter train.  At least one attendee was in a less than celebratory mood, however.  
Former mayor Frank Rizzo watched the proceedings from the sidelines, hurt that no one 
had offered him a chance to speak.  Although Rizzo had been ambivalent about the tunnel 
during his time in City Hall, he now spoke to the press “with some bitterness” about the 
opposition the project had encountered.  “I got all kinds of opposition,” Rizzo 
complained.  “I couldn’t do anything right as far as the ultra-liberal press wa  concerned.  
You would have thought I was going to spend the money myself.”172 
The Inquirer remembered that the tunnel fights of the 1970s of which Rizzo 
spoke were driven by the argument that the tunnel was taking away money Philadelphia 
sorely needed for urban mass transit improvements.  But the city, claimed the paper, had 
ended up getting both the tunnel and urban improvements such as new buses and subway 
cars and renovations of subway stations.173  These improvements, however, were band-
aids on a patient with life-threatening wounds.  Philadelphia’s urban mass transit, in dire 
straits throughout the 1970s, continued to flounder in the early 1980s.  Disgruntled riders 
continued to deluge both SEPTA and city officials with complaints.  In response to the 
complaints, Planning Commission chair Bernard Meltzer’s office issued a form letter 
acknowledging that “Public transportation in this City has fallen to a deplorable state . . . 
Bus and trolley service is notoriously unreliable.  Security is a major concern of the 
riders.  All of these problems did not come overnight; instead, transit in this City has been 
deteriorating gradually over the past 30 years.”174  Even the Inquirer admitted in 1980 
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that things were bad, reporting on “buses that break down, subway cars that won’t 
operate at all, an entire transit system that is antiquated and, literally, falling apart.”175  
A lengthy Inquirer article in April 1981 detailed the shockingly distressed state of 
the SEPTA transit system.  Simply put, wrote reporter Frederic Tulsky, “Philadelphia’s 
rapid transit systems – the subways and the elevated trains – are among the oldest, w rst-
maintained, most breakdown-prone systems in the country.”  Tulsky recounted a 
September 1979 fire on the Broad Street Subway caused by a broken power cable on a 
subway car, which someone had “repaired” by wrapping it with electrical tape and 
pushing it back into place.  The cable broke again two days later, dragging on the third 
rail and causing an electrical explosion.  When the subway operator attempted to call for 
help, he found the train’s emergency phone was dead.  One hundred and forty-eight 
passengers were injured in the incident, many of them by breaking windows and crawling 
out of them to escape.  Another electrical explosion two months later, on a trolley this 
time, injured 53 passengers, four of them with serious burns.176   
The Broad Street Subway was a particular embarrassment.  Its cars were relics 
from the 1920s that broke down constantly.  Patchwork repairs began in 1979 only when 
SEPTA nearly had to shut down the line due to a lack of working cars.  New wheels 
purchased for the cars began to crack because they were made for modern subway cars 
that were considerably lighter than those comprising SEPTA’s ancient flet. In addition 
to the serious September 1979 fire (which occurred on a car that had run nearly 6,800 
miles since its last inspection), eight other fires had occurred recently on the Broad Street 
line, most caused by faulty equipment.  “For years,” Tulsky wrote, the authority “has 
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skimped on repairs, safety measures and inspections on its rapid transit system – the 
Broad Street Subway, the Market-Frankford subway elevated line and the high-speed 
trolley line between 69th Street in Upper Darby and Norristown.  For years it has failed to 
replace worn-out cars, failed to buy new cars, failed to plan improvements needed to 
maintain the system.”  One engineer cracked that the system ran “on Band-Aids and 
chewing gum.”  Federal officials who inspected the system feared that “sooner or later a 
serious accident will result if these conditions are allowed to continue.”177 
It could not be denied that the Center City Commuter Connection played a major 
role in preventing SEPTA from making major enhancements to its disastrous urban 
transit system.  On the same day as the article recounting the authority’s fault  equipment 
and safety problems, the Inquirer ran another piece, also written by Tulsky, about the 
Frankford El, the supports of which had deteriorated so badly that maintenance workers 
spent a great deal of their time welding cracks shut to keep the supports from collapsing.  
SEPTA general manager David Gunn wanted to ask the federal government for money to 
help rebuild the line, but feared that the project would be so large as to inhibit progress on 
any other needed improvements to the system.  City Hall’s earlier assurances that the 
Commuter Connection would not affect SEPTA’s future funding were “silly,” according 
to members of the administration of Democratic mayor William Green, Rizzo’s 
successor.  “Indeed,” Tulsky pointed out, “$150 million of the $250 million in federal 
funds for area capital projects for transportation this year were sunk 12 feet under the 
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center of Philadelphia while SEPTA gropes for capital funds to overhaul its decrepit 
vehicles and refurbish the sadly outdated depots in which they are maintained.”178   
The problem stemmed in large part from the fact that SEPTA was, as Philadelphia 
City Council pointed out, “the only major transit system in the nation without a 
permanent funding base provided by government.”179  The lack of a permanent source of 
funding, which required the authority to depend on yearly budget allocations from the 
federal, state, and local governments, wasn’t the only cause of SEPTA’s problems, 
however.  A report prepared by Mayor Green’s office blamed the transit crisis on the fact 
that “the region has done a poor job in setting priorities.”  Instead of prioritizing new 
vehicles and maintenance of the existing urban transit system, the report asserted, “the 
previous City Administration and SEPTA’s previous management agreed to allocate 
$240 million in federal aid to build the Center City Tunnel, $75 million to build the 
Airport Line, and $45 million to relocate the Frankford El to the median of I-95 for a 
distance of a mile.”180 
As the 1980s continued, SEPTA’s situation did not improve significantly.  In 
February 1982, the state gave the transit authority $4.5 million to help it keep the 
commuter railroads running, but coupled the grant with a warning that Harrisburg wo ld 
not be able to provide enough assistance going forward to make up for the fact that the 
federal government was reducing its aid.  Governor Thornburgh emphasized that the stte 
could not afford to help SEPTA with major improvements, saying, “I don’t foresee any 
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major capital budget.  There is a limit to what we can stand.”  While SEPTA had planned 
to make improvements to the transit system in 1983, it also faced a $30 million budget 
deficit for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1982, and Thornburgh’s announcement put 
the capital program in jeopardy.  SEPTA officials pointed out that a failure to make
capital improvements would hurt doubly, because it would lead to increased maintenance 
costs in the future.181 
The transit authority did go ahead with modernizing some parts of its system, but 
scaled down the scope of its upgrades.  For the dangerously deteriorated Frankford El, for 
example, Philadelphia’s Department of Public Property (which could have managed the 
repairs, because the line was operated by SEPTA but owned by the city) pushed for a 
complete reconstruction of the line, a project that would have cost $353 million and taken 
eight years to complete.  SEPTA officials, however, fearing that such an extensive 
overhaul would cripple proposed improvements to the rest of the system, wanted to 
perform a much smaller renovation – including less extensive work on the structure 
supporting the elevated line – at an estimated cost of $88 million.  Mayor Green sided 
with SEPTA, and in October 1982, the transit authority’s board agreed, paving the way 
for the quicker and cheaper fix.  Community organizations in Northeast Philadelphia – 
the section served by the Frankford line – objected to “giving the taxpayers Band-Aid 
treatment instead of major surgery,” and expressed concern about the safety of th  line.  
Their protests went unheeded, however.182 
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Despite some improvements to SEPTA’s urban mass transit system, conditions 
remained grim.  In early 1984, Philadelphia transit workers complained, according to the 
Inquirer, that the authority “routinely sends out buses and other equipment with serious 
mechanical defects, such as worn brakes or steering failures, and the transit agency 
pressures employees to overlook flaws and falsify inspection records.”  SEPTA general 
manager David Gunn denied that the authority compromised the safety of its operators 
and riders, but pointed out that, in the paper’s words, “the transit agency was struggling 
to correct many years of neglect and could not do everything overnight.”183  In August 
1984, shortly before the opening of the Commuter Connection, SEPTA proposed a $215 
million capital budget for fiscal year 1985, which was to focus primarily on new buses 
and rail vehicles as well as the renovation of the Frankford El.  A SEPTA official 
admitted, however, that the proposals outstripped available funds by more than $25 
million, calling the budget “on the very optimistic side of reality” and “both optimistc 
and a cry for help.”  The operating budget also faced a deficit of approximately $20 
million.  In truth, authority officials conceded, “SEPTA’s needs for new equipment, new 
stations, new vehicles and other improvements exceed the available money by several 
hundred million dollars.”184  While the commuter tunnel may not have been solely 
responsible for the hole in which SEPTA found itself, its impact was undeniable.         
What happened after the Commuter Connection opened suggested that the city 
may indeed have misplaced its priorities.  In her history of downtown renewal in the post-
World War II era, Alison Isenberg pointed out that The Gallery, the new mall in the heart 
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of Market East that was to be the centerpiece of tunnel-related redevelopment, did not 
work out as its creators had planned.  The suburban customers for whom the retail center 
was designed never came in large numbers, and the mall transitioned eventually into  
successful establishment for urban shoppers, most of which arrived via SEPTA’s buses 
and subways.  The Gallery’s fate undermined many of the assumptions that surrounded 
postwar urban renewal.  As Isenberg put it, “Here was evidence that an integrated 
clientele could in fact reinvigorate urban commerce – that test question of the 1960s.”185 
Commuter rail ridership did not respond in the way tunnel proponents had hoped, 
either.  The railroads had over 34 million passengers in 1977, but with the service cuts 
and fare increases brought on by the financial problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
this number fell to 21 million by 1982 and then 12 million during the disastrous strike 
year of 1983.  Despite the Commuter Connection’s opening in 1984, it was not until 1986 
that ridership reached pre-strike levels.  Ridership continued for the most part on an 
upward trend for the next twenty years, but it was 2006 when the figure cracked the 30 
million mark once again.186   
While ridership fluctuated, what remained constant was that a large portion of the 
system’s riders came from the suburbs.  The Commuter Connection, however, had 
seemingly no effect on the ratio of suburban to city riders.  Because the vast majority of 
regional rail passengers boarded their trains in the suburbs or in outlying areas of 
Philadelphia, bound for one of the three hub stations in Center City, SEPTA calculated 
daily ridership for each station in terms of the number of passengers boarding inbound 
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trains each day.  In the fall of 1978 for example, stations within Philadelphia totaled 
16,980 inbound passengers per weekday, compared with 38,123 for Bucks, Chester, 
Delaware, and Montgomery Counties combined; 69% of passengers boarded in the 
suburbs.  In the fall of 1985, shortly after the tunnel’s opening, Philadelphia had 9,556 
weekday passengers compared to 29,087 for the suburban counties, as the proportion of 
suburban passengers increased to 75%.  In 2001, with total ridership up 10 million from 
1985, the disparity was similar, with Philadelphia totaling 15,545 weekday passengers 
compared to the suburbs’ 34,929 and the suburban proportion returning to 69%.  In 2003, 
the suburban counties provided 65% of all inbound and outbound weekday passengers, 
with 69,923 riders to Philadelphia’s 37,690.187 
Although the Center City Commuter Connection did not revitalize the Market 
East retail area in precisely the way its proponents had envisioned or lead to a boom in 
commuter rail ridership, the project nevertheless reflected Philadelphia’s transportation 
planning priorities in the 1960s and 1970s.  While the defeat of the Crosstown 
Expressway represented the apex of democratization in the city’s transportation politics, 
the fact that the resulting shift away from expressways and toward mass tran it led to a 
project to which a majority of city residents were opposed was quite significant.  The 
city’s decision to back the commuter tunnel left the working-class and poor who used 
SEPTA’s urban mass transit system in a difficult spot in the early 1980s.  With no 
permanent funding source, inflation continuing to drive operating costs ever higher, a 
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hostile Reagan administration in the White House, and a need to compete for resources 
with regional rail, the immediate future of the urban system was not bright.  The 
Commuter Connection, while perhaps not a triumph for the region, was a prime example 
of the extent to which, despite greater democratization, Philadelphia’s transport tion 
planning process continued to privilege the interests of affluent white suburbanites, the 





Philadelphia continues in 2010 to grapple with many of the transportation 
problems it faced in the decades following World War II.  In particular, many are 
unhappy with the legacy left by the city’s expressway era, despite the mitigating effects 
of citizen opposition in the 1960s and 1970s.  The Schuylkill Expressway – or, as some 
locals call it, the “Surekill Expressway” – is still, despite several renovati ns, clogged 
perpetually with traffic and the site of frequent accidents.1  Residents bemoan the fact 
that the Delaware Expressway, or I-95, cuts off the city from its waterfront and depresses 
the value of what otherwise could be some of the choicest urban real estate in America.  
Some citizens and planners have suggested that the entire Center City portion of I-95 be 
buried underground, similar to what Boston accomplished with the “Big Dig” project 
begun in the mid-1990s and completed in the early twenty-first century.  Others have 
gone so far as to opine that the stretch of expressway should be eliminated altogther.2 
The region’s mass transportation, under the auspices of SEPTA, still finds itself in 
constant financial difficulty.  Users of the urban mass transit system complain, just as 
they did in the 1970s, of dirty stations and vehicles, poor service, and a perceived lack of 
safety, bolstered by occasional outbreaks of violent crime in and around the system.3  
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Moreover, the labor troubles that plagued the Philadelphia Transportation Company and 
then SEPTA have not gone away, making transit strikes a frequent and unwelcome 
disruption to the lives of Philadelphians.4  For decades, SEPTA existed without a 
dedicated source of funding, forced to resort to yearly contributions from the federal, 
state, and county governments.  As a result, the authority operated frequently at a defici , 
making large-scale improvements impossible.  In 2007, the Pennsylvania legislature 
passed Act 44 with the intent of improving funding for transportation projects throughout 
the state and giving SEPTA a permanent source of funding.  Such funding was to come in 
large part from highway tolls, which were to be enhanced considerably by converting 
Interstate 80 in Pennsylvania to a toll road.  As of early 2010, however, the federal 
government had denied the state permission to do so, putting SEPTA’s hope of a stable 
funding source in jeopardy.5 
Philadelphia’s travails in 2010 serve to illustrate that cutting off the story of the 
city’s postwar transportation politics in 1984 – with the opening of the Center City 
Commuter Connection and the achievement of a unified regional transportation system – 
is by necessity artificial.  In reality, the issues I have explored have no end point.  
Philadelphia’s transportation systems have continued to evolve and have always, as was 
the case between 1946 and 1984, been the products of battles between competing 
political and civic values as well as material interests.     
What I have attempted to do here is merely to take a snapshot, or perhaps a series 
of snapshots, of the way Philadelphia’s transportation politics operated during what I 
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believe to have been a particularly important era in its history.  As I hope my story has 
demonstrated, transportation politics have been dynamic.  Changes in the economy, 
political culture, technology, and the environment made and remade the landscape of 
transportation planning priorities and possibilities.  Once more time has passed and the 
events of the late twentieth century can be placed in better perspective, I and other 
scholars will be tasked with continuing the story of how transportation has evolved in 
Philadelphia and other cities – a story that constitutes only one part, albeit an important 
one, of the rich mosaic that is American democracy.  
In the years between the end of World War II and the mid-1980s, Philadelphia’s 
transportation politics changed in important respects, yet remained the same in ways just 
as significant.  The city’s transportation planning became significantly more democratic 
beginning in the 1960s, mirroring a national trend.  The emergence of New Left social 
movements and their challenge to authority and expertise, the struggle for racial justice, 
and new concerns about the environmental damage caused by human development all 
played an important role in this transformation.  Citizens in cities across the country, 
spurred by these cultural and political changes as well as a growing appreciation for the 
destructive effects of urban expressway construction, challenged the authority of the 
highway engineers and planners who previously had imposed their will without regard to 
expressways’ social, environmental, and aesthetic impacts.  The protestors were joined by 
federal officials in the Johnson and Nixon administrations who sympathized with their 
concerns and worked toward a greater decentralization of power over transportation 
planning.   The result was a series of “freeway revolts” in Philadelphia and elsewhere, 
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many of which succeeded in altering or even eliminating proposed urban expressway 
projects. 
In Philadelphia, however, the democratization of transportation politics, and the 
shift away from expressway construction and toward mass transportation that 
accompanied it, opened up less space for influence by grassroots organizations than was 
the case in many other cities.  Although large business interests were intimately 
intertwined with municipal governments in drawing up blueprints for urban renewal 
throughout the United States, local business-oriented groups and quasi-public 
corporations such as the Greater Philadelphia Movement, the Old Philadelphia 
Development Corporation, and the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia 
remained especially influential with respect to Philadelphia’s transportation planning 
priorities.  Big business, with its focus on downtown renewal, often had interests that 
were at variance with those of residents of Philadelphia’s working-class and poor 
neighborhoods.  Nevertheless, business interests contributed significantly to the 
democratization of the city’s transportation planning by helping to wrest control away 
from planners and engineers, thereby making the planning process susceptible to 
influence by a broader array of social groups.  Perhaps the best example was OPDC’
backing of the movement for a lowered and covered Delaware Expressway in Society
Hill. 
Despite the significant hold that Philadelphia’s business and political elite 
maintained on transportation decisions, the defeat of the Crosstown Expressway in 1973 
represented a major setback for them.  Philadelphia’s freeway revolt was also the apex of 
the democratization of its transportation politics.  Massive citizen opposition and the fear 
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of racial violence, combined with financial, legal, and environmental obstacles, made 
construction of the highway impossible.  As a result, those in the proposed expressway’s 
path won the ability not only to keep their homes and small businesses, but to participate 
in their neighborhoods’ renewal.  The anti-Crosstown activists prevented the 
displacement of thousands of African Americans and eliminated from the city map what 
would have been a daunting racial barrier.  The Crosstown’s demise also contributed to 
an unusual state of affairs in which Philadelphia’s expressway construction – in particular 
the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension of the Schuylkill Expressway as well as theDelaware 
Expressway – displaced mainly working-class white residents at a time when most urban 
highways were built through African American neighborhoods.  Although Philadelphia’s 
urban renewal program as a whole was highly disadvantageous to its black community, 
its expressways were most disruptive to the city’s white working class. 
Historians have written about other freeway revolts, many of them successful, in 
cities such as San Francisco, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and New Orleans.  
The nature of such revolts as well as their degree of success was dependent on a 
multiplicity of specific factors that varied widely from city to city.  There is a paucity of 
literature, however, placing these freeway revolts in their larger context and analyzing the 
extent to which they altered the overall trajectory of a city’s transportation planning 
politics.  Zachary Schrag’s The Great Society Subway, which weaves artfully the issue of 
freeway opposition in Washington, D.C. into the story of Metro’s creation, is a notable 
exception.  What can be gleaned from the existing historical accounts of freeway protest, 
however, is that grassroots citizens’ groups in many cities were able to ex r  powerful 
and lasting influence upon the city establishment.  Widespread highway opposition in 
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San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Boston in particular caused governments in those 
cities not only to cancel specific projects, but to take an anti-freeway stance ge erally – 
something that never occurred in Philadelphia. 
In contrast to the cities listed above, Philadelphia had a highly organized, 
motivated, and well-connected set of business organizations pushing for highway 
construction.  Although big business did not win every battle – as was evidenced by the 
Crosstown Expressway’s cancellation – it remained the most powerful force shaping 
Philadelphia’s transportation planning decisions.  The origins of the close relationship 
between the city’s large business interests and its City Hall stemmed from the 1940s, 
when business leaders spearheaded charter reform and pushed for a stronger City 
Planning Commission, and then, in 1951, helped bring about the election of Joseph Clark, 
the first of Philadelphia’s Democratic reform mayors.  Clark and his compatriot nd 
successor, Richardson Dilworth, maintained a close relationship with downtown business 
interests, solidified by the creation of quasi-public corporations, such as the Old 
Philadelphia Development Corporation, to assist with the city’s renewal.  Kirk Petshek, 
who witnessed events in City Hall firsthand during the Clark and Dilworth years, 
commented on the novelty of the fluidity with which professionals passed between city 
government and civic organizations in Philadelphia.6  While the mayors that followed – 
James Tate and Frank Rizzo – lacked the intimate ties with business that characterized 
their predecessors’ administrations, existing connections were too strong to be disrupted 
completely.  Moreover, the Home Rule Charter of 1951 created a strong-mayor form of 
government under which a weakened City Council, while retaining some power over 
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expenditures, was admonished not to interfere with the administration of the mayor and 
his cabinet.7    
Philadelphia’s freeway revolt, while representative of a nationwide change in th
politics and culture surrounding highway planning, did not alter the city’s transportation 
planning priorities.  Instead, City Hall continued to focus on business-oriented 
transportation planning with the primary aim of revitalizing Center City as a home for 
white-collar commerce and luxury shopping, dining, and entertainment.  As Philadelphi 
shifted its focus away from highways and toward mass transportation, therefore, city 
officials made the commuter railroads and their affluent white patrons the number one 
transportation priority.  Beginning in the mid-1960s, federal transportation policy 
reflected a growing commitment to mass transportation.  Philadelphia took advant ge of 
this trend – which began in earnest with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 – by 
creating SEPTA and seeking funding for the Center City Commuter Connection.   
Both major policy initiatives were focused on preserving and enhancing the 
commuter railroads.  The regional transit authority’s roots could be traced directly to 
earlier efforts to subsidize the railroads through the Passenger Service Improvement 
Corporation and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Compact.  The Commuter 
Connection was designed not only to link the formerly separate Pennsylvania and 
Reading Railroad systems, but to serve as the centerpiece of the effort to renew th  
Market East area as a place for suburbanites to shop.  Left decrepit and struggling were 
the urban mass transit system of buses, subways, and trolleys, and its poor and working-
class riders, many of whom were African American.  City Hall and the business 
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community with which it was so closely connected did not perceive the urban system’s 
patrons to be as crucial to downtown renewal as the riders who came from the suburbs 
and outlying areas of the city to fill Center City’s office buildings, shops, restaurants, and 
hotels.  The result was a mass transit system that most felt to be dirty, dilapidated, unsafe, 
and simply unworthy of a city with the stature of Philadelphia.  The widespread public
opposition in the 1970s to using a large federal grant for a commuter railroad tunnel 
rather than to shore up the urban transit system was of no effect, as large business and 
labor interests pushed the project through.  Nothing demonstrated as well as the 
Commuter Connection the limits on the democratization of Philadelphia’s transportation 
politics. 
The tunnel project, as well as SEPTA’s takeover of the commuter railroad system, 
created a counterintuitive state of affairs whereby a greater emphasis on mass 
transportation produced virtually no redistribution of transportation resources downward 
to those of lower socioeconomic status.  The notion of making mass transit improvements 
to enhance central business district redevelopment was not unique to Philadelphia; San 
Francisco’s BART system, for example, was built with a similar goal in mind.  Transit 
systems built in the 1960s and 1970s, however – such as BART, Atlanta’s MARTA, and 
Washington, D.C.’s Metro – served downtown areas while also providing improved 
mobility to lower-income populations, both black and white.  Cities with older transit 
systems – such as New York, Boston, and Chicago – used federal money to modernize 
those systems in the 1960s and beyond.  Scholars have yet to explore these modernization 
programs in depth to determine how they affected transit riders and how, if at all, they 
redistributed resources.  Unlike Philadelphia, though, none of these cities poured such a 
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large share of its transportation resources into a single project designed to benefit such a 
small proportion of its mass transit patrons.  It seems likely, therefore, that upgrades to 
older transit systems produced results more equitable than those in the City of Brotherly 
Love.  
As the Philadelphia region continues to strive for transportation systems that are 
funded adequately, serve its residents and workers effectively, contribute to its c nomic 
growth, and enhance its stature as a vital metropolitan area, it will be worthwhile and 
indeed necessary for policymakers to consider how and why those systems evolved the 
way they did.  The lessons of the past always must guide the decisions of the present.  
The shape of Philadelphia’s future transportation systems will, as before, be a product of 
battles between competing values, and the identities of the winners and losers will 
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